2) We can be conscious of one choice at any given time — bahman

Says who?

Says who? — T Clark

Everybody can only focally be conscious of one thing at a time.

Everybody can only focally be conscious of one thing at a time. — bahman

Don't agree, but we don't need to get into it much. I don't believe that decision making is primarily a conscious activity.

Is this thread going to descend into a discussion of Buriden's Ass?
As I have a solution.

Everybody can only focally be conscious of one thing at a time. — bahman

Then the decision and all the options form a coherent whole, which is one thing, of which the decision-maker is conscious.

Is this thread going to descend into a discussion of Buriden's Ass? — charleton

Why should it go to that direction?

As I have a solution. — charleton

What is your solution?

Then the decision and all the options form a coherent whole, which is one thing, of which the decision-maker is conscious. — BlueBanana

Interesting. But then why we are not aware of content of the whole? Perhaps we are disturbing consciousness by reflecting on decision while the consciousness is busy with making conscious decision.

Everybody can only focally be conscious of one thing at a time. — bahman

So we could decide on whether or not to do it? We have two choices at least?

So we could decide on whether or not to do it? We have two choices at least? — apokrisis

It seems that we are only aware of choices sequentially. I want this or that. This or that is sequential mental state. I have never experience this and that as a coherent mental state at the spot.

Even so, we can be conscious of a decision. We can attend to a choice presented to us. The choice could be whether or not to hit a button. The choice could consist of a whole panel of buttons, as in a vending machine.

So yes, attention is a thing. It narrows our focus on the world, or even out thoughts, by suppressing whatever seems extraneous. So attention itself involves a decision. It is the choice not to be focused on anything else at some moment. And that choice could exclude a vast range of other possibilities already.

Then conscious of some particular area of action or choice, like the bounteous variety of a vending machine, we might narrow our attention still further to the Mars bar. And even then, there is the choice to buy it, or not.

If buying the bar is our daily habit, then we could just hit the right button with little attention. There is also habit or automaticism. As much as possible, we want to make our choices in a learnt and routine fashion. Attention is there to deal with choices and decisions that are surprising, novel or significant.

The fact that attention is a narrowing of awareness - an active exclusion of many alternatives - is the feature, not the bug. It is how we avoid just acting out of unthinking habit, even if mostly we want to learn to act out of unthinking habit.

Even so, we can be conscious of a decision. We can attend to a choice presented to us. The choice could be whether or not to hit a button. The choice could consist of a whole panel of buttons, as in a vending machine. — apokrisis

Yes, we can conscious of a decision. The question is whether we can decide consciously: having both option at the same time in mind and deciding. How could we possibly decide on a situation when only one of options are consciously available to us? There is even moment that we are conscious of non of options, when we switch between options.

So yes, attention is a thing. It narrows our focus on the world, or even out thoughts, by suppressing whatever seems extraneous. So attention itself involves a decision. It is the choice not to be focused on anything else at some moment. And that choice could exclude a vast range of other possibilities already. — apokrisis

This is an area which is very confusing for me. We need the attention for specific purpose and for attention we need attention. Paying attentions seems to me that is enforced unconsciously, like when you are deriving and something disturb your deriving.

Then conscious of some particular area of action or choice, like the bounteous variety of a vending machine, we might narrow our attention still further to the Mars bar. And even then, there is the choice to buy it, or not. — apokrisis

Yeah, but the process of narrowing down always involve two choices.

If buying the bar is our daily habit, then we could just hit the right button with little attention. There is also habit or automaticism. As much as possible, we want to make our choices in a learnt and routine fashion. Attention is there to deal with choices and decisions that are surprising, novel or significant. — apokrisis

Yes, I agree.

The fact that attention is a narrowing of awareness - an active exclusion of many alternatives - is the feature, not the bug. It is how we avoid just acting out of unthinking habit, even if mostly we want to learn to act out of unthinking habit. — apokrisis

Well, I think we are not evolved enough to perform conscious decision.

Your argument seems to boil down to the observation that the experience of contemplating two things together, whether simultaneously or in quick succession for sake of comparison, is vague and hard to describe in contrast to the two things contemplated separately.

But why should experiential vagueness be interpreted epistemically?

Take another example; the problem of identifying colours that are poorly illuminated. One reports that the hues are ambiguous. But why should colour ambiguity under poor illumination be considered 'evidence' that poorly illuminated colours are hard to determine? For if the illumination is increased we are no longer comparing like for like.

One is simply conscious of alternative possibilities. I look in a refrigerator. I see several foods that creates an image. I then might gradually widdle it down to two or three possibilities, all envisaged as a single image in memory. Then I choose one course of action. Reach and grab the apple.

Your argument seems to boil down to the observation that the experience of contemplating two things together, whether simultaneously or in quick succession for sake of comparison, is vague and hard to describe in contrast to the two things contemplated separately. — sime

I don't think if we can focally experience two things together. I am familiar with the experiencing options sequentially but that doesn't help when it comes conscious decision since you cannot compare options simultaneously.

But why should experiential vagueness be interpreted epistemically? — sime

What do you mean?

Take another example; the problem of identifying colours that are poorly illuminated. One reports that the hues are ambiguous. But why should colour ambiguity under poor illumination be considered 'evidence' that poorly illuminated colours are hard to determine? For if the illumination is increased we are no longer comparing like for like. — sime

How this example is related to the topic?

