I stand by all of them. Again, my criticism of Dawkins, Dennett, and their ilk is purely on the grounds of their scientific materialism for which they are known public advocates. — Wayfarer

Ok. Once again: you said that Dawkins et al claim that life is an "accident," when in fact he has said exactly the opposite. You have said the evolutionary biology is unique among the sciences in allowing for "chance" to enter into explanations, which is grossly false. You have admittedly never even read The God Delusion, and yet carp about it endlessly. So, again I submit that you are as ignorant about the target your criticisms as you purport Dawkins to be about religion.

I would again offer you to submit some arguments against materialism, which you never seem to get around to doing: you offer only complaints, and then quote additional complaints by like minded individuals. You have accused me of not doing philosophy, but you never seem to do any yourself.

Once again: you said that Dawkins et al claim that life is an "accident," when in fact he has said exactly the opposite. — Arkady

No, he doesn't say the opposite at all. In The God Delusion, he presents an elaborate argument along the lines that 'life only had to start once' and that there are billions of planets on which this might have occurred. He admits that science really has no account of how DNA came into existence, but also claims that this is not really important.

What Dawkins objects to, is the assertion that evolution progresses 'by chance alone', i.e. random and unguided chance gives rise to new species. He says that there are many factors involved, meaning that 'chance' is only one facet of the whole process.

I accept that, but I still consider the above criticism to stand.

You have said the evolutionary biology is unique among the sciences in allowing for "chance" to enter into explanations, which is grossly false. — Arkady

What I have said, is that the belief that 'life began for no reason', as argued by, for example, Jacques Monod, in his book, Chance and Necessity, does not amount to an hypothesis. Ask the proverbial man-in-the-street why they came to exist, and they will generally say that life's a cosmic crap-shoot, it's a fluke. Overall, 'popular Darwinism' has had a degenerative effect on modern culture IMO.

You have admittedly never even read The God Delusion, and yet carp about it endlessly. — Arkady

If my posts about it bother you, you have the option of ignoring them.

The reason I started this thread, if you read the OP, was to acknowledge a negative review of one of the authors I have frequently referred to about this matter.

But - you're right. This is the very last post, ever, I will write about Dawkins and Dennett.

No, he doesn't say the opposite at all. In The God Delusion, he presents an elaborate argument along the lines that 'life only had to start once' and that there are billions of planets on which this might have occurred. He admits that science really has no account of how DNA came into existence, but also claims that this is not really important.

What Dawkins objects to, is the assertion that evolution progresses 'by chance alone', i.e. random and unguided chance gives rise to new species. He says that there are many factors involved, meaning that 'chance' is only one facet of the whole process.

I accept that, but I still consider the above criticism to stand. — Wayfarer

Yes, there is a gap in scientific knowledge concerning the origin of DNA (you may be aware that some models - referred to as the "RNA world" - posit RNA as the first molecule of heredity, rather than DNA).

But why wedge God or Purpose or Design or anything into that gap? A creationist offering a "God of the gaps" strategy has set himself upon an ever-shrinking landscape, with fewer and fewer places to provide refuge every year against the advance of science (yes - materialistic science). I know you've previously derided such thinking as the "promissory notes of materialism" (channeling Popper, was it?), but given the history of the last 400 years or so, where would the safe money be? On supernatural or teleological explanations, or on mechanistic, physicalistic science? I think that any objective reading of the historical record can give succor only to the latter.

What I have said, is that the belief that 'life began for no reason', as argued by, for example, Jacques Monod, in his book, Chance and Necessity, does not amount to an hypothesis. Ask the proverbial man-in-the-street why they came to exist, and they will generally say that life's a cosmic crap-shoot, it's a fluke.

I suppose it would depend on what street. The majority of Americans, for instance, profess belief in God (or a "spirit" of some sort...), so it's questionable as to whether they would indeed say that "life's a cosmic crap-shoot." Indeed, popular discourse is rife with narcissistic statements (masquerading as pious humility) along the lines that "God sent me here to [X]..."

Speaking for myself, I would indeed say that life is most likely a purely chemical and physical phenomenon, with no purpose, design, or teleology in either its origin or functional workings.

