I’ll again look up “fact”, “proposition”, “statement” and “utterance”. This time I’ll check many sources.
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For now, I’ll just tell you how I use those words:
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A fact is a state of affairs, an aspect of the way things are.
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A proposition is a maybe-fact. It’s like a fact, except that it might not be a fact. A hypothetical “fact” that might not really be a fact. My definition of a proposition doesn’t require that it be uttered. For example, an if-then fact relates two hypothetical propositions, one of which is true if the other is true. …none of which need be uttered.
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A statement is an utterance that claims a fact. A statement is an (not necessarily true) utterance about a fact. A statement expresses a proposition, which may or may not be a fact. A statement can be a true statement or a false statement. A proposition could be called a potential statement.
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An utterance is something that’s actually said.
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Things are what can be referred to. Things are what facts are about.
--------------------------------
[end of definitions]
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Definitions need only to be reasonable, clearly-specified, and consistently-used.
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But if any of the above-stated definitions are wrong, in the sense of being strongly-contradicted by standard philosophical usage, then of course I’ll use the standard definitions instead.
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Of course we should all use the standard definitions, for clarity of meaning.
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I didn’t intentionally violate standard philosophical usage. As I said, if some of my definitions are definitely wrong, then I’ll change them.
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But, in the meantime, all that’s needed is that they be reasonable, clearly-specified, and consistently-used (by the person who uses them).
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As long as they’re well-specified and consistently-used, they certainly don’t invalidate a metaphysics that’s stated in terms of them.
--------------------------------------------------
Now, I’ll post these definitions, to clarify what I’ve meant by what I’ve said.
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Then (maybe today, maybe tomorrow morning) I’ll reply to the rest of your message.
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Then I’ll check on the philosophical definitions of those terms (fact, proposition, statement, utterance), at many sources, and then post what I find.
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Michael Ossipoff

A fact is a state of affairs, an aspect of the way things are. — Michael Ossipoff

There is a big problem with this definition. "The way things are", refers to a moment of time at the present. But time is passing, and things are changing. So there is really no such thing as "the way things are", because this would require a stoppage of time, and that would create an unreal situation.

But if any of the above-stated definitions are wrong, in the sense of being strongly-contradicted by standard philosophical usage, then of course I’ll use the standard definitions instead. — Michael Ossipoff

Your definition of "fact" is not only wrong in the sense that it is inconsistent with the standard definitions, that I gave in my last post, but it is also wrong in the sense that it describes something which appears to be physically impossible, (the way things are), as I explained above.

"A fact is a state of affairs, an aspect of the way things are." — Michael Ossipoff


There is a big problem with this definition. "The way things are", refers to a moment of time at the present. But time is passing, and things are changing. So there is really no such thing as "the way things are", because this would require a stoppage of time, and that would create an unreal situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Incorrect.

Your confusion is linguistic.

Abstract facts are timelessly true. An abstract fact can be defined as an aspect of the way things (timelessly) are.

Likewise "A state of affairs" needn't mean a state of affairs at one particular time. It can refer to a timeless state of affairs, which is what an abstract fact is.

You're insisting that the "is" and "are" refer to the present, but abstract facts are timeless facts. They're timelessly true.

The abstract fact that If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4 (by an obvious definition of 1, 2, 3 & 4 in terms of the multiplicative identity and addition), is a timeless abstract if-then fact.

Likewise, my abstract if-then fact about Slitheytoves & Jabberwockeys is a timeless abstract fact.

It isn't only true today, for example. One could insert the word "timelessly" in front of "is" and "are" where needed, and I sometimes do. But often its understood.

In logical discussions and articles, in mathematical theorems and proofs, "are" and "is" are often understood to have timeless meaning.

Your definition of "fact" is not only wrong in the sense that it is inconsistent with the standard definitions, that I gave in my last post, but it is also wrong in the sense that it describes something which appears to be physically impossible,

Only if you think that "is" and "are" must always only refer to the present, or that a state of affairs can only mean a state of affairs at one particular time.

See above.

