Isn't any type of word use essentially the same type of "faith based belief"? So if you reject transubstantiation, you make the statement, "I have no faith in the way that they use words". — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the part of the discussion I disagree with you the most I suppose, which I'll get back to in a second.

As it relates to transubstantiation and the references to arcane Aristotlian philosophy, I'll acknowledge you simply wore me down. I don't really think anyone truly adheres to those views and his various categories and so it seemed an exercise in learning a purely historical system for academic purposes. I couldn't really sort out all the distinctions, and so when I began reading up on it online, it became clear that the issues of concern for me were concerns for everyone.

One thought I did have, for example, from a Cartesian perspective, is that I am composed of two substances: mind and body. It would make sense to say therefore that the properties of the person-object are that it is composed of those two things. That would make a substance a property, and while the identification of the mind substance/property could not be empirically shown by putting it under the microscope and seeing it, it could certainly be identified behaviorally in the person through the display of consciousness. This whole issue made me question your claim that the interjection of the body of Jesus into the wafer could not be known by the person except by faith because it is not the case that substance changes are per se undetectable.

In fact, the way I saw it is that you simply divided the world into two sorts of properties: those that were detectable and those that were not. A wafer therefore has things you can know about it and things you can't. In fact, I'd go as far to say that the real words one should use instead of essential versus accidental properties is undetectable versus detectable, at as it relates to this discussion.

Whether I'm a better person for having thought about this, I really don't know.

But to your over-riding point that this is all some sort of language game and that I am just rejecting their word usage, I'm really not. I'm being offered no evidence whatsoever of the claim they're making, and when I ask, I'm being given an explanation based upon a thousands year old antiquated logic system that no one really adheres to. What happened was that the Church arrived at a notion based upon biblical passages and then used the contemporary logic to try to explain how it could be.

Your decision to reject as "nonsense" a system which has allowed ideas to persist for hundreds, even thousands of years, is not a rational decision. — Metaphysician Undercover

And so the difference between a system that I make up on the spot and the Catholic one is simply they came up with theirs first? We can pretend its longevity is based upon its validity, but that would simply overlook certain political and historical realities.

Your decision to reject as "nonsense" a system which has allowed ideas to persist for hundreds, even thousands of years, is not a rational decision. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's interesting. It does have some force against the comparisons some people have made with things they have made up on the spot and that have no meaning or function. But I think ideas can be persistent because they are functional without being true.

And so the difference between a system that I make up on the spot and the Catholic one is simply they came up with theirs first? — Hanover

No, stuff you make up on the spot is likely to be functionless. The stuff that L Ron Hubbard made up on the other hand, clearly functions psychologically as a cohesive force, and has attraction to outsiders looking for answers and meaning in their lives. But longevity does have its own attraction too, as advertisers know. 'Transubstantiation - tried and trusted for 2000 years. Recommended by your ancestors.' As against 'New improved religion, with added science and no nasty morals. Scientology, the only religion designed for the modern age'.

Whereas 'Truth - you probably won't like it, and it'll do you no good.' is not a great advert.

That's interesting. It does have some force against the comparisons some people have made with things they have made up on the spot and that have no meaning or function. But I think ideas can be persistent because they are functional without being true. — unenlightened

Longevity can be the result of all sorts of things, from it being true, to it being functional, to it being a way to manipulate the masses, to it being just something that stuck and became local legend, to whatever. The point being that longevity offers us nothing in terms of proof of value or whether it'd be better to finally abandon it and move on.

This all seems an argument for tradition for tradition's sake. And they call me conservative.

The point being that longevity offers us nothing in terms of proof of value or whether it'd be better to finally abandon it and move on. — Hanover

I quite agree. But moving on does not come with a guarantee either. Seems like there's nothing for it but to think things over and discuss them back and forth and make the best choices we can. Sounds like hard work.