Overall, 'popular Darwinism' has had a degenerative effect on modern culture IMO.

Perhaps you'd like a return to the European Middle Ages: the "Age of Faith"? Ah, those were the days.

If my posts about it bother you, you have the option of ignoring them.

The reason I started this thread, if you read the OP, was to acknowledge a negative review of one of the authors I have frequently referred to about this matter.

Sure...but that has nothing to do with his views on The New Atheists, his criticism of whom you've repeatedly said you still agree with. That's what at issue in the little sidebar you and I have going here.

But - you're right. This is the very last post, ever, I will write about Dawkins and Dennett.

Somehow I doubt that. >:O

But why wedge God or Purpose or Design or anything into that gap? A creationist offering a "God of the gaps" strategy has set himself upon an ever-shrinking landscape, with fewer and fewer places to provide refuge every year against the advance of science (yes - materialistic science) — Arkady

But it’s just not true., The nature or existence of purpose, design, intention - none of these are scientific questions at al. Certainly naturalism puts those matters aside for its purposes, but then declaring that ‘science has shown’ that the Universe/world is devoid of purpose is a metaphysical; conclusion based on a naturalist assumption.

Second - the gaps are getting bigger, not smaller. We are told that science can detect only 4% of the totality of the cosmos. Galaxies are held together by some unknown force - let’s call that ‘dark matter’ as matter is all we’ll consider. The Universe is expanded by some unknown energy - let’s call that ‘dark energy’ as energy is all we’ll consider. And so on. Then there’s ‘the multiverse’ - respected scientists are on the record saying they favour the idea, because it presents a solution to the annoying problem of why the universe seems fine-tuned for life. And other respected scientists question whether the multiverse and ‘string theory’ are even scientific theories at all.

There’s progress in some ways - better technology, medicine, food production techniques, enerfy sources. All indispsnable and highly important. But there are also many respects ini which modern scientific cultures fail to provide a sustaining philosophy, precisely because of Western cultural attitudes towards purpose, intentionalit,y life and death. Actually, it’s not the job of science to provide such a philosophy, which is the point.

So I am going to stop posting about Dawkins and Dennett, but it’s not for one minute that I think theiir anti-religious polemics have the slightest merit. IN fact the world has moved on, ‘new atheism’ is no longer new, and there are more interesting things to consider. Over and out.

But it’s just not true., The nature or existence of purpose, design, intention - none of these are scientific questions at al. Certainly naturalism puts those matters aside for its purposes, but then declaring that ‘science has shown’ that the Universe/world is devoid of purpose is a metaphysical; conclusion based on a naturalist assumption. — Wayfarer

This would seem an argument by assertion. As we've gone over many times at this point, some disciplines (e.g. natural theology - for which you yourself have expressed some sympathy - and intelligent design creationism) have purported to detect the workings of God, gods, or a "Designer" based on an examination of nature. To simply state that these questions are out of bounds of science doesn't cut it: the onus is on you to demonstrate or argue for this point.

As I've pointed out to you long ago, to say that design, purpose, and intentionality in nature is not a matter for science is to posit that a designed universe is empirically indistinguishable from an undesigned one. To say the least, this proposition is counter-intuitive, so you need to flesh out your position somewhat instead of just stamping your feet and declaring what must be the case.

Second - the gaps are getting bigger, not smaller. We are told that science can detect only 4% of the totality of the cosmos. Galaxies are held together by some unknown force - let’s call that ‘dark matter’ as matter is all we’ll consider. The Universe is expanded by some unknown energy - let’s call that ‘dark energy’ as energy is all we’ll consider. And so on. Then there’s ‘the multiverse’ - respected scientists are on the record saying they favour the idea, because it presents a solution to the annoying problem of why the universe seems fine-tuned for life. And other respected scientists question whether the multiverse and ‘string theory’ are even scientific theories at all.

I largely agree with this. Writer Matt Ridley once had a nice line about scientific progress sometimes clearing a space in the forest of questions which gives scientists a clearer view of multitude of trees still before them.

