That's the longest reply I've seen you write in quite some time. ;)
— creativesoul

Procrastination is a powerful motivator. — Banno

X-)

If the criterion for JTB includes that the believer offer an account...
— creativesoul

"If...", as the Spartans replied to the Macedonians.

Yes, I agree that in such circumstances Jack knows very little. But I don't see that this is problematic; all that is happening is that one sense of know differs from another. — Banno

I thought we were unpacking that already.

:s

Banno, what do you know of the book entitled Kettel? Completely beside the current vein of thinking...

Just acquired a copy. Gotta love used bookstores.

X-)

Nothing.

The second is that Theaetetus ends inconclusively. — Banno

An important thing to note, I think, is that Socrates ends the Theaetetus with an explanation that they've actually been looking for the wrong thing. They went into the inquiry with the preconceived notion that to be knowledge, it must be true. But then when they looked at examples of how knowledge could actually exist, they found no way to exclude the possibility of falsity, and "must be true" could not be supported by actually existing instances of knowledge.

So they appeared to approach a paradox which would deny the possibility of knowledge. Knowledge must exclude falsity, but there is no way to actually exclude the possibility of falsity. At the end, Socrates suggests that their notion of what knowledge is, and therefore their description of what they were looking for in the first place, was probably wrong. It turned out to be a case of looking for something (knowledge) but having the wrong description of what they were looking for.

Such revolutions might be interesting and grab our attention, but they do so because they are extraordinary. Should you base your understanding of knowledge on the extremes rather than the mundane? — Banno

Here is the question then. What do you consider is the most important aspect of knowledge, that we continually progress toward a better and better understanding of reality, and therefore better our ways of being, or that we stay fixed in our understanding, and way of being, forever? If you believe that we ought not doubt the rules, then you opt for the latter. I opt for the former.

The hinge proposition was not that time is absolute, but that the laws of physics must be the same for all observers. — Banno

Have you read Einstein's special theory of relativity? He specifically states that he is providing a new way of understanding "time", that until this point "time" has been understood as absolute. He explains that in order to provide compatibility between the relativity theory which existed before him, and the postulate that the speed of light remains constant, all we need to do is to understand "time' as relative rather than absolute.

And the Copernican revolution came from the hinge proposition that the simples explanation of the orbits of the planets was to be preferred. — Banno

Sure, but the introduction of this hinge-proposition required doubting the prior hinge proposition, that the planets and sun orbited the earth. Introduction of a new hinge proposition, to describe a specific phenomenon, can only follow after doubting the hinge proposition which presently describes that phenomenon. Proceeding with the attitude that our eyes see the sun rise up in the east and go down in the west, and therefore this must be what is the case, because we ought not doubt what our senses show us, is not conducive to progress.

Are you saying that the hands you perceive every day doing all the kinds of things that hands do; preparing food, washing the dishes, swinging a hammer, typing on the key board, and so on, might not be hands at all but actually might be something else? Are you saying that they might be, for example, oranges, dogs, cars, feet, tennis racquets, pumpkins, snakes, rivers, boiled eggs, pin cushions...? — Janus

Yes, I am saying that it might actually be a person who is doing these things, for example, rather than hands which are doing these things, and the person is just using the hands to do these things. If an individual lost both hands, that person would probably still find a way to get those things done, so I don't think it's really the hands which are doing these things. And if you want to insist that it really is the hands doing these things, why not give recognition to how much of this is actually being done by the fingers, rather than the hands?

Unless you've changed your position, I suspect that your view regarding what it takes for a belief to be justified includes justification in the sense of offering one's grounds for said belief to another. — creativesoul

OK, I've been reading back over some of your posts. I see your still stuck in the same rut which you were in when we last discussed justification.

Moreover, on my view, a justified belief does not necessarily require justification(providing one's grounds to another). — creativesoul

How can you not see that this position is untenable? "Justified" is past tense, implying necessarily that an act of justification has occurred.

The thing is, you can give examples, of another person's beliefs as justified, but you are another person passing judgement on the other's belief. If you give an example of your own belief as justified, then you are simply trying to justify your belief. If you sit there by yourself, thinking about your own belief, telling yourself this belief is justified because I think it is justified, then you have nothing more than a simple belief. So a belief must be expressed to another person in order to obtain the status of being justified. If it is not, it can't be anything more than a true belief.

Here is the question then. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, no. That's just a bit of a side issue you have added to suit yourself - as if the choice were between doubting everything or doubting nothing.

Have you read Einstein's special theory of relativity? — Metaphysician Undercover

Once or twice. If you did not recognise the Principle of Relativity, then that's not my problem.

