Well stick to Descartes if you don't like W. One talks of 'experience of' - an oasis, say - precisely to bracket off the possibility of illusion. The illusion of experience is a nonsense. One can have phantom limb pain, but not phantom phantom limb pain, except in the unlikely circumstance where one believes wrongly that one has lost the limb.

Well stick to Descartes if you don't like W. One talks of 'experience of' - an oasis, say - precisely to bracket off the possibility of illusion. The illusion of experience is a nonsense. — unenlightened

I agree. I think people do a switcharoo and try to explain the causes of consciousness as some sort of hitherto unexplored origin and then because it is some genus of causes which is not what we originally thought, they want to then go an extra step and say the actual consciousness is therefore an illusion. If we want to bring in Wittgenstein, we can bring it there. It's not even an illusion as much as something that was not what we originally thought. They are confusing everybody by misusing the word illusion.

either I don't understand or I don't think it actually does answer this question of how representing can "come on" the scene AFTER pure Will is on the scene. — schopenhauer1

I didn't mean for it to answer this question, for my point has been that this question cannot be answered, as to do so would involve something like a category mistake.

To my mind, representation is ALWAYS there along with Will (as it's flipside double-aspect) because it cannot "arise" when "arising" implies causality. — schopenhauer1

So you say from an empirical perspective, which is quite correct. However, there is another perspective, resultant from the denial of the will, in which time ceases to be. While in time, timelessness is unthinkable, but while in timelessness, time is unthinkable.

While in time, timelessness is unthinkable, but while in timelessness, time is unthinkable. — Thorongil

That's fine, but how about the prospect of an ever present organism or ever present "something" by which representation must subsist? I get ever present Will, but ever present organism? If you deny the ever present organism, you will then say representation came on the scene "after" and we both agree that cannot happen if all is Will.

Empirically, we can say conscious organisms arose at a certain point in time. Transcendentally, we can say that the knowing subject is atemporal. Other than that, I would only repeat that there can be no object without a subject and no subject without an object.

Transcendentally, we can say that the knowing subject is atemporal. — Thorongil

Right, so ever present "knowing subject". The knowing is the keyword here. The thing is, in this construct, it seems he is saying that even though it "appears" that organisms arose in time qua the organism doing the reflecting, really everything is atemporal. However, being that the "illusion" of the appearances subsist, this illusion is also atemporal being that it cannot have arisen "anywhere". Thus, there is an ever present organism because it did not "arise" (because arisen would be as if there was causality when there really is not). The illusion cannot be taken out of the equation. It cannot be explained away because "really" everything is atemporal Will. There is still the illusion to be accounted for, and which CANNOT have arisen. I'm adding in what I see to be a necessary conclusion to Schopenhauer's framework which is the ever present organism part. I'm not sure if I'm explaining myself well though.

So much selves, so little consciousness. This is getting a bit off topic perhaps, but I would say that most of the time I am performing, conforming to an image that I hold onto and from that nothing new can come. But to be 'authentic' (is that the right word?) is not to make that division for a moment but to respond from the whole of what one is, and in doing so one learns - recognises -something of the truth of what one is. Unfortunately, what tends to happen is that the same process of thought immediately makes a new image of this, and one starts performing it.

My experience is very similar. To my therapist, I've likened that moment, where an image is immediately made of authentic expression, to those scenes in horror movies where the protagonist finally escapes the lair of their captor, runs out into the street, flags down a car --only to realize their captor is the one driving it. (Probably a bit melodramatic, but it sometimes feels that disheartening.) (& the turn of the screw here is when I first came up with this metaphor, it was spontaneous, to the point where I teared up a bit. Now its something I've rolled out a couple times in various places as yet another set piece)

I wonder to what extent this is universal though? You certainly see this kind of thing discussed a lot in philosophy, but perhaps that's because the type of people drawn to philosophy are the same type of people who struggle with 'authenticity'? (You have to be at least a little of a narcissist to think you can uncover profound truths through the exercise of your reason.)

