But no scientific method establishes, say, the axiom of extentionality — StreetlightX
One suspects that the very vocabulary here is wrong, that there is a mistake of grammar at work. — StreetlightX
Let's not forget: logic is just a formalisation of rules for inference making. There are multiple logics, not all of which are compatible with each other, depending on what it is you'd like to do. It's just a series of games, like chess and checkers: it simply makes very little sense - it's not even wrong - to speak of the scientific method in establishing the rules for those games - likewise logic. — StreetlightX
One can establish a system of logic without a single reference to any real life constraint, or scientific result. Logic is more or less entirely disconnected from the empirical — StreetlightX
My suggestion is to look further into what logic is: it's a formal discipline that has alot of specificity to it — StreetlightX
I think your'e in for a hard time trying to discuss anything sensibly if you're aren't familiar with even the actual axioms of logic themselves — StreetlightX
I don't mean this harshly, but only as a suggestion for study! — StreetlightX
What are you referring to when you say the axioms of logic? — MonfortS26
The scientific method is the cycle of these three forms of reasoning according to Charles Sanders Peirce and it seems to me that is an accurate statement. — MonfortS26
These axioms should be ideally be grounded in the scientific method. — MonfortS26
It's main categorizations are informal and formal logic. Informal including inductive reasoning, and abductive reasoning. Formal mainly being deductive. — MonfortS26
No such intervention is required by logic, which can freely float above world in perpetuity without in the least encountering any worldy resistence. — StreetlightX
My main question, is there an application of logic that falls outside this cycle? — MonfortS26
So the world is present in the grammar of predication, or whatever. It is present in its most generalised possible form. It is a view of how the world works boiled down to a most abstract view about the necessity of certain relations. — apokrisis
The notion of generals and particulars fails the test of naturalness? — apokrisis
I've never met a general anything, so there's that. — Akanthinos
Modern science emerged in the seventeenth century with two fundamental ideas: planned experiments (Francis Bacon) and the mathematical representation of relations among phenomena (Galileo). This basic experimental-mathematical epistemology evolved until, in the first half of the twentieth century, it took a stringent form involving (1) a mathematical theory constituting scientific knowledge, (2) a formal operational correspondence between the theory and quantitative empirical measurements, and (3) predictions of future measurements based on the theory. The “truth” (validity) of the theory is judged based on the concordance between the predictions and the observations. While the epistemological details are subtle and require expertise relating to experimental protocol, mathematical modeling, and statistical analysis, the general notion of scientific knowledge is expressed in these three requirements.
Science is neither rationalism nor empiricism. It includes both in a particular way. In demanding quantitative predictions of future experience, science requires formulation of mathematical models whose relations can be tested against future observations. Prediction is a product of reason, but reason grounded in the empirical. Hans Reichenbach summarizes the connection: “Observation informs us about the past and the present, reason foretells the future.” — E R Doherty
the first step is to make observations, based on those observations, you ask yourself questions. — MonfortS26
The scientific method is the cycle of these three forms of reasoning according to Charles Sanders Peirce and it seems to me that is an accurate statement. My main question, is there an application of logic that falls outside this cycle? — MonfortS26
In Einstein's epistemology..."the axiomatic structure (A) of a theory is built psychologically on the experiences (E) of the world of perceptions. Inductive logic cannot lead from the (E) to the (A). The (E) need not be restricted to experimental data, nor to perceptions; rather, the (E) may include the data of Gedanken experiments. — Galuchat
Einstein referred to the demarcation between concepts or axioms and perceptions or data as the 'metaphysical original sin' (1949); and his defense of it was its usefulness. — Galuchat
But even if the (E) is the data of Gedanken experiments, is that not to some extent the result of abductive reasoning? If we define abductive reasoning as a form of logical inference which starts with an observation then seeks to find the simplest and most likely explanation, isn't that synonymous with the statement above which you proposed? — MonfortS26
That sounds like an axiom. That leads us to ask what it is grounded on.These axioms should be ideally be grounded in the scientific method. — MonfortS26
It seems like the scientific method is just the application of logic, reduced to 'scientific' axioms — MonfortS26
But then why choose that axiom? We could try to say because it has worked well in the past, but that would be circular, as Hume pointed out. — andrewk
do your encounter a beach as well as the grains of sand? — apokrisis
except for -well - any general noun. — Wayfarer
Well, is it phenomenologically correct to say that you encounter a general noun? — Akanthinos
The rest is typical nominalist evasion. — Wayfarer
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