Proceeding with the attitude that our eyes see the sun rise up in the east and go down in the west, and therefore this must be what is the case, because we ought not doubt what our senses show us, is not conducive to progress. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you are going to reduce what has been said here to such childish nonsense, then where are we to go? How do we proceed?

I feel quite disrespected by such a trivial response.

Zettel

I've nothing further.

Why must Jack be required to be able to think about his own belief in order for him to be able to know that his bowl is empty?

Does Jack need to be able to think about his own belief in order for him to know that touching fire causes pain?

What do you think? How do you want to make use of the word “know”?

The difference here is one of existential contingency. The fire belief is not existentially contingent upon language. Fire exists and it does so independently of language. Touching exists and it does so independently of language. The agent exists and it does so independently of language. The agent connects themselves to reality by virtue of drawing correlations between the act and the pain that followed. None of this is existentially contingent upon language aside from my report itself.

The same cannot be said about the bowl belief.

Jack knows how to get fed.

By the way...

In order to be able to reasonably doubt, belief must already be had. All reasonable doubt is belief based. To doubt 'X' is to believe 'Y' whereas 'Y' somehow places 'X' under suspicion. So, those who mistakenly hold that the ability to believe requires the ability to doubt...

Something to seriously consider... what else would it take to show otherwise?

I am using the word "know" to mean that the knower has formed well-grounded true belief. If that doesn't count as a justified true belief, then the notion of justification is utterly useless.

An act of justification argues that belief is well-grounded(and/or true). The fire belief is well-grounded and true.

A justified true belief doesn't require being accepted and/or held by anyone other than the believer at the moment of formation. The fire example. Copernicus. Einstein.

I was talking to Πετροκότσυφας but I'd be interested to hear why you think it's more nuanced than that.

There is a lot to respond to in these posts. I just won't be able to respond to everything. There is something though that I think is worth pointing out, and that is, what is a brain state? This is important to understanding the idea that beliefs refer to brain states. It's my contention that brain states "are synchronized neuronal activity in a specific frequency," based loosely on, What is a Brain State? (2006) Philosophical Psychology 19(6) 729-742 Richard Brown. There is a distinction made in this paper between "brain states" and "states of the brain." This paper doesn't bring up the idea that beliefs are brain states, but it does point to the idea, which is a basic intuition of mine (and others) that there is something specific going on in the brain that is associated with beliefs as brain states, which is then correlated with actions that are related to that brain state. This is an interesting paper. If you would like to read it I have provided a link... https://philpapers.org/archive/BROWIA-2.pdf

This point, which Wittgenstein suggests, "whether it makes sense to doubt the statement", is just an arbitrary line, a division which Wittgenstein seeks to impose. In reality, "whether it makes sense to doubt", is just a decision which we all must make, and a decision which is specifically formulated for each particular instance of usage. There is no general principle, of this or that statement ought not be doubted, as Wittgenstein might appear to imply. In reality any statement might be reasonably doubted under the right circumstances. So your claim that there are foundational statements which are outside the epistemological language-games cannot be supported. Otherwise we would have to admit that there are statements which are "necessarily correct". But the correctness of statements is contingent on how the statements relate to the world, and this contingency denies the possibility of "necessarily correct" statements. If you go that route, toward necessarily correct statements you validate Platonic Realism.
— Metaphysician Undercover
(My italics)

I decided to quote this in full, since it shows not only the inoperability of Meta's position, but also the misunderstanding of Wittgenstein that underpins his criticism of Sam.

That the bishop moves only diagonally is, in the context, arbitrary. And it makes no sense to doubt it in that context - the playing of chess.

Nor is the movement of the bishop a decision that we all make. I never made that decision. But I did learn the rule. That rule is the general principle that underpins the absurdity of doubting that the bishop only moves diagonally!

And... saying that the bishop moves only diagonally is not playing chess. Similarly, saying "here is a hand" is not doing epistemology. It is a foundational statement that is outside of epistemology. It's not a necessary statement - necessary being a term that Meta uses in his own curious way - it is a foundational statement, in the same way that "the bishop moves only diagonally" is not necessary, but foundational. — Banno

I thought I would respond to both of these points. First, MU's comments...