And I guess you could say, even in those 'authentic' moments, one is performing. The difference, maybe, is that its a performance you truly believe in, deep down, all the way down to those primitive emotional currents we can never really leave behind. I've always liked the phrase 'Transcendence is absorption.'

I think people do a switcharoo and try to explain the causes of consciousness as some sort of hitherto unexplored origin and then because it is some genus of causes which is not what we originally thought, they want to then go an extra step and say the actual consciousness is therefore an illusion. — S1

Yeah, I tried to read Dennett's Consciousness Explained (recon to know the enemy better, I guess) but, even though I expected to disagree, I was legitimately disappointed by how shallow the argumentation was. It's exactly as you say - he just attacked the 'cartesian theater', again and again, as if the only two positions were eliminative materialism and Homunculism.

Maybe the book gets better, but I gave up after a couple hundred pages.

Yeah, I tried to read Dennett's Consciousness Explained (recon to know the enemy better, I guess) but, even though I expected to disagree, I was legitimately disappointed by how shallow the argumentation was. It's exactly as you say - he just attacked the 'cartesian theater', again and again, as if the only two positions were eliminative materialism and Homunculism.

Maybe the book gets better, but I gave up after a couple hundred pages. — csalisbury

Sounds about right for Dennett.

When it comes to such as "mind" and "self" and "consciousness" I think we're best off applying Peirce's pragmatic maxim, and then getting on with life. But I'm no philosopher.

When it comes to such as "mind" and "self" and "consciousness" I think we're best off applying Peirce's pragmatic maxim, and then getting on with life. But I'm no philosopher. — Ciceronianus the White

Why do you think we are "best off" applying Peirce's maxim to mind, self, and consciousness? And why even comment on it if we should just "get on with life"? Why even comment on a philosophy forum about it in the first place? It sounds like you aren't following your own maxim. Of course, you might just like being troll-y.

So much selves, so little consciousness. This is getting a bit off topic perhaps, but I would say that most of the time I am performing, conforming to an image that I hold onto and from that nothing new can come. But to be 'authentic' (is that the right word?) is not to make that division for a moment but to respond from the whole of what one is, and in doing so one learns - recognises -something of the truth of what one is. Unfortunately, what tends to happen is that the same process of thought immediately makes a new image of this, and one starts performing it. — unenlightened

Un, Just to say this is exactly how I feel. Thanks for articulating it in a way I haven't been able to. I would say 'authentic' too but then I'm irretrievably stuck with Sartreian categories I mis-learnt about 45 years ago.

There are some basics. Even the Churchlands or Dennett use the first person to describe opinions, themselves, what they did, what they thought and think, what their intentions are. So there are first person accounts.

'Mind' is a word used more by philosophers than anyone else, but if there's something illusory about it, it's still handy to have some term to describe what the creature does, from her point of view, in a mental way, even when she looks as if she's idly staring out of the window. So if you declare mind an illusion you have to reinvent something very like it to explain stuff. Quite often it seems to me that physicalists/materialists start to say 'brain' or 'nervous system' instead of 'mind', which seems to me an error. It's the human being that is conscious, deliberates, decides, speaks, moves, acts in the world, not dissectable bits of the being.

The hope is that in applying the pragmatic maxim, one might achieve some sort of clarity regarding concepts. But it has a negative function as well, as a tool of criticism.

I think application of the pragmatic maxim would suggest that it's inappropriate to speak of "the mind" or "the self" or "consciousness" or "the Will" in the abstract, without context; in other words, without consideration of what is meant by them when applied to actual situations arising in life, If I'm right, its application would thus indicate that we should stop speaking of them in that manner, and so get on with life.

Now, is it "troll-y" (I think "trollish" is better) to make such a comment in the august, sublime confines of a philosophy forum? I would hope not.

