The 'privileged access' is the presumption that science is the only way of knowing. In pre-modern philosophy, there was a distinction between science and sapience, the latter being 'wisdom', which I think overall has been lost sight of. — Wayfarer
The only problem I really have with Naturalism is that its proponents seem to believe it provides some sort of privileged outlook on the nature of reality, which I strongly believe is wrong. — T Clark
In what way is the belief that science isn't the only way of knowing any less of a presumption. — Inter Alia
In light of the history of the subject of philosophy. In my view, the discipline of philosophy comprises seeing through the illusion of materialism. — Wayfarer
That seems a strange view considering the large number of more or less strictly materialist philosophers. — Inter Alia
There seems to be an excessively binomial use of the term 'Skepticism' here - either one is skeptical or one is not, but surely skepticism, by whatever definition, is a matter of degree? — Inter Alia
As one example, were a single light in the home to no longer turn on when I flick the light switch, the realism of an external world would indicate that there is something physically amiss with the light switch, the respective lightbulb, or with the wiring that dwells in between. The real problem might not be perceived nor thought of at first, yet the web of causal relations which such realism affirms facilitates my being able to discover what is wrong so as to resolve the problem. Other hypotheses, such as a Cartesian evil demon (or the materialist counterpart of being a BIV), could be conceived as alternatives to the reality of an external world. Yet, devoid of upheld belief in the very same external world, these alternative hypotheses would at best only encumber my ability to remedy the stated problem. This then can be expanded to why electricity operates the way that it does, to the question of where the electricity in my home originates from, etc. — javra
The question to me is one of why uphold something like the Cartesian evil demon rather than an external world? I.e., what justifies the upholding of such a conviction? — javra
For example, it is common knowledge that Plato, an idealism-leaning philosophical skeptic, was a realist. It seems logically sound to me that Buddhists, by virtue of upholding Nirvana to be, are all realists--regardless of possible divergences as concerns other aspects of ontology—for Nirvana (and the four Noble Truths) would yet be even if all sentience were to somehow be, or become, unenlightened (in the Eastern sense of this term) … in other words, the Buddha didn’t invent an axiom of Nirvana but, instead, discovered Nirvana's existential presence via enlightenment (this, of course, in Buddhist worldviews). Materialist realism is, of course, yet another variant of realism—one that strictly upholds an underlying physical reality (here thinking of QM, the vacuum field, etc.). In all cases, there are one or more things postulated to be even when not perceived, thought of, or talked about by anyone. — javra
Skepticism is the tendency for beliefs in representational theories of perception to collapse into beliefs in direct-perception and vice-versa.
I don't like discussions of skepticism in relation to idealism or realism, since both idealism and realism have been interpreted through the lens of representational metaphysics, and it isn't clear that either position constitutes a substantial ontological thesis. — sime
The problem with this is that we understand computation to be a process. The laptop at T2 can't complete a computation without having undergone the process of computing starting at T1. — Marchesk
But given that we're doing philosophy, a strong reason to trust the realist inference is because when we do watch our laptops, they undergo a process of computation from one state to the next. So we have no reason to think they don't just because we've closed our eyes. — Marchesk
Big "S" skepticism seems lazy and cowardly to me. Come on Rene - don't give me this "cogito ergo sum" bullshit. Make up your damn mind. As I said previously, that type of skepticism is a luxury for those who can afford to sit around on their asses. — T Clark
Aren't you and Wayfarer mixing up two different types of skepticism? When Descartes says "cogito ergo sum" he is talking about facts. Do I exist? Does the world I see exist? Is the capital of France Paris? When you talk about skepticism about Naturalism, you are questioning the metaphysical basis of a whole system of belief. Those seem fundamentally different to me. The only problem I really have with Naturalism is that its proponents seem to believe it provides some sort of privileged outlook on the nature of reality, which I strongly believe is wrong. — T Clark
Is this an acceptable inference - To the best of my memory, every time I saw something and then closed my eyes, one of two things happened when I opened my eyes again. Either it was still there or I could find an explanation of why it wasn't there. If there were times I don't remember when I couldn't find an explanation, I am confident enough in my understanding of the world to believe that there was an explanation even if I couldn't figure out what it was.
That seems trivial to me. — T Clark
It seems to me that the evil demon hypothesis or one where reality is just a program running on a computer are metaphysically equivalent to realism as long as we can never step outside the universe/program/demon's imagination to see what is really going on. If Morpheus, Neo, and the crew had never escaped the Matrix, could never escape it, what difference would it have made that it existed?