One is simply conscious of alternative possibilities. I look in a refrigerator. I see several foods that creates an image. I then might gradually widdle it down to two or three possibilities, all envisaged as a single image in memory. Then I choose one course of action. Reach and grab the apple. — Rich

I think you are explaining unconscious decision. You can neither be conscious options as an coherent image nor you can consciously give them a weight.

I think you are explaining unconscious decision. You can neither be conscious options as an coherent image nor you can consciously give them a weight. — bahman

I have no idea what you are experiencing in your mind but I described what I am experiencing in my mind. It is quite conscious and deliberate.

I have no idea what you are experiencing in your mind but I described what I am experiencing in my mind. It is quite conscious and deliberate. — Rich

Are you conscious of the options at the moment you decide?

Are you conscious of the options at the moment you decide? — bahman

Of course. There is an image in my mind and I consciously decide to take action in a certain direction. What's going on in your mind? Are you groping in the refrigerator and removing what ever you touch? Don't you see all of the choices and choose one? Maybe your mind works differently?

You seem to be working with a homuncular notion of awareness. Language demands that we speak of the “I” who is the self behind every mental doing. And so when we are attending and consciously deciding, there is this elusive “we” now apparently an extra part of the picture. We lose sight of the fact that this we-ness is part of the process, part of the construction, part of the action. It describes the fact that the brain was doing something, and that included taking a point of view, and a point of view implies “an observer with a choice”.

So you seem to accept functional talk. There is what it is like to be behaving habitually or to be behaving attentionally. However you also want to assign a further identity to the doer of any doings. Language demands that there be an efficient cause. And you believe grammar more that you believe psychological functionalism.

Of course. There is an image in my mind and I consciously decide to take action in a certain direction. What's going on in your mind? Are you groping in the refrigerator and removing what ever you touch? Don't you see all of the choices and choose one? Maybe your mind works differently? — Rich

That is how I make a decision: (1) I collect options one by one and memorize them, (2) I retrieve option one by one and contemplate about each option separately and then (3) I decide about an option while I am not aware of anything but my decision.

You seem to be working with a homuncular notion of awareness. — apokrisis

What is homuncular notion of awareness?

Language demands that we speak of the “I” who is the self behind every mental doing. And so when we are attending and consciously deciding, there is this elusive “we” now apparently an extra part of the picture. We lose sight of the fact that this we-ness is part of the process, part of the construction, part of the action. It describes the fact that the brain was doing something, and that included taking a point of view, and a point of view implies “an observer with a choice”. — apokrisis

I agree.

So you seem to accept functional talk. There is what it is like to be behaving habitually or to be behaving attentionally. However you also want to assign a further identity to the doer of any doings. Language demands that there be an efficient cause. — apokrisis

I agree.

And you believe grammar more that you believe psychological functionalism. — apokrisis

Could you please elaborate on this part?

Wow, if I made choices like that on the highway, I would have been dead by now, not to mention the hapless fate of others who happened to be on the road with me at the time, as I one by one tried to memorize the dozens of cars surrounding me and then unconsciously choosing the one that I will not hit (the others will just have to avoid me the best they can).

When we say the river flows, is there something more than the water and the channel carved over time?

The landscape certainly has developed a habit. We can give a name to the dent in the ground that usually has water draining down it. But do the Volga or the Elber exist over and above the particular drainage function they have in their settings?

There is more to the identity of an individual brain, an individual psychology. But the basic point is the same. If we can discover a functional description that seems a true explanation of what we observe, then that is when we should be wary of the reification - the habit of language - which then demands we turn a process into an object, a verb into a noun.

If you speak of some doing, it is the rules of grammar that insist on the presence of some doer. Yet you just described the doings in a functional way where there is no object, just a process.

So again, do you believe a habit of language and insist there is some missing doer? Or do you believe the functional description that looks to have included all the causality you could find? A process is just a process. Giving the process a name doesn’t mean there is now the further thing of some object standing behind all the actions of the process.

“Oh no! The Volga flooded and washed away the village. Why did it decide to do that?”

“Oh no! Brahman decided to pick the hazelnut whirl rather than the Turkish delight from the box of chocolate All Sorts. Why did he decide to do that?”

Grammar wants us to think about things a certain way. A functional or process view - the one science is seeking to take - is the attempt not to get sucked in by the usual games of language.

I don't know if it is like this for you but I can derive miles without being conscious of deriving, unless an expected thing happen.

I believe that there is a doer which can initiate or terminate a chain of causality otherwise there is no free will.

A conscious decision is one we know we have made.
I see no problem here at all.

I don't know if it is like this for you but I can derive miles without being conscious of deriving, unless an expected thing happen. — bahman

You are driving while unconscious? Ok.

Yes. Have you ever heard of sleepwalker?

Of course there are habits that one isn't always conscious of. But you are claiming you drive while unconscious - and live to tell about it. This is an entirely different matter.

I believe that there is a doer which can initiate or terminate a chain of causality otherwise there is no free will. — bahman

But apparently you also believe you can drive unconsciously, and that consciously you are only aware of a single thing. So how does it all fit together for you if you reject a more scientific view?