And if the definition of a fact as a state of affairs is wrong, then you'd better inform SEP that they're wrong too.

Anyway, as I said, after replying to your latest message of yesterday, I'll check on the definitions of the terms that you dispute, at a lot of sources., and will post what I find.

Michael Ossipoff

"Sure there were, before there were humans on the Earth. There were facts, but there were no utterances made about facts, because there were no animals with speech". — Michael Ossipoff
— Metaphysician Undercover

A "fact" is a thing known to have occurred

No. A fact needn't be about a past event.

, and this implies a knower.

There's no consensus to that effect. it's a contentious issue. But it needn't be an issue here, because my metaphysics is about individual subjective experience. If you say that a fact is only meaningful with respect to an experiencer, that isn't an objection to my metaphysical proposal.

What makes you think that there was a knower before there was animals with speech?

The fact that nonhuman animals aren't language-speakers doesn't mean that they aren't knowers.

A proposition is a statement. There is no such thing as a proposition which is not a statement.

I've told the definitions that explain what i meant when I used those words.

As I said, I'll check on the listed definitions of the terms that you dispute.

I'd said:

Again, you could truly say that, for any proposition, there's a potential statement. I don't deny that.

I agree that, for any fact, there's a potential statement of that fact. But I'm talking about facts instead of statements. — Michael Ossipoff

Sorry, but a proposition is an actual statement, not a potential statement

So you're saying that a proposition is an utterance, and requires a speaker. If that's how it's defined, then maybe there's another word for what might or might not be a fact, but which hasn't been uttered.

I'll check the published definitions.

, and a fact is an actual thing known, not a potential thing known.

So then, if there's a wiring short-circuit in a building, but no one knows about it, until later, when the fire-inspectors examine the scene, it can be truly be said that was no fact of a wiring short-circuit before the building burned down?

...and a building owner can assure his employees that there isn't a wiring-fault in his old dilapidated building, because no one knows of one (and no one has looked for one).

You are using words in an unacceptable way, and that's why I disagree with your metaphysics.

You're grasping at straws.

You're confusing the metaphysics with the definitions that you dispute. I've stated the metaphysics in terms of a set of definitions that I've specified. I have nothing against the use of standard definitions, when I find out what they are.

I'd said:

The physical world consists of facts, and I agree that, for every fact, there's a potential utterance about that fact.

But the facts are what the world consists of. — Michael Ossipoff

You replied:

As far as I know, there are two principle ways that "fact" is used. One is to refer to a thing known, and this requires a knower. The other is to refer to a truth, and a truth is something which is true. True means to correspond with reality. If you are using "fact" to refer to something which corresponds with reality, rather than to refer to something which is known to have occurred, then how is this not a statement?

It's a state of affairs, which may or may not be the subject of an utterance. A statement is an utterance that claims a fact.

By the definitions that I've been using. But,as I said, I'll check many sources, for the standard definitions of those terms.

Michael Ossipoff

The abstract fact that If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4 (by an obvious definition of 1, 2, 3 & 4 in terms of the multiplicative identity and addition), is a timeless abstract if-then fact. — Michael Ossipoff

The idea of an "abstract if-then fact" is redundant. '2+2=4' is true by definition; there is no "if-then" about it. Facts are facts, what we may think are facts in the domain of empirical speculation may or may not be facts, but a mathematical fact, if it is proven and thereby becomes a matter of definition, is a mathematical fact, period.

The idea of an "abstract if-then fact" is redundant.

??? :D

Well yes, you could say that, because all abstract facts are timeless.

But you were the one who wanted to say that "is" and "are" can only refer to the present.
— Janus

'2+2=4' is true by definition; there is no "if-then" about it.

Incorrect. 4 isn't defined as 2+2.

4 is defined (most obviously at least) as 3+1

As you might guess, 3 is defined as 2+1.

2 is defined as 1+1

1 is the symbol for the multiplicative identity referred to in the multiplicative identity axiom.

It is unnecessary to define every counting number from 2 to 9, multiple times, as every sum of lower counting-numbers that it's equal to.--when one obvious sum would do.

