Perhaps "good science" should be rooted in its consistent ability to predict future events instead of its ability to be falsifiable

Karl Popper proposed the solution to the problem of demarcation that is known as falsifiability. The problem with that is that the foundational axioms of science are unfalsifiable. Therefore, under this definition, all science is pseudoscience. I still think the idea of falsifiability is valuable to scientific understanding, but I have a proposition that builds upon that idea. If a claim is unfalsifiable, but the idea that the belief in its truth provides value is falsifiable, then it should still be regarded as science. I'm curious as to other peoples views on the concept of pseudoscience, certainty, as well as what I wrote above. — MonfortS26

I think I like where this is heading, but I could use some clarification. How about an example of a claim which is unfalsifiable, but the idea that the belief in its truth provides value is falsifiable.

Part of my investigation into the philosophy of science started with my investigation into the philosophy of mind, specifically my attempts to define thought. I arrived at the hypothetical conclusion that if reductionism and determinism are true, thought could be defined as the action of carrying out instructions. Basically identical to the function of a CPU if I understand correctly. That drove me deep into the hard problem of consciousness, the concept of certainty, and the concept of "good science". If this is the case we could bypass the attempts to locate "consciousness" and focus directly on modifying behavior from a neuronal point of view. But the core of that idea is essentially panpsychism. The notion that thought is possible on an atomic level. I think it is possible that thought is a dimension (for lack of a better word) of matter. Attempting to test that though would be the same as trying to solve the hard problem of consciousness. Frankly though, all of that could be bullshit, all I know is I am officially confused.

But really one could argue that all science is reducible to its axioms and therefore any scientific evidence fits the description of what I was going for in the first post. It's just a way to include its axioms in the idea of falsifiability.

Karl Popper proposed the solution to the problem of demarcation that is known as falsifiability. The problem with that is that the foundational axioms of science are unfalsifiable. Therefore, under this definition, all science is pseudoscience. — MonfortS26

Popper's view was basically pragmatic - an empirical theory is one for which there can be empirical evidence either for or against. That covers an awfully large domain of possible knowledge. But metaphysical or epistemological theories may not be falsifiable in that way, and for this reason aren't considered scientific theories, regardless of any other merits they might have.

Perhaps it is right to say that 'falsifiability' is not itself an empirical principle but that doesn't undermine its validity. It's simply a definition or demarcation as to what ought to be considered empirical and what not. I don't see why the fact that it is not empirical is an argument against it.

There's a current case in point - actually a really very large and significant case. This is the debate over whether string theory and the idea of multiverses is science or pseudo-science, because they might never be testable. Those prosecuting the case against are George Ellis and Joe Silk, who led with a paper called Defend the Integrity of Physics in December 2014.

This year, debates in physics circles took a worrying turn. Faced with difficulties in applying fundamental theories to the observed Universe, some researchers called for a change in how theoretical physics is done. They began to argue — explicitly — that if a theory is sufficiently elegant and explanatory, it need not be tested experimentally, breaking with centuries of philosophical tradition of defining scientific knowledge as empirical. We disagree. As the philosopher of science Karl Popper argued: a theory must be falsifiable to be scientific.

Chief among the 'elegance will suffice' advocates are some string theorists. Because string theory is supposedly the 'only game in town' capable of unifying the four fundamental forces, they believe that it must contain a grain of truth even though it relies on extra dimensions that we can never observe. Some cosmologists, too, are seeking to abandon experimental verification of grand hypotheses that invoke imperceptible domains such as the kaleidoscopic multiverse (comprising myriad universes), the 'many worlds' version of quantum reality (in which observations spawn parallel branches of reality) and pre-Big Bang concepts.

These unprovable hypotheses are quite different from those that relate directly to the real world and that are testable through observations — such as the standard model of particle physics and the existence of dark matter and dark energy. As we see it, theoretical physics risks becoming a no-man's-land between mathematics, physics and philosophy that does not truly meet the requirements of any.

I agree, although I also know that my own understanding of the technicalities is very slight. But science nowadays is prepared to entertain some truly mind-boggling ideas that might never be 'falsifiable' in Popper's sense, so I think the question of whether they really are scientifically sound is a perfectly valid and important one.