One thought I did have, for example, from a Cartesian perspective, is that I am composed of two substances: mind and body. It would make sense to say therefore that the properties of the person-object are that it is composed of those two things. That would make a substance a property, and while the identification of the mind substance/property could not be empirically shown by putting it under the microscope and seeing it, it could certainly be identified behaviorally in the person through the display of consciousness. This whole issue made me question your claim that the interjection of the body of Jesus into the wafer could not be known by the person except by faith because it is not the case that substance changes are per se undetectable. — Hanover

I think you still misunderstand the nature of substance. If a person is composed of two substances, then the person is two individual objects. To say that one thing is two substances would really be contradictory because substance is what validates the existence of the thing, so this would be like saying one thing has two existences. So substance dualism says that the human person is composed of two distinct things, body and soul, and this is why the soul can persist as a thing even without the body. It is usually argued that Aristotle's system is not consistent with substance dualism.

You're really just turning things around, saying that there is one thing (person) with two substances mind and body. This allows you to say that the one thing, person, has two properties, body and mind. The proper understanding of substance dualism would be more like two things, body and soul, each with properties. Each of these would be an individual substance.

If you check Aristotle's "Categories" Ch. 5, "Substance in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance the individual man or horse." In no way can primary substance be a property, this is what is explicitly excluded from the definition. "Substance" refers to the individual thing itself, not a property of the thing.

In fact, the way I saw it is that you simply divided the world into two sorts of properties: those that were detectable and those that were not. A wafer therefore has things you can know about it and things you can't. In fact, I'd go as far to say that the real words one should use instead of essential versus accidental properties is undetectable versus detectable, at as it relates to this discussion. — Hanover

It's really not a matter of dividing the world into two sorts of properties, it's a matter of dividing the world into properties and the particular thing (substance), which has the properties. This is sometimes explained as "what the thing is" (properties), and "that the thing is" (substance). In any case, the substance is the existing thing which is said to have the properties. In the case of transubstantiation the existing thing, substance, changes from being the substance called "bread", to being the substance called "body of Christ", while all the sensible properties stay the same. So at this time all those sensible properties, which were prior to this, attributed to the substance that was known as bread, are now attributed to the substance known as body of Christ.

But to your over-riding point that this is all some sort of language game and that I am just rejecting their word usage, I'm really not. — Hanover

Yes that is exactly what you are doing, rejecting their word usage. When you accuse someone of saying something untrue, you are rejecting their word usage. The Church has said, that for the purpose of our ceremony, we are not going to call this object "bread" we are going to call it "body of Christ". You object, saying that it shouldn't be called body of Christ unless it really is body of Christ, so they are engaged in some sort of deception. They say it really is the body of Christ, God ensures this, so there is no deception. It's just a matter of you rejecting the way that they use words, and how they turn to God to justify this usage.

I'm being offered no evidence whatsoever of the claim they're making.. — Hanover

The only claim they're making is that they are authorized to call this object "body of Christ". What you're failing to grasp, is that anyone is allowed to use any words they want to refer to any object. We don't need evidence to support our usage when we refer to objects with words, but if someone thinks that the word usage is wrong, then they'll point this out. If people are ok with the usage, they'll go along with it.

And so the difference between a system that I make up on the spot and the Catholic one is simply they came up with theirs first? We can pretend its longevity is based upon its validity, but that would simply overlook certain political and historical realities. — Hanover

This is pure, unabashed, conceited vanity. Do you really believe that you could come up with a ceremonial practise which would be in use two thousand years from now? Come on. Not only is it a "system", but it is a practise. That's where I think the root of your misunderstanding lies. You are looking at this as if it were a logical system or something like that, which is reducible to a set of claims. It's not, it's a practise. And that's why "word usage" is the proper representation of transubstantiation rather than "assertion", or "claim". So if you look at it for what it is, a practise, (not instinctual, but learned practise), which has persisted for that long, then you might start to grasp the gravity of it.

But I think ideas can be persistent because they are functional without being true. — unenlightened

You may have noticed that I have been purposely staying away from "truth" here. My argument from the beginning has been that transubstantiation is a valid verbal practise, this would most likely base its validity in its functionality. Only when Michael pressured me on the fact that my position is inconsistent with that of the Church, did I turn to truth. I agree that there's a claim of truth, as it's God who makes the spoken words true. But I believe that without God we do not have real objective truth to any words, as truth and objectivity are based in inter-subjectivity without God. At this point, without God, I don't think there's a real line between true and functional, as true appears to be a special type of functionality.