But, given those definitions that I stated:

If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4.

That's a timeless abstract if-then fact.

All abstract facts are timeless.

In general, a proved and correct mathematical theorem is an if-then fact whose "if " premise includes (but isn't necessarily limited to) a set of mathematical axioms (algebraic or geometric).

Michael Ossipoff

In general, a proved and correct mathematical theorem is an if-then fact whose "if " premise includes (but isn't necessarily limited to) a set of mathematical axioms (algebraic or geometric). — Michael Ossipoff

The point is that within a system it is redundant to specify "if the axioms are true, then..." . The system. and any truth within it, does not exist without the axioms which are simply taken to be self-evident and fundamental. The alternatives of truth and falsity cannot be applied to the axioms. So your formulation is ill-formed. It cannot constitute an adequate starting point for any thought.

When you prove a theorem, you show that, if the relevant axioms are true (and maybe of certain other propositions are true too), then the conclusion that you want to prove is true.

In other words, you prove an if-then fact.

You said:

The point is that within a system it is redundant to specify "if the axioms are true, then..." . The system. and any truth within it, does not exist without the axioms which are simply taken to be self-evident and fundamental. — Janus

...and it's because the axioms are taken to be self-evident and fundamental (for a certain set of elements, under certain operations*), that the if-then statement that you prove establishes the truth of the conclusion that you want to prove.

*The multiplicative inverse axiom isn't true with the Integers, for example, and so,, unlike the real numbers and the rational numbers, the integers aren't a field (They're a ring). So, you see, there's an instance in which the multiplicative inverse axiom is false.

Of course there are numerous other examples in which an axiom, or several axioms, are false with respect to some set of elements, under certain operations.

But it's well-understood, and often said, that what you're proving is that your desired conclusion is true if the axioms (and whatever other propositions) are true.

The alternatives of truth and falsity cannot be applied to the axioms.

Yes they can be an are. See above*.

Michael Ossipoff

If you want to say that something could be true or false, then you must be able to give an account of what difference that would make in either case.

You want to say that the axioms of mathematics could be either true or false, so you need to give an account of what differences we would find in either case.

Or, put it another way, you need to give an account of how we might, at least in principle, be able to discover that the axioms of mathematics are true or false. I don't believe you will be able to give any such accounts; and if I am right, and you can't give any such accounts, your claim that the axioms of mathematics could be either true or false is an empty one.

I refer you to my most recent post.

Various axioms of mathematics are false for various sets of elements with respect to various operations.

In the example i gave, the multiplicative inverse axiom is false with respect to the Integers.

Michael Ossipoff

If you want to say that something could be true or false, then you must be able to give an account of what difference that would make in either case.

You want to say that the axioms of mathematics could be either true or false, so you need to give an account of what differences we would find in either case.

Or, put it another way, you need to give an account of how we might be able to discover that the axioms of mathematics are true or false. I don't believe you will be able to give any such accounts; and if I am right, and you can't give any such accounts, your claim that the axioms of mathematics could be either true or false is an empty one. — Janus

The fact that axioms might be limited in their applicability does not speak to their truth or falsity, but to their relationship with context.

The fact that axioms might be limited in their applicability does not speak to their truth or falsity, but to their relationship with context. — Janus

Yes, in some contexts they're false.

Michael Ossipoff

You are just playing with words and clutching at straws. The challenge for you is to show how an axiom could be false in a context where it is applicable. The salient point is, that it makes no sense to say that something is true in some context, if it could not be, even in principle, false in that context.

You are just playing with words and clutching at straws. The challenge for you is to show how an axiom could be false in a context where it is applicable. — Janus

Oh, ok, all you're asking is that i show how an axiom could be false in a context in which it is true :D

The salient point is, that it makes no sense to say that something is true in some context, if it could not be, even in principle, false in that context.

How could it be false, even in principle, in a context in which it is true?

I'd say that you're asking a lot :D

But I'm not saying that the multiplicative inverse axiom is or could be false for the real numbers or the rational numbers. I'm just saying that it's false for the integers.