However, my point is that since the advent of modern science, every question posed about organisms and their workings has yielded to a physicalistic, naturalistic, and mechanistic analysis. Living things have been dissected down to their component atoms, and it has become increasingly clear that there is no mysterious "life force", "elan vital," or any other supernatural or teleological process. Some frontiers remain: consciousness, for instance, is still very poorly understood.

But given the successful track record of modern science to date, there is no reason whatsoever for thinking that the answer to such questions will not be solved in the same manner. The same applies to cosmological mysteries such as dark matter and dark energy. Yes, they are as-yet poorly understood: but there is no inkling that it is anything other than yet another scientific problem.

Over the years I have referred on many occasions to a 2006 review by Leon Wieseltier, then Literary Editor of the New Republic, of Daniel Dennett’s book Breaking the Spell, in the New York Times, under the headline The God Genome.

THE question of the place of science in human life is not a scientific question. It is a philosophical question. Scientism, the view that science can explain all human conditions and expressions, mental as well as physical, is a superstition, one of the dominant superstitions of our day; and it is not an insult to science to say so. For a sorry instance of present-day scientism, it would be hard to improve on Daniel C. Dennett's book. "Breaking the Spell" is a work of considerable historical interest, because it is a merry anthology of contemporary superstitions.


Agreed with every word of this savage review which triggered a fierce response from Dennett. — Wayfarer

First of all, the question of the place of science in human life is a scientific question because you use evidence, observations and falsification in order to determine the answer to that question.

If the view that science can explain all human conditions and expressions is a superstition, then ANY view of some method of determining all truths will also be a superstition. If you can't falsify any claim about the world and our place in it, then what good is the claim? What makes it better than any other claim that can't be falsified?

As I've pointed out to you long ago, to say that design, purpose, and intentionality in nature is not a matter for science is to posit that a designed universe is empirically indistinguishable from an undesigned one — Arkady

All the things you've 'pointed out to me' over the years, amount to your explaining your point of view. We agree on some things, and disagree on many more, as I have always been opposed to scientific materialism, and so it would be mistaken to assume that I have been persuaded by your arguments. As for 'stamping my feet', I have been on these forums for a good while, at various times I have entered elaborate arguments in favour of the views I hold which I'm not going to repeat in detail on every occasion. What I provided is my general attitude towards the matter, and I stand by it.

I don't think even the nature of 'purpose, intention or design', or arguments about what these amount to, are in scope for the physical sciences (although they may be for natural philosophy proper). Certainly in the modern scientific method until now, such questions have generally been put aside, in line with the approach of 'methodological naturalism'. But to say that science thereby shows or proves that there are no such factors in play, goes beyond the remit of methodological naturalism and into the territory of philosophical positivism. And positivism is precisely the error of making metaphysical statements on the grounds of naturalistic judgements.

Design, purpose or intention doesn't incidentally mean an endorsement of 'intelligent design', which I am generally averse to, on account of my dislike of American evangelical protestantism. But I do think some of the arguments that have been thrown up by these controversies cast serious doubt on the materialist elements of so-called 'neo-darwinism', regardless of the merits of their proponents. That's why I think Thomas Nagel's book Mind and Cosmos is important, as it demonstrates the inherent absurdity of philosophical materialism on purely rational grounds. Nothing could go past Andrew Ferguson's review of the controversy generated by that title, The Heretic, for explaining in brief what I see as the absurdities of the materialist view, and not least because Nagel is not defending a theistic philosophy. It is instructive, however, that as far as his critics are concerned, if he criticizes materialism, then he must be religious, as this demonstrates the sense in which their own views amount to a religious commitment.

However, my point is that since the advent of modern science, every question posed about organisms and their workings has yielded to a physicalistic, naturalistic, and mechanistic analysis. — Arkady

However, the nature of life and mind remain elusive. Certainly there is no 'vital spirit' as an objective substance, but the allegory I prefer to think in terms of, is the relationship between letters and meaning, or between microelectronics and drama - you won't find TV shows or the characters that play them, inside a television set, you won't find the meaning of a text inside the ink and paper in which it is reproduced.