The point being that longevity offers us nothing in terms of proof of value or whether it'd be better to finally abandon it and move on. — Hanover

This is false though, longevity is proof of value. For human beings to preserve something, it must be of value to them, so if it is preserved it has value. Value though is inherently subjective, what I value is not necessarily what you value. Longevity is proof of a value which is passed from one generation to the next. Because it is not of value to you, you can refuse the practise. But if the practise still continues, you cannot deny that it has any value, just because it has no value to you, because the fact that it continues demonstrates that it has value.

Here's another way of demonstrating how your way of looking at this issue is completely backward. We can designate names to objects for any purpose, whether its for a logical proceeding, or any other proceeding, we name objects. Wittgenstein explains this at the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations, the tradesperson names the object, the apprentice learns the name. So for example in a trial court there may be an object labeled "exhibit A". What this says, is that for the following intent and purpose, i.e. the following trial procedure, this object will be known as exhibit A. And in a logical proceeding we'll say "let X be...", so that the object described is known as X.

In a similar way, the Church stipulates that for the intent and purpose of the following sacrament, the objects will be known as body and blood of Christ. Furthermore, the Church insists that for all intents and purposes these items will be known as such. What this stipulates is that there cannot be a practise in which these objects are known as anything other than body and blood of Christ. Therefore in relation to any practise, these objects must always be known as body and blood of Christ, so it is impossible that the objects might be known by any other name. What the Church has claimed, is nothing more than ownership of these objects; it has claimed all rights of usage for these objects, as well as naming rights with respect to that usage. Would you deny them these rights?

But this isn't just a case of stipulating the referent of a term.

I have yet to see a demonstration otherwise. Hanover was trying to make a distinction between reporting what is the case, and decreeing what is the case, but failed to substantiate this distinction.

As far as I see, there are objects of the sacrament which are named, and the objection is to the naming of these objects.

There's a difference between naming and predication. When I claim that the 45th President of the United States is Barack Obama I'm not simply stipulating that the 45th President of the United States is to be named "Barack Obama"; I'm claiming that the thing referred to by the name "the 45th President of the United States" and the thing referred to by the name "Barack Obama" are the same thing. And, of course, my claim is false.

Claims of transubstantiation are of the latter kind (where it is said to be literal and not just a metaphor).

I don't see the relevance of your example. There is no predication, simply naming of objects

There is predication where there are claims of literal transubstantiation. It isn't just a case of naming. Just ask those Christians who believe in the miracle. I gave an example of a cardinal's take on it here.

Their claims are far more substantial than just word games as part of a ritual. That's exactly why there are theological discussions on the matter.

I'm not really interested in what some individual Christians believe, as those beliefs are all over the place. What I'm interested in is the act of transubstantiate itself, and this is how it is presented by the Church itself, in the sacrament. I have never taken part, so I cannot claim to know exactly what takes place.

Your objection seems to rely on the claim that there is some sort of predication going on here. Could you justify this claim by referring to the sacrament, and the act of transubstantiation itself, and not by referring to what some Christians believe about it.

Your question doesn't make any sense to me. There are people eating bread and drinking wine. Some claim that the substance of the bread and the wine literally changes into that of the body and blood of Christ. Any competent speaker will understand that their claim isn't to be understood simply as some stipulated naming convention, but as predicating some fact about the world. What proof can there be except asking those who claim such a thing what they mean by their claim?

Your question doesn't make any sense to me. There are people eating bread and drinking wine. Some claim that the substance of the bread and the wine literally changes into that of the body and blood of Christ. — Michael

This is a very peripheral, perspective dependent, subjective, description of the situation. Let's get beyond that, right to the point. You are describing the people as drinking wine and eating bread. The Church is describing them as drinking the blood of Christ, and eating the body of Christ. Clearly there is inconsistency between these two descriptions.