The hope is that in applying the pragmatic maxim, one might achieve some sort of clarity regarding concepts. But it has a negative function as well, as a tool of criticism. — Ciceronianus the White

Right, because no one else wants clarity or has clarity using any other methodology. We are all just flies in the bottle, and you are releasing the fly. I'm glad you came along to single-handedly save the day show us all the error. Ok, I'm done trying to out snark you.

it's inappropriate to speak of "the mind" or "the self" or "consciousness" or "the Will" in the abstract, without context; in other words, without consideration of what is meant by them when applied to actual situations arising in life, If I'm right, its application would thus indicate that we should stop speaking of them in that manner, and so get on with life. — Ciceronianus the White

The question was "is it legitimate to say that mind is an illusion, if the illusion itself has to be accounted for". Again, how does the pragmatic principle apply to this? I'm not saying it doesn't, but I want your interpretation and application specifically to this case, since you brought it up. I'm not looking for a rough outline of the pragmatic maxim itself. If you want an explication of Will, I can do that.. It is discussed at length as to how it "applies" in everyday life in Schopenahuer's book. I'm not saying it is "truth" but you certainly are not charitable with it based on your short statements here.

You should really thank Peirce for the pragmatic maxim, not me. I don't know what other methodologies you refer to.

I'm afraid the only work of Schopenhauer I've read (that I can recall; I may have had to read something of his in college in a history of philosophy course) is his little book on wisdom of life, which I wasn't impressed by as I thought it entirely derivative, but may have been an eye-opener when written for all I know. He seems to have been somewhat lacking in that wisdom since he assaulted that poor woman for talking too loudly outside his door. It appears he had a poor opinion of women in general, though.

The Will, from what I heard/read is some mindless, non-rational force or urge that is the foundation of everything in the universe; but this understanding is second-hand. If that understanding is correct, I'm inclined to think that the application of the pragmatic maxim would indicate the concept is idle, as it would seem to be the case that the Will either is everything or some unverifiable, perhaps unknowable, impulse that makes everything happen which Schopenhauer chooses to call "Will."

As for the mind being an illusion, I think we have to determine what the mind is before we can make such a statement, and I think the pragmatic maxim would mandate that we do so by considering what it is that we say "the mind" does that influences our lives. It would seem that in a broad sense, it can be said that what the mind does is pretty much everything that we do, except perhaps or in most cases what we do of necessity as a living organism, e.g. breath, excrete.

So, we think, we feel, we dream, etc. It would seem unnecessary at best to say that our minds do such things. That doesn't mean "the mind" is an illusion, though. It just means that there is no basis on which to distinguish our minds from ourselves.

I don't know what other methodologies you refer to. — Ciceronianus the White

By that I mean, anything that is not Peirce.

I'm inclined to think that the application of the pragmatic maxim would indicate the concept is idle, as it would seem to be the case that the Will either is everything or some unverifiable, perhaps unknowable, impulse that makes everything happen which Schopenhauer chooses to call "Will." — Ciceronianus the White

So how is it idle? You just explained the theory and framed it in a negative way.

So, we think, we feel, we dream, etc. It would seem unnecessary at best to say that our minds do such things. That doesn't mean "the mind" is an illusion, though. It just means that there is no basis on which to distinguish our minds from ourselves. — Ciceronianus the White

That's fine, I guess you agree in a roundabout way that saying "mind is an illusion" still has to account for the illusion.

So how is it idle? You just explained the theory and framed it in a negative way. — schopenhauer1

I tried to note that what I've read of Schopenhauer's Will may be incorrect in some way. If what I've read is correct, though, I think it would be idle in that it would be a mere assertion along the lines of the claim that God is the impulse that makes everything happen. It tells us nothing, explains nothing.

I tried to note that what I've read of Schopenhauer's Will may be incorrect in some way. If what I've read is correct, though, I think it would be idle in that it would be a mere assertion along the lines of the claim that God is the impulse that makes everything happen. It tells us nothing, explains nothing. — Ciceronianus the White

So any a priori philosophy is illegitimate, and since empirical science does not answer the question either, we should move on. How is it that it tells us nothing and explains nothing? He ties our own wills and subject/object relationship with the rest of nature, and extrapolates an underlying Will. He uses Kant's transcendental idealism as a launching point for speculation on the thing-in-itself. I'm not saying his theory is absolutely correct, but your uncharitable interpretation does not even let you look at his arguments.