Those prosecuting the case against are George Ellis and Joe Silk, who led with a paper called Defend the Integrity of Physics in December 2014. — Wayfarer

Maybe they were right. Maybe we've reached the limit of scientific knowledge and it's collapsing back onto its logical foundations. With that description, it seems like the work of these theoretical physicists is better described as abductive reasoning than science.

The problem with that is that the foundational axioms of science are unfalsifiable — MonfortS26

I don't think science has any foundational axioms.

The only scientific axioms I know of are those that are part of a theory - eg the postulates of quantum mechanics. Those postulates are open to falsification by doing experiments where the predictions of the postulates are not realised.

I don't think science has any foundational axioms. — andrewk

Off the top of my head. Not sure about all of these:

• There is an objective reality
• There is a relationship between a statement and objective reality called "truth."
• To know something the following statements must be true 1) I believe the subject of knowledge exists 2) The subject of knowledge is true and 3) I am justified in believing the subject of knowledge is true.
• Objective reality can be known by the procedures included in the scientific method.

Another big one is the belief that because natural laws have been true in the past, that they will continue to be true in the future

There is an objective reality — T Clark

In order for there to be an object, there must be a subject.

That is not science, in fact most scientists wouldn't think about it, but I'm sure it's true.

It comes out of Kant.

Another big one is the belief that because natural laws have been true in the past, that they will continue to be true in the future — MonfortS26

That is not far from Hume's 'problem of induction'.

That is not science, in fact most scientists wouldn't think about it, but I'm sure it's true.

It comes out of Kant. — Wayfarer

Of course it's not science, it's metaphysics. Of course it's not true, no matter how sure you are, it's metaphysics. Or were you saying you don't think it's true? If so, it's not not true, it's metaphysics.

And no, it's doesn't come out of Kant.

Or were you saying you don't think it's true? If so, it's not not true, it's metaphysics. — T Clark

I was questioning your first 'axiom', i.e. 'that there is an objective reality'. What I said was, that in order for there to be an object, there must also be a subject. So I am indirectly challenging the so-called 'mind-independence of reality'. But we can take that up in one of the threads to which it is probably more relevant.

I'd call those philosophical assumptions, not scientific assumptions.
I'm a Shut Up and Calculate person. When I want to connect scientific theories to ideas about reality or existence I take off my science hat and put on my philosophy hat.

yes

It's philosophy of science though. Are the two really as separate as you're making them?

Yes

If a claim is unfalsifiable, but the idea that the belief in its truth provides value is falsifiable, then it should still be regarded as science. — MonfortS26

Haven't you shot yourself in the foot? The value of scientific theories rests on them being falsifiable. If yes, how can an unfalsifiable claim/theory have any value? And why would anyone adopt a claim solely on value derived off it? By your reckoning religion is scientific because belief in God has value in terms of a moral society.

Pseudoscience is a bad concept because it's lazy. Anything someone disagrees with can be labeled as pseudoscience. If you think there is something wrong with it, don't just slap on a label and declare your dogmatism to be true. Spend the time to explain what is wrong with it and let people come to their own conclusions. There absolutely must be a separation of science and state, as there is religion and state, in order to avoid these totalizing and oppressive schemes where anything not-science is bad, wrong, misguided, corrupt, outdated, and worthless.

In fact I think we ought to scrap the whole label "science" and just refer to things as their individual disciplines. Fuck the idea of a unifying theory and fuck the idea of a unified methodology.

Another big one is the belief that because natural laws have been true in the past, that they will continue to be true in the future — MonfortS26

Admittedly it would be more difficult to make progress in science if that were not the case, but the scientific method, as expounded by Popper, makes no such assumption.

In fact, it is central to the scientific method that no such assumptions are made.

I think your oversimplification of Popper is basically a straw man.

Perhaps "good science" should be rooted in its consistent ability to predict future events instead of its ability to be falsifiable — MonfortS26

Like astrology? They consistently predict future events because of the broad likelihood that millions of Capricorns might feel stressed in a few days time but that they will find a day to relax and things will get better. It does show something; is 'science' here being defined rationally or sociologically as Kuhn pointed out? These predictions merely accommodate pre-existing facts or possibilities because pseudoscience is static. "Astrologers were greatly impressed, and misled, by what they believed to be confirming evidence - so much so that they were quite unimpressed by any unfavourable evidence. Moreover, by making their interpretations and prophesies sufficiently vague they were able to explain away anything that might have been a refutation of the theory had the theory and the prophesies been more precise. In order to escape falsification they destroyed the testability of their theory. It is a typical soothsayers trick to predict things so vaguely that the predictions can hardly fail: they they become irrefutable."