My claim is that you have no respect for the naming practise of the items of their sacrament. So you are using unacceptable names to describe the items being consumed. Unless you can justify your use of unacceptable names, then your description is also unjustified. You might attempt to justify your description, that the people are consuming bread and wine by referring to the sensible properties of these items. But the principles of the sacrament request that you do not refer to the sensible properties of the items, as these are accidental to the substance which is being consumed. Such an attempt would only prove that you have no respect for the naming practises of the sacrament.

So how do you justify your description that they are consuming bread and wine, without demonstrating the validity of my charge, that you have no respect for the naming practises of the items of their sacrament?

So for example in a trial court there may be an object labeled "exhibit A". What this says, is that for the following intent and purpose, i.e. the following trial procedure, this object will be known as exhibit A. And in a logical proceeding we'll say "let X be...", so that the object described is known as X. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the court instead labeled the object 'incontrovertible evidence of the defendant's guilt', then one might start to question their judgement.

It has nothing to do with naming practices and everything to do with the facts. Whether or not the wine is the blood of Christ is a factual matter (where transubstantiation is said to be literal), not a naming convention, much like whether or not the 45th President of the United States is Barack Obama.

It has nothing to do with not respecting naming practices. It has to do with stating the facts. Whether or not the wine is the blood of Christ is a factual matter (where transubstantiation is said to be literal), not a naming convention, much like whether or not the 45th President of the United States is Barack Obama. — Michael

See, you are still making the same mistake. You are referring to the object as wine, when in fact, it is called the blood of Christ. We are trying to determine what it is in fact, what is the proper name for it. So when you ask what is the fact, is the wine wine, or is the wine blood of Christ, you have just begged the question because you have already premised that it is wine. The appropriate question is whether the object is properly called wine or whether it is properly called blood of Christ.

I'll make things easier for you, in light of unenlightened's comments. Instead of you justifying your description, which calls the stuff wine and bread, you can show how the Church's naming is logically inconsistent. Let's say that "body and blood of Christ" refers to the flesh and blood of the person, Jesus, who died on the cross, as well as the items in the sacrament. All you need to do is to show inconsistency in this naming practise.

The Church claims that the substance of the flesh and blood of Jesus are the same substance as the items of the sacrament, and this justifies the naming practise. So we need to provide an understanding of "substance", which denies that this is possible, or at least to make it highly unlikely. It appears to me, like "substance" is what all individual, particular things have in common, it is one universal. So I don't see how the substance of one particular object could differ from the substance of another particular object, if it is one universal, therefore all objects would be of the same substance and there is no inconsistency.

You are referring to the object as wine, when in fact, it is called the blood of Christ. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's a difference between what a thing is and what a thing is called. They might call it the blood of Christ, but if it isn't the blood of Christ then they are wrong, just as if I call the 45th President of the United States Barack Obama then I am wrong because the 45th President of the United States isn't Barack Obama.

It appears to me, like "substance" is what all individual, particular things have in common, it is one universal. So I don't see how the substance of one particular object could differ from the substance of another particular object, if it is one universal, therefore all objects would be of the same substance and there is no inconsistency. — Metaphysician Undercover

This isn't what the Church means by "substance", given that transubstantiation is the change from one substance (namely bread and wine) to another (namely the body and blood of Christ). If there is just one universal substance then the substance doesn't change and so no transubstantiation happens.

Whatever it is you're talking about it has nothing to do with Christian theology.

There's a difference between what a thing is and what a thing is called. They might call it the blood of Christ, but if it isn't the blood of Christ then they are wrong, just as if I call the 45th President of the United States Barack Obama then I am wrong because the 45th President of the United States isn't Barack Obama. — Michael

I look at that as a pointless argument. What a thing is, is dependent on two things, how you define your terms, and your judgement of the thing in question. Naming a thing is much more fundamental than this, allowing us to avoid both of these problems. We assign the word to the thing, and the thing goes by that name. This is not saying what a thing is, it is identity, it is giving a thing an identity. In the case of the sacrament of the Eucharist, it appears very clear to me that the ceremony is a ceremony of naming the objects, giving them a new identity in the eyes of God, like baptism is, and marriage is, these are instances of giving things (people in these cases) an identity within the structure of the religion.

