Suppose that we have evolved to behave in a certain way. It remains an open question as to whether we ought behave in that way.

The question has to do with the meaning of intent, as in should behave a certain way. It is my opinion that the phrase should behave a certain way is a partial expression of a more complete sentence should behave a certain way in order to achieve a certain outcome.

The shortened version is a summarized aggregate of experiences with an implied acceptance that the proposed outcome is desirable; for example not getting eaten by a tiger. Those that got eaten no longer exist to express their opinion - which got them eaten.

This describes intelligence as a classification of behavior, a definition that gives some support for the Intelligent Design theory camp, but not in the manner they usually attempt to convey.

Instrumental oughts are ends justify the means. When the ends justify the means, then to hell with what's right, good, fair, just, harmless, etc.

I was simply showing the common denominators in morality, some of them anyway. I mean, you strongly asserted against the notion, so...

What makes you think and/or believe that Virgil's behaviour was governed and/or driven by moral intuition? Why not just plain 'ole attribution of causality, that giving to the others produced results Virgil wanted, inferred, and expected?

When the ends justify the means, then to hell with what's right, good, fair, just, harmless, etc. — creativesoul

Or it could be like sorting where each path goes and choosing the destination ranked highest. And that ranking system seems to have more than one axis: One for a motive that inclines toward action and another that measures cost.

So perhaps terms like 'right, good, fair, just, harmless, etc' are categorical bands across the plane described by that two-dimensional pair of axes.

Or it could be that when the ends justify the means, any and all means are rationalized by virtue of meeting the goal of the ends...

Here's a point that needs consideration.

Suppose that we have evolved to behave in a certain way.

It remains an open question as to whether we ought behave in that way.

This is Moore's open question argument, and so far as I am aware, no solution has been offered.

So basing you moral choices on what you have evolved to do, remains a moral choice. — Banno

That we evolved to be the way we are isn't what's important, it's simply that we are the way we are.

That we feel pain and pleasure and want to go on living are the basic evolution-endowed facts that we can use as a moral foundation. We cannot appeal to evolution to establish the value of avoiding pain and seeking pleasure, or to continue living; we can only establish those values individually and subjectively (but the good news is just about everyone will naturally affirm these values, so moral agreements based on these similarities can be constructed between individuals).

Say evolution designed us to be generally more greedy and less intelligent than we currently are and as a result we repeatedly fail to share resources in tribal settings... Moore might consider it to be "moral" from the perspective of an innately greedy agent, but from the nearly objective and more universal perspective of avoiding pain and pleasure, and going on living, such a strategy may result in extinction and on those grounds be immoral.

I was simply showing the common denominators in morality, some of them anyway. I mean, you strongly asserted against the notion, so... — creativesoul

Actually I pointed to the most common starting values, and explained that the starting value of "serving god" is in reality a confused and bastardized version of those most common starting values (life, liberty, happiness).

By ridiculing away someone's devotion to god and showing them their own happiness and well being was it's function all along, they then tend to happily trade in the old world strategy of theistic morality for a much more rational and successful one.

What makes you think and/or believe that Virgil's behaviour was governed and/or driven by moral intuition? Why not just plain 'ole attribution of causality, that giving to the others produced results Virgil wanted, inferred, and expected? — creativesoul

Evolution has oriented Virgil's intuition to be a certain way (with inexorably strategic results), and in this case his evolution endowed intuition has lead him to make a counter-instinctual decision that was strategically beneficial to his well-being in the long run (many animals would simply horde all the treats for themselves). The mechanical causality of Virgil's derision making is secondary to the strategic ramifications of his actions. We can describe the "why" of the specific action in terms of biological and cognitive processes, but we could also explain the "why" by pointing to the fact that such behavior is prevalent in hominids because it is an extremely successful strategy for preserving life and well-being, which has resulted in creatures with such dispositions to become prevalent.

Instrumental oughts are ends justify the means. — creativesoul

The notion of should do something implies motive toward a goal, as in if I wish to accomplish A then the best known route to do so is pathToA.

The cliche describes a situation where the witness has already ranked the set of possible goals and chosen A as the desired outcome. It presents the situation of explaining reasons for action afterwards, and people are notoriously creative and inventing reasons.

