I agree with all of your post up to the last para - quite strongly in fact. I regret the prominence of scientists like Krauss, Dawkins and Hawking who seem to have no understanding of or interest in philosophy, and I think they give science a bad name. I fondly remember Heisenberg, Einstein, Bohm and so many twentieth century scientists that were as interested in the philosophical interpretations of science as in the science itself.

I don't understand the last para though, particularly the distinction between requiring metaphysics and requiring metaphysical assumptions. Perhaps you can elaborate on that. To me they seem the same, and I think one can do science without either. I sympathise with your feeling that science without those is uninteresting, but I do not agree. I see a beauty in the patterns one finds, regardless of whether one attaches them to any metaphysical assumptions. But these are aesthetic judgements and people will vary in how they feel about that.

That some form of teleology is real (even if most do not realize that teleology extends beyond intelligent-design babble)

Yeah. I have no idea what what a nonteleological account of causation is without making your nature Humean. Does Andrew just deny a form of immanent causation in an organism? Does he think that blood pumps in a body by the heart for no reason? Or does the blood pump blood in virute of the preservation of oxygen and nutrients. If it's the latter than you have end-directed activity (telos). Surely the heart isn't self-preserving and merely mechanical, but has an intended use outside itself for-the-sake-of-which of pumping blood.

If it pumps for no reason, then I do not see how you're just not saying the same thing as the organ is working indeterminately. But that just seems to me to say it has no function. If determinately, then it works for a reason.

Or like, I'm not even sure how you can talk about processes like homeostasis without then referring to, "the attempt to regulate an internal environment."

I'm not sure what work the concept/idea is doing here (when the mind is investigating) other than to determine the immanent process of any biological object we experience.

You're entitled to that view. I think you are taking too wide an interpretation of 'meaningless'. Science is useful and it is also beautiful, to those that understand it. You may not be in a position to find it beautiful but there is no question that you find it useful. If you don't also find it meaningful, be content that it is useful. — andrewk

Oh, don't get me wrong, I find science to be meaningful, and beautiful, as well as useful. But I believe all these things are dependent on context.

You are forgetting how that discussion arose. It has nothing to do with dismissing any activity. You claimed that the proliferation of interpretations of QM imply that QM's definitions are nebulous. My response was that interpretations talk about things that QM does not even seek to address, and that they are completely different activities, not that one is more important than the other. To complain that QM does not address the issues with which interpretations concern themself is like complaining because biology tells us nothing about how stars are formed. — andrewk

No, you are the one forgetting how the discussion arose, only going back part way, and not to the beginning. What I took issue with was your claim that a good argument requires clear and concise definitions, rather than demonstrating the meaning of words through examples. You claimed that the latter form of argumentation, demonstrating meaning through examples, required a leap of faith, that the words actually have a meaning which could be used in reasoning.

You gave QM as an example of a science with clear definitions in comparison with the nebulous definitions which are derived from philosophical works like Aristotle's which demonstrate meaning through examples of usage. I made no complaint, but I confirmed your statement of "completely different activities". My claim was that one of these forms of reasoning is not more important than the other, and each, to be meaningful is dependent on the other. So I'll reassert my point. To dismiss one of these types of reasoning, that which speculates and reasons about the meaning of descriptive terms through the use of examples, as inadequate for reasoning about the nature of the universe, is a mistake.

It is a mistake because to understand the nature of anything requires both of these forms of reasoning. The one proceeds from clear definitions. The other determines whether the definitions correspond with reality. To proceed from clear definitions is pointless if the definitions don't describe reality. So we have to turn to the reality of how the terms are actually used in describing things to determine whether the definitions are accurate or not. If one produces a clear definition of a word like "potential", and proceeds to make a logical argument based on this definition, the logical argument is useless if the word potential cannot be actually used in this way to describe anything real. That is why we must turn to examples of usage, in which the terms are used to describe different aspects of reality, to determine whether the definitions being used represent anything real.

What I took issue with was your claim that a good argument requires clear and concise definitions, rather than demonstrating the meaning of words through examples. — Metaphysician Undercover

We resolved that already. Arguments can be proofs or dialectics. Proofs have to meet that higher standard of definition. Dialectics do not. The Aristotelian argument in the OP is a dialectic, not a proof. I thought that was all agreed. If not, which part do you disagree with?