Maybe this is the kind of answer you're asking for:

How would the rational numbers have to change in order for the multiplicative inverse axiom to become false for them? Delete every rational number that isn't also an integer, The multiplicative inverse axiom will then be false for the (thus modified) rational numbers.

In fact, don't do that much. Just delete one well-chosen rational number such as 1/37.

Then the multiplicative inverse axiom will be false for the (thus slightly modified) rational numbers.

Michael Ossipoff

An axiom typically isn't defined only for a particular set of elements and operations, Various axioms are true for, various sets of elements and operations. So it's meaningful to speak of an axiom's truth or falsity over various sets of elements and operations.

Michael Ossipoff

You are just playing with words and clutching at straws. The challenge for you is to show how an axiom could be false in a context where it is applicable. — Janus

Alright, the multiplicative inverse axiom is applicable to the integers, in the (perfectly meaningful) sense that we can apply it to them by evaluating them by it, and asking "Do the Integers meet the multiplicative inverse axiom? Is that axiom true for the Integers?"

So the multiplicative inverse axiom is applicable to the integers, and is false in their context.

Michael Ossipoff

Abstract facts are timelessly true. — Michael Ossipoff

I don't agree with this principle. That's Platonic Realism and I do not agree with it. I believe in an ever changing world where human beings have free will, and if there is anything which is outside of time (timeless), it is not abstract facts.

Your confusion is linguistic. — Michael Ossipoff

That's right. You and I use the same words in completely different ways, so I haven't the capacity to really comprehend what you are saying. I understand enough to get a gist of what you are saying, and I disagree with it.

How could it be false, even in principle, in a context in which it is true? — Michael Ossipoff

"If that is so, then why the need to state a conditional as you did earlier

"The abstract fact that If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4 (by an obvious definition of 1, 2, 3 & 4 in terms of the multiplicative identity and addition), is a timeless abstract if-then fact."

if the "additive associative axiom" could not be false even in principle. The fact is that you want to make 2+2=4 seem to be a "timeless if-then abstract fact" rather than merely a timeless abstract fact, because the former fudge enables you to develop your whole purportedly "non-speculative" metaphysics. This shows clearly the way in which your thinking is based on a superfluous conditional. Of course, I don't expect you to admit that, being as obviously wedded to your "system" as you are. :-}

Alright, that's enough for this evening. I'm calling it a day. I'll resume replies tomorrow.

Michael Ossipoff

Again you are merely playing with words; equivocating on the sense of "applicable".

A proposition is a statement. There is no such thing as a proposition which is not a statement.

[...]

Sorry, but a proposition is an actual statement, not a potential statement, and a fact is an actual thing known, not a potential thing known. You are using words in an unacceptable way, and that's why I disagree with your metaphysics. — Metaphysician Undercover

From Cambridge Philosophy Notes:

A statement usually means that which is said when a sentence is uttered or inscribed. Not all sentences makestatements, for instance imperative or interrogative sentences, or sentences uttered in,
say, reciting a play. A proposition is the hardest to define, but can be taken to mean
that which is common to a set of synonymous declarative sentences. Propositions,
even the false ones, are usually taken to exist timelessly and independently of
anything that expresses them, and even independently of whether they are ever
expressed.

Michael Ossipoff

I’d said:
.

Abstract facts are timelessly true.

— Michael Ossipoff
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You replied:
.

I don't agree with this principle. That's Platonic Realism and I do not agree with it.

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Yes, I’ve discussed this before, but let me say it again here:
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Absolute Anti-Realism is out of the question. I’ll get back to that later, below.
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For now:
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Fine, that needn’t be an issue for my metaphysical proposal, because my proposal is stated in terms of our individual experience, described as a life-experience possibility-story.
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So, if you want to say that facts are only meaningful with respect to an experiencer, that doesn’t contradict my metaphysical proposal.
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Instead of saying that the abstract facts are independently true, you want to say that the facts and their experiencer are true together, as part of the experience, which is more fundamental. Fine, because my metaphysical proposal is an Anti-Realism, stated in terms or our experience.
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But yes, I did say what you quoted above:
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Abstract facts are timelessly true.

