But we really ought to ;)

[edit] Look at my magical powers of responding before you even submit! (something went wrong and i lost a reply to creativesoul)

so we've got to play the cards we were dealt. — VagabondSpectre

No, we don't. There is a logical gulf in your argument.

How is that not drawing mental correlations between an 'object' of physiological sensory perception(another person in this case) and oneself? — creativesoul

Understanding that someone is suffering is mental. Feeling something yourself because you understand that someone else is suffering is emotional. It's a capacity we're wired for.

Actually we're not discussing our disagreement. I agree with the crucial importance of empathy, emotion, and innate potential. I disagree with your account. You're overstating the case. — creativesoul

I wish you would be really specific about which part of my account you disagree with. Is it so hard to believe that Virgil felt a bad emotion when seeing his friend upset and was thusly motivated to act?

There is a logical gulf in your argument. — Banno

Yes there is. Because there's no logic that can produce an ought out of thin air; we've got to make a starting assumption somewhere.

Humans nearly universally want to go on living, and so taking that for granted as a starting moral premise makes for a nearly universally appealing moral framework.

What's the point of considering it a possibility that we ought not continue living? why not just reject such a premise and resulting moral argument out of hand?

I don't want an objective morality, I want a morality that objectively serves humans.

Because it's an emotional response. Understanding that someone is suffering is mental. Feeling something yourself because you understand that someone is suffering is emotional — VagabondSpectre

A baby does not understand the source of it's mother's sadness.

If one does not understand the source of emotional states(pick one), then one does not understand emotion. Layers upon layers.

We don't need to understand the source of someone's emotions in order to have an emotional response of our own, we just need to recognize that they are feeling the emotion.

Babies think people cease to exist when they leave the room, so I'm not surprised they cannot easily recognize the emotions of others.

Seeing something being done allows one to know what doing something looks like. Hearing something being done allows one to hear what something being done sounds like. Doing something allows one to understand what doing something is like.

In this corner, we have Judy. In that corner, we have Jane. Jane is a year-and-a-half old. She is Judy's grand-daughter. Judy is sad. Janes sees the expression of sadness and tries to help.

Some want us to believe that Jane does all of this without ever making a connection between mamaw's behaviour and her own memory of times just like these.

:-}

There's more than one hole here.

Babies think people cease to exist when they leave the room... — VagabondSpectre

Rubbish. Now babies have conceptions of existence? Next you'll be saying that they perform calculus.

Babies know whether or not they're content or discontent. They do not know how to say it. They experience it. The attribute and/or recognize causality by virtue of drawing correlations between being pin pricked and pain if they see it occur. If they do not eye-witness the first occurrence, there will be no visual connection drawn between the pain and the pin.

Babies do not understand emotion in any way that is even remotely close to the kind necessary for having empathy for another.

Some want us to believe that Jane does all of this without ever making a connection between her mom's behavior and Jane's own remembered experience of times just like these. — creativesoul

Specifically I'm pointing to what Jane feels as a motivator of action. Figuring out how to remedy the bad feeling is learned, but feeling the bad feeling itself is not. (Assuming Jane can indeed recognize the emotions of others).

Virgil was motivated by the bad feeling of seeing his friend suffering. Presumably the bad feeling of seeing his friend suffering overpowered his greed or desire to keep all the nuts for himself. That Virgil needed to make the connection between a lack of nuts and Vulcan's unhappiness is secondary to my point, the empathy is what motivated him to try and remedy it in the first place.

Rubbish. Now babies have conceptions of existence? Next you'll be saying that they perform calculus. — creativesoul

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object_permanence

Babies do not understand emotion in any way that is even remotely close to the kind necessary for having empathy for another. — creativesoul

And yet, dogs exhibit empathy, so they must understand emotion in a way remotely close to the kind necessary for having empathy, right? (the ability to recognize it in others)

You're a fucking twit. Recognition requires experience. Being innate does not.

I don't want an objective morality, I want a morality that objectively serves humans. — VagabondSpectre

You can want whatever you like, that does not make it right.

The most coherent description of morality is that it's a a cooperative strategy between two or more parties that is designed to be mutually beneficial... — VagabondSpectre

So morality is expediency.

That's exactly wrong. Morality begins when one starts to take the other into consideration.

I'm talking about the feeling though, not the recognition.

recognition =/= feeling.