Consciousness does not contain physical properties and as such cannot be defined in physical terms, because consciousness is a feature of the brain and thus property dualism can be compatible to science.

Off the top of my head. Not sure about all of these:

There is an objective reality
There is a relationship between a statement and objective reality called "truth."
To know something the following statements must be true 1) I believe the subject of knowledge exists 2) The subject of knowledge is true and 3) I am justified in believing the subject of knowledge is true.
Objective reality can be known by the procedures included in the scientific method. — T Clark

It would seem that every single statement there is questionable if not downright false:

A great deal of progress was made in the early 20C by scientists who denied the objective reality of what they were studying. Famously Einstein disagreed with them, but they were making the progress, not him!

Science does not claim truth for any of its theories or statements, or that true statements or theories are possible.

Justified true belief???? Nay, Nay, and thrice Nay!

"Nonsense on Stilts" by Pigliucci is a fun read. (Y)

Consciousness does not contain physical properties and as such cannot be defined in physical terms, because consciousness is a feature of the brain and thus property dualism can be compatible to science. — TimeLine

It occurs to me that the 1st and 2nd Laws of Thermodynamics are also evidence that science can cope with property dualism.

How both physical and phenomenal properties interact without violating the law of thermodynamics is pretty complex because of the autonomy of phenomenal experiences; do mental states have energy? Gosh, what a juicy topic!

I think I like where this is heading, but I could use some clarification. How about an example of a claim which is unfalsifiable, but the idea that the belief in its truth provides value is falsifiable. — T Clark

Ironically, I think the theory of Evolution might just provide an example of this. I don't mention it often, because the fits of emotional apoplexy it reaps, but I think the theory of Evolution is in large part a metaphysical theory which is unfalsifiable.

Evolution is also the only "scientific" theory that I have ever heard scientist claim is actually true, which is another hint at its metaphysical status.

So, I think we have an unfalsifiable theory, that people actually believe is true, and that this belief adds value. You can test this by comparing societies that believe or deny Evolution on an objective scale of progress in medicine etc.

How both physical and phenomenal properties interact without violating the law of thermodynamics is pretty complex because of the autonomy of phenomenal experiences; do mental states have energy? Gosh, what a juicy topic! — TimeLine

Energy and entropy - remember the 1st and 2nd Laws!

(Y)

"How about an example of a claim which is unfalsifiable, but the idea that the belief in its truth provides value is falsifiable."

Here is the unfalsifiable claim: An unbiassed coin thrown randomly is equally likely to fall heads or tails.

And here is the falsifiable hypothesis arising from that claim: If I flip this evenly weighted coin nice and high a thousand times I'll get about the same number tails as heads.

Suppose I only get three heads and 997 tails. Then the hypothesis is falsified. But the original claim is not. I would assume the coin was not thrown randomly, or I've got a possible but unlikely run of tails, or some other strange factor was at play.

Honestly, I don't think Popper can be taken seriously after Feyerabend. Not that you have to go "all the way" with Feyerabend, but his work can be read as a thorough critique and revealing of the weaknesses in Popper's thoughts on science. In "Against Method" he basically uses Popper's thoughts on falsifiability to prove that if they were true, then Galileo would not have made the inferences he did.

On the whole this is the problem with Popper's project -- it is prescriptive, and when one looks at the work actual scientists do they simply do not follow the prescriptions. So it leaves one wondering what good are these prescriptions if the actual practices of scientists, which do, in fact, continue, aren't even close to what they prescribe.

Popper is best read with the problem of induction and the positivists in mind. His criterion of demarcation is the kind of thing journalists of science like to grab onto because it seems simple to explain, and gives them some kind of philosophical authority for rejecting this or that. But science is messier than what the venerable Popper wanted it to be in order to solve his philosophical problems.