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Does that seem to contradict the Anti-Realist character of my proposal?
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It doesn’t, because I don’t advocate absolute Anti-Realism.
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As I said, I propose that, for you, the world around you is just the setting for your (more fundamental) life-experience possibility-story. You, the experiencer, are primary and central to that story, as its protagonist.
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The complex system of inevitable abstract if-then facts that is your life-experience possibility-story is just as valid as any other abstract fact, or system of them. And it and its validity are self-contained, and quite independent of anything outside it, such as other abstract facts or systems of them. The only reality that it has or needs is in its own inter-referring context.
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Like any system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts, your life-experience possibility-story doesn’t and needn’t have objective reality or existence in some global context, or in any outside context or medium.
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But obviously, on the other hand, the abstract if-then facts that constitute your life-experience possibility-story aren’t really different from all the other abstract facts.
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That’s why I say that it would be animal-chauvinist to say that the only abstract facts that are valid are the ones that are in someone’s experience. That would only be so if you define validity as “experienced by someone”. That would be distinctly un-objective, It would also be something made true only by a special definition that says that it’s true.
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I’ve previously said that that would be reminiscent of the following (only roughly quoted) passage from Kenneth Patchen:
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“Alright”, said the Giraffe, “then let’s just say that the one with the longest neck gets all the jellybeans.”
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That’s why I say that absolute Anti-Realism is out of the question.
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Another thing:
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I’ve given a few examples of inevitable abstract if then facts. One was about Slitheytoves and Jaberwockeys. Another was about “if the additive associative axiom is true for the real numbers, the rational numbers, the integers, the positive integers, and the non-negative integers, then 2+2=4.”
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The point is that these inevitable abstracts are absolutely, timelessly, true for anyone anywhere. …true now or in ancient Greece, true for someone on a different planet, or in a different galaxy, or in a different sub-universe of a physically-inter-related multiverse of which our Big-Bang Universe (BBU) is a part….or even in an entirely different self-consistent possibility-world
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(All possibility-worlds are self-consistent, or they’d be impossibility-worlds. Possibility-worlds and possibility-stories are built on inevitable abstract if-then facts. Mutually-contradictory propositions aren’t facts.)
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So, since the inevitable abstract if-then facts are true for anyone, anywhere or anywhen, even in an entirely different possibility-world, they’re universally, timelessly true. …not just locally true in some particular person’s experience.
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That’s another reason why I say that absolute Anti-Realism is out of the question, and that abstract if-then facts are inevitably timelessly true.
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You said:
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I believe in an ever changing world where human beings have free will, and if there is anything which is outside of time (timeless), it is not abstract facts.

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We needn’t get into the free-will issue here.
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As I mentioned above, my metaphysical proposal doesn’t need for abstract facts to be true independent of an experiencer.
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But I told, above, why inevitable abstract facts have independent validity, and why absolute Anti-Realism has problems.
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I’d said:
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Your confusion is linguistic. — Michael Ossipoff

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You replied:
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That's right. You and I use the same words in completely different ways

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Yes indeed. You use “is” and “are” to refer exclusively to the present, meaning that you disagree with their timeless meaning frequent used in mathematics and logic.
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, so I haven't the capacity to really comprehend what you are saying.

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…then at least comprehend that your meaning for “is” and “are” contradicts a meaning for them that is routine and standard in mathematics and logic.
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If you don’t speak the language that I and others speak, then we can’t talk.
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I understand enough to get a gist of what you are saying, and I disagree with it.

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…and I’ve been answering your disagreements.
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Whether they’ve been adequately answered isn’t for you, me, or any advocate of a position on the matter, to judge. It’s for outside observers of the discussion to judge.
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Michael Ossipoff

I’d said:
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How could it be false, even in principle, in a context in which it is true? — Michael Ossipoff

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You replied:
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"If that is so, then why the need to state a conditional as you did earlier.