Evolution has oriented Virgil's intuition to be a certain way (with inexorably strategic results), and in this case his evolution endowed intuition has lead him to make a counter-instinctual decision that was strategically beneficial to his well-being in the long run (many animals would simply horde all the treats for themselves). The mechanical causality of Virgil's derision making is secondary to the strategic ramifications of his actions. We can describe the "why" of the specific action in terms of biological and cognitive processes, but we could also explain the "why" by pointing to the fact that such behavior is prevalent in hominids because it is an extremely successful strategy for preserving life and well-being, which has resulted in creatures with such dispositions to become prevalent. — VagabondSpectre

How would you know if any of this is true?

What makes you think and/or believe that Virgil's behaviour was governed and/or driven by moral intuition?

Why not the much simpler and adequate explanation of just plain 'ole attribution of causality; that giving to the others produced results Virgil wanted, inferred, and expected?

I find no justification at all for attributing strategy to such simplistic thought and belief.

Instrumental oughts are ends justify the means.
— creativesoul
The notion of should do something implies motive toward a goal, as in if I wish to accomplish A then the best known route to do so is pathToA.

The cliche describes a situation where the witness has already ranked the set of possible goals and chosen A as the desired outcome. It presents the situation of explaining reasons for action afterwards, and people are notoriously creative and inventing reasons — AngleWyrm

Indeed, as you've just shown.

Instrumental oughts are ends justify the means.
— creativesoul

The cliche describes a situation ... of explaining reasons for action afterwards, and people are notoriously creative and inventing reasons — AngleWyrm

Indeed, as you've just shown. — creativesoul

Some people people claim they meant to do that afterwards, and some people claim they mean to do that beforehand. Would you care for some popcorn?

If the end cannot be gotten solely by virtue of good means, then there ought be no such end in sight.

Who decides what should be censored? I propose that life does its own censoring through the process of culling away the least fit. Good in that sense is the actions that did not result in getting eaten by a tiger.

Consider a game universe: In the game Starbound it is necessary to first steal things in order to get the blueprints to make them for yourself. And in the game Rimworld it is a reasonable course of action to take enemies prisoner and remove their organs until they die on the surgery table, as spare parts for the colony.

Those actions are 'good' within the context of their universe, but not 'good' in RealLife(tm).

Who decides what should be censored? — AngleWyrm

History shows that that would be all of us.

We measure what's good about things with different metrics, depending upon the candidate. For example, when thinking about what sorts of actions are acceptable/unacceptable, we measure in quantities of harm. Notably, we minimize as best we can the sheer amounts of unnecessary harm. When we do this, we offer ourselves the best insurance possible. It guards against hatred. Such a shared understanding instantiates good feelings and a basic well-grounded sense of giving a fuck.

When we want to measure whether or not a thought, belief, and/or action is acceptable/unacceptable we can also think about what would happen if everyone did that... whatever that may be. If it helps promote goodness for goodness' sake it is good in and of itself. It doesn't matter who murders. It is bad in and of itself, by definition even. A priori justificatory ground, if that's your cup of tea.

It's basic common sense.

We set the bounds as we go. As we must. We are aiming to improve.

Game theory is another ends justifies the means construct.

If everyone acted like that, the world would be a much better place. That my friends... is good behaviour. Admirable. Noteworthy. Aspirational. Inspirational. Worthy of duplication.

a basic well-grounded sense of giving a fuck. — creativesoul

How would you know if any of this is true?

What makes you think and/or believe that Virgil's behaviour was governed and/or driven by moral intuition? — creativesoul

If moral intuition is the biology driven emotional response when confronted with a moral dilemma (a situation where someone else is suffering or may suffer) then the description fits perfectly.

Why not the much simpler and adequate explanation of just plain 'ole attribution of causality; that giving to the others produced results Virgil wanted, inferred, and expected? — creativesoul

"Causality" is not an adequate explanation, or even an explanation...

"What Virgil wanted" is incorporated in my explanation: he wanted to help his friend due to his emotional response to seeing him wanting.

