but that doesn't seem right — unenlightened

It doesn't really seem right to me either. I can't tell if his argument is that transubstantiation is wholly subjective, or that it is objective, but the evidence for it is wholly subjective.

What is left, for an atheist, is nothing. But for a theist there is another possibility, which is that God sees it differently. 'In the eyes of God' there is a difference, that we can see as a moral difference. It is a real difference, because God cannot be deceived, and hence substantial, but not a physical difference. Thus it is rather in line with holy water, consecrated ground, testimony sworn on the Bible, or the union of marriage. Ritual does nothing physical, and yet transforms the moral significance of things, not merely in the eyes of the faithful, but in the Eyes of God, such that though it might be a virtue to wash one's socks, it would be a sin to use holy water for such mundane purposes. — unenlightened

This makes sense. If these things were presented as such, I doubt much debate would arise. It's when the doctrine wants to have its cake and eat it that it gets called into question.

Aristotle said nothing about it, as it had not been invented in his time, living 100s of years before Xist. Aristotle would have called it bollocks too.
The fact was that the blood was taken totransform in substance. the clue is in the word DUH.
There is not one scrap of evidence to think that Luther ever took that to be true.

I recommend you go back to things you know, such as smoking weed.
— Agustino

I recommend you stop being so rude. Since you know more about this, educate us, don't just sneer at our ignorance. — unenlightened

Insults can also be a response to being confronted with your own ignorance with a valid challenge

Obviously Wiki knows more than Agustino.
"Catholic Church, the change of substance or essence by which the bread and wine offered in the sacrifice of the sacrament of the Eucharist during the Mass, become, in reality, the body and blood of Jesus Christ.
The Catholic Church teaches that in the Eucharistic offering bread and wine are changed into the body and blood of Christ.[1] The reaffirmation of this doctrine was expressed, using the word "transubstantiate", by the Fourth Council of the Lateran in 1215"

In 1551, the Council of Trent confirmed the doctrine of transubstantiation as Catholic dogma, stating that "by the consecration of the bread and wine there takes place a change of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood. This change the holy Catholic Church has fittingly and properly called transubstantiation."[34]

In law, a verbal contract confers a substantial obligation. This cannot be reduced either to a physical change in the environment, or to the brain states or beliefs of the participants, but is a matter of fact to be established by the courts. A matter of fact, but not a matter of physics. The utterance of an agreement changes things. The hammer comes down, and a bid becomes a contract and the contract becomes enforceable. I'm not suggesting that transubstantiation is this exactly, but that ritual functions in a substantial though non physical way in ordinary secular life.

Michael's argument relied completely on reference to "properties". — Metaphysician Undercover

No it didn't. My argument relies on the distinction between naming a thing and asserting a proposition about a thing. When the Christian describes the ritual as being transubstantiation, they are not just naming the ritual (that would actually be an account of the term "Eucharist"); they are asserting that the substance of the bread and the wine has changed into something else. Whether or not the substance changes isn't determined by fiat or by belief. No matter how many times they claim it to happen, it might not actually happen. They might be wrong. Just as those who claimed that the world is flat were wrong.

I had a bad dream last night. I was back in school and I had to write a paper on transubstantiation. It was the day before the paper was due and I couldn't find any information on it. It was as if it didn't exist.

The ritual is transubstantiation if and only if the substance changes, and whether or not the change occurs has nothing to do with what people believe or what people claim or what word people use to describe the ritual. — Michael

My claim is that the substance changes.

Maybe this is missing something? You can correct me if I'm misrepresenting your position — ProbablyTrue

That's about it. And the reason why transubstantiation occurs iff communicants have faith, is that substance is something we assume, to support our observed experience of the temporal continuity of existence. So there is no problem with saying that at any moment, this particular object ceases being bread, and starts being body of Christ, because it just requires shifting our assumptions concerning the temporal continuity of existence.

The further issue though, is what supports our assumption of substance. There is an observed temporal continuity, but why, what supports this? This is where we appeal to God. So if we say that the substance changes from bread to Christ, then without the assumption of God, we can say anything, because it's all human assumptions. With the assumption of God, it is necessary that God goes along with this transubstantiation, to ensure that it's true. Why wouldn't He?

. If it states that the thing is the same as itself, then that's what it is. — Sapientia

You are just asserting "that's what it is", in the very same way that the Church asserts "that's what it is", referring to the articles of the Eucharist. So you're being hypocritical now denying that the Church may do this, when you are doing the very same thing.