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If you know that the additive associative axiom is true for the real numbers, the rational numbers, the integers, the positive integers, and the non-negative numbers; and if you know that if that’s so, then 2+2=4, then that tells you that 2+2=4.
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As I’ve already explained, mathematical theorems are proved by showing that if an axiom is true (and maybe if other propositions are true as well), then a certain desired conclusion is true.
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I’d said:
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"The abstract fact that If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4 (by an obvious definition of 1, 2, 3 & 4 in terms of the multiplicative identity and addition), is a timeless abstract if-then fact."
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You replied:
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…if the "additive associative axiom" could not be false even in principle.

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An axiom can be false with respect to some systems of elements and operations on the elements. The multiplicative inverse axiom is false for the integers. The commutative axiom is false for many groups, though there’s a class of groups for which it’s true.
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In case you want to say that it isn’t the same associative axiom or commutative axiom, when applied to different systems, then let me clarify a bit.
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It’s true that a group is only defined with respect to one operation. And that operation isn’t usually addition or multiplication. But a group’s operation is often similar to addition, where the elements are things that are done, and the binary operation on those elements consists of doing one thing, and then doing a different thing. ..which could be regarded as adding one thing to another.
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Anyway, the “+” sign is often used to stand for a group’s operation.
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Suppose, just for the moment, we let “+” stand in for addition or multiplication (for numbers), or for whatever operation a group is defined with respect to.
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So, the associative axiom, (a+b) + c = a + (b+c) is true for groups, just as it’s true for the integers with respect to addition and multiplication.
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And likewise, the commutative axiom, a+b = b+a, is false for many groups, while true for Abellian groups, and for the integers with respect to addition and multiplication.
.

The fact is that you want to make 2+2=4 seem to be a "timeless if-then abstract fact" rather than merely a timeless abstract fact

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No, I don’t.
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2+2=4 isn’t an if-then fact.

If the additive associative axiom is true for the real numbers, the rational numbers, the integers, the positive integers, and the non-negative integers, then 2+2=4 (by an obvious definition of 1, 2, 3, & 4, based on the multiplicative identity and addition).

That's an inevitable abstract if-then fact.
.
As you said, 2+2= 4 is a timeless abstract fact.

You can experimentally show yourself that 2+2=4, by sitting on the floor with four apples, and experimenting. But the proof in terms of the number-definitions and axioms shows that 2+2=4 is indeed a timeless abstract fact. …given the associative axiom, which we all know to be true for the real numbers, the rational numbers, the integers, the positive integers, the non-negative integers (under the addition and multiplication operations), and for all groups.
.

…, because the former fudge enables you to develop your whole purportedly "non-speculative" metaphysics.

.
See above.
.

This shows clearly the way in which your thinking is based on a superfluous conditional.

.
???
.
See above.
.
Michael Ossipoff

None of this addresses my central criticism of your position, which is that "if-then" conditionals are relevant only to the future; and that the notion of "if-then abstract facts" is incoherent.

Bulk is not a substitute for quality of response.

That’s why I say that it would be animal-chauvinist to say that the only abstract facts that are valid are the ones that are in someone’s experience. That would only be so if you define validity as “experienced by someone”. That would be distinctly un-objective, It would also be something made true only by a special definition that says that it’s true. — Michael Ossipoff

When you demonstrate that animals other than human beings understand abstract facts, then we might proceed in this direction. Regardless though, this wouldn't help support your assumption that the world prior to the existence of life consisted of abstract facts.

at least comprehend that your meaning for “is” and “are” contradicts a meaning for them that is routine and standard in mathematics and logic. — Michael Ossipoff

Mathematicians and logician who use "is" and "are" use it to refer to what is the case, now. It is only metaphysicians who extend this principle, through extrapolation, to make the claim that what mathematicians and logicians assume to be true right now, is an eternal truth. That is Platonic Realism, which I do not agree with. I think that mathematical truths are principles invented by the human mind, which are dependent on the human mind for existence, and therefore cannot be eternal.

…and I’ve been answering your disagreements.
.
Whether they’ve been adequately answered isn’t for you, me, or any advocate of a position on the matter, to judge. It’s for outside observers of the discussion to judge. — Michael Ossipoff

You answer my disagreements by reasserting the things I disagree with.