It is very clear, that in the sacrament, the Church is assigning these names to these objects, giving them a particular identity. It is not looking at these objects and judging whether or not they fulfil the conditions required by a definition to be called by these names. Your argument is really a straw man because the sacrament is a case of naming items, not a case of describing what a thing is. The priest does not look at the object, and state the name suited for describing the object, the priest assigns a name of identity, to the object This is what such sacraments consist of, giving things a particular identity (naming them) in relation to God.

Whatever it is you're talking about it has nothing to do with Christian theology. — Michael

The fact that you started into this discussion talking about properties, instead of substance, demonstrates that you have even less knowledge of Christian theology than I have. And I must say that your understanding of such sacraments is very deficient. When the priest declares the man and woman husband and wife, do you believe that what the priest says is a falsity, because the man and woman are not married at that time? That appears to be the logic you are using. Do you not see that they are husband and wife because the priest has named them as such. Likewise, the articles of the Eucharist are body and blood of Christ because the priest has named them as such. Your argument, that even if the priest has named them as such, the priest is wrong if they aren't really such, is completely missing the point, because they only are such by virtue of the priest naming them as such.

To make a coherent argument you need to demonstrate that it is wrong for the priest to name them as such. Or, you need to demonstrate that the priest has no right to name them as such. But to say that the priest is wrong, if they aren't really such, is just nonsense, because they are really such by virtue of the priest naming them as such, just like the man and woman are husband and wife by virtue of the priest naming them as such. That is the way these sacraments work. The Church is wrong only if it is wrong for it to assign these names. The question of whether or not the objects are the proper objects which the words refer to, can only be determined by determining whether or not the church is wrong in assigning these names. So to go at this from the opposite direction, and say that the Church is wrong if the items are not the body and blood of Christ is just backwards. We must take it for granted that these items really are the body and blood of Christ, because that's what the Church calls them, and determine whether or not the Church is wrong in calling them this.

In the case of the sacrament of the Eucharist, it appears very clear to me that the ceremony is a ceremony of naming the objects, giving them a new identity in the eyes of God, like baptism is, and marriage is, these are instances of giving things (people in these cases) an identity within the structure of the religion.

It is very clear, that in the sacrament, the Church is assigning these names to these objects, giving them a particular identity. It is not looking at these objects and judging whether or not they fulfil the conditions required by a definition to be called by these names. Your argument is really a straw man because the sacrament is a case of naming items, not a case of describing what a thing is. The priest does not look at the object, and state the name suited for describing the object, the priest assigns a name of identity, to the object This is what such sacraments consist of, giving things a particular identity (naming them) in relation to God. — Metaphysician Undercover

Just ask a Christian what they are doing when they claim that the bread and wine literally changes into the body and blood of Christ. Just ask them what they mean by the term "transubstantiation". They'll tell you that this isn't just a word game or name-assignment. I've shown you a cardinal's take on the matter here.

You don't seem to understand the difference between those who claim that transubstantiation is literal and those who claim that it isn't. Although the latter is just a case of naming items, the former is a case of describing what a thing is (and open to being wrong). We're supposed to be talking about the former.

Not every Christian will do. Not all Christians accept transubstantiation as literal. — Πετροκότσυφας

We're specifically talking about claims of literal transubstantiation. There's nothing to argue if it's just a metaphor.

I don't think we're talking past each other. I think he's just wrong, and not making any sense. Take this where he says that the will of God is required for transubstantiation, as without it there's just people making false claims (as with me saying that the water is the blood of Zeus). But then here he says that transubstantiation happens even if there isn't a God to miraculously change the substance.

He seems to want to say that if it doesn't literally happen then it happens by fiat, which is ridiculous.

If there isn't a God (or, I suppose, some other power) who (or which) changes the substance of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ then transubstantiation doesn't happen. You can't simply say, as he says here, that because people refer to something as being "transubstantiation" then ipso facto it is transubstantiation. Else I might as well argue that because I refer to him as being "wrong" and me as being "right" then ipso facto he is wrong and I am right. It's a bastardization of Wittgenstein's "meaning is use", which he seems to be pushing.

