There's something about beliefs arising non-linguisticaly that resembles beetles in boxes — Banno
When one says beliefs are concepts, it sounds like some explanation has been offered. — Banno
This might seem rather surprising, given that Ramsey is usually associated with a redundancy or proto-deflationary theory of truth. But Misak argues that, after about 1926, Ramsey saw that an adequate account of truth needs to do more than note the equivalence of “p” and “‘p’ is true”: if one has a disposition toward a dispositional account of belief, as Ramsey did, then it’s natural to ask what sorts of dispositions, in general, go along with believing that p is true.
Ramsey came to much the same conclusion as Peirce: the belief that p commits one to giving reasons for p and considering the evidence for and against it. Thus, on Misak’s reading of Ramsey, “if we unpack the commitments we incur when we assert or believe, we find that we have imported the notions of fact (vaguely conceived), experimentation, and standards for good belief” (230).
Pragmatic approaches to meaning and truth thus offer a tidy, mutually-reinforcing package that is an attractive alternative to the more typical combination of a representational theory of meaning with a correspondence theory of truth—while also offering a meaningful extension beyond the truism at the heart of deflationism.
[Review: Cambridge Pragmatism: From Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein, by Cheryl Misak - John Capps]
When I communicate that belief using language... — Sam26
Sure.It's not as though we can't talk about our internal experiences using language, — Sam26
They don't give meaning to language, but we can refer to them. — Sam26
However, this does not negate what's happening privately, apart from the social. — Sam26
SO the question I have for the in-the-head theorists is, what is added by the stuff in the head that is not already in the statement? And the answer seems to me to be that the Beetle argument shows that in so far as a belief is private, it drops out of the discussion; and in so far as it is public, it is a statement and associated behaviours. — Banno
"the stuff in the head" is very real... — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see it as up to you to deliberately determine what is significant for you. That task has already been accomplished the moment you experience any event. You find yourself attending to something before you consciously will it. — Joshs
And what is relevant to you is that entitiy that is not so similar in relation to your construing history that it will not be noticed, and not so other that you will fail to assimilate it. The 'too other' is what is experienced via affectitites of fear, anger,etc. that paralyze our ability to go on. — Joshs
Bateson shared some things with Kelly, but I prefer Kelly's phenomenological stance to Bateson's behaviroistic model of causation. ' — Joshs
Kelly defined constructs as bipolar categories—the way two things are alike and different from a third—that people employ to understand the world. Examples of such constructs are "attractive," "intelligent," "kind." A construct always implies contrast. So when an individual categorizes others as attractive, or intelligent, or kind, an opposite polarity is implied. This means that such a person may also evaluate the others in terms of the constructs "ugly," "stupid," or "cruel."
Please justify this. — Banno
Thus, proposition B is true, Smith believes that B is true, and Smith is justified in believing B is true. — Sam26
However, it is not clear who ‘the man’ refers to here. If ‘the man’ refers to Jones then the statement is false, because Jones is not the man who gets the job. If ‘the man’ refers to Smith, then Smith would be making a statement without any justification, since he believes that Jones will get the job. — Sam26
Gettier has tried to use semantic obscurity to trick the reader into believing that justified true belief is not enough for knowledge. However, it can be seen that in this case the ‘knowledge’ was either not justified or false, and thus never constituted knowledge in the first place. — Sam26
In both cases, justification for Smith comes from empirical evidence. — Sam26
the stuff in the head is very real", is justified. — Metaphysician Undercover
↪charleton When one says beliefs are concepts, it sounds like some explanation has been offered.
But has it? Do you have a better notion of what a concept is that of what a belief is?
I don't think we do. Concepts are just more things-in-the-head. — Banno
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