The point is that these inevitable abstracts are absolutely, timelessly, true for anyone anywhere. … — Michael Ossipoff

I disagree. If the person cannot interpret the symbols, or misinterprets the symbols, then the abstracts are not true for that person. And even if they were true for anyone anywhere, this does not make them eternal, which would require that they are true when there is no people, or anything to interpret the symbols. Since the abstracts are expressed as symbols, and symbols require interpretation, and truth is attributed to the interpretation, then there can be no truth without interpretation.

None of this addresses my central criticism of your position, which is that "if-then" conditionals are relevant only to the future; and that the notion of "if-then abstract facts" is incoherent. — Janus

That's nonsense.

Timeless if-then facts are routinely spoken of in logic and mathematics.

The relation between ifs and thens needn't have anything to do with the future, this physical world, or its time..

It isn't possible to talk to you, and the pointlessness of answering you couldn't be more obvious than it is now.

Bulk is not a substitute for quality of response.

I wanted to show others that I wasn't evading answering your claims.

As for "quality of response" or the matter of who has supported what they've said, that's a matter for others to judge for themselves. What you, I, or any other participant or advocate on the matter say about that is irrelevant.

We've both had our say about this, and I suggest that there would be no point in continuing this conversation.

Michael Ossipoff

Timeless if-then facts are routinely spoken of in logic and mathematics. — Michael Ossipoff

They are propositions, not facts. If there is an "if' then it is a proposition; there can be no "if" about a fact.

"Timeless if-then facts are routinely spoken of in logic and mathematics". — Michael Ossipoff

They are propositions, not facts. — Janus

Incorrect. When proven, they're established as facts.

If there is an "if' then it is a proposition; there can be no "if" about a fact.

Yes the "if" premise is a proposition, not necessarily a fact. Likewise the "then" conclusion, which isn't a fact unless the "if" premise is fact.

But when an if-then proposition, itself, has been proven to be a fact, and then it's not just a proposition. It's then known to be a fact.

I'd said:

If all Slitheytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slitheyitoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.

My Jaberwockeys and Slitheytoves if-then proposition is obviously a (timeless) fact, even if none of the Slitheytoves are brillig, and/or none of the Jaberwockeys are Slitheytoves. ...and even if there are no Slitheytoves and no Jaberwockeys.

The proposition "If the associative axiom is true for addition of integers, then 2+2=4 (given the definitions I stated)" is provably a fact, A provable timeless abstract if-then fact.

I have no criticism of, or impatience with you when you ask questions, ask for clarification, or express your opinion.
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Michael Ossipoff

Incorrect. When proven, they're established as facts. — Michael Ossipoff

When proven they are no longer "if-then" possibilities; they become actualities. You are just playing with words as usual, as I see it. "Pouring from the empty into the void".

Think of this way: "if-thens" have only semantic reality; they therefore have no metaphysical relevance beyond showing that semantics, possibility, is an ineliminable aspect of reality. They cannot undergird any comprehensive metaphysics.

Incorrect. When proven, they're established as facts. — Michael Ossipoff


When proven they are no longer "if-then". — Janus

Sure they are My Slitheytoves & Jaberwockeys if-then proposition is obviously a fact. But, though it's true, it's still an if-then fact.

That's because, though the Slitheytoves & Jaberwockeys if-then proposition is a fact, its "if" premise isn't an established fact. It hasn't been proven that all Jaberwockeys are Slitheytoves and that all Slitheytoves are brillig. Therefore, its "then" conclusion (that all Jaberwockeys are brillig) likewise isn't established as a fact.

But the Slitheytoves & Jaberwockeys if-then remains an obvious timeless if-then fact.

You are just playing with words as usual, as I see it. "Pouring from the empty into the void".

You're welcome to express your opinions on these matters (limiting those opinions to the topic itself) or ask for clarification. But you need to refrain from expressing opinions about who's right or wrong,

As I said, that's a matter for others to judge.

Michael Ossipoff