But that's not what the law of identity actually says though. Do you understand a difference between the word "same" and the word "what". If I say "X is the same as X", this says nothing about what X is. The word "same" indicates no options. "What" indicates a choice made from options. To say "what a thing is", indicates that one has made a choice from options. What it is, might be bread, might be body of Christ, whatever, "what" implies options.

If you're saying that what a thing is, is something other than itself, then you're contradicting the law of identity, and are therefore mistaken. — Sapientia

I've explained this very clearly to you. It's is absolutely necessary that what a thing is, is other than the thing itself, and this does not contradict the law of identity. It is necessary because all sorts of fictional ideas qualify as "what a thing is", but are not actually things. That is why Aristotle introduced the concept of "substance" into his logic, so we can distinguish fictional things (which are only logical possibilities), from existing things, substantial existence. "What a thing is" does not necessitate that the thing has substantial existence, therefore "what a thing is" is necessarily something other than the thing itself, because the thing itself has substantial existence.

What items? You need to be clearer. We start with a wafer and wine. These items are consumed, and a ceremony is performed. I do not believe that the ceremony changes the items in any way. So we are left with consumed wafer and wine. End of. — Sapientia

You've got the temporal order wrong. The ceremony is first, then the objects are consumed. I went through this with Hanover already. Hanover claimed that the ceremony accomplishes nothing, but clearly it does accomplish something. The attitude of the participants toward the items is changed. And, as I said "substance" is an assumption which we make concerning the physical existence of objects. If the substance of the objects changes, this implies that the assumptions of the people, concerning the objects changes, and therefore the attitudes of the people changes. The substance of the items changes, and the evidence, the change in the people's attitude demonstrates this. Is that so hard to understand?

If you believe in God, then the assumption of substance, which is made by human beings, is supported by God. If you do not believe in God, the assumption of substance is difficult to support, and that's why process philosophy is so popular today. But if you do believe in God, then the belief is that God goes along with transubstantiation to support this change of substance. And there is no reason to believe that God would not support this.

My claim is that the substance changes. — Metaphysician Undercover

That wasn't the claim I was responding to. I was responding to this:

Why should you believe that the colour of the sky ought to be called "blue", and not some other name? Faith. Why should you believe that the items of the Eucharist ought to be called body and blood of Christ, and not some other name? Faith. There is no substantial difference between these two examples.

There's a difference between calling the colour of the sky "blue" (an act of naming) and calling the items of the Eucharist "the body and blood of Christ" (an act of asserting a proposition).

And I was also responding (albeit indirectly) to this:

That's not even an issue. Transubstantiation occurs, that is a fact. There is something which is referred to as transubstantiation, and to deny this is to deny a fact. So the question is what is transubstantiation. To ask whether transubstantiation occurs, is to deny the fact in skepticism, then ask whether the fact is a fact. It's a pointless exercise because one will inevitably come to the conclusion, yes there is something which is going on which is called transubstantiation. Now let's proceed to see what this thing, transubstantiation, is. So it doesn't matter what religion you are, you can refuse to take part in the ceremony if you have no faith in it, but that doesn't matter. Unless everyone refuses, then it will still be going on, and there will still be something called transubstantiation, and therefore transubstantiation will still be a fact.

Transubstantiation (unlike the Eucharist) isn't the sort of thing that is established by fiat. One cannot simply dictate that the substance of the bread becomes the body of Christ, just as one cannot simply dictate that the shape of the Earth is flat.

Your argument fails to understand the distinction between a claim like "this planet is Mars" and a claim like "this planet is round".

This is the exact conversation that I've been having with MU, although he doesn't seem to accept the analogy you've provided. I don't necessarily see a problem with the way you've characterized it to give the event personal meaning, but from what I've read about the Catholic doctrine, the Church isn't so willing to back away from there being an actual physical change to the bread and wine.

If a priest says "I now pronounce you man and wife," he has changed the status of the parties, but he hasn't changed the parties in any substantial way. Part of religious doctrine related to marriage is that the man and woman become a single flesh, which might have metaphorical implications, but certainly literally they do not. While we can say that the priest is fully empowered to change the legal relationship between the man and woman, he cannot change their physical state by melding their flesh by his simple utterance.

There's a difference between calling the colour of the sky "blue" (an act of naming) and calling the items of the Eucharist "the body and blood of Christ" (an act of asserting a proposition). — Michael

As I said with Hanover, I don't recognize the distinction you are making. To assert the proposition "this item is the body of Christ", is nothing other than to name the item as the body of Christ. A proposition is by nature a proposal, and no matter how it is asserted, it may be rejected. So your use of "asserting" here is just a red herring.

