"So, one person can simply do whatever s/he chooses to do to another and it would not be right nor wrong - so long as there is no agreement?"
correct, no one is bound to something they are not a part of, or in agreement with. — DPMartin
I'd say the 'pursuit of true happiness' is futile, because if you are pursuing something then it does not currently exist within yourself.
If true happiness is an internal state that you desire, are you not furthering yourself from that state by conditionalising happiness on external occurrences?
If so, can you ever be truly happy unless certain conditions are met?
This, for me at least, disregards the whole idea of true happiness, and if we follow, the same can be applied to our agreed conceptions of goodness.
Find goodness within and it need not be conditioned by externals. — Qurious
How might your understanding suffice when within the context of another animals life? — Qurious
Even if we might conceive it as serving our own base-ends, that conception is limited by a presupposition that 'human nature' equates to no more than securing our own interests, and by fulfilling this naively accepted purpose we are somehow doing good. — Qurious
Thus, subjective morality. — Qurious
I'd say the 'pursuit of true happiness' is futile, because if you are pursuing something then it does not currently exist within yourself. — Qurious
If true happiness is an internal state that you desire, are you not furthering yourself from that state by conditionalising happiness on external occurrences? — Qurious
If following the rules does not require knowing them, then one can follow the rules simply by acting in ways that does not break them. You're bringing sentience into the matter doesn't help, it just continues to move the goalposts. If Virgil can act morally by virtue of acting in a way that you think is moral, but he does not need to be aware of the fact that he's following the rules, then the notion of choice making is moot as well. That would be to say that one can make a choice to act moral without considering what's not. Choosing presupposes volition. Virgil has none. I suspect you know that and that's why you glossed it over earlier... — creativesoul
You're still appealing to your own unsubstantiated assertion that morality is only to do with consciously choosing to follow the rules. — VagabondSpectre
P.S I had to bring up sentience because you compared Virgil to a dandelion — VagabondSpectre
At the heart of it all, your position, at a minimum, is one where the ends justify the means. This has always been the case with what you've been proposing. On the old forum, there have been numerous people with numerous examples of behaviours which meet your criterion but are clearly immoral. Here, you've neglected to answer my earlier objections regarding that, and instead moved the goalposts. — creativesoul
If you wish to talk in meta-ethical terms, regarding what counts as being moral or not, then what methodology do you find fit to do so? — creativesoul
I say, we look to all morality(codes of conduct) to see what they have in common that is morally significant. We can set aside all the individual particulars and look at what remains extant after doing so. What's left would be universally extant, that is - what's left would be a part of all morality. We could then make statements that would be true of all codes.
You seem to be taking a similar route with the bit about what you claim all morality has in common, promoting social and individual welfare(or words to that affect/effect). — creativesoul
Admitting ad hoc isn't compelling you know. — creativesoul
You're still appealing to your own unsubstantiated assertion that morality is only to do with consciously choosing to follow the rules — VagabondSpectre
That's not what I said, nor does it follow from what I've said. — creativesoul
The problem here is clear. Either there are moral behaviours, in and of themselves, or not. In order for Virgil to be acting morally even though he cannot think about the moral rules, then it must be the case that certain behaviours are moral in and of themselves.
You're attempting to argue that some behaviours are moral in and of themselves. The problem is that your criterion admits of clearly immoral behaviour — creativesoul
Sustaining the planet for the sake of the elephants and tigers is noble and all, but it's much more important to me that we sustain the planet for the sake of humans. We are locked in a struggle for survival, against nature, in what is in many ways a zero sum competition. In order for humans to eat, many animals must die. One day we may be technologically and logistically able to take the most morally praiseworthy path without sacrificing actual human lives, but until then extending all possible moral considerations to animals leads to a breakdown of morality when survival and health dilemmas arise. — VagabondSpectre
The real value of my moral approach is that it is very clear from the outset regarding the "subjective" element of moral judgments: nuanced and subjective conceptions of "goodness" are less persuasive and therefore secondary to a specific set of basic values/desires which are nearly universal to all humans (and most animals too). The desire to go on living, the desire to be free and free from strife, and to pursue happiness (in Locke's sense). — VagabondSpectre
What makes pursuing something that does not currently exist in yourself futile though? Humans have achieved much. — VagabondSpectre
Life and liberty are dependent on external sources, and they are both required for happiness. So in many ways, no, by conforming external sources to our will we are improving our odds at achieving higher states of happiness. — VagabondSpectre
You're still appealing to your own unsubstantiated assertion that morality is only to do with consciously choosing to follow the rules
— VagabondSpectre
That's not what I said, nor does it follow from what I've said.