"What Virgil inferred" assumes more than my appraisal of the situation does. Is Virgil actually making inferences about moral strategy? I don't think so.

"What Virgil expected" is a possibility, but you haven't explained why he expected that. Perhaps Virgil has been trained to share and expect praise for sharing. That's possible, but something tells me that Capuchin monkeys really do have an unconscious and intuitive/emotional sense of fair play.

I find no justification at all for attributing strategy to such simplistic thought and belief. — creativesoul

Evolution did the strategic thinking for Virgil by endowing him with unconscious and somewhat hardwired emotional responses like empathy. And evolution is no simple thinker; it's more than sophisticated enough to figure out that in-group resource sharing is a successful strategy.

"Causality" is not an adequate explanation, or even an explanation... — VagabondSpectre

Indeed it's not. Nor was that the whole of my answer. Misquoting, blatantly even, is bad form. Red herring. Non-sequitur. Strawman/dog. None of those are acceptable.

The primate draws a connection between his/her own mental state, it's actions, and what happens afterwards. The effects of the act are imprinted into the mind of the primate affecting it's subsequent mental connections.

Moral thinking is a metacognitive endeavour. It is thinking about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. That primate is incapable of thinking in such a way. That is not to say that the primate does not exhibit thoughtful behaviour. It is to appropriately temper our talk of what that consists in/of.

Some of the content of moral thinking exists prior to our awareness of it. For example. Some moral belief is true, others are not. Some religious based. Others are not. Just as it is the case with all our thought and belief, we only first discover that our thought and belief can be true/false. It is false prior to our becoming aware of it. It is true prior to our becoming aware of it. Our becoming aware of it does not make it so, either way. All of this is necessary for moral thinking.

The outlined content in the second paragraph above doesn't require language in order to form, happen, or take place. It is both necessary and sufficient for roughly outlining the primate behaviour we're discussing. It doesn't mistakenly attribute complex thought and belief to an agent incapable of forming and/or holding them. That is the only kind of content that that primate can have within it's mental ongoings. Simple.

Just as we once were, it is not capable of complex thought. It merely acts upon it's own mental ongoings. We describe them.

Indeed it's not. Nor was that the whole of my answer. Misquoting, blatantly even, is bad form. Red herring. Non-sequitur. Strawman/dog. None of those are acceptable. — creativesoul

:-}

I haven't misquoted or ignored any part of your response. You, however, seem to have completely missed my point.

I offered a causal explanation of why Virgil behaved the way he did: A strategy, devised by the trial and error based mind of evolution, encoded into the genetics of Virgil, which expresses itself through the intuitive and emotional tendencies of the overall organism (I.E hard coded nuero-chemical and hormonal regimes designed to promote specifically cooperative behaviors; innate empathy for lack of a better term).

I never at any point stated that Virgil is cognitively aware of the long term "moral" ramifications of his actions. I made it clear I believe he is not

Your response of "it's a better explanation to just say: causality; what he wanted; what he inferred; what he expected" is then flabbergasting.

So my overall point is two fold: Firstly, the "value" (life and well-being) which evolution has caused Virgil's actions to serve is the same most universal/persuasive starting value that we base our actually conscious moral systems on, and secondly what makes Virgil's actions moral is that they happen to be mutually beneficial to both Virgil and Vulcan in terms of preserving life and well being
(which I am positing is the best moral value, essentially).

The primate draws a connection between his/her own mental state, it's actions, and what happens afterwards. The effects of the act are imprinted into the mind of the primate affecting it's subsequent mental connections. — creativesoul

And then what? The primate distinguishes between outcomes which it desires and outcomes which it does not and acts accordingly? The problem with this is that the payoff for being altruistic is indirect and may never come (hard for simple minds to connect with the altruistic act itself). And I don't think that Virgil's keepers conditioned him to be altruistic with direct encouragement...