My contention from reading Wittgenstein isn't that Wittgenstein is drawing an arbitrary line as to whether it makes sense to doubt a particular statement/proposition. As I read you MU, you seem to suggest that whether we can doubt a particular statement is purely subjective, i.e., dependent on a "decision we all must make." You seem to suggest that each person must decide for him or herself, whether say, Moore's proposition is doubtable. I'm suggesting based on my understanding of Wittgenstein, that it's senseless for anyone to doubt Moore's proposition, and that it's not an arbitrary decision, but one that's rooted in the nature of Moore's proposition. What is this nature? Certain propositions have at their core something basic, foundational, or bedrock, which makes doubting them nonsensical. This is rooted in the language-game of doubting. There is a kind of logic built into a language-game that dictates how words are used. And although context plays an important part, context does not drive correct usage. Correct usage can be seen in particular contexts, but it's not the context itself driving correct usage. If this were true (and I'm not necessarily suggesting that you think this), then any word would have an arbitrary meaning based on whatever context I choose to use it in. So if I use the word car to refer to the moon, then it would be correct, because meaning is driven by a context. However, this is not the case, it's the implicit rules of usage within a wide range of cultural driven language-games, that provides the logic behind correct usage. Sure these correct uses of words do take place within a range of contexts, but that's not the driving force behind correct usage. Think of contexts as having importance in terms of the rules of language within a context.

So is there a general principle that dictates whether some statement is doubtable? One cannot tell this by looking at a written statement alone, apart from how that statement or word is used within a wide array of language-games and contexts. How could all statements be doubtable? If that were the case, then doubting would lose it's meaning. Doubting only makes sense against a backdrop of non-doubt. We learn what to doubt, and what to not doubt. There have to be good reasons to doubt.

There are statements that are necessarily correct. For example, triangles have three sides, or bachelors are unmarried. There are many necessarily correct statements. And I would disagree that this would validate Platonic Realism. There are also statements that are contingently correct, for example, the Earth has one moon.

I agree with your response Banno.

But if there can be no coherent skepticism about our hands existence, then to say that we know that they exist is incoherent as well. If Moore gives perceptual evidence for the existence of hands, then he accepts skepticism as coherent. — Πετροκότσυφας

Well said, I definitely agree with this. The knowing and the doubting in Moore's context are incoherent, which is why Moore's answer doesn't work. It's important to understand the connection between knowledge and doubt.

I was talking to Πετροκότσυφας but I'd be interested to hear why you think it's more nuanced than that — Janus

Before I respond to this let me get a little more familiar with what you contending.

Again, well said. I agree, there is a kind of certainty regarding the external world that's different from the certainty that arises out of epistemology. This certainty in many ways is reflected in our actions. It's a kind of trust that arises out of the backdrop of reality.

I agree that animals certainly hold beliefs. While Jack cannot believe that "the bowl is empty", he most certainly can look at the bowl and see that there is no food in it and hence believe that the bowl is empty. If that is not well-grounded and true belief(assuming it's empty) then nothing can be. Moreover, on my view, a justified belief does not necessarily require justification(providing one's grounds to another). So, with that in mind, Jack has formed and holds justified true belief. Jack knows that his bowl is empty, despite his not being able to justify his belief. That is a metacognitive endeavor. It requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. Metacognition requires language. Thus, Jack cannot justify his own belief to us, nor can he even be aware that he has such belief. — creativesoul

I think there is a sense where one can be grounded in one's belief apart from epistemological ideas. One's experience as one acts in the world provides a kind of grounding. Jack's belief has a grounding to it, but it's not an epistemological grounding, i.e., the epistemological grounding that occurs within the language-game of knowing. So knowledge, in terms of how I'm using it (JTB), is something that necessarily occurs within language. Justification is something we do with others, i.e., it gets it's meaning within a rule-based language. If it's something one can simply do on one's own, then whatever seems justified to you, is justified. It would seem to lose it's meaning if we separate the idea of justification from a linguistic format. Not only can't Jack justify his belief to us, but he can't justify it period. He just HAS the belief - the state of mind reflected in his actions.

I don't know about all of you, but it takes me a lot of time to respond to your remarks. I've been sitting at this computer for about 4 hrs. This is why I can't always respond to everything. It just takes too damn long.

feel quite disrespected by such a trivial response. — Banno

Fine, I'd offer an apology if you could demonstrate the disrespect. I'm very accustomed to your tact at avoidance of the issues, and that's all I see here.

If you want to belief that knowledge is solely involved with following the principles which work to get the job done, and not at all involved in the seeking of better ways of doing things, then I think that's your problem.

Certain propositions have at their core something basic, foundational, or bedrock, which makes doubting them nonsensical. — Sam26

I think I've satisfactorily demonstrated that this is not the case. It is reasonable to doubt any proposition when the circumstances make doubt reasonable. I've identified three important factors which play a role in whether or not any proposition ought to be doubted, One's understanding of the language, one's trust or faith in the speaker, and the appearance of ambiguity

What is unreasonable is the assumption that a proposition could be removed from all context, and claimed to have a meaning which cannot be doubted.

