Spinoza and Hegel all reject the supernatural — Janus
According to Maimonides' exegesis, as explained by his commentators, the sword can destroy the body, but not the disembodied intellect. Maimonides quotes also other [Old Testament] verses….The one who knows and passionately loves God has no fear of death, because the intellect cannot be physically harmed; and this eternal freedom from the bodily passions is true "peace".
In Ethics, Vp38-39, Spinoza echoes Maimonides, and argues that amor Dei intellectualis removes the fear of death, since the intellect is invulnerable. The more the mind has intellectual knowledge, the more it remains "unharmed". Consequently, those who have eternal intellectual knowledge "hardly fear death".
Based on that, parents that want to keep their offspring alive, have to feed them (that young humans have to be provided with food instead of getting it themselves is in itself another such fact). — Πετροκότσυφας
I have said numerous times that this distinction is unnecessary as the "physical" and "non-physical" still interact and are causally influenced by each other. — Harry Hindu
Isn't that my point - that it ISN'T useful to make such a distinction when talking about causation and information flow?As I've told you already, the fact that two things interact is not reason to deny that there is a useful distinction to be made between those two things. If you want to claim that the distinction between physical and non-physical is unnecessary, you need a much better argument than that. — Metaphysician Undercover
Stimulus and response and language and abstraction are simply different forms of information flow. You're simply talking about different levels of causation/information flow. You haven't made an argument against anything I have said.Stimulus and response are different to language and abstraction. — Wayfarer
I grasp the distinction you are making, it's just that it doesn't go against anything I have said. You and Andrew M are simply talking about different levels of causation. You are simply saying that humans can get at the deeper causal influences of what it is that they are experiencing at any moment. Humans just get at more information than other animals because we can get at the deeper causes - all the way back to the Big Bang.It has been said that ‘intelligence is the ability to make distinctions’. There are some fundamental distinctions you’re failing to grasp here, although it is habitual nowadays to ignore the distinction between h. Sapiens and other animals (which is ‘sapience’, the Latin equivalent of ‘sophia’, which is wisdom, which is what philosophy is named for.) — Wayfarer
You, like Wayfarer, are simply trying to move the goal-posts. I'm talking about information flow and causation. You are simply talking about different degrees, or levels, of causation and information flow.That's true, but I'm not just referring to seeing the flags and that they're being waved (which, as you say, also involves a flow of information). Seeing the flags waving is presumably automatic and instinctual for humans and animals alike.
I'm instead referring to the higher-level information that is being communicated via the flag waving, namely, the ship arrival details.
Now that information is in the world as well. But to interpret and understand it requires the ability to think abstractly, it is not just an automatic sensory process. — Andrew M
Some things, like the integers, are included in that domain, and other things, like the square root of -1, are not. — Wayfarer
To clarify, I was referring to information pointing to no concepts, that is, meaningless raw data, like statics from the tv set, perceived by the senses but unintelligible to the mind. Otherwise, I agree that meaningful information must be non-physical, for the reason you pointed out. — Samuel Lacrampe
You are once again confusing the symbol or word, with the concept it points to. Yes, we can change the symbols 1, 2, 3, ..., but we cannot change the concepts I, II, III, ... As such, we can make 1+1=3 if we change the symbols, but cannot make I+I=III <-- As you can see, there is one too many bar on the right side of the equation, which makes it unbalanced.
And as it is with concepts of numbers, so it is with other concepts. E.g., we can change the word "red", but the concept of red-ness will remain unchanged. — Samuel Lacrampe
A rock participates in the form of rock-ness, even before a subject observes it or find a word or symbol for it for the first time. — Samuel Lacrampe
think this is very close to the naturalistic fallacy. And besides, none of the quoted passage does anything to address what has been rightly called The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. One of the noticeable achievements of mathematical physics, is to discover hitherto entirely unknown, and even unsuspected, properties of matter, on the basis of mathematical symmetries and reasoning. To reduce mathematics to 'behaviours' seems comically insufficient to account for these achievements. (It's also worth mentioning, again, the considerable influence of Platonism on the development of modern scientific method, via the influence of the Italian Renaissance humanists on Galileo, among others.) — Wayfarer
Isn't that my point - that it ISN'T useful to make such a distinction when talking about causation and information flow?