The same applies to cosmological mysteries such as dark matter and dark energy. Yes, they are as-yet poorly understood: but there is no inkling that it is anything other than yet another scientific problem. — Arkady

More of the 'promissory notes of materialism'.

You generally seem to suggest that Dennett is somehow dishonest for holding to the ( from your point of view, it seems, somehow monstrous) philosophy that he does. And yet I doubt you have read his actual works,and you never seem to produce any cogent critique of anything he has actually written. Mostly hand-waving it seems to me. I'm not trying to be unkind, just calling it as I see it, because I think rigor is important if you aspire to engage in genuine philosophical critique.

I couldn't find any critique of Dennett in your own writing, and mostly only sarcasm in the quoted passage. If you take the following excerpt, and do not interpret the "not at all" as a sarcastic jibe, and substitute "says Dennett" with 'says Buddhism', the passage seems apt enough to me. Or think of Plato's "Noble Lie".

Better, said Dennett, if the public were told that “for general purposes” the self and free will and objective morality do indeed exist—that colors and sounds exist, too—“just not in the way they think.” They “exist in a special way" - which is to say, ultimately, not at all.

It is instructive, however, that as far as his critics are concerned, if he criticizes materialism, then he must be religious, as this demonstrates the sense in which their own views amount to a religious commitment. — Wayfarer

Can you cite any statement from any of Nagels' critics where it is explicitly claimed, or even implied, that Nagel "must be religious"?

Can you cite any statement from any of Nagels' critics where it is explicitly claimed, or even implied, that Nagel "must be religious"? — Janus

Thomas Nagel is Praised by Creationists

Nagel is a teleologist, and although not an explicit creationist, his views are pretty much anti-science and not worth highlighting. — Jerry Coyne

Where Thomas Nagel Went Wrong

(I do wonder if it's the only recorded accusation of being 'a teleologist'.)

One wonders if Nagel is losing his critical abilities, or simply is plagued by a nagging desire to go to church. — Jerry Coyne

From his blog

I have myself argued that it is a serious mistake to allow fear of creationists and other obscurantists to discourage discussion of the weaknesses and unanswered questions in evolutionary theory. Nagel has no fear of such people and expresses a considerable sympathy with intelligent design. On the basis of his understanding of evolution, he considers that the rejection of their criticisms of evolution is 'manifestly unfair' (p. 10). (This may, of course, reflect on either the understanding or the unfairness.) He just personally feels an aversion to the theistic perspective. The title of the book, however, all too readily interpreted as announcing the falsity of Darwinism, will certainly lend comfort (and sell a lot of copies) to the religious enemies of Darwinism.

Notre Dame Review

I regret the appearance of this book. It will only bring comfort to creationists and fans of “intelligent design”, who will not be too bothered about the difference between their divine architect and Nagel’s natural providence. It will give ammunition to those triumphalist scientists who pronounce that philosophy is best pensioned off. If there were a philosophical Vatican, the book would be a good candidate for going on to the Index. — Simon Blackburn

Thomas Nagel: An Atheist Loved by Creationists, yet Hated by his Kin

The Most Despised Science Book of 2012 is worth reading

A Darwinist Mob Goes After a Serious Philosopher.

You generally seem to suggest that Dennett is somehow dishonest for holding to the ( from your point of view, it seems, somehow monstrous) philosophy that he does. And yet I doubt you have read his actual works, and you never seem to produce any cogent critique of anything he has actually written — Janus

I am of the view that Dennett's work is so preposterously mistaken that it ought not to warrant serious consideration. But that's also why I've said, above, that I am finished with commenting on Dennett, and I certainly am - this is the last thing I will ever say on a public forum about Dennett.

I could say the same thing about Leon Wieseltier.

