Hey, welcome thecone137.

The incompatibility between moral responsibility and determinism is a tricky one, the latter fixed and so the idea of alternate possibilities is really that someone could have acted differently or better. That seems plausible enough, there needs to be some contrast. Frankfurt, from memory, believed that this responsibility can be taken away from us, that there can be only one, fixed and determined possibility such as being forced to commit a crime. I personally think this is distorting moral responsibility because there are a number of features that it appears to bypass (moral responsibility vs. responsibility). There is also an absence of intention, but is moral responsibility only of these subjective qualities?

This is where incompatibilists would perhaps draw the line and say that it is impossible for determinism and moral responsibility to be compatible in anyway and the objections to his nefarious neurosurgeon example as this 'irresistible force' implies Frankfurt to be begging the question, basically that the Frankfurt controller cannot stop or manipulate alternative possibilities without thinking about epistemic causality and so the neuroscientist will never know what a person will be choosing to do until at that very moment unless he had some prior knowledge. Similarly, you can read some stuff here not specifically pertaining to the problem of PAP though.

You can see some details of this objection here too.

In other words, has anyone refuted the idea that someone can be morally accountable for an action without saying that they could have acted otherwise? — thecone137

Determinism states that at no single nexus of events a person could have acted otherwise. If we suppose that determinism is true, then where does that leave moral responsibility??
Answer exactly where it is.

Moral responsibility, crime and punishment and all that goes with it in a deterministic world is not different in outcome than a hypothetical world in which free-will is supposed to reign.
It just leave us to assess what are the implications of a moral world of deterrence, punishment, shame, and blame in a deterministic world..

Threats of punishment and social sanctions of all sorts are put in place as causal agents that seek to deter. The hope is that a person knowing they might be sanctioned shall avoid negative actions to avoid those sanctions. Where the threat is incapable of overcoming the innate fear of an individual the punishment is then applied. In a deterministic world this SHOULD suggest that the punishment is "correctional"; that it ought o be able to cause a person to change. You are directing the punishment at the person's innate causalities which led them to transgress. This should indicate assessment followed by further sanctions or rehabilitation.
I do not see where there is any contradiction here. In fact I would prefer that the prison system did NOT treat people as is they had free will, but were persons capable of change, rehabilitation and reform; that prisons where institutions capable of steering a person to a better legal and moral life, rather than pretend that they were willful recidivists incapable of productive change.

Moral responsibility, crime and punishment and all that goes with it in a deterministic world is not different in outcome than a hypothetical world in which free-will is supposed to reign. It just leave us to assess what are the implications of a moral world of deterrence, punishment, shame, and blame in a deterministic world.. — charleton

I am not sure what you are trying to say here. Can you please explain this a bit further? You should also consider the difference between responsibility and moral responsibility.

In a deterministic world this SHOULD suggest that the punishment is "correctional"; that it ought o be able to cause a person to change. You are directing the punishment at the person's innate causalities which led them to transgress. This should indicate assessment followed by further sanctions or rehabilitation. — charleton

I like this suggestion, however determinism implies that the actions we commit cannot be other than what it is and therefore the OP is discussing the probabilities and not what follows from this said act. I agree insofar as there is a chance to rehabilitate and thus improve, but hard determinists would not believe that reform is possible because they are not responsible morally for their actions. Determinism here differs from causation.

but hard determinists would not believe that reform is possible because they are not responsible morally for their actions. Determinism here differs from causation. — TimeLine

I utterly disagree. On the contrary. A determinist knows that all things are the result of causes. If you want to effect a change in a person then you have contribute to that by introducing causal factors and by understanding how that person acts in morally irresponsible ways.

The real problem is with proponents of free will who assert that a person can act IN SPITE of causal factors. For them locking up a wilful person and throwing away the key is the only sure solution. If a person has ultimate choice then you can never trust them that they will not re-offend.

I really feel that this is why the US penal system works so poorly, whilst the Scandinavian model works so well

Determinism states that at no single nexus of events a person could have acted otherwise. If we suppose that determinism is true, then where does that leave moral responsibility??
Answer exactly where it is. — charleton

Determinism is true and when we punish for a crime we punishwho the person is, and not just what they did.
That suggests that the penal system would work more effectively not with vengeance, but by understanding the nature of the person and trying to change the conditions of the person's life, they way they conceive of their place in society and offering them alternative routes to avoid further punishment.