This is a fun thread. — T Clark
Possibleaaran’s excellent thread. — Wayfarer
that our beliefs lack a certain credibility status; perhaps that our faculties aren't reliable about certain matters, or we can't prove our beliefs using premises acceptable only to someone who does not believe them. — PossibleAaran
Now I don't deny that many people have things to do of a more consequential nature. If you are concerned with getting food for the starving, protecting the rainforest, saving endangered species or lessening terrorism then this kind of scepticism might seem abstract and useless. But I think if this sort of scepticism is right it teaches something very important. — PossibleAaran
We have no reason to think that they don't compute when we close our eyes, but we have no reason to think that they do either, without some sort of inferential argument. Having no reason to think that it is false that X is not a reason to think that it is true that X. — PossibleAaran
I'm not seeing how either of these examples are not a matter of degree. Our faculties can be quite reliable, very reliable or completely unreliable, no? Likewise we can consider our belief completely unprovable to others, quite convincing or virtually impossible to refute (but retaining some small doubt). In each case our actions (or other response) are surely more guided by our beliefs about the extent of our skepticism than by its existence or not. — Inter Alia
If I took the skepticism about the unperceived world seriously, then wouldn't I doubt whether those issues even exist when I'm not perceiving them? — Marchesk
As long as I'm not perceiving starving kids in Africa, terrorist cells, or the rainforest being cut down, then why should they be of any consequence? For all I know, they only exist when they come into view.
Maybe the better approach would be just to avoid seeing those issues so as to keep them nonexistent, if esse is percipi. — Marchesk
But we do have cases where we open our eyes and see that the laptop is frozen up instead of delivering a result. So we have different possible scenarios upon opening our eyes:
The laptop displays a finished computation.
The laptop is frozen up.
The laptop is out of power.
The laptop has overheated.
The laptop is gone!
And so on. Brutely speaking, we can't say why any of the above happened. We open our eyes, and there's a new experience to be had. But we can provide realist explanations. The laptop is gone because someone else took advantage while our eyes were closed. Perhaps philosophical skepticism at a busy bus stop is a bad idea. — Marchesk
If I were to take the Idealist route, I would likely answer you like this. The Idealist view is not that nothing exists unperceived by me, but that nothing exists unperceived by some mind. The starving kids in Africa obviously perceive themselves and their starvation, so the Idealist need not say they don't exist. The same with terrorists. The rain forest being cut down is obviously being perceived by the people cutting it down. — PossibleAaran
The rain forest being cut down is obviously being perceived by the people cutting it down. — PossibleAaran
Strange as Idealism is, we never found any reason to think that things exist unperceived. — PossibleAaran
You would need to ask an Idealist how he knows that there are other minds, and why he cares about a rain forest which only exists when people perceive it. — PossibleAaran
I have often heard professional philosophers in Britain, including gifted ones, assert that according to transcendental idealism 'everything exists in a mind, or in minds, or 'existence is mental'.
This is a radical error. It is not what Kant or Schopenhauer were saying, nor is it what they believed. On the contrary, both of them believed that the abiding reality from which we are screened off by the ever-changing surface of our contingent and ephemeral experiences exists in itself, independent of minds and their perceptions or experiences.
If reality had consisted only of perception, or only of experience, then it would presumably have been possible for us to encompass it exhaustively in perception or experience, to know it through and through, without remainder. But that is not so, and the chief clout of transcendental idealism is contained in the insight that while it is possible for us to perceive or experience or think or envisage only in categories determined by our own apparatus, whatever exists cannot in itself exist in terms of those categories, because existence as such cannot be in categories at all. This must mean that in an unfathomably un-understandable way whatever exists independently of experience must be in and throughout its whole nature different from the world of our representations. But because the world of our representations is the only world we know ‚ and the only world we can ever know ‚ it is almost irresistibly difficult for us not to take it for the world tout court, reality, what there is, the world as it is in itself. This is what all of us grow up doing, it is the commonsense view of things, and only reflection of a profound and sophisticated character can free us from it.
think what the realist does, and this is something Schopenhauer is explicit about, is that s/he forgets to take account of him or herself, the sense in which all of our knowledge of the world is mediated by the senses, assimilated by the understanding, and represented in the intellect. Realism, generally, doesn't critically reflect on the nature of experience, and the contribution the mind makes to it. — Wayfarer
Since we can't step outside, there's no reason to suppose we're inside a simulation. It's merely a philosophical exercise in what sort of wild scenarios we can imagine which aren't incompatible with our experiences. Brains in vats, evil demons, computer simulations, God's dreaming are flights of fancy. Something being merely possible isn't saying much. Maybe a cosmic unicorn farted and started the Big Bang. — Marchesk
You're asking this question by starting out saying the Matrix exists. We're not in a situation were we can do that. We can only imagine the possibility. — Marchesk
This is not skepticism, this is apathy.