I know a lot of people think that [telos] is optional, — Marty

Are you able to accept your differences with them as just a reasonable difference of opinion, or do you think they are all objectively wrong and just too stupid to realise that? If the former then I'm just one more person you can identify as someone with whom it is reasonable for both parties to differ.

I have no idea what what a nonteleological account of causation is without making your nature Humean. — Marty

I'm not sure what it means to 'make nature Humean', but I love Hume's writing as much as the Aristotelians appear to love his, so that sounds good to me.

I'm not sure what it means to say that things aren't directed, or dont have a means-end framework. — Marty

Nor am I. Nor do I know what it means to say that things 'are directed, or do have a means-end framework', unless one follows a 'God designed it that way' approach, which is not what I am sensing you are proposing.

I'm not even sure how you can talk about processes like homeostasis without then referring to, "the attempt to regulate an internal environment." — Marty

In biology, largely for historical reasons, it is common to talk about things in a teleological fashion. This is a residue of the science's history, not a logical necessity, and is a feature not shared by most other sciences. Every teleological statement can be rephrased non-teleologically if one wants to. One usually doesn't bother, for the same reason that one doesn't bother to rephrase 'sunrise' as 'earth-turn'.

I still remember thinking, in high-school chemistry classes, how weird it sounded when the teacher told us that Chlorine 'really wants to gain another electron' and Sodium 'really wants to get rid of its outer electron'. It was many years later that I finally made sense of these weird-sounding statements by figuring out the non-teleological version of them.

A non-teleological description of homeostasis is 'the body has processes that regulate its internal environment'.

I was surprised that, based on a quick scan of the wikipedia page on homeostasis, it appeared to make few if any teleological statements. But all that tells us is that the writer was likely more Humean in disposition than Aristotelean.

A non-teleological description of homeostasis is 'the body has processes that regulate its internal environment'.

That's not non-teleological. Because you have the means of which are in the body (in the case of homeostasis), for the end of regulating its internal environment. Otherwise, what is the process describing? You've just presupposed a totum, form, etc - and smuggled in Aristotlean concepts without thinking about it.

Body's processes = form
Regulation of internal environment = telos

At least one of it's teleological behaviors, any way.

I'm afraid I didn't understand that post. In particular I can't parse the second sentence.

The one bit I did understand is 'what is the process describing?'. My answer to that is that the process does not describe anything, it just does things. If the body gets too hot, sweating and other temperature-lowering processes take place. If it gets too cold, shivering and other temperature-raising processes take place. Over millions of years and genetic variations, the ones that survived were those that had such features, or their precursors, in place, and that is what we see today.

What are you talking about? Of course it does. You just described it earlier.

All I'm asking is how does your previous sentence escape teleology. Because it seems to me the body is being used as a type of organism that functions for-the-sake-of - at least in part - homeostasis.

Because it seems to me the body is being used as a type of organism that functions for-the-sake-of - at least in part - homeostasis. — Marty

That is your interpretation, which you are entitled to make. But I do not make that interpretation. I am content to simply describe the processes that occur within the body. If somebody asks how the body came to have those processes, it can be explained in terms of evolution, again without teleology.

It is not necessary to make a teleological interpretation in order to learn about or research homeostasis.

My answer to that is that the process does not describe anything, it just does things.

I am content to simply describe the processes that occur within the body.

:-|

And what? I didn't say the processes occur outside the body. The process is immanent in the body.

And the process itself is functioning to do things, yes? The process doesn't work indeterminately, right? Homeostasis occurs because the body needs to work out an internal regulation of its temperatures and fluid balance, right? That is teleology.

And the process itself is functioning to do things, yes? — Marty

No, I would not say that.

The process doesn't work indeterminately, right? — Marty

No, I would not say that. I don't even know what it means.

Homeostasis occurs because the body needs to work out an internal regulation of its temperatures and fluid balance, right? — Marty

No, I would not say that.

So, the process of homeostasis attempts to not do things, works indeterminately, in order to not maintain the internal regulation of its temperature and fluid balance. And this seems like a scientific explanation for you?

So, the process of homeostasis attempts to not do things, works indeterminately, in order to not maintain the internal regulation of its temperature and fluid balance. — Marty

No. None of those statements follow from what I wrote.

Maybe I'm misunderstanding the bivalent forms of logic, because generally when you reject the affirmation of a statement, you think its inverse is true.

Yes, unless one finds the statement meaningless, which covers the second statement.

What, exactly, is the negation of the following statement?

'The process is functioning to do things'

It is not what you wrote.

Similarly, your alternate version of the third statement is not its negation.