This is where incompatibilists would perhaps draw the line and say that it is impossible for determinism and moral responsibility to be compatible in anyway and the objections to his nefarious neurosurgeon example as this 'irresistible force' implies Frankfurt to be begging the question, basically that the Frankfurt controller cannot stop or manipulate alternative possibilities without thinking about epistemic causality and so the neuroscientist will never know what a person will be choosing to do until at that very moment unless he had some prior knowledge. — TimeLine

Thank you for sharing this information. My book also mentions this objection about the neurosurgeon (Black) not knowing what the subject(Jones) will do until Jones has already performed the action, unless some prior indication is given. Without some prior indication, there cannot be intervention after the action, which was desired to be interrupted, has already completed, resulting in responsibility with alternatives on Jones' part. This objection is countered with the preventative (blockage) measure argument proposed by David Hunt, and it involves restricting actions before the decision is made (think standing at the end of a long corridor, facing two doors, one of which was locked beforehand). Further blockage developments involve implanting a device into the neural pathways of Jones' decision making process so that only one conclusion can be made. If Jones' independent deliberation arrives at A, the implant will override the decision, but isn't Jones still responsible for the decision he independently arrived at, whether that decision is interrupted?

Upon reflection, it seems to me that the issue simply got pushed back one step (what's next, restricting the action that initiated the neural pathway process... and so on and so forth???). It seems to me that in all of the examples:

1. A decision event occurs by the subject (alternate possibilities exist)
2. The following event is either interrupted (reactive or blockage) or not interrupted at all.
3. Either way, (moral) responsibility and alternate possibilities existed at the decision event.

I think I can come up with examples, but before I do, am I missing something here?

Determinism states that at no single nexus of events a person could have acted otherwise. If we suppose that determinism is true, then where does that leave moral responsibility??
Answer exactly where it is. — charleton

I don't think I have a problem with a lack of moral responsibility given determinism is true (deterrence laws, as you state, will still be in effect). With that said, my issue is centered more on the requirement of alternate possibilities, given that moral responsibility is true.

With that said, my issue is centered more on the requirement of alternate possibilities, given that moral responsibility is true. — thecone137

Sorry I have no idea what you mean here.
You do not let off a tiger determined to kill you. If the tiger is responsible for killing humans, then you have to do something about it. What ismoral responsibility except some peri-christian nonsense which demands the impossible that we are all free to open the door to the baby Jesus what ever we might think or feel, or reason about the existence of god.

I'm sorry if what I said sounded confusing. If it helps, we can remove the word moral and just look at responsibility.

I'm trying to understand the relation between responsibility and alternate possibilities as my OP mentions. Are you able to address that relationship or is the mere notion of responsibility still a peri-christian nonsense concept?

I'd also like to add that not everyone agrees that determinism is true, so if that is the assumption in your response, please state that.

I utterly disagree. On the contrary. A determinist knows that all things are the result of causes. If you want to effect a change in a person then you have contribute to that by introducing causal factors and by understanding how that person acts in morally irresponsible ways. — charleton

The issue here is that determinism contains no 'before' that leads to a choice, no prior chain or contingent possibilities and so by abandoning this chain, the possibilities and the outcome are one and the same. The questions prior to this decision become irrelevant, no probabilistic measurement to assess in advance of that 'choice' or any antecedent conditions and so causality and determinism here become irreconcilable. While your psychological take on deterministic causality has merit, there is a conflict it has with probabilistic causation.

The real problem is with proponents of free will who assert that a person can act IN SPITE of causal factors. For them locking up a wilful person and throwing away the key is the only sure solution. If a person has ultimate choice then you can never trust them that they will not re-offend. — charleton

From a psychologically deterministic point of view, I think you may be confusing the argument with fatalism, but that is not the problem the OP is attempting to ascertain.

Further blockage developments involve implanting a device into the neural pathways of Jones' decision making process so that only one conclusion can be made. If Jones' independent deliberation arrives at A, the implant will override the decision, but isn't Jones still responsible for the decision he independently arrived at, whether that decision is interrupted? — thecone137

Jones could have done something otherwise and so while the decision may have been changed by this device, it does not challenge in any way the possibilities in advance of the outcome that was determined by an earlier event - implanting this device. Moral responsibility cannot be abandoned because free will and alternate possibilities still exist. This leads back to the problem between responsibility and moral responsibility. I would be keen to see your examples and maybe we can flesh them out together.