— charleton
But this was what scepticism was for the ancients, and certainly for Sextus. — PossibleAaran
Of course it's proponents believe it provides some privileged outlook, if they didn't they wouldn't have chosen to think within such constraints. They've selected it from the range of possible beliefs because they think it might work better. This is surely no less true for idealists, solipsists, theists, or agnostics. They've all selected their ways of looking at the world because they think it offers them some privileged insights, but none have any convincing proof that this is the case, why single out naturalism for criticism? — Inter Alia
There are only three positions - an objective world exists, an objective world does not exist, an objective world may or may not exist. None provides the proponent any greater insight or privileged outlook. There seems to be an implicit assumption that being 'open to the possibility' of some spiritual or non-physical dimension confers some advantage such that choosing one of the other two options is reprehensibly narrow minded, but I'm not seeing any convincing argument to that effect. — Inter Alia
Maybe it's a bit imposing for the materialist to scoff at the spiritualist and say they have no proof for their beliefs, but is it any less imposing for the agnostic/skeptic to scoff at either and say they have no reason to be so convinced? — Inter Alia
Hold on a bit there. Change the referent from one of perceivable world/reality to one of logical inference. As regards logical possibilities, either a) there is an objective reality or b) there isn’t. Here, the law of excluded middle holds … and A and B are contradictory positions—so only one of the two can be true. — javra
This one wasn't directed at me, but I disagree. Realism says that the objects which I perceive exist when I am not perceiving them. The evil demon hypothesis says that the objects which I perceive do not exist when I am not perceiving them. It also says that the evil demon exists even when I am not perceiving him, and he is the explanation of the existence of the things I perceive. If 'metaphysically' is read in the usual way as concerning 'what there is', it is clear that these two hypotheses are not equivalent at all. I imagine that you mean equivalent for practical purposes, given your later remark, 'what difference would it have made'? — PossibleAaran
"Objective reality" is a name we give to a set of perceptions, observations, ideas. — T Clark
Objectivity—the state of being objective—holds multiple definitions (confer with Wiktionary, for instance). One of which is that of being just/impartial and, hence, unbiased. Objective reality is then either a repetition of synonyms (objective objectivity; the really real) or, to my mind, the affirmation of a reality not clouded by, hence impartial to, hence independent of, personal preferences (etc.).
All the same, how does the logic I’ve previously expressed not hold? — javra
What do you mean by never having found any reason? Do you mean any reason the idealist would accept? I think there are good reasons for being a realist. They might not be good enough to convince an idealist or skeptic, but that's their problem. — Marchesk
You posit the evil daemon to be inconsistent to realism—the latter, by your definition, being the stance that one or more things can hold presence when not perceived or thought about.
To understand your “skeptical” point of view better:
Does the evil daemon hold presence when not perceived or thought about?
Secondly, is everything that one thinks true (here, correspondent to what is real)?
BTW, it wouldn’t make much sense for me to answer your questions when mine are not first answered … since I’d have little if any understanding of your own stance. — javra
No, I do not think so.I think this is more like the case of Catholics calling Protestants "atheists", failing to describe their thinking.
Skepticism was also for many years in the modern period (late Medieval) a term of abuse directed from those that were happy with their certainty, especially about God, against those that preferred to ask questions.
`By the religious establishment a good dose of healthy skepticism was seen as a major danger and was traduced as a "burning issue" in a literal sense.
But those self identifying as skeptic would have a more positive view of their position, as do I. — charleton
I think what the realist does, and this is something Schopenhauer is explicit about, is that s/he forgets to take account of him or herself, the sense in which all of our knowledge of the world is mediated by the senses, assimilated by the understanding, and represented in the intellect. Realism, generally, doesn't critically reflect on the nature of experience, and the contribution the mind makes to it. — Wayfarer
What, exactly, does my mind contribute to that experience? What I am tempted to say is just that I look and I see the laptop. My mind isn't adding anything. The laptop is there before my consciousness. But I recognize that this is likely far too simple to be true. — PossibleAaran
[Kant once remarked] 'If I take away the thinking subject, the whole material world must vanish, as this world is nothing but the phenomenal appearance in the sensibility of our own subject, and is a species of this subject's representations.' … [An] objection would run: 'Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to what Kant has just been quoted as saying, that is impossible.' Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was twofold. First, the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of our sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room. The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.
This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood, so that these statements appear faulty in ways in which, properly understood, they are not. Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them.
I studied Hume under David Stove. He was a great guy, and a terrific teacher. Very sympathetic to me, who was kind of a rebel without a clue. But I don't think Stove 'got' Kant at all. — Wayfarer
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