I've shown you a cardinal's take on the matter here. — Michael

This is what you said there:

The body and blood of Christ are present in the sacrament by reason of the promise of Christ and the power of the Holy Spirit, which are attached to the proper performance of the rite by a duly ordained minister. — Michael

See, the presence of Christ is dependent on "the proper performance of the rite".

You don't seem to understand the difference between those who claim that transubstantiation is literal and those who claim that it isn't. — Michael

That's right, I look at this whole question of whether or not it is "literal" as a red herring, and nothing more. "Literal" is a vague, ambiguous term which holds no force in comparison with the law of identity which allows for the direct association of a symbol to an object. Am I "literally" MU, or is that just a name I call myself? When we are discussing the identity of an object, the question of "is it literal?" is not even relevant

The issue is whether or not it is correct, or right, for the Church to name (identify) the items as they do. It makes no sense to ask whether the items are literally what they are called, because it is implied that there is a direct symbolic relation between the words and the items, such that if the relationship were anything other than direct, it would not be an instance of these items having this name.

Although the latter is just a case of naming items, the former is a case of describing what a thing is (and open to being wrong). We're supposed to be talking about the former. — Michael

That we're "supposed" to be talking about a description of what a thing is, is your false presupposition. Descriptions refer to properties, and that's where I corrected you when we first engaged. Now you keep wanting to slip back into descriptions of what the thing is, as if that is what we are "supposed" to be talking about. It is not, we are talking about identity, not description. Is it correct for the Church to identify these objects as body and blood of Christ? You want to turn to descriptions of the objects, and a description of what "body an blood of Christ" refers to, in order to address this question. But this is not what we're supposed to be talking about, and it is completely irrelevant because of that, we are supposed to be talking about substance. Clearly we're not supposed to be talking about descriptions and this is made clear by the word "transubstantiation".

Look at the quote above. This is what is claimed. There is "the proper performance of the rite". There is the promise by Christ to appear, which is carried out by the Holy Spirit. That is the description. If it is true, as you seem to be insisting, that there is no presence of Christ, then one or both of these conditions must not have been met. Either the rite was not properly performed, or the Holy Ghost did not fulfill the promise of Christ. There is nothing else to describe.

I don't think we're talking past each other. I think he's just wrong, and not making any sense. — Michael

Thinking that the other person is not making sense is exactly what "talking past each other" is.

He seems to want to say that if it doesn't literally happen then it happens by fiat, which is ridiculous. — Michael

If, "proper performance of the rite", means "fiat" to you, then it happens by fiat. What you do not seem to recognize is that assigning identity to an object is an act of fiat. The proper performance of the rite is the act of fiat which assigns identity to the objects.

Your claim seems to be that these words, which are assigned to the objects for the means of identification, have a meaning (some sort of "literal meaning") other than the meaning which is created by the direct association of identification. Your argument seems to be that this "literal meaning" is inconsistent with the meaning created by direct association. I can only assume that the objects named by direct association do not appear to you to fulfill the conditions of your "literal meaning", and that is the basis of your rejection. But the Church has dealt with this objection, it is not a matter of appearance here.

Else I might as well argue that because I refer to him as being "wrong" and me as being "right" then ipso facto he is wrong and I am right. It's a bastardization of Wittgenstein's "meaning is use", which he seems to be pushing. — Michael

This is exactly the problem with "meaning is use". I am wrong because you say I am, in reference with your rules of usage, and you are wrong because I say you are, according to my rules of usage, and that's the way it is. Right and wrong are relative to our rules of usage so we may both refuse to compromise because we are both right. What recourse do we have but to appeal to God?

What recourse do we have but to appeal to God? — Metaphysician Undercover

God is, assuming he exists, a useless ambiguous cunt who "moves in mysterious ways" but not so mysterious as to allow the powers that be to use his "word" to enforce definitive rules on others. 21 pages of semantics. Wonderful. The only thing religion is good for is illuminating what the religious feel comfortable accepting without thinking.