I am of the view that Dennett's work is so preposterously mistaken that it ought not to warrant serious consideration. But that's also why I've said, above, that I am finished with commenting on Dennett, and I certainly am -this is the last thing I will ever say on a public forum about Dennett. — Wayfarer

In that case I won't ask you what precise ideas of his you find "preposterous", and just why you find them so. ;)

Most of those quotes and links seem somewhat sensationailzed, and in any case, I did not find any statement to the effect that Nagel "must be religious". The main criticism would seem to be that his argument might lend support to creationism. I do agree that some evolutionary theorists are philosophically militant against any suggestion of teleology operating in nature. That seems misplaced. On the other hand, in the context of scientific practice the idea, because it cannot be demonstrated one way or the other, is pretty much useless.

As I’ve said that Dennett’s project is preposterous, then I had better explain it.

The preposterousness of Dennett’s philosophical project is not hard to identify. His whole philosophy is based on arguing that the mind is an illusion. Of course, if you say it bluntly like that, then it’s clearly preposterous, because illusions can only occur in minds. But he goes to great lengths to argue this case, in book after book, and despite his critics pointing out that he ignores the problem of consciousness, rather that explaining it. Indeed, his book ‘Consciousness Explained’ was called, satirically, Consciousness Ignored - and not just by rubes on philosophy forums, but by John Searle and Thomas Nagel. It’s exactly what he’s up to, and it’s preposterous.

David Bentley Hart:

Some of the problems posed by mental phenomena Dennett simply dismisses without adequate reason; others he ignores. Most, however, he attempts to prove are mere “user-illusions” generated by evolutionary history, even though this sometimes involves claims so preposterous as to verge on the deranged.

Thomas Nagel:

I am reminded of the Marx Brothers line: “Who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?” Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). And he asks us to do this because the reality of such phenomena is incompatible with the scientific materialism that in his view sets the outer bounds of reality.

Other examples could be given ad nauseum. But that’s definitely all from me on this topic.

Most of those quotes and links seem somewhat sensationailzed, — Janus

They’re from reputable sources, including Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. If it’s sensational, it’s because a respected member of the academy has come out against the mainstream consensus. It would be like a medieval Bishop preaching the Death of God.

I take Dennett to be saying that the mind is just the brain and that illusions can occur in brains; so there doesn't seem to be a contradiction inherent in what he is claiming.

I mean it is certainly possible that we are just physical beings and that the ideas we have of minds and qualia are just illusions caused by our inability to perceive our brain activity.

If that were the case do you believe it would necessarily (I mean apart from some individual's emotional reactions to the very idea) detract any value from human life?

If that were the case do you believe it would necessarily (I mean apart from some individual's emotional reactions to the very idea) detract any value from human life? — Janus

What do you mean by "I mean"? Do you really "mean" something, or is that just a kind of neurological reflex, that is causing you to say that?

illusions can occur in brains; — Janus

Another point - all kinds of conditions can occur in brains, but illusions can only occur in cognitive systems. Illusions are mistaken judgements. I can see how a brain injury could cause you to make mistakes in judgement, but I can’t see how a brain injury would BE a mistake in judgement.

I don't know what you mean to be indicating here. I favor a phenomenological approach, so I don't personally hold to a physicalist view, as you should be aware.

But I see no contradiction in saying that meaning something and neurological activity are the very same activity seen from two different perspectives. I favour the phenomenological approach because no one feels meaning something as neurological activity; and for me experience is primacy. But this is a really matter of approach, and I can understand that others favor other approaches.

Do you understand that, or do believe there can only be one approach?

You acknowledge that neuronal activity may be the origin of cognitive errors?

I see no contradiction in saying that meaning something and neurological activity are the very same activity seen from two different perspectives — Janus

I’m sure the point a materialist would make is that perspectives are also part of the illusion that the brain generates; ‘a perspective’ as such can’t have any real meaning. Materialism is strictly monistic

Do you understand that, or do believe there can only be one approach? — Janus

It’s not about what I believe.

You acknowledge that neuronal activity may be the origin of cognitive errors? — Janus

Obviously. But that doesn’t undermine the fact that illusions amount to errors of judgement.

I’m sure the point a materialist would make is that perspectives are also part of the illusion that the brain generates; ‘a perspective’ as such can’t have any real meaning. Materialism is strictly monistic — Wayfarer

If that were true, the materialist perspective would fare no better than any other. The point is that even if all perspectives are, ultimately, illusory as Buddhism also proclaims, it doesn't follow that we experience them as illusory. An illusion cannot be experienced as an illusion otherwise it could not be an illusion.