I like this suggestion, however determinism implies that the actions we commit cannot be other than what it is and therefore the OP is discussing the probabilities and not what follows from this said act. — TimeLine

Probabilities and what follows from an act are the same thing, just with a different count of repetitions. A 1% chance of something happening is identical to saying the frequency of occurrence is roughly once per hundred iterations.

Upon reflection, it seems to me that the issue simply got pushed back one step (what's next, restricting the action that initiated the neural pathway process... and so on and so forth???). It seems to me that in all of the examples:

1. A decision event occurs by the subject (alternate possibilities exist)
2. The following event is either interrupted (reactive or blockage) or not interrupted at all.
3. Either way, (moral) responsibility and alternate possibilities existed at the decision event.

I think I can come up with examples, but before I do, am I missing something here? — thecone137

This gets to the point of making decisions, and the judgement/score system used by the subject. Laws are a social agreement on the values we place in sorting those possibilities, and attempts to enforce those ranking & priority schemes.

Probabilities and what follows from an act are the same thing, just with a different count of repetitions. A 1% chance of something happening is identical to saying the frequency of occurrence is roughly once per hundred iterations. — AngleWyrm

This leads to defining the difference between probabilities and possibilities, the former aligned with this direct course that you speak of and unfortunately distorts the arguments against Frankfurt cases; we then assume that if we have two unlocked doors at the end of the corridor, there is equal probability or a 50/50 chance that you will select one to open first. How possibilities here differ is that it is simply just possibilities and the probability is irrelevant, what could lead to an action and where free-will vs. determinism problem is raised to the fore. Is the behaviour randomised that will lead to either door 1 or door 2, is it determined by the persons subjective intent etc.

This leads to defining the difference between probabilities and possibilities, — TimeLine

Rolling 2d6, there are 11 possibilities, [2..12], and 36 probabilities (chances). Only 1 chance to get the possible 12 outcome, but six chances to get the outcome 7.

With determinism there is no moral responsibility, because the only responsibility lies in the first cause which set off the chain of events. Presumably, a determinist blames the Big Bang (God) for everything though I imagine it is difficult to mete out appropriate punishment without obliterating the universe.

Missing from the picture is contributing factors. If laws are meant to contribute deterrance, then surely we can assume that provocation toward an illegal act is also contributed externally.

Jones could have done something otherwise and so while the decision may have been changed by this device, it does not challenge in any way the possibilities in advance of the outcome that was determined by an earlier event - implanting this device. Moral responsibility cannot be abandoned because free will and alternate possibilities still exist — TimeLine

And that is why I struggled with understanding how Robert Kane could describe Frankfurt-style cases as an ongoing problem...Since 1969!

Moral responsibility cannot be abandoned because free will and alternate possibilities still exist. This leads back to the problem between responsibility and moral responsibility. — TimeLine

I'm having trouble distinguishing the difference between responsibility and moral responsibility, but at risk of going off-topic, I will continue without mentioning both unless someone can explain the distinctions.

I would be keen to see your examples and maybe we can flesh them out together. — TimeLine

Going back to the Jones and Black scenario, Jones is standing in front a table, and on this table are two voting machines, which tally the counts electronically. Each vote is recorded by simply pressing a button located on the top of each machine. Still undecided, Jones rests his left hand on the left machine button (Vote A) and places his right hand on the right machine button (Vote B). Now of course we all know that Black wants Jones to vote for A but is not sure about the method with which use to ensure this happens. The two options available to Black are:

1) reactive approach - Black waits for a sign of what Jones is going to do before intervening.
2) proactive approach - Without waiting for Jones to act, Black can reprogram the electronic tally machines so that no matter which button Jones selects, the electronic signal will be routed to the left machine. In other words, vote A will always count.