If you're incapable of addressing my argument that's fine, but you might want to refrain from direct name calling. That's not effective ridicule at all ;)

Whack a mole is tiresome.

Morality begins when one starts to take the other into consideration. — Banno

Well said.

So morality is expediency. — Banno

Not quite. In my view successful morality is by necessity functional strategy (strategy which serves some initial value)

That's exactly wrong. Morality begins when one starts to take the other into consideration. — Banno

Well, mutually agreeable morality begins when one starts to take the other into consideration. Depending on who you ask though, "moral consideration" need not apply to them.

What does it mean to take the other into consideration though? How should we treat them per moral consideration? (according to their human condition perhaps?)

Whack a mole is tiresome. — creativesoul

The singular hard-working mole takes note of your blatant mental exhaustion...

What does it mean to take the other into consideration though? How should we treat them per moral consideration? — VagabondSpectre

Good questions. Now you are starting to think ethically.

But you've looped me back onto the surface!

Do I treat people how they want to be treated? What makes how they want to be treated morally right?

By framing consideration of the other as the inherent game of morality, you've implicitly appealed to that very set of nearly universal human desires that I'm always on about.

I'm not arguing against your conclusion, but against how you got there.

I've simply defined morality as a mutually beneficial strategy from the outset rather than beating around the age old bush of "rightness and wrongness" as it's obscured proxy.

Every moral system I've encountered converges around the same basic formula: offer people a way to make decisions that benefits them and those around them (or more simply, does not harm those around them). Even the most esoteric moral systems serve these same ends if in roundabout ways (not always rationally or successfully I should add; obeying god can be perceptually for one's own good even if it really isn't).

And most of the actual meat and potatoes of moral systems aren't even in the strategic bits (the actual positions and prescriptions/proscriptions) it's the persuasive groundwork designed to convince people to stop being selfish assholes in the first place and to actually consider the other.

If the only starting premise we need for morality is consider the other, how do we justify it?

How do we persuade people to do it?

I think I do it by being honest: because if you don't consider other people then they will likely retaliate, so if you value life, liberty, prosperity, and happiness, you might want to consider cooperation instead of conflict.

And how's it going so far? Folk generally agreeing with you, are they?

I think I do it by being honest: because if you don't consider other people then they will likely retaliate, so if you value life, liberty, prosperity, and happiness, you might want to consider cooperation instead of conflict. — VagabondSpectre

Again, you are not doing ethics, you are doing game theory.

Can one act morally without thinking morally?

Is that act moral in and of itself, or is it moral because we say so? Does what we point out require language? If so, then what's moral in and of itself requires language, does it not?

Does morality require language?

Morality is conventionally understood as a code of behaviour. Do codes of behaviour require shared meaning? I would say so. Shared meaning requires a plurality of agents with common meaningful language.

There is no such thing as innate moral intuition.

Morality is best understood as a human condition. Codes of conduct are necessary when different community members have conflicting ideas regarding what should or should not be done.

There is no such thing as innate moral intuition

And how's it going so far? Folk generally agreeing with you, are they? — Banno

As a system of applied ethics my approach is very persuasive. It's very hard to not be suaded by an argument appealing to basic values like life and liberty. It's the meta-ethical bits that I haven't figured out how to get people to swallow....

Again, you are not doing ethics, you are doing game theory. — Banno

If I practice game theory while extending consideration for the loss/win conditions of others, how does that differ from your own normative approach?

It seems to me that convincing people to extend moral consideration to others is the very crux of (mutually agreeable) moral frameworks. It matters more that we persuade people to adopt this position (while being clear on what's nearly universally beneficial) in the first place, than it does the means of our persuasion (so long as they are well persuaded). The idea that the most selfish strategy is actually a long term cooperative strategy is the basic root of how I would persuade someone to be moral in the first place, and it's a strongly persuasive form of appeal (rationally and emotionally).

Can one act morally without thinking morally? — creativesoul

Yes. Just like how someone can make the correct move in a chess game without thinking strategically (it can be coincidence or the result of factors other than conscious understanding/thought).

Is that act moral in and of itself, or is it moral because we say so? Does what we point out require language? If so, then what's moral in and of itself requires language, does it not? — creativesoul

It's not merely that we say so which gives the act moral relevance, it's that our most important goals are to continue living, freely and happily, and that the action is objectively strategically beneficial to these, our most important goals. We need language to consciously deconstruct the moral framework I describe, but human emotions are such that they push us toward strategically beneficial habits even before we understand that certain actions are strategically beneficial (sometimes evolution pushes in immoral directions, moral on that later though).