Transubstantiation (unlike the Eucharist) isn't the sort of thing that is established by fiat. One cannot simply dictate that the substance of the bread becomes the body of Christ, just as one cannot simply dictate that the shape of the Earth is flat. — Michael

Are you familiar with the term "substance"? It appears like you are not.

So, it strikes me that the philosophical grounds for this argument (as I really don't think anyone here is considering changing their minds on the idea of transubstantiation) is what originally was presented in the Shoutbox.

The question is: Do those accepting of the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation employ a different epistemological standard for their beliefs than the materialists?

It seemed the thrust of much of the previous debate was that there was some level of logical inconsistency on the part of materialists in rejecting (and even ridiculing) transubstantiation as not being properly rooted epistemologically because both sides are using inherently faith based systems.

Not only do I think this is wrong, but I think the Catholic Church doesn't even present this argument. The official doctrine is described as follows: "The manner in which the change occurs, the Catholic Church teaches, is a mystery: "The signs of bread and wine become, in a way surpassing understanding, the Body and Blood of Christ."[5]:1333 The precise terminology to be used to refer to the nature of the Eucharist, and its theological implications, has a contentious history especially in the Protestant Reformation.[6]" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transubstantiation

That is to say, transubstantiation surpasses understanding, meaning it does not make sense to us mere mortals. It's a mystery. It cannot be known. It therefore is accepted just as a doctrine, not subject to invalidation, and not something that can be derived by observation of the world. It is distinct among events, and it is therefore logical and consistent for a materialist to reject it on the basis of it lacking the epistemological basis consistently relied upon by the materialist.

As I said with Hanover, I don't recognize the distinction you are making. To assert the proposition "this item is the body of Christ", is nothing other than to name the item as the body of Christ. A proposition is by nature a proposal, and no matter how it is asserted, it may be rejected. So your use of "asserting" here is just a red herring. — Metaphysician Undercover

That you don't recognize the distinction doesn't mean there's not one though. You're just indicating your inability to understand. The Catholic Church claims that the utterances of the priest result in the metaphysical alteration of the bread in an actual way. Those utterances would alter the substance even if the name remained the same and the substance would be whatever it is even if it lacked a name.

If a priest says "I now pronounce you man and wife," he has changed the status of the parties, but he hasn't changed the parties in any substantial way. — Hanover

I disagree. The substantial change is that sexual relations that were formerly sinful become a sacrament and duty. The legal aspects give a way to approach things from a secular view, but trying to understand transubstantiation without God, and without granting substance to moral condition is not really possible.

Has anyone else noticed that 'substance' and 'understanding' are almost identical? What's that about?

By "substantial," I mean something changed to the actual substance of the bread and wine, or, in my analogy, the substance of the man and wife. It is not just a change in status.

"The Catholic Church understands the real, objective presence of Christ as coming about by the replacement of the substance of the bread and wine with the substance of the body and blood of Jesus Christ, with no change in the accidental properties of the bread and wine—such as its appearances, color, and shape; the change in substance is known as transubstantiation.[9"

"The Catholic Church understands the presence of Christ in the Eucharist as real, that is to say, objective and not dependent on faith."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real_presence_of_Christ_in_the_Eucharist#Catholic:_Objective,_substantial_and_entire

The Catholic Church claims that the utterances of the priest result in the metaphysical alteration of the bread in an actual way. Those utterances would alter the substance even if the name remained the same and the substance would be whatever it is even if it lacked a name. — Hanover

This is nonsense, the utterance are the name change. You are proposing a scenario in which the name change occurs (the utterances), without the name change occurring.

In the case of a named article, the name represents the substance, that's why an object can undergo changes while maintaining the same name. Transubstantiation occurs by the power of the Word. The priest changes the name, God goes along with this and changes the substance. If God changed the substance of something, and the name for it didn't change, we would have no way of knowing that the substance changed.

If God changed the substance of something, and the name for it didn't change, we would have no way of knowing that the substance changed. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's an epistemological issue, not a metaphysical one, but not even correct. We could know the substance changed by its behavior prior to altering its name.

Are you going to address the rest of my post? Because there are some important parts, and one part of particular importance which I emphasised, that you've decided to leave unaddressed.

I haven't even read your reply yet, only skimmed over it. It's quid pro quo or nothing. Take it or leave it.