We resolved that already. Arguments can be proofs or dialectics. Proofs have to meet that higher standard of definition. Dialectics do not. The Aristotelian argument in the OP is a dialectic, not a proof. I thought that was all agreed. If not, which part do you disagree with? — andrewk

There you go again with your insistence on particular definitions, wanting to define terms in ways other than how they are used in reality. So long as an argument is sound, it is a proof. So why are you saying that there is a type of argument, the dialectical argument, which cannot be a proof? That's contradiction. There is nothing essential to the definition of "proof" which dictates that a particular type of argument, so long as it is sound, is not a proof. You are clearly biased toward one particular type of proof, thinking for some reason, that other proofs, such as dialectical proofs, are not real proofs.

I like it. Here are my questions/comments.

4) "It cannot be infinitely long." Is there a way to demonstrate this, other than by Occam's Razor?

6.) "Things can only exist, however, if it has the potential to exist which is actualized." I don't think this is possible. It seems to me that before a thing exists, then neither does its properties, including the property of potential existence. But we can reach the same conclusion that there must be an actualizer (7) from the premise "everything that begins to exist requires a cause that exists".

8.) "There cannot be more than one purely actual actualizer, as differences between them would entail some difference in potential, which cannot be since it is actualized." This assumes both things have the same potential, which is not necessary (or not demonstrated to be). One thing could be fully actual with respect to its own potential, and similarly for the other thing. Thomas Aquinas comes to the same conclusion from the premise of full perfection, but I can't recall how he demonstrates full perfection in God.

14.) "A privation is an unactualized potential, which corresponds to evil" This is interesting. Could you expand on this? I have trouble imagining that a lamb, having the un-actualized potential of being a sheep, must have evil.

4) "It cannot be infinitely long." Is there a way to demonstrate this, other than by Occam's Razor? — Samuel Lacrampe

If you want to put a cup on a table, the table has to be stable and relatively motionless, which requires that it be on the floor, which requires it to be on the ground, etc. Each element in this series has derivative power, but derivative power is just simply power that is derived from something with ultimate power.

"Things can only exist, however, if it has the potential to exist which is actualized." I don't think this is possible. It seems to me that before a thing exists, then neither does its properties, including the property of potential existence. — Samuel Lacrampe

Things come into existence, as we usually see them, from other things that are already existing. And furthermore, it seems to me that, if material things are contingent, then this means they do not have to exist, which means that they have the potential to not exist. If this potential is not "part" of the material thing (since it does not exist), then it still exists as a possibility (perhaps in a mind).

This is interesting. Could you expand on this? I have trouble imagining that a lamb, having the un-actualized potential of being a sheep, must have evil. — Samuel Lacrampe

I'm not very confident about this notion either, I'm more sympathetic to the undefinability of goodness a la Moore and the British moral philosophers. But if we're going to Aristotelian route, it's that goodness has a lot of similarities to that of functioning "as it should". A lamb might not be bad if it's functioning as it should, i.e. to develop into a sheep. But it may be a bad lamb if it fails to develop. I don't really like this way of putting goodness, it doesn't seem very moral in nature.

If you want to use the word 'proof' in that bizarre way, then go ahead. There's no point in discussing it further.

Yeah. I have no idea what what a nonteleological account of causation is without making your nature Humean. — Marty

Well, the most popular account of causation nowadays is probably counterfactual dependence, which seems to be as far from teleology as you could get. Causal processes, causal powers - those aren't obviously teleological either. Not that I necessarily subscribe to any of those accounts - just pointing out that a nonteleological account of causation isn't something unheard of - not by a long shot.

In biology, largely for historical reasons, it is common to talk about things in a teleological fashion. This is a residue of the science's history, not a logical necessity, and is a feature not shared by most other sciences. — andrewk

There may be good objective reasons for teleological language in biology, other than it being a holdover from the prescientific era. This is most obvious in behavior science: behavior is, pretty much by definition, goal-directed. But, less obviously, it has been argued that even in other biological contexts we find features that are isomorphic to goal-directedness.

No, I think teleological accounts are distinct from efficient causation insofar as they are describing two different causes; however, I do think the efficient causation is dependent on the form of any organism.