What exactly IS the distinction being made anyway, and why? If I have said that information is both "physical" and "non-physical", then what use is there to make a distinction between them? If you're wanting to simply make a distinction between different kinds, or forms, of information, then you aren't making an argument against anything I have said, as it is all still information. — Harry Hindu
I think it is far too sweeping to say that Kant, Spinoza and Hegel 'all rejected the supernatural'. There are books on 'Hegel the mystic'; Kant said the purpose of his philosophy was to 'find the limit to knowledge so as to make room for faith'; the high point of Spinoza's philosophy was 'the intellectual love of God'. It is also the case that the rejection of metaphysics, in a general and broad sense, was the defining characteristic of positivism. And you yourself have on numerous occasions in this thread, and elsewhere, said that anything you regard to be 'supernatural' is out of bounds for philosophy; I seem to recall your quoting Biblical verses in support of that argument in this very thread. — Wayfarer
Further to Spinoza - I have been looking into his well-known phrase 'the intellectual love of God' (amor Dei intellectualis ), and it is thoroughly metaphysical, in just the same way as medieval Jewish mysticism was. (And bear in mind, the words 'metaphysical' and 'supernatural' are Greek and Latin terms, respectively, meaning the same thing.) — Wayfarer
If you don't understand Kant's project as a critical rejection of speculative systems like Platonism, Scholasticism, Cartesianism, Spinozism and Leibnizism, then you simply don't understand Kant. — Janus
Spinoza's "intellectual love of God" comes, for him, from our intuitive intellectual capacity... — Janus
It consists in imagination, feeling and intuition; what else? I predict you will say that it points to something 'higher'; but you can't say what that "something" is, or in what sense it could be real, apart from your mystical feeling. — Janus
Hegel made this point when he said that if there is a set of rules or imperatives, then morality is already deficient. — Janus
"Everything that from eternity has happened in heaven and earth, the life of God and all deeds of time simply are the struggles for Mind to know itself, to make itself objective to itself, to find itself, be for itself, and finally unite itself to itself; it is alienated and divided, but only so as to be able thus to find itself and return to itself. Only in this manner does Mind attain its freedom, for that is free which is not connected with or dependent on another. True self-possession and satisfaction are only to be found in this, and in nothing else but Thought does mind attain this freedom.
"Reason," Hegel says, "is the conscious certainty of being all
reality." This does not mean that a separate person is all reality;
in his separateness he is not quite real, but what is real in him is
his participation in Reality as a whole. In proportion as we become
more rational, this participation is increased.
The Absolute Idea, with which the Logic ends, is something like
Aristotle's God. It is thought thinking about itself. Clearly the
Absolute cannot think about anything but itself, since there is
nothing else, except to our partial and erroneous ways of appre-
hending Reality. We are told that Spirit is the only reality, and
tffat its thought is reflected into itself by self-consciousness. The
actual words in which the Absolute Idea is defined are very
obscure.
Now, don't get me wrong; I think those mystical feeling can have great value; they can totally transform lives in ways nothing else can; but this does not entail that they are anything more than feelings. — Janus
But this would not be anything we could ever experience, because experience requires change, temporality. — Janus
Nevertheless I think ‘the domain of natural numbers’ is a perfectly intelligible expression, even if it’s not something that exists in a spatial or temporal sense. — Wayfarer
So again, a Platonic realist view, as I would understand it, is not that natural numbers are existing things in an existing place, but that they’re real, insofar as they’re the same for anyone capable of counting. It’s possible to be wrong about maths (as I nearly always was, and failed the subject). — Wayfarer
Furthermore, numbers are not ‘aspects of the natural world’, if by that we mean the world that is perceptible by sense, as they are only perceptible by means of reason. — Wayfarer
All we are doing is talking about causation and how information flows from the first cause to the final effect we are talking about at any given moment. — Harry Hindu
If by definition, you mean quite literally the description of the concept, and not the concept in itself, then I agree with you. (man this topic is hard). — Samuel Lacrampe
realises him or herself as the imperishable Mind, Intellect or Soul and this is as much true for Spinoza as for many or all the other pre-moderns. — Wayfarer
It is not that it's 'vague' or 'subjective' or 'can't be described' - it's a transformation of perception, it is a different way of being. — Wayfarer
Notice that in this framing, mysticism might be valid, but it is entirely subjective. It is wholly and solely a matter of 'how you feel'. And you can respect that, because individuals have a right to such private and subjective feelings. But when it comes to accepting that it might reveal something that is actually true - well, different story altogether. — Wayfarer
It's mistaken to say that Spinoza uses intellect in the same way as "other medievals". Which other medievals? — Janus
What's the point of distorting philosophical ideas to fit your own favored conceptions — Janus
If such a thing were indeed possible; you would only know that if you had realized it; and I don't believe you have — Janus
You are distorting those passages form Hegel through a tendentious lens. — Janus
The common thread is the feeling; the kind of experience; which is a commonality of affectivity. — Janus
I haven't anyway said it is totally "subjective" — Janus