My reason for this example is that we need something in which timing does not complicate the matter. Having Jones' hands resting on each button severely reduces the time between the beginning of the act and the end of the act, which almost completely removes the possibility of an objection like "well, Black waits for Jones hand to begin moving towards a particular box and THEN he intervenes". My point is that once Jones takes action, the action is, for all practical purposes, completed. With that said, I don't think this condition reduces the force of my example, because one while one cannot appeal to the action as evidence, one can always appeal to prior evidence that the action will occur. Further, prior evidence is what I think Frankfurt was getting at when he said "Jones is about to make up his mind" and "Jones is going to do something other than what he [Black] wants him to do"

Now let's say Jones deliberates about the decision and let us call this decision process PL or PR ( decision to press left button/decision to press right button) . This decision process, however long it takes, begins and ends at time T1, so PL/PR occurs at T1. Immediately following T1, Jones takes action by pressing one of the buttons LB or RB (left button/right button). This button pressing process begins and ends at time T2, so LB/RB occurs at T2. From a chronological perspective:

PL or PR --> LB or RB
T1 -----------> T2

Using the reactive approach, Only after PR at T1 will Black intervene at T2 with LB, rendering PAP true(Jones holds no responsibility). Black will not intervene after PL at T1, rendering PAP true(Jones is responsible).

Using the proactive approach, Jones will carry responsibility either LB or RB, because while the result of voting for A at T2 was the same due to the reprogramming, his decision making process or PL or PR at T1 was not coerced. His deliberation process had alternate possibilities, and, therefore Jones is responsible for what he intended to do.

And that is why I struggled with understanding how Robert Kane could describe Frankfurt-style cases as an ongoing problem...Since 1969! — thecone137

Because there are so many factors to consider. I would think that while responsibility remains, it could be transferred over to the 'device' and imagine how that would render all sorts of issues; does this device need to have a soul for it to be morally blameworthy and if so, what is this 'soul' - is it value, consciousness, or love (and why I mentioned the difference between responsibility and moral responsibility because the focal is morality)? To be either directly or indirectly accountable vis-a-vis the causal chain leading to the agents' choice. It brings to mind the very properties of choice, the actual information and so where epistemic causality comes to life and whether, ontologically, such information even exists. This is where the device would need to block that information in order to prevent the agent from being capable of ascertaining the very possibilities.

Having Jones' hands resting on each button severely reduces the time between the beginning of the act and the end of the act, which almost completely removes the possibility of an objection like "well, Black waits for Jones hand to begin moving towards a particular box and THEN he intervenes". — thecone137

I think it is essential that we answer how time relates to determinism and it brings to mind what I mentioned above about information. How does time relate to our experience of the past, present and future and is it merely an illusion? Or is time an organic, energetic and active system of cause and effect not fixed in a spatial knot but where past choices and experiences can shape our responses and decisions in the present, including the likelihood of which button to press? You are making a presupposition here that time exists in a classical framework and this will make it real or objective.

The reactive approach is also about probabilities and not possibilities. There are algorithms where past decisions can be used to ascertain possible or likely choices made in the present (like voting a presidential candidate) and whilst not absolutely accurate, relies both on time (the past) and information. I think it is very complex that only the proactive approach really enables us to discuss the subject in question without it leading to a slippery slope. What do you think?

You are making a presupposition here that time exists in a classical framework and this will make it real or objective. — TimeLine

That is true. I personally find the illusion of time convincing, but I think granting a classical framework would not be unreasonable, at least from an experiential perspective. I'm not even sure one

The reactive approach is also about probabilities and not possibilities. There are algorithms where past decisions can be used to ascertain possible or likely choices made in the present (like voting a presidential candidate) and whilst not absolutely accurate, relies both on time (the past) and information. I think it is very complex that only the proactive approach really enables us to discuss the subject in question without it leading to a slippery slope. What do you think? — TimeLine

It seems to me that opening up the possibility of multiple time theories can lead to some very complex problems that I'm not prepared to answer (e.g. how can intervention have meaning at all when all actions happen at once?).

As for probabilities,(slightly) balanced probabilities (60/40) pose no threat as the choice by Jones is indeterministic. As we get into more unbalanced probabilities, though, we might see a problem. I suppose it could be extremely unlikely (.00001% chance) that one of the two options are chosen, which means the choice could be considered irrelevant, and an irrelevant choice may as well just be no choice at all. Yet, the choice is still technically indeterministic (probabilistic), so I'm not sure which side of the fence I want to lean.

In any case, doesn't the idea of probabilities (desired outcomes/possible outcomes) require alternate possibilities?