And yes, I'm aware that the enlightenment sciences attempted to remove teleology, but that was mostly because of the a-priori assumptions of those type of sciences, and the dualism created between the mind and body, such that, they wanted to place directionality in place of only something the mind can do. This isn't true of all modern sciences, though.There's plenty of scientists, whom I just mentioned, that still use teleological accounts. Not to mention the enlightenment could not sustain its reduction of the world to merely material or efficient causes. Even with the advent of Newton's gravity, the project of rendering everything as being explicable to only two causes was highly questionable, particularly at the dawn of the chemical-electrical revolutions where we saw mechanical motion just wasn't fit to describe all physical processes, particularly biology.

Also, I don't believe Hume or Kant's account of causation work. Hume because causation is most certainly not a habit, certainly not two events that are clear and distinction - which I took to be a skeptical interpretation of Hume. Or Kant because I don't think teleology is a regulative function of the mind. The entire point of late German Idealism was to overcome Kant's idea that teleology was merely a regulative feature. There were great pains to overcome this idea that we're merely projecting these type of experiences into the world, and I feel like this is a problem created by the noumenal-phenomenal distinction Kant had, and regulating experience to be just "in the mind".

But even Kant had problems, which became obvious during the end of his career. His late Philosophy of Nature already anticipated the system of Naturphilosophie, and the organicism implicit in it. Organicism, imho, was a fair account of nature that was inbetween vitalism and mechanism.

Of course there are, and I don't think they work. I didn't actually mean that I don't think people attempt to do the project. Most scientists probably don't think its a thing.

But what I was saying is that I don't think saying, "modern science got rid of teleology" is really a fair representation of philosophy or science.



As I recall reading, and this was actually mentioned in Edward Feser's Scholastic Metaphysics, powers are just formal-final causes under a different name. As for counterfactual dependence, I'm not sure what it means to say “If A had not occurred, C would not have occurred” without wondering why that claim is the case. In virute of what?

If you want to use the word 'proof' in that bizarre way, then go ahead. There's no point in discussing it further. — andrewk

That's so childish: "you have to use the words my way, or I don't want to talk to you". Is "compromise" not in your vocabulary?

Really, I think you're just upset because I demonstrated that your position is contradictory. Now look what you've done. First, you say that an argument must proceed from a clear definition. Then, when I define "proof", and make such an argument proving that you contradict yourself, you decide that you do not like my definition of "proof". Your hypocritical actions are just proving my point, which is that there must be a method to determine how terms ought to be defined. And, that this type of reasoning, which makes these determinations, is just as important as the reasoning which proceeds from these determinations.

The potential that the first actualizer has to create other substances would be actualized by the first actualizer itself. — Andrew M

I read Feser's chapter and I was wrong: he is talking about the actualization of a substance's existence, not just the actualization of its potencies. Your response is to deny the dichotomy presented in proposition 9 and affirm the possibility of a substance that both exists necessarily and yet is a composite of act and potency. Feser will deny this possibility.

That's because Feser accepts the real distinction between essence and existence (Thomistic Proof) and also the contingency of composite substances (Neo-platonic Proof). In the Thomistic model, a being is necessary if only if its existence is identical with its essence. Not only is such a being absolutely simple (because there's no distinction between its existence and essence), but since existence is the purest and highest form of act, it is also pure act. As such, a being that is a composite of potency and act could not exist necessarily.

If you want to put a cup on a table,[...] — darthbarracuda

That makes sense to me. I wonder if an objector might say that it is logically possible to have an infinite loop, where the one derivative power is passed down in circle, like a game of hot potato; but this seems so absurd that it would be a last-resort hypothesis.

[...] if material things are contingent, then this means they do not have to exist, which means that they have the potential to not exist. [...] — darthbarracuda

Yes, good point. It is true that contingent existing things have the potential to not exist; and the potential of 'x' implies the potential of 'not x' at some point; and therefore contingent existing things must have the potential to exist at some point.

[...] if we're going to Aristotelian route, it's that goodness has a lot of similarities to that of functioning "as it should". A lamb might not be bad if it's functioning as it should, i.e. to develop into a sheep. But it may be a bad lamb if it fails to develop. [...] — darthbarracuda

How about this:

In man-made things, it is evident that a thing is good if it actualizes its nature, its design. E.g., a paper-cutter is called good if it actually cuts paper correctly, which is its nature. And the nature of a thing is synonymous to its essential potential. E.g., the paper-cutter does not have the potential to cut paper if there is no paper to cut at this time, but once there is, then the potential appears, and a good paper-cutter will actualize it. Therefore a thing is good if it actualizes its essential potential; which means that an un-actualized essential potential corresponds to evil. As is the case of man-made things, so it would be for non-man-made things if these also have essential potential, that is, a nature, a design, a purpose, a final cause.