To consciously explore and consciously construct morality, we need language or symbols of some kind, but deferring to one's emotions and intuition doesn't require formal language.

Morality is conventionally understood as a code of behaviour. Do codes of behaviour require shared meaning? I would say so. Shared meaning requires a plurality of agents with common meaningful language — creativesoul

We can describe particular moral systems as codes of behavior, but not all moral actions are the result of following linguistically codified instruction. Shared language is fairly essential for the social sharing and communication of moral systems, but even where formal language doesn't exist, if shared values (desires, goals, needs) exist, and we come to realize that we have these shared values, the cooperative strategies can become obvious and highly appealing.

What happens when two uncivilized humans who do not share language have a chance encounter with one-another? Are they incapable of moral interaction because they do not share language?

What's really the reason that two strangers who are incapable of communication might try to avoid conflict and violence when confronted with a novel encounter? Is it because each of them thinks "morality is a code of conduct that I should adhere to, and my code of conduct says be nice to strangers"? Or is it because each of them thinks "I don't want to die in battle with this stranger, and they may not want to risk battle with me; therefore I should not risk escalation to violence"?

Side tangent: evolution doesn't always let us have rational and peaceful encounters because it will happily trade in a cooperative strategy that is beneficial down to the individual level for a violent and competitive strategy that is beneficial on what we might consider a species-wide level (where most individuals suffer and die while the better adapted few proliferate). For example, when confronted with a surprise, such as a chance encounter between two primitive hunters, biological reactions such as a flooding of adrenaline into our system from the stimulating surprise and possibly emotional fear can easily overwhelm our mental faculties and lead to an escalation of violence. If they can remain calm though, then the rational course of action is to threat the other as they themselves want to be treated (others are more likely to treat you as you like if you treat them as they like), which is the strategic nut-shell of why we try to piece together mutually beneficial codes of conduct in the first place; it avoids the prosperity and life destroying ramifications of conflict, which are de facto bad and unappealing outcomes for those whose life and prosperity is destroyed.

There is no such thing as innate moral intuition. — creativesoul

There are a set of hard wired instincts and emotions that indirectly nudge us in some cases toward behavior that just so happens to be strategically beneficial to ourselves and others.

Emotional attachment to others; bonding or "love", if you will, is a big one. Pity, leading us to console and comfort and sometimes assist random strangers for our own emotional reward is another (heretofore labeled: empathy). Reciprocity is another (the natural desire to scratch the back of another who has scratched your own). Fear is also a large stabilizer of behavior that sometimes indirectly leads us to cooperate, although sometimes it is the very source of conflict.

"The human condition" is a mixed bag of norms provided by evolution, not mutually agreeable strategy, and some of it is constructive and good and some of it is destructive and bad. If there is a moral intuition, it has the capacity to grant us innate compassion and consideration for others, but it also has the capacity to grant us the will to plunder and rape (to dis-consider others).

Codes of conduct are necessary when different community members have conflicting ideas regarding what should or should not be done. — creativesoul

Codes of conduct are great avoiding conflict in general, but when specific conflicts do arise the best we can do is appeal to the context and specifics of the specific case in question (moral exceptions to absolute rules or codes of conduct are famously easy to contrive, and we need lots of careful and rational consideration to get the the bottom of complex moral conundrums (i.e: a court system)).

I think the best approach to resolving moral dilemmas is to clarify exactly what it is morality is supposed to be doing/serving in the first place, and once we agree on that we can make some moral judgments as a matter of empirical fact. If morality is supposed to be about making decisions which are mutually beneficial to our survival and well-being, then we can appraise whether or not a specific code of conduct/virtue or contextual moral decision is beneficial (or not harmful) to any given individual.

If an individual is selected as a subject for superstition based human sacrifice (to make the crops grow, let's say), then that individual might decide that they don't like the whole system of human sacrifice altogether because it is about to cost them everything (it's not beneficial to them, and hence not agreeable; immoral). Additionally, if you can show that human sacrifice does not actually lead to a better harvest (or that the gods do not exist), then you might persuade them that the harmful action they propose to carry out is not necessary, helpful, or justifiable.