Un, Just to say this is exactly how I feel. Thanks for articulating it in a way I haven't been able to. I would say 'authentic' too but then I'm irretrievably stuck with Sartreian categories I mis-learnt about 45 years ago. — mcdoodle

Thanks. It's all stolen from Krishnamurti and rephrased. Psychologically, he says, the trick is 'learning without accumulation'; always learning in the present, and never knowing from the past about oneself.

The problem with using a priori is it takes an empirical state (us, in the world, in each moment) and tries to turn it into the infinite. Will is idle because, in forming that universal idea, it leaves out where the action occurs, in each moment of existence, where every little thing is distinct and change occurs.

It is an abstraction of meaning expressed by states of the world. Desire might be everywhere at all times, but no instance of it is the same as another. Will is not what acts. It's merely something expressed in any action. Those actions differ vastly. One soldier is Willed to fight. Another soldier is Willed to flee. Different consequences, different meaning, an understanding of which is not dependent on understanding Will (i.e. that everyone is willed to act), but rather on the states themselves.

The so called "it-in-itself" is a red-herring. With respect to the world, it gives us understanding of nothing, for it only refers to the infinite expression found in any state. It our escape from the world into an abstract realm free of finite difference and change. About the world and its relationships, it says nothing at all.

And that's why a "reason" cannot be found for Will. It doesn't have one. To pose the question is to ask, "Why is making a post making a post?" Unlike states of the world, where existence defines whether or not something occurs, Will contains no action and cannot be said to be or not be. The infinite nature of Will means it cannot have a reason. It's necessary. No matter what we do, Will is still expressed.

The problem with using a priori is it takes an empirical state (us, in the world, in each moment) and tries to turn it into the infinite. Will is idle because, in forming that universal idea, it leaves out where the action occurs, in each moment of existence, where every little thing is distinct and change occurs. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I guess @Ciceronianus the White passed the baton to you? Ok..

Then you miss the point that Schopenhauer made which is a furtherance of Kant's point which is the thing-in-itself (non-spatial/non-temporal aspect) and the world as representation (world individuated in space/time). That is not idle, that is simply speculating based on what we know about our own bodies, and the limits of our epistemology.

It is an abstraction of meaning expressed by states of the world. Desire might be everywhere at all times, but no instance of it is the same as another. Will is not what acts. It's merely something expressed in any action. Those actions differ vastly. One soldier is Willed to fight. Another soldier is Willed to flee. Different consequences, different meaning, an understanding of which is not dependent on understanding Will (i.e. that everyone is willed to act), but rather on the states themselves. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Will is not simply every action though, but the underlying striving below the surface. It's context in language-dependent and situation-dependent instances are simply minor variations on the same theme.

The so called "it-in-itself" is a red-herring. With respect to the world, it gives us understanding of nothing, for it only refers to the infinite expression found in any state. It our escape from the world into an abstract realm free of finite difference and change. About the world and its relationships, it says nothing at all. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This just sounds like TheWillowofDarkeness's (not surprisingly) grumpy feelings of the matter, not necessarily the matter itself. I am pretty sure it is saying a lot. It is giving a principle behind which all is connected. It gives a ground of unity in an only apparently individuated world.

And that's why a "reason" cannot be found for Will. It doesn't have one. To pose the question is to ask, "Why is making a post making a post?" Unlike states of the world, where existence defines whether or not something occurs, Will contains no action and cannot be said to be or not be. The infinite nature of Will means it cannot have a reason. It's necessary. No matter what we do, Will is still expressed. — TheWillowOfDarkness

You are eating your own tail here. Schop's (and Kant's) point was you cannot use empiricism to ground empiricism.

Anyways, I have made a great deal of criticisms of Schopenhauer lately, but this "a priori SMASH" approach of just denying the approach all together is too uncharitable for my taste. We may agree more than you think, but typically, because you get all frothy at the mouth the instant you see something you disagree with I cannot have a dialogue only a shouting match.

Right, so ever present "knowing subject". The knowing is the keyword here. — schopenhauer1

Indeed, and what does the knowing subject know? In consciousness, it knows representation, but in self-consciousness, it knows not a representation, or a "thing" called a self or a soul, but simply willing, or the will, which Schopenhauer calls the subject of willing.