Moral thinking is a metacognitive endeavour. It is thinking about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. That primate is incapable of thinking in such a way. That is not to say that the primate does not exhibit thoughtful behaviour. It is to appropriately temper our talk of what that consists in/of. — creativesoul

I don't think Virgil is capable of moral thought; his biology and instincts do the thinking for him unconsciously and mechanically. It just so happens though that a very beneficial strategy (re: life and well-being) for communal living is to behave altruistically to members of your group. It's an objectively successful strategy that evolution has long since imbued into many hominids (to varying degrees). Consciously though, humans are able to come up with their own strategies for survival (What's the right course of action if I (or we all) want to go on living and be free from strife?), and it's very easy to see the rationale behind in-group altruistic behavior (both from a species level evolutionary perspective, and from a selfish or individual perspective).

For the sake of clarity, the reason why I always include the "mutual benefit" clause in what I refer to as moral is because unless we extend consideration to people other than ourselves (even if the primary reason to do so is selfish) we might simply destroy one-another in pursuit and according to our differing moral platforms (making them shitty moral platforms IMO, which is also one of the reasons why I value persuasiveness in and of itself when it comes to moral reasoning).

Some of the content of moral thinking exists prior to our awareness of it. For example. Some moral belief is true, others are not. Some religious based. Others are not. Just as it is the case with all our thought and belief, we only first discover that our thought and belief can be true/false. It is false prior to our becoming aware of it. It is true prior to our becoming aware of it. Our becoming aware of it does not make it so, either way. All of this is necessary for moral thinkin — creativesoul

I agree with this although you could be a bit clearer in the way you describe some moral belief as true and untrue. Moral belief can be untrue if it is based on factually inaccurate information (I.E: sacrificing the lamb ensures a good harvest, therefore we must sacrifice the lamb; it's strategically wrong) but it can also be a different kind of untrue: the starting moral premise that "gods will is what is best" isn't even wrong. It could be the case but it cannot be proven or dis-proven, or elucidated upon in any rational or empirical fashion. It's not even reasoning; it's just a random starting assumption that people point to and insist "this is the most important, and therefore moral, concern".

The outlined content in the first paragraph above doesn't require language in order to form. It is both necessary and sufficient for roughly outlining the primate behaviour. It doesn't mistakenly attribute complex thought and belief to an agent incapable of forming and/or holding them. That is the only kind of content that that primate can have within it's mental ongoings. Simple.

Just as we once were, it is not capable of complex thought. It merely acts upon it's own mental ongoings. We describe them. — creativesoul

Hopefully I have made it clear by now that the objective moral component of Virgil's actions doesn't stem from his own conscious mind, but instead that they stem from the strategic serving of a certain set of nearly universal values which we humans ourselves consciously use as a foundation or starting point for our own moral systems.

we are the way we are. — VagabondSpectre

This does not imply that we are the way we ought be.

First off this seems like a non issue question as morality is subjective and is relative to an individual and is based off that individuals internal and external locus of control.

But my most simple and direct response which carries my point would be that any of the things you think is wrong or is right is just something that "is" and there is no truth value to any label of right, wrong or moral. They are perspectives. That is all.

I haven't misquoted or ignored any part of your response. — VagabondSpectre

You have and you did once again. Not much more can be said, except to point it out. An astute reader will take note.

You, however, seem to have completely missed my point.

I offered a causal explanation of why Virgil behaved the way he did: A strategy, devised by the trial and error based mind of evolution, encoded into the genetics of Virgil, which expresses itself through the intuitive and emotional tendencies of the overall organism (I.E hard coded nuero-chemical and hormonal regimes designed to promote specifically cooperative behaviors; innate empathy for lack of a better term).

I'm not missing your point, I'm refuting it based upon Ockham's razor amongst other things. Here, you'r attributing agency where none exists. Evolution is a process. There is no warrant for either intent, nor purpose. You preach intelligent design in evolutionary terms. An abuse of language.

Your response of "it's a better explanation to just say: causality; what he wanted; what he inferred; what he expected" is then flabbergasting.

As is this... Yet another misquote. You seem to still fall prey to not being able to correct yourself when your belief is wrong in light of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. I'm setting out what's basic for all thought and belief. Thought and belief is accrued. What's basic to simple is basic to complex(in terms of it's basic constitution). What's true of the simple is true of the complex(in terms of it's basic constitution). You've put forth ideas and notions that are contrary to what basic thought and belief consist in/of. Thus, I reject what you've said. That rejection is grounded upon Ockham's razor and the fact that you're attributing complex thought and belief where none is warranted, where none can be had... yet.