Correct usage can be seen in particular contexts, but it's not the context itself driving correct usage. If this were true (and I'm not necessarily suggesting that you think this), then any word would have an arbitrary meaning based on whatever context I choose to use it in. — Sam26

Yes, this is pretty much what I argue is the case. We are free, by the nature of free will, to use words however we please. I see adolescents showing this off, quite often taking random words and giving them whatever meaning they want. The problem is that this is generally not conducive to good communication which is what we mostly want. So unless our intent is to show off, or deceive, then we mostly attempt to use words in consistent ways.

Whether or not any particular usage is "correct" is another issue altogether, because this requires a judgement. So anyone making a judgement as to whether particular instances of usage were "correct" or not, would have to refer to some principles in order to justify this judgement.

So if I use the word car to refer to the moon, then it would be correct, because meaning is driven by a context. However, this is not the case, it's the implicit rules of usage within a wide range of cultural driven language-games, that provides the logic behind correct usage. — Sam26

Referring to "implicit rules" does not qualify as justification. To justify you need to make those rules explicit. If I want to use "car" to refer to the moon, there is no rule that says that I cannot do this, and this is what the kids demonstrate. There is no such thing as "implicit rules", you're making that up, it's all in your mind, all imaginary. Each person decides, on the spot, which words to use for the situation at hand, and we do not refer to any rules in making those decisions.

If you really believe that there is such a thing as "correct usage", and that the judgement of whether a particular instance of usage is correct or not is not just a figment of your imagination, then you need to demonstrate this, set out some standards which we could agree on, as to what distinguishes an instance of correct usage from an instance of incorrect usage.

So is there a general principle that dictates whether some statement is doubtable? — Sam26

Try this Sam26. For the sake of argument, let's assume that if it is possible that the person making the statement did not follow the rules of correct usage, then the statement is doubtable. Does this sound reasonable to you? How are we supposed to know whether the person making the statement followed the rules of correct usage?

There are statements that are necessarily correct. For example, triangles have three sides, or bachelors are unmarried. There are many necessarily correct statements. And I would disagree that this would validate Platonic Realism. — Sam26

How is this not Platonic Realism? If it is necessary that triangles have three sides, then this is an eternal truth, it cannot in any way be otherwise, and that is the very thing which Platonic Realism refers to. These Ideas exist eternally whether or not they are described by human beings.

There are two principal uses of "necessary" which need to be distinguished. One is a logical necessity which states that by the principles of logic, things cannot be otherwise. If we hold fast to this definition, then things which cannot be otherwise are necessarily eternal truths, Platonic Forms. However, there is another use of "necessary", and this is that it is needed for some purpose.

If we allow that logical necessity is reduced to this second form of "necessary", such that logical necessity is just produced because it is needed for some purpose, then we can dismiss Platonic Realism. However, now when you say that triangles necessarily have three sides, "necessary" here means needed for some purpose. So this is what you imply when you say that you can make this statement without implying Platonic Realism. But now it is a matter of free choice, human beings choose that triangles must have three sides, because they apprehend this as necessary for some purpose.

So, we have a proposition, "triangles necessarily have three sides". I have demonstrated ambiguity with respect to "necessarily". The ambiguity has far reaching consequences in relation to ontology. Since I have demonstrated this problem, do you not believe that I am justified in doubting this proposition?


.

Ok Sam. Seems we're not so far apart. I mean, that's how I took Wittgenstein, and what I thought you were holding as well. The bit about Jack not being able to justify his own beliefs.

Must a belief be argued for in order for it to be well-grounded? Isn't a well-grounded belief exactly what justification shows?

Must a belief be argued for in order for it to be well-grounded? Isn't a well-grounded belief exactly what justification shows? — creativesoul

When I use the term justification it has a specific application, and in particular to the uses of JTB across a wide spectrum of language-games. It means being justified not only in terms of arguments, but also in terms of the other uses that I mentioned early on in this thread.

The term well-grounded can also be used as a synonym for justification in the JTB sense, but it also has an application quite apart from epistemological applications. Thus, well-grounded also applies to those applications that are not epistemological, like Wittgenstein's bedrock propositions. So Jack's belief is grounded, but not justified in the JTB sense (language-games of epistemology). Jack's beliefs are grounded in reality, but not linguistically grounded, i.e., they're not dependent on a statements.

Of course someone could ask what it means for a belief to be grounded in reality.

I don't know about all of you, but it takes me a lot of time to respond to your remarks. I've been sitting at this computer for about 4 hrs. This is why I can't always respond to everything. It just takes too damn long. — Sam26

Sam, just to mention that although I'm not participating in this thread, I'm finding your contributions really interesting and useful to my own thinking. I wouldn't want you to feel you were just whistling into the wind :)

Sure, 'propositional' suggests abstractive capability; I would say a linguistic belief (or proto-belief, or whatever you want to call it) is better thought of as dis-positional rather than pro-positional.