We just need to demonstrate this last part. Unfortunately, I don't know how yet. I am not even sure if demonstrating that things have essences is sufficient to prove that they must have a purpose, for even Aristotle seems to make a distinction between formal cause (essence) and final cause (purpose). I suspect Aristotle was wrong in making this distinction.

I read Feser's chapter and I was wrong: he is talking about the actualization of a substance's existence, not just the actualization of its potencies. Your response is to deny the dichotomy presented in proposition 9 and affirm the possibility of a substance that both exists necessarily and yet is a composite of act and potency. Feser will deny this possibility.

That's because Feser accepts the real distinction between essence and existence (Thomistic Proof) and also the contingency of composite substances (Neo-platonic Proof). In the Thomistic model, a being is necessary if only if its existence is identical with its essence. Not only is such a being absolutely simple (because there's no distinction between its existence and essence), but since existence is the purest and highest form of act, it is also pure act. As such, a being that is a composite of potency and act could not exist necessarily. — Aaron R

Interesting. I disagree that there is any ontological separation between existence and essence as Feser argues for in his discussion (from p117).

Feser gives the example of a lion and a unicorn and argues that one could, in principle, know their essences without knowing whether they existed or not.

In my view, part of the essential nature of a lion is that it lives in the world that we inhabit, whereas a unicorn is a merely a fictional creature represented in books and pictures. So for someone to mistakenly talk about lions as if they were fictional entities would be for them to entirely misconceive the essential nature of lions.

That's because real things and representations belong to different logical categories. It's not that a real lion and a fictional lion share the same essence where one exists and the other does not. Instead they are essentially different things.

I'll leave it there for now. I'll just add that I don't dispute that the first actualizer is a simple (non-composite) substance. However, as with existence/essence and form/material, I don't see that act/potency should be understood as ontologically separate parts or aspects of a substance.

In my view, part of the essential nature of a lion is that it lives in the world that we inhabit, whereas a unicorn is a merely a fictional creature represented in books and pictures. — Andrew M

So... if someone genetically engineered a horse to become a unicorn, then the unicorn would be fictional? :s

It's not that a real lion and a fictional lion share the same essence where one exists and the other does not. Instead they are essentially different things. — Andrew M

What makes them different, apart from existence? If existence is what makes them different, then you're granting Feser's point that existence is a property, and denying Kant's.

Science looks for patterns and makes models to describe them. One does not need to postulate a telos to do that, any more than one needs a telos when one looks for interesting shapes in clouds or star constellations. One may overlay a telos on it, if one's philosophical disposition encourages that - and some do. But such an overlay is strictly optional, and plenty don't. — andrewk

That is false. Part of understanding a thing is understanding that thing within a particular context. There are no context-less things out there. So when I understand the heart in the context of the body, I need teleology. Otherwise how will I understand it?

So please take this simple example, of the heart pumping blood, and give me a non-teleological explanation of it. You won't be able to do so without appealing to the larger context in which the heart works (the body), and hence without appealing to the heart's telos - which just is an explanation of how it fits in within its larger context.

But I do not make that interpretation. I am content to simply describe the processes that occur within the body. If somebody asks how the body came to have those processes, it can be explained in terms of evolution, again without teleology. — andrewk

And those processes don't affect each other, and don't function together to create effects that they couldn't by themselves?

For example, is a match not directed towards the production of fire when you strike it on the right side of the match box? If it wasn't so directed, then why does it start burning?! Is this a miracle that every time, or almost every time, the match starts burning instead of turning into a cute buterfly?

The fact that we notice that particular things are directed towards particular effects - and not to any effect at all - shows us that they are goal-directed. Putting a sharpened pencil on a regular paper is directed towards producing a mark on that paper. It's not directed towards turning into a cute hamster that proceeds to eat the paper, is it? Why does it never turn into the cute hamster? Because that's not its telos.

This thread has petered out. It became apparent - after a long discussion - that if one accepts the Aristotelean view of the world, in which notions like 'potential, 'essence' and 'directed' are believed to have meanings beyond their everyday pragmatic meanings, then the OP argument has some bite, and if one doesn't, then it has none.

I like to learn wherever I can from discussions, and the lesson from this one has been that the gulf between Aristoteleans and non-Aristoteleans is immense. I am starting to think that it is bigger than that between theists and anti-theists.