You have and you did once again. Not much more can be said, except to point it out. An astute reader will take note. — creativesoul

How about you point out how I misquoted you then? This is the second time you've griped about me misquoting you, and the second time you've failed to explain how I've done so.

I'm not missing your point, I'm refuting it based upon Ockham's razor amongst other things. Here, you'r attributing agency where none exists. Evolution is a process. There is no warrant for either intent, nor purpose. You preach intelligent design in evolutionary terms. An abuse of language. — creativesoul

First of all, obviously "evolution" is not a creature with a mind or intelligence; the mind of evolution is a figure of speech used to assist the portrayal of an evolutionary perspective. Secondly, you have not successfully employed Ockham's razor (which is itself vague and unreliable): saying "the much simpler and adequate explanation of just plain 'ole attribution of causality; that giving to the others produced results Virgil wanted, inferred, and expected?" does not offer an alternative explanation and frankly says nothing interesting at all.

As is this... Yet another misquote. You seem to still fall prey to not being able to correct yourself when your belief is wrong in light of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. — creativesoul

What evidence? And how have I misquoted you?

The nutritional value of your word salads are rapidly declining...

I'm setting out what's basic for all thought and belief. Thought and belief is accrued. What's basic to simple is basic to complex(in terms of it's basic constitution). What's true of the simple is true of the complex(in terms of it's basic constitution). — creativesoul

Honestly I have no clue what you're even trying to say here.

What does "Thought and belief is accrued" and how is it relevant to my point?

What does "What's basic to simple is basic to complex(in terms of it's basic constitution)" mean?

What does "What's true of the simple is true of the complex(in terms of it's basic constitution)" mean?

You've put forth ideas and notions that are contrary to what basic thought and belief consist in/of. — creativesoul

Such as? You've got to clarify which contrary ideas I've put forward and how they are contrary to what you can demonstrate about thought and belief.

Thus, I reject what you've said. That rejection is grounded upon Ockham's razor and the fact that you're attributing complex thought and belief where none is warranted, where none can be had... yet. — creativesoul

Do you mean empathy? Because that's a feeling that even dogs are capable of. Please try to realize I'm not suggesting Virgil is capable of conscious moral thought. If you're now referring to my reference to evolution as able to devise strategies, then you just don't understand evolution.

we are the way we are.
— @VagabondSpectre

This does not imply that we are the way we ought be.

"we are the way are" because that is the way we imagine our self as acting in our relationship with our self and others.

How "we ought to be" suggests to me a mysterious tableau somewhere outside "the way we are", and I suggest that our code of conduct already contains this tableau ( & others) which are already manifest in the way we are.

The ancient saying "know thyself" applies.

I'm setting out what's basic for all thought and belief. Thought and belief is accrued. What's basic to simple is basic to complex(in terms of it's basic constitution). What's true of the simple is true of the complex(in terms of it's basic constitution).
— creativesoul
Honestly I have no clue what you're even trying to say here. — VagabondSpectre

Of all things said thus far, this is the most significant.

Would you care to?

This does not imply that we are the way we ought be. — Banno

No, but we can take the way we are and use it to make arguments about how we ought to behave.

Should we be creatures who almost universally have the desire to go on living? I cannot say, but we're trapped in this form so we've got to play the cards we were dealt.

Of all things said thus far, this is the most significant.

Would you care to? — creativesoul

I would like you to communicate whatever it is you are trying to say clearly and succinctly,

"What's basic to simple is basic to complex(in terms of it's basic constitution)" is not clear or succinct, and it sounds a lot like equivocation between moral intuition and conscious moral systems or perhaps a compositional fallacy.

At conception, we are all void of any and all thought and belief...moral belief notwithstanding. Some thought and belief are extremely complex. Others are not. Calculus cannot be understood prior to understanding arithmetic. Moral belief systems cannot be understood as such by an agent until s/he has one to talk about. Thought and belief begins simply and gains in it's complexity. We all adopt our first worldview.

Agree with this so far?