As I see it, since I have known you on this and the other two older forums, you have been repeating the same themes and mistakes over and over. — Janus
The key point is that number is a universal and so ultimately derives its meaning from observed particulars. — Andrew M
The essay I was reading, compared him with Maimonides, who was famous in the ancient and medieval world. — Wayfarer
I can ask you exactly the same question: you read everything through a specific mindset also. — Wayfarer
You know that how? — Wayfarer
I didn't pursue philosophy as a subject, because I don't like the way it is generally understood in the secular west. It is not at all concerned with spiritual enlightenment, which it once used to be. — Wayfarer
Those three thinkers share at least one significant thing in common: they all reject any notion of real transcendent realms. — Janus
Are you going to claim that you are self-realized? — Janus
I'm not interested in your academic credentials — Janus
If you are then why not go out into the world and enlighten people? — Janus
Spiritual enlightenment, whatever it is, is not a matter of philosophy, in the sense of something that can be sensibly argued about. — Janus
This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed. — Socrates
Wrong. Depending on what we are talking about, the cause can be "physical" and the effect "non-physical", or vice versa. Or it is even possible that they both be "physical" or both be "non-physical". Again you evade the questions we need answered in order to make any sense of what you are saying.Of course it's useful to make such a distinction, just like it's useful to distinguish between cause and effect. Following your stated principle, it would be pointless to distinguish between cause and effect, because this is an interaction and there is no point distinguishing between the two parts of an interaction. But we make those distinctions in order to understand.
So if information has both a physical and a non-physical part, it is important to distinguish between these, just like its important to distinguish cause from effect in a causal relation. I would argue that since the physical part of information is always a representation of the non-physical part, the non-physical part is necessarily prior in time to the physical part. — Metaphysician Undercover
I already agreed to that and even explained what abstract thought was in relation to getting at information (the causal relationships between causes and their effects). Thinking abstractly is an effect of prior causes and a cause of subsequent effects (both "physical" and "non-physical").Yes, so the ship arrival details were transmitted via a causal process that resulted in those details being entered into a log book. We agree about that.
Do you also agree that the humans involved in transmitting that message were thinking abstractly in order to understand the message and relay it on? — Andrew M
Depending on what we are talking about, the cause can be "physical" and the effect "non-physical", or vice versa. Or it is even possible that they both be "physical" or both be "non-physical". quote]
Right, so why would this mean that it is not useful to distinguish between physical and non-physical?
— Harry Hindu
Again you evade the questions we need answered in order to make any sense of what you are saying. — Harry Hindu
What exactly IS the distinction being made anyway, and why? If I have said that information is both "physical" and "non-physical", then what use is there to make a distinction between them? If you're wanting to simply make a distinction between different kinds, or forms, of information, then you aren't making an argument against anything I have said, as it is all still information. — Harry Hindu
Non-physical" does not always precede the "physical". The idea of your mother does not precede her material existence. If it did, you have a great deal more explaining to do - like how it is that you are even here - an effect of physical causes like sex and birth. — Harry Hindu
Except that "two plus two equals four" is a mathematical proposition. Splitting food and assorting things is not. I was referring to the latter. Tell me MU, so that I might understand what you're saying, is "two plus two equals four" right according to you? If it is, in virtue of what is it correct? — Πετροκότσυφας
Sure. You can always prefer math that fail to build houses and fly planes as good as the ones we use. Why you would do that, I don't know, I wouldn't and people tend to want houses that do not collapse and planes that do not crush, but, sure, you can do that. In a less queer fashion, the principles are the extra-mathematical practices and the practices internal to our mathematical systems, i.e. established procedures of calculation. — Πετροκότσυφας
So, twice two four is not correct simply because "that's what everybody does". It is correct because we want ways to do stuff out in the world and we have found that this specific and syntactically rigorous system of calculation within which twice two four is decided, helps us do exactly that. Had you built an equally rigorous system which would help us do stuff out in the world and in which twice two twentyfive, would just mean that you built a new system, not that twice two four is wrong in the old system. — Πετροκότσυφας
Had you built an equally rigorous system which would help us do stuff out in the world and in which twice two twentyfive, would just mean that you built a new system, not that twice two four is wrong in the old system. — Πετροκότσυφας
Except that he says mathematical propositions (like other formal propositions) acquire their sense from extra-systemic applications, otherwise they would be syntactically right but empty, a literally useless game of signs. — Πετροκότσυφας
n other words I don't think that the idea that universals are physical or non-physical is a proposition that could be correct or incorrect; but merely more or less useful or fruitful in different contexts. This is why I have been criticizing Wayfarer on this; because he seems to think there is some higher, unimpeachable truth of the matter regarding universals; that universals point to some 'higher, supernatural order". I don't believe any of that; I don't think there is anything like an ultimate authority or power beyond nature that could hold sway over us and our investigations. — Janus
