So this is my problem right here. Why ought we assume that some statements fall outside the need for justification? We are talking epistemology here, and knowledge is assumed to be justified true belief. So if a statement falls outside justification, then what that statement says cannot, by definition, be considered to be knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover
Just remind me about how you deal with the obvious circularity: should you doubt that you ought doubt every statement? — Banno
Yes, it's important to understand what it means to justify a belief, and I'm not sure we can come to any agreement on a general definition. — Sam26
The problem with this is that you're not following closely what I'm saying, and that's part of the problem. I answered this a few posts back. Wittgenstein points out, and I believe correctly so, that Moore statements are outside the purview of epistemological concerns. And of course, if a statement is outside of epistemology, then it doesn't concern itself with JTB, and that's the point. Moore's propositions are nonsensical, it's not about knowing, it's about something that's bedrock or basic, which is why Wittgenstein refers to them as hinge-propositions. Think of the door as the language-game of epistemology, and the hinge allows it to swing. Without such basic beliefs there would be no epistemology. The door wouldn't swing, so to speak. — Sam26
↪creativesoul Thanks Creative. My ontology of a belief is that it starts pre-linguistically, so it tends to be broader in its scope. — Sam26
I said that every statement is inherently doubtable, — Metaphysician Undercover
So "every statement is inherently doubtable" is doubtable? — Banno
↪creativesoul Why is Jack meowing and rolling on the floor? Because his bowl is empty.
Why is Jack meowing and rolling on the floor? Because he thinks his bowl is empty.
Why is Jack meowing and rolling on the floor? Because he believes his bowl is empty. — Banno
Didn't Witt use the notion of "well-grounded" as compared to "justified"?
If a prelinguistic belief cannot be argued for, which by definition it cannot, does that mean that it cannot be well-grounded?
Banno's cat Jack. Jack can believe his bowl is empty. Does his inability to argue for that render his belief unjustifiable, and hence he cannot know that his bowl is empty simply by virtue of looking? — creativesoul
I think I see more clearly now, what you mean by "hinge-propositions", and why you assume that they are bedrock, or foundational. Is it correct to say that hinge-propositions would demonstrate, or show the use of the individual words, such that the hinge propositions act as fundamental justifications in themselves? Moore's "here is a hand" acts to demonstrate the meaning of "hand". If this is the case, then the hinge-proposition would take the place that definitions hold in formal logic, or axioms in mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, it's important to keep in mind what Moore is responding to, and it doesn't seem to be about linguistic justification. — Sam26
Does Jack know his bowl is empty? — creativesoul
Absolute certainty is impossible, — Metaphysician Undercover
Until we can say precisely what existence is, then the skeptic has reason to doubt that things exist. — Metaphysician Undercover
My argument is that whether or not it is reasonable to doubt a particular proposition is not a function of the proposition itself, it is a judgement made by the rational human being, a judgement based in the particularities of the circumstances. — Metaphysician Undercover
So it seems that the content of such a creature's belief is not linguistic, nor could it be. — creativesoul
But what about certainty, without the obtuse adjective? — Banno
You have to know what 'existence' means in order to be able to coherently ask the question as to whether any thing exists. — Janus
When Moore shows his hands as an answer to skepticism; I take him to be pointing out that our idea of existence comes from perception. For an object to exist is to be perceptible; so when Moore shows his hands he is showing that they exist, and there can be no coherent skepticism about that. The answer to "How do I know my hands exist?" is " You can see that they are parts of your body". — Janus
On the language game involved? — Banno
it seems you have committed yourself to doubting that the bishop only moved diagonally. — Banno
That depends on how you define "certainty". As I said I associate doubt with ambiguity. Do you distinguish "certainty" from "certitude"? If so, then when someone states "this is a certainty", how would you know that it is not just a case of certitude? — Metaphysician Undercover
Is there any sort of certainty you are happy with? — Banno
I have no reason to doubt that the bishop only moves diagonally, — Metaphysician Undercover
The way I see it is that we have to decide with each instance of usage, whether or not it is reasonable to doubt what has been said. This requires that we start with the assumption that any statement is potentially doubted. — Metaphysician Undercover
since every statement is inherently doubtable, then we ought to make that decision as to whether or not to doubt the statement, with respect to every instance statement. — Metaphysician Undercover
(My italics)This point, which Wittgenstein suggests, "whether it makes sense to doubt the statement", is just an arbitrary line, a division which Wittgenstein seeks to impose. In reality, "whether it makes sense to doubt", is just a decision which we all must make, and a decision which is specifically formulated for each particular instance of usage. There is no general principle, of this or that statement ought not be doubted, as Wittgenstein might appear to imply. In reality any statement might be reasonably doubted under the right circumstances. So your claim that there are foundational statements which are outside the epistemological language-games cannot be supported. Otherwise we would have to admit that there are statements which are "necessarily correct". But the correctness of statements is contingent on how the statements relate to the world, and this contingency denies the possibility of "necessarily correct" statements. If you go that route, toward necessarily correct statements you validate Platonic Realism. — Metaphysician Undercover
So you are certain of it?
Here is an odd contradiction, since previously you said — Banno
SO, it seemed to me that each time you moved a piece, it was incumbent on you to first whether or not it is reasonable to doubt that the bishop moved only diagonally. — Banno
There is an issue here that we ought sort through. For if, as you say, we must start with the assumption that every statement can be potentially doubted, then we must also suppose that any justification offered in the form of a sentence must also be doubted. So if we doubt that the bishop moves diagonally, we must also doubt that the my authority on the issue, as well as the authority of such Chess Federations as one might choose. — Banno
For you must doubt any such decision. — Banno
I don't see the contradiction. I have no reason to doubt that the bishop moves only diagonally because I know the rules. But this does not mean that the statement cannot be doubted. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think there is a difference between being well-grounded and being justified, at least as Wittgenstein seems to use the terms. Hinge-propositions are grounded, but not justified. Justification takes place in epistemology, as in JTB. However, hinge-propositions, don't need to be justified, at least generally. We can always think of an example where one could justify Moore's propositions, i.e., where it would make sense to doubt that this is my hand, as in the examples I gave in other posts. — Sam26
Consider the rules of chess, i.e., we can state the rules, but there is no need to justify the rules. They are simply the ground of the game, and in this case quite arbitrary. But to ask how you justify that the bishop moves diagonally is simply nonsense, and it seems that this is why Wittgenstein referred to such propositions as bedrock or hinge.
There seem to be certain things that we just accept as part of reality, things that we trust, things that make it possible to have, for example, the language-game of epistemology. — Sam26
The cat cannot know in the sense that it can use the language-game of epistemology. It's obvious, at least to me, though, that animals show beliefs, i.e., they act in ways that demonstrate their beliefs. — Sam26
Does Jack know his bowl is empty?
— creativesoul
Does it make sense to say Jack thought he knew the bowl was empty? — Banno
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.