It’s not about what I believe. — Wayfarer

But it is about what you believe. That's what it's all about; what each of us believes. What else?

Obviously. But that doesn’t undermine the fact that illusions amount to errors of judgement. — Wayfarer

Sure, and that definitional fact is as compatible with materialism as it is with idealism or just about any metaphysical standpoint you can imagine. It actually seems to be most compatible with realism, because there must be a reality (independent of perception) about which we may be mistaken for there to be the possibility of cognitive error in the first place.

That's what it's all about; what each of us believes. What else? — Janus

You came into this thread, saying, ‘what’s the matter with Dennett’s realism? He might after all be correct.’ But then when I challenged that, you say, well it’s not how I see things, I prefer ‘a phenomenological’ approach, whatever that is. It’s a pointless argument.

That's a truly pointless objection Wayfarer; Dennett's position represents one of the metaphysical scenarios that may be imagined, and it might even be correct, for all we know. I don't personally think it is correct, and you obviously don't. But you have provided no compelling argument as to why it is preposterous; which is to say, why it could not be correct.

And what we all believe is what it is about; I mean look at your own posts which are mostly concerned with asserting what you believe, based on the assumptions that are amenable to you personally. There's nothing wrong with that; that's what we all do; but some humble recognition that what you happen to believe (about Dennett or anything else) is not thereby self-evidently true would be a good thing and a step forward, I would say.

That's a truly pointless objection — Janus

It's not. If, as you suggest:

it is certainly possible that we are just physical beings and that the ideas we have of minds and qualia are just illusions caused by our inability to perceive our brain activity. — Janus

Then what is the point of discussion? That's what makes it pointless, because, if true, there is no way to persuade by reasoned argument. This is what I mean about the preposterousness of Dennett's materialism: if it's true, then philosophical debate is pointless. It undermines reason itself. Now, that has been elaborated in journal articles which I could link to [i.e. here] but what would be the point? You could still say 'it could be that we are just physical beings....'

No Dennet's position just leads to the conclusion that reasoned argument along with all our experience is ultimately illusory. But it is still important to human life, so we must engage in it. Reason just like the rest of human experience, is not undermined unless you want to claim that it must have some absolute foundation. Interestingly Buddhism says exactly the same thing; that ultimately human experience and reason are illusory; and you are a Buddhist. You don't mind when it is said by Buddhism but you don't like it when Dennett says it. :s

Interestingly Buddhism says exactly the same thing; that ultimately human experience and reason are illusory; — Janus

From a point beyond it, not from the point of view of being an evolved simian.

How can anything at all be said from a "point beyond human experience and understanding" that makes absolutely no sense. And from Dennett's view of the 'ultimate' nature of reality as being something like physical forces and particles, the notion of being an "evolved simian" would also be ultimately illusory, en epiphenomeon of conscious awareness. And that statement would also be ultimately based on illusion as well, as, ultimately, would the view of physical particles and forces itself. I see no inconsistency there. It minds me of Wittgenstein's ladder or Buddhas raft.

How can anything at all be said from a "point beyond human experience and understanding" that makes absolutely no sense. — Janus

That's what 'transcendental' refers to - the Buddha has gone beyond, that is part of what it means to be Buddha. That is symbolised in Tibetan depicts of the Wheel of Life and Death, by the fact that the Buddha is outside the 'six realms'.

That's not what 'transcendental' refers to in Western philosophy, which is what we are dealing with here. In those terms the story about Buddha's purported transcendental nature is groundless and thus unsupportable. IT is based on myth and allegory not rigorous thought. It is not the stuff of philosophy (understood as rigorous argumetation) at all, although it could be argued that it sits more comfortably with philosophy as "love of wisdom" (where 'wisdom' is not coterminous with 'discursive knowledge'). The point is that that is not what most of the people who participate in these forums are primarily concerned with; and thus not what the forums themselves are primarily concerned with; it's a different set of "language games".