An abstraction is not, by definition, physical; but what it is an abstraction from may be. So gravity is not an abstraction as you previously said it is, but is a phenomenon that may be thought of as physical insofar as its effects are observable even though it is not. My original point was to ask how mind is different than this. — Janus
This is an interesting topic. I think you are making an error with the claim that because 1 can be divided, then it loses its original nature of being the most simple unit or identity. 1 whole can be divided into two halves, but notice that we are forced to change identity, as underlined, in order to speak truly. 1 whole = 2 halves, but 1 whole ≠ 2 wholes, because 1 ≠ 2. Similarly, 1 m = 100 cm, but 1 m ≠ 100 m. In other words, for a given identity, 1 remains the simplest unit; and if it gets divided, then it gets divided into different identities. As such, the nature of 1 remains unchanged.I believe concepts change too. I believe that 1 was originally used to signify the most simple unit. Unlike 2, 4, 6, 8, it could not be divided. As the practise of division developed it was allowed that 1 could be divided, and this gave us fractions. So the concept signified by 1 changed from being the most simple, indivisible unit to being infinitely divisible. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is indeed my position that the particular thing and the universal form are inherently united. If I understand you correctly, your position is that the particular and the universal are distinct, objectively disconnected, and only related by man-made judgement, is that correct? From this view, does it follow that only particular forms are objective real, where as universal forms are only man-made?That "a rock participates in the form of rock-ness" requires a judgement. The thing itself, and the form of rock-ness are two distinct things. [...] Without that judgement, the particular thing, and the universal form must be inherently united. In the way that I describe, the particular and the universal are distinct, and a judgement relates them. Without the judgement, they must be already related through participation. — Metaphysician Undercover
The difference between humans and other animals is simply the degree in which we can delve into the causal relationships of nature. — Harry Hindu
1. What exactly is the distinction you are trying to make when using the terms, "non-physical" and "physical"? What exactly does it mean for something to be "non-physical" as opposed to "physical".What question are you talking about? I am only objecting to your claim that it is not useful to distinguish between physical and non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, it wouldn't be useful because there could be instances where the cause and effect sequence we are talking about is all "physical", or all "non-physical".If, as you say, information is both physical and non-physical, then it would be useful for us to determine which aspects are physical and which are non-physical, in order to understand the nature of information.
So consider this. We have identified an object, and we have named it, "information". We agree that it is both physical and non-physical, but we still don't have a firm agreement or understanding concerning the nature of this thing. Do you not think that it would be productive to proceed toward analyzing how we distinguish between physical and non-physical within that thing, in order to get an understanding of the nature of that thing? For example, suppose we have identified and object which is both blue and not-blue. Do you not think that it would be productive to analyze how we distinguish between the blue and the not-blue of that object in order to understand the nature of that object.
In other words, if we agree that an object has contrary properties, my claim is that it is useful to determine the way that we distinguish between those contrary properties within that object, in order to understand the object. By the law of non-contradiction, we only allow that the same object has contrary properties at different times. That is why I used a temporal explanation in my last post. — Metaphysician Undercover
No. The effect (whatever effect we are talking about) is a representation of it's prior causes. It has nothing to do with whether or not some cause, or some effect is "physical" or not. All effects carry information about their prior causes. All effects are representations of their causes.Ok, I agree that in some examples, the physical precedes the non-physical. Perhaps you agree with me though, that the way to approach this issue is through temporality, because that is the only way to accept that contrary properties are attributed to the same object. My argument was in the case of this one specific type of object, which we have identified as "information", the non-physical property precedes the physical because the physical is a representation of the non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover
The texts are there, read them. — Πετροκότσυφας
They agree in what they do. Mathematical truth isn't established by their all agreeing that it's true—as if they were witnesses of it. Because they all agree in what they do, we lay it down as a rule, and put it in the archives. Not until we do that have we got to mathematics.
It is as if we had hardened the empirical proposition into a rule. And now we have, not an hypothesis that gets tested by experience, but a paradigm with which experience is compared and judged. And so a new kind of judgment
They are determined by a consensus of action: a consensus of doing the same thing, reacting in the same way. There is a consensus but it is not a consensus of opinion. We all act the same way, walk the same way, count the same way.
The agreement of humans that is a presupposition of logic is not an agreement in opinions, much less in opinions on questions of logic.
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