What is not, is anti-what is (being), but this is categorically different from becoming, which is activity. So being is not anti-becoming, it is anti-not being. — Metaphysician Undercover
But that's not what "change" means. It means that one state becomes another. To have two distinct states is to have two distinct states, and this does not imply change. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is why I believe that dualism provides the only coherent approach toward understanding reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
mind and matter are not really separate, but in our accounts and explanations we just cannot look at both poles simultaneously. — Janus
Men could know God just as directly and surely as they knew the world. — apokrisis
A philosophy of the supernatural replaced a philosophy of nature. — apokrisis
The mainstream consensus is that the mind has evolved in the same way as other organs, i.e. through the processes of evolution, as an output of the physical brain. Those who don't agree would necessarily uphold some form of dualism regarding mind. — Wayfarer
It's because reality has (at least) two attributes: the mental and the physical. Consequently, we understand things in two ways; in terms of causes and in terms of reasons. Nature is mostly understood in terms of causes, although animal behavior may be understood in terms of reasons as well; and notably, there is much intentional language used in biological explanations. — Janus
Hence the Peircean process view. Now being is emergent and so an eternal state of becoming. You only have degrees of definiteness.
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So the Peircean view fixes things with a hierarchical structure. — apokrisis
Then definite being emerges as the concrete action that arises between these two bounds. — apokrisis
Being and becoming must have some relationship. You can't have it both ways - that as "different categories" they are related and they are not related. — apokrisis
It is pretty clear that if something can change to become something else, then something can stay the same by not becoming that something else. — apokrisis
The point I made before, though, is that there may be no intermediate state between two contiguous states of yourself. — Janus
The point I made before, though, is that there may be no intermediate state between two contiguous states of yourself. Indeed, how could there be; if there were intermediate states or even just one intermediate state between contiguous states then there would have to be infinitely many intermediate states between any contiguous states. — Janus
The problem being that Peirce's "eternal becoming" as you describe, renders definiteness incomplete. Therefore things cannot be properly fixed, and the claim that the Peircean view "fixes things" must be contradictory. This is the problem with vagueness as a first principle, it is intelligibility compromised. — Metaphysician Undercover
What I would say is that the nature of this relationship is not well known. It is a deficiency in our knowledge, just like the relationship between the past and future is not well known, it is a deficiency. Still, we know enough to say that the past is categorically different from the future, like we know that being is categorically different from becoming. — Metaphysician Undercover
In reality, when we talk about a thing staying the same thing, it does so despite changing. So I stay the same person despite undergoing changes. It might be that some aspects of me stay the same while others change. This brings us back to the issue of unity. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well we do know the nature of the relationship. It is a dichotomy. We arrive at it via dialectical reasoning. Metaphysics has been operating this way since it began. — apokrisis
A categorical difference is one in which two categories stand absolutely opposed. — apokrisis
Again, already accounted for. Constraints regulate dynamism. The purpose of a thing maintains its identity despite all material changes it might undergo. You can't pretend this is a great mystery. — apokrisis
For instance a monist would say that the two elements of the dichotomy are fundamentally the same, swhile a dualist would say that they are fundamentally different. — Metaphysician Undercover
You'll see this with any opposing terms negative/positive, hot/cold, large/small, etc. — Metaphysician Undercover
A categorical separation is a separation between types of thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
So "constraint" appears to be something you just made up, a word which has nothing underneath it, no substance, just mystery. — Metaphysician Undercover
And, I see a categorical separation between living and inanimate such that the inanimate is excluded from acting with purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover
That whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must be silent.
— Mitchell
Minds have purposes, life has functions, and physics has tendencies. — apokrisis
Schumacher advocates the traditionalist view that there are four kingdoms: Mineral, Plant, Animal, Human. He argues that there are critical differences of kind between each level. Between mineral and plant is the phenomenon of life. Schumacher says that although scientists say we should not use the phrase 'life energy', the difference still exists. Schumacher points out that though we can recognize life and destroy it, we can't create it.
For Schumacher, a similar discontinuity exists between plant and animal, which is differentiated by the phenomenon of consciousness. We can recognize consciousness because animals exhibit at minimum primitive thought and intelligence.
The next level, according to Schumacher, is between Animal and Human, which are differentiated by the phenomenon of self-consciousness or self awareness. Self-consciousness is the reflective awareness of one's consciousness and thoughts.
Schumacher realizes that the terms—life, consciousness and self-consciousness—are subject to misinterpretation so he suggests that the differences can best be expressed as an equation which can be written thus:
'Mineral' = m
'Plant' = m + x
'Animal' = m + x + y
'Human' = m + x + y + z
In his theory, these three factors (x, y and z) represent ontological discontinuities. He argues that the differences can be likened to differences in dimension; and from one perspective it could be argued that only humans have 'real' existence (hence the designation 'beings') insofar as they possess the three dimensions of life, consciousness and self-consciousness. Schumacher uses this perspective to contrast with the materialist view, which argues that what is 'real' is inanimate, denying the inherent reality of life, consciousness and self-consciousness, despite the fact each individual can verify those phenomena from their own experience.
Yes, I understand this point that you made. The point I made is that if there is no intermediate state, then there is no such thing as "change", as we commonly use, and understand the word. That is because two distinct states, does not constitute change. — Metaphysician Undercover
As we have learned, semiotics has sought to re-introduce the notions of formal and final causes, although I am still a bit unclear how you can have a 'final cause' in the sense of a 'reason for existence' with respect to sentient beings, without something towards which they are evolving (which is generally ruled out by the antipathy towards 'orthogenesis'.) — Wayfarer
The existence of teleology requires that [those] successor states [which lead to the formation of more complex systems, and ultimately life] have a significantly higher probability than is entailed by the laws of physics alone […] Teleological laws would assign higher probability to steps on paths in state space that have a higher “velocity” toward certain outcomes.
This is Spinoza's view, thinking as he did under the aegis of Newtonian mechanics. — Janus
I have often contemplated the idea that humans are in some sense the cosmos become self-aware; it's not something explicitly stated in the Western tradition, although you do find such ideas amongst the Hermetics, with the notion of 'man as microcosm'. — Wayfarer
What I am getting at is the idea that there is a telos towards life and mind implicit in cosmic evolution, as a kind of final cause. — Wayfarer
These examples you've chosen are weak and easily reversed differences. They are symmetry-breakings of the same scale - anti-symmetries - and so can quickly erase each other. A metaphysical dichotomy is a full-blown asymmetry. The outcomes look to be orthogonal and as unrelated as possible. The relationship is reciprocal or inverse, not merely additive/subtractive. — apokrisis
No. It is the separation that produces the familiar list of metaphysically opposed types.
Aristotle's categories were a bunch of dichotomies - quality~quantity, active~passive, time~space, symmetry~symmetry-breaking, particular~universal. — apokrisis
Minds have purposes, life has functions, and physics has tendencies. — apokrisis
Orthogonal is a completely different concept from opposition. — Metaphysician Undercover
So if minds have purpose, and physics has tendencies, how do you get to your principle, that purpose regulates dynamism? — Metaphysician Undercover
Well, you could... I don't know - maybe explain better. — T Clark
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