First, it seems that there are beliefs that arise apart from language, and a belief, whether linguistic or not, is simply a state-of-mind. These mind states are clearly seen in our actions. This is not to say that all actions by living organisms reflect beliefs, but simply to say that all beliefs are reflections of mind states, which in turn are shown by the things we do. — Sam26
Fourth, these three previous ideas form what is bedrock to all of epistemology. For epistemology arises out of language, it is a way of expressing what we know, or what we believe we know by using propositions. Justification come to an end with beliefs that are quite apart from those that arose through any method of linguistic justification. These bedrock beliefs are outside the purview of epistemology. — Sam26
Finally, the ideas expressed here solve two problems that have plagued some epistemological theories. First, the infinite regress problem, viz., that there is no end to justification, and the problem of circularity. — Sam26
Second, not only are there beliefs that arise non-linguistically, but our thoughts are also not dependent upon linguistics. This it seems, has to be case if one is to make sense of the development of linguistics. For if there are no beliefs and no thoughts prior to the formation of linguistics (language), what would be the springboard of language? How does one get from a mind of no thoughts and no beliefs, to a mind that is able to express one's thoughts linguistically? It also seems to be the case that language is simply a tool to communicate our thoughts to one another, which also seems to lend support for the idea that thinking is prior to language. — Sam26
Of course it all depends on how you define thinking. As you say, animals can reason in a causal fashion. Brains are evolved for that kind of Bayesian inference. Certain bodily actions will predict certain experienced outcomes. — apokrisis
I think this makes a big problem for your desire to secure epistemology in bedrock causal knowledge. — apokrisis
Biology and evolution sorted out the epistemic rules for an animal level of cognition. The epistemic rules for linguistically-structured thought could be another whole ball-game. I would certainly argue that their bedrock seems "mathematico-logical" for a good reason. — apokrisis
First, I did not say that animals reason, but of course I'm using reason as something that takes place in language. — Sam26
I also did not say anything about causal knowledge, in fact, I said just the opposite. Knowledge is based on certain causal beliefs. I do not even think there is such a thing as causal knowledge. — Sam26
I do not understand this. I would not say that evolution sorted out epistemic rules, what does that mean? It sounds like you are giving evolution an intellectual basis. Maybe there are certain causal laws that dictate certain outcomes, but rules imply something else for me. — Sam26
Thanks for the response Apokrisis, that took time to write out. — Sam26
First, it seems that there are beliefs that arise apart from language, and a belief, whether linguistic or not, is simply a state-of-mind. These mind states are clearly seen in our actions. This is not to say that all actions by living organisms reflect beliefs, but simply to say that all beliefs are reflections of mind states, which in turn are shown by the things we do. — Sam26
And a disposition would be some preceding metal state. — Banno
Second, not only are there beliefs that arise non-linguistically, but our thoughts are also not dependent upon linguistics. — Sam26
There are two ways of reading this.
In the first, I could read it as setting out in some absolute sense what belief is.
In the second, I could take it as setting out how you intend to make use of the word belief in the discussion.
Given your Wittgensteinian disposition, I'll take the second.
In which case I think it worth pointing out that we could make a distinction between a belief and, say, a disposition. In this account a belief would be a statement that is the subject of a statement of belief, and hence subject to whatever grammatical rules might be deemed appropriate. So in "Banno believes that Moore had two hands", the belief is that Moore had two hands.
And a disposition would be some preceding metal state. — Banno
I also did not say anything about causal knowledge, in fact, I said just the opposite. Knowledge is based on certain causal beliefs. I do not even think there is such a thing as causal knowledge.
— Sam26
That's another quibble so far as I'm concerned. — apokrisis
There's something about beliefs arising non-linguisticaly that resembles beetles in boxes. You rescue yourself later in saying that any belief can be stated. But that leaves hanging the nature of non-linguistic beliefs. Are they more than beliefs that have not been stated? If so, don't they exemplify the sort of private mental furniture Wittgenstein cleared out? — Banno
I do believe, that beliefs acquired by humans and animals are all states-of-mind — Sam26
Even Wittgenstein held to the idea that beliefs can be nonlinguistic, — Sam26
Prior to language there were plenty of beliefs that were unstateable — Sam26
Even Wittgenstein held to the idea that beliefs can be nonlinguistic, as in my earlier post in which I quoted him. — Sam26
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