We could know the substance changed by its behavior prior to altering its name. — Hanover

You are making Michael's mistake, mixing up properties for substance.

I replied to everything I thought was relevant, maybe repeat the part that you have a special interest in.

To assert the proposition "this item is the body of Christ", is nothing other than to name the item as the body of Christ. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. Just as to assert the proposition "I have £1,000,000 in my bank account" isn't just me naming the amount in my bank account (which is actually less than £1,000,000). If I were to assert such a thing then I would be wrong. And so the same could be the case for the Christian asserting that the item is the body of Christ. He's wrong if the item isn't what he says it is (and Sap's saying that it isn't; it's just bread, nothing more).

There is a difference between claiming that the facts are such that X is Y and stipulating that the term "Y" is being used to refer to X.

I replied to everything I thought was relevant, maybe repeat the part that you have a special interest in. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm not repeating anything. You can go back and properly address it. Or not, and that will be the end of our discussion.

Just as to assert the proposition "I have £1,000,000 in my bank account" isn't just me naming the amount in my bank account (which is actually less than £1,000,000). — Michael

That's completely different, it's predication, stating a property of your bank account, it's not naming an object. The example is not relevant.

That's completely different, it's predication, stating a property of your bank account, it's not naming an object. The example is not relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

And in the case of the Eucharist, it's not just naming an object. The Christian isn't simply stipulating that he's using the term "the blood of Christ" to refer to the wine. He's saying that the facts are such that the wine satisfies the pre-established meaning of the term "the blood of Christ". His claim isn't true by fiat.

The doctrine of transubstantiation isn't just a terminological one.

Sorry Sap, but I lost interest when I hit this part:

What matters is the fact that I'm right, you're wrong, and I know that to be the case. — Sapientia

But you think likewise, and I wouldn't believe you if you said any different. Plus you've been very uncharitable, yet I set that aside and got stuck in. All I ask is that you do as I have done, tit for tat. Not leaving out large and important chunks. That's only fair.

By "substantial," I mean something changed to the actual substance of the bread and wine, or, in my analogy, the substance of the man and wife. It is not just a change in status. — Hanover

Yes, of course you do, but 'actual substance' doesn't 'actually' clarify what is meant. If the 'substance' of your claim is that 'substantial' means 'material' then I think you are substantially mistaken. There is a substantial difference between being married and being single. Plumbers marry female connectors to male connectors, and assembled plumbing is substantially different to disassembled plumbing despite the materials being the same. We call these differences emergent properties.

But again, secular examples are simply preliminary arguments that seek to open the conceptual way to a more charitable understanding of something that is not coming from a materialist perspective in the first place.

He's saying that the facts are such that the bread satisfies the pre-established meaning of the term "the blood of Christ". His claim isn't true by fiat. — Michael

Right, the pre-established meaning appears to be what the Church has established, and this is that the items referred to are in fact, the body and blood of Christ. You're like Sapientia, are trying to reach, in equivocation, for some other meaning. But this is the meaning you, or Sapientia attempt to establish, and therefore not the pre-established meaning.

Right, the pre-established meaning appears to be what the Church has established, and this is that the items referred to are in fact, the body and blood of Christ. You're like Sapientia, are trying to reach, in equivocation, for some other meaning. But this is the meaning you, or Sapientia attempt to establish, and therefore not the pre-established meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're making no sense.

I can't make it the case that the water in my glass is the blood of Zeus just by saying that it is, or by creating a religion and having others perform some ritual and claim that the water is the blood of Zeus.

Claims of transubstantiation are more than just word games. If you can't understand that then this discussion will go nowhere.

You are making Michael's mistake, mixing up properties for substance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nope, I've got that straight. The accidental properties remain unchanged but an essential change to the substance occurs, thus rooting this whole discussion in ancient Greek philosophy, I assume to offer an explanation for why there is nothing empirically verifiable when transubstantiation occurs.

Regardless, I don't see how this is responsive to what I said, which is that a substantial change can occur without a name change, as I don't see how linguistic theory impacts metaphysical change.

In fact, I don't know you deal with the problem that any time anyone says any set of special words over a physical object that changes the attitudes of those hearing it that something mysterious won't happen to that physical object.

If I say "Alacazam" over a rock and everyone thinks I have a rock that contains the blood of Moses, is the rock now different?

Claims of transubstantiation are more than just word games. — Michael

Yes, I've said that from the start. I'm just about ready to give up, and it seems that Metaphysician Undercover is not willing to play fair, so...