It cannot be explained away because "really" everything is atemporal Will. There is still the illusion to be accounted for, and which CANNOT have arisen. — schopenhauer1

I still think you're confused by categories. Perhaps the following will help. The will can be said to be the reason for the existence of the world as representation, but not its cause. Reasons and causes are not the same, though often conflated, as Schopenhauer shows in the Fourfold Root. The will is a logical explanation of the world, not a physical one. If you recognize this distinction, then I think the force of your concern evaporates.

The will is a logical explanation of the world, not a physical one. If you recognize this distinction, then I think the force of your concern evaporates. — Thorongil

Yeah, but the Fourfold Root only applies to the world of representation- it cannot be applied to Will itself. Also, since we are talking about when "time started", it actually does apply to the category about time and sufficient reason.

Since we are essentially talking about the same thing, why don't we move this conversation to the "This Old Thing" thread.

Ciceronianus gets a bit busy now and then; no doubt due to the Will which underlies him, the law, his clients, the court system, and everything else.

I like Dewey better than Peirce, but agree with Peirce about such things as Kant's "thing in itself." Peirce admired Kant, but thought the "thing in itself" was meaningless surplusage, as must be anything the nature and existence and nature of which cannot be determined, located, found, investigated, known, and regarding which propositions cannot be made and analyzed--propositions which cannot be said to be true or false, likely or unlikely. The same, I think, can be said of the Will. Certainly we can speculate if we wish, but that is all we do in that case, but when our speculation is unable to be judged correct or incorrect, or even probably correct or incorrect, that speculation is idle.

Certainly we can speculate if we wish, but that is all we do in that case, but when our speculation is unable to be judged correct or incorrect, or even probably correct or incorrect, that speculation is idle. — Ciceronianus the White

Of course, "judging correct or incorrect" being the crux. If there are different criteria for this, then even that statement cannot be made. Why is the speculation idle though? The word idle is kind of not doing anything for me right now, so maybe use something else to explain it? Is it because it doesn't allow people to "do" anything with technology or science? You can debate it because one can point out flaws in the argument, etc. Again, you are assuming empiricism, but there are ways to debate non-empirical arguments.

This brings me to a larger point: You assume what is "true" is what is goal-oriented. That in itself could be false. What is useful to "achieve" a a goal, might be good if that is your goal, but then you must argue why being goal-oriented should be the goal, and when you start arguing for the basis of this without any a priori appeal, you will be begging the question and then what happens is you can only use snark and smugness to assert your claim, which would be sad and annoying.

This brings me to a larger point: You assume what is "true" is what is goal-oriented. That in itself could be false. What is useful to "achieve" a a goal, might be good if that is your goal, but then you must argue why being goal-oriented should be the goal, and when you start arguing for the basis of this without any a priori appeal, you will be begging the question and then what happens is you can only use snark and smugness to assert your claim, which would be sad and annoying. — schopenhauer1

I would say, instead, that what we would be justified in calling "true" or provisionally "true" or probably "true" is that which the best available evidence indicates is the case. That evidence can be gained only through observation, investigation, experiment, life experience--living and interacting with the rest of the world, trying and failing or succeeding, seeking solutions to problems, answers to questions, and finding out what happens when we do.

That evidence can be gained only through observation, investigation, experiment, life experience--living and interacting with the rest of the world, trying and failing or succeeding, seeking solutions to problems, answers to questions, and finding out what happens when we do. — Ciceronianus the White

Certainly the Schopenhauer's Will can be found in our own striving nature which is hard to simply deny by fiat. Our own striving is something immediate to us. Try stopping it..

Certainly the Schopenhauer's Will can be found in our own striving nature which is hard to simply deny by fiat. Our own striving is something immediate to us. Try stopping it.. — schopenhauer1

I don't think Schopenhauer's Will, if I understand it correctly, is something that can be inferred from the fact that we have wants, needs, or desires we try to satisfy. And in fact, if we focus on the contexts in which we want something or to do something, we find instances when we can regulate our desire or refrain from indulging it.