— creativesoul
It's precisely what you said. Here:
"Morality is rule based. If one follows the rules, s/he is behaving morally. Behaving in a way that does not break the rules is not equivalent to following them." — VagabondSpectre
It's not the behavior in and of itself that is "moral". It's the fact that the behavior is mutually beneficial toward the shared interests of Virgil and Vulcan both, which is also dependent on the environment they are in. — VagabondSpectre
I'm not sure what you're going on about here... — creativesoul
So, being moral equates to being mutually beneficial toward the shared interests of Virgil and Vulcan. Writ large that would be to say that moral behaviour is behaviour which is mutually beneficial towards the shared interests of the behaving agent and... someone else... anyone else... or everyone else effected/affected by the behaviour? — creativesoul
That's not precisely what I said.
Morality is ruled based. Behaving morally is only to do with following the moral rules. Behaving morally is not morality. — creativesoul
So, being moral equates to being mutually beneficial toward the shared interests of Virgil and Vulcan. Writ large that would be to say that moral behaviour is behaviour which is mutually beneficial towards the shared interests of the behaving agent and... someone else... anyone else... or everyone else effected/affected by the behaviour? — creativesoul
P.S.
The SEP defines morality exactly how I've been employing the term... — creativesoul
The distinction you make between "being moral and being called so" is irrelevant. Every action, human or otherwise, is something we 'call' moral in the hope that we have correctly identified it as moral. The fact that we're 'calling' Virgil's behaviour moral because it looks like it is obviously doesn't automatically mean it is moral, we might be wrong, but we might be right also, I'm not sure what pointing that out does for the argument? — Inter Alia
either being moral is wholly determined by what we say it is, or we can get it wrong. — creativesoul
If we define a moral thing as a thing which has some properties (x,y,and z), then (presuming we all still agree it has those properties), it is possible for everyone in the world to be wrong, they could all call X moral, but it does not have properties x,y and z which they have all just agreed a moral thing has so they have all made a logical error. — Inter Alia
We could define moral by first deciding properties x,y and z and then going around looking for everything with those properties, or we could define moral by collecting all the things we'd like to put together on the grounds of sufficient similarity and then look for what properties are both necessary and sufficient for membership of that group. — Inter Alia
I'm saying (and I think Vagabond is too) that I think the behaviour exhibited by Virgil goes in the set of 'Moral things' I think it is similar enough in shared properties to be lumped in with all the other things we call moral behaviour. If you think it lacks some property that should be a necessary property of moral behaviour, that's fine, let us know what that property is, but we might not agree.
There are then only two ways of resolving that disagreement. We could either take an ordinary language approach and ask whose set of properties is most like the set used by most people when they use the word 'moral', or we could take an analytical approach and ask what job the word 'moral' does and which set of properties are necessary for it to do that job. — Inter Alia
What I'm saying is that in order to describe any action as moral we must presume at least the 'goodness' of the outcome and it must be an action which at least appears to be one selected from a range of choices. — Inter Alia
I'm saying that if being moral is not existentially contingent upon our awareness of it, then we can get it wrong by virtue of (misconception). Contrary to many, I hold that we can define things incorrectly. — creativesoul
Virgil does not have what it takes to conceive of acting in a way that follows codification. — creativesoul
being helpful is something that is not existentially contingent upon our awareness. It is good/moral in and of itself. ... Virgil is being helpful. — creativesoul
Thinking morally requires metacognition. Metacognition requires written language. — creativesoul
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