How would you address the problem then? My way of using words is right according to my rules, and Michael's way of using words is right according to those rules. The two ways are very contrary, so they can't "really" be both right. You could claim to know the right way, and that both mine and Michael's are wrong, or you could side with one or the other, but that still wouldn't make your way any more right than either of ours, even if it were two against one. Furthermore, we can't appeal to pragmatics because my rules are good for my purposes and yours are good for your purposes. How would we determine which purposes are the right purposes? If we all insist that we are using words in the correct way because we are following our rules, how do you propose that we might compromise and find agreement? And if we do not find agreement, won't our ability to communicate be jeopardized?

God is, assuming he exists, a useless ambiguous cunt who "moves in mysterious ways" but not so mysterious as to allow the powers that be to use his "word" to enforce definitive rules on others. 21 pages of semantics. Wonderful. The only thing religion is good for is illuminating what the religious feel comfortable accepting without thinking. — Benkei

The non-believers are arguing semantics as much as the believers. More than 400 posts and people are still making the same arguments they did at the beginning. My sympathies are with the believers. They are simply stating their belief. In arguing against that belief, not a single believer I've read has put himself imaginatively in the place of the believers and come ready to listen. If you don't do that, it's not reason.

The only thing religion is good for is illuminating what the religious feel comfortable accepting without thinking. — Benkei

Really?

Your original question makes no sense to me in this context, if I interpreted it correctly. When you asked me what I would see, I took that literally, as in, asking what it is that I would observe. I would observe no difference in the bread and wine.

The purported difference is that the substance has changed, and that the elements of the Eucharist which were formerly bread and wine are now the body and blood of Christ. But that isn't something I'd expect to see, and I don't know how I could know that to be the case.

And I didn't say that I had no internal criticism. I do. The internal criticism is epistemological: how can we know this? Even under the assumption that it is true, that question remains. What I did was emphasise the distinction between external and internal criticism, because the absence of that distinction seemed to be the cause of some confusion. — Sapientia

Right, so no wonder you haven't adequately judged the matter if you don't know the criterion of truth in this case. I suggested that the criterion of truth, in this case, is experiential. You have to experience it, and it is that internal change that is the substantial change mentioned. So bread and water remain physically bread and water, but their meaning has changed for the believer. So, by all means, this is a mystical experience, that is open to those who take part in the Eucharist.

I disagree, but I think that this is semantic. I'd call that a miracle, as would countless others. In fact, I think that if you put it to the general public in the form of a survey, then the vast majority would agree that it's a miracle. So you're just not speaking the same language as the rest of us. — Sapientia

A miracle it might be, so long as you understand that the traditional definition of a miracle as something that "breaks the laws of nature" is silly.

I wouldn't be willing to die for most of what I'd testify to having witnessed, but that doesn't discount my testimony. — Sapientia

Yes, it actually does discount your testimony in comparison to someone who is willing to die for what they've witnessed. If you have no skin in the game, it's easy to testify for anything. And don't be silly now - if you were a judge and a man risked his life to testify something, while the other didn't risk anything, who would you believe?

No, I can't add metaphysics to the list. That's far too vague and unexplained. And if you think that you've got a solid case, then you must have much lower evidential standards than me - at least when it comes to what we're talking about here. Elsewhere you raise the standards, creating a double standard. The stuff that we're talking about here gets special treatment, because it's your religion. But that isn't a reasonable, objective stance to take, and you should admit that. — Sapientia

That's not true from my perspective at least. I apply the same standard to all claims in intellectual matters.

How much testimony? What if it was a central tenet of your religion? What if people reported mystical experiences which they attributed to the sea lion? These were not rhetorical questions. — Sapientia

Sure, I can absolutely imagine a world - not our world though - where the sea lion produced mystical experiences, and everything around the universe revolved around it. Sure, nothing ridiculous in that. Just a different world from ours. In ours, as we know it today, that would indeed be ridiculous.

And don't be silly now - if you were a judge and a man risked his life to testify something, while the other didn't risk anything, who would you believe? — Agustino

The one telling the truth?

The one telling the truth? — Hanover

Sure, but isn't "skin in the game" one of the criteria you will use to determine the truth ceteris paribus?