I accepted pragmatism for quite a few years, until I looked in to epistemology more fully. In so far as pragmatism offers a theory of truth it fails to understand what truth is. Truth is perhaps subject to more over-thinking than any other notion in philosophy.

What makes a theory of truth true? Well, the theory has to tell us what is true, so it also tells us if the theory itself is true. That is, any consistent theory of truth will suffice. Coherentism is true if it is coherent; falsificationism is true if it is falsifiable; pragmatism is true if it is useful (or measurable or whatever). But if each says it is true, then we have not made any progress.

The substantive theories of truth all fail. Pragmatism included.

The substantive theories of truth all fail. Pragmatism included. — Banno

But pragmatism claims truth is only relative. How could that view fail?

I accepted pragmatism for quite a few years, — Banno

LOL. Some half-arsed AP notion of it?

So after a series of evasive one-liner deflections, the confession of the lack of any reasonable counter. — apokrisis

Rather the confession that I'm here to talk about Wittgenstein, not Peirce. Your posts are pretty much of topic. IN any case, when I have attempted any sort of analysis of your claims, you avoid them.

But if you like, you could explain the belief-truth thing, and explain to people how we do not know how high Mount Everest is.

But if you like, you could explain the belief-truth thing, and explain to people how we do not know how high Mount Everest is. — Banno

Well I was quite happy to talk about the example you raised in this post - the social construction of Uluru as sacred. And that is a good example. There is the phenomenon of people returning sorry stones and a system of fines. Even souveniring sand is verbotten. Taking away the dust on your clothes could be problematic.

So there we had a fair test of truth theories. One that spans the mental and material realms pretty evenly in its truth claims.

You saw where that example of yours had to go and so now want to revert to what feels like safer ground - the height of Mt Everest. You want to argue from an example in which the presumptions are suppressed as a matter of ordinary everyday education. You would be laughed out of class for not assenting to some factual reply from a suitable expert in terms of some number of metres.

Your problem Banno is your rhetorical manoeuvres are transparent. And you simply walk away as fast as your argument starts to burn.

IN any case, when I have attempted any sort of analysis of your claims, you avoid them. — Banno

LOL. Sometimes you must even amaze yourself at your bare faced cheek.

A string of your one-liners have been knocked on their arse just as fast. Every attempt to deflect has failed. Nothing has been avoided, just sent over the boundary for six.

If I am as bad as you say, then one supposes that you are co-dependent, since despite my failings you are still here.

Here's a straight question; let's see if you can answer it. Is belief distinct from truth?

Yep. Words can only function as constraints on interpretance. — apokrisis

No, words cannot function as constraints, the interpreter is free to interpret words in any way one desires, at the risk of misunderstanding what was meant. The constraints on interpretance are property of the interpreter. The learned habits of interpretation are what serve as constraints on interpretation. Such constraints are not property of the words themselves.

Again, your response founders on a failure to recognise that language games must create their speakers along with their worlds. — apokrisis

This as well is incorrect. Language does not create speakers, speakers create language.

You are assigning agency to words and to language, where none is warranted. Agency ought to be attributed to those who use words and language, not to the words and language themselves.

How are you defining those terms exactly?

It's up to you. Remember that for me defining terms is setting out how to use them. How do you use belief and truth?

Agency ought to be attributed to those who use words and language, not to the words and language themselves. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to dualism.

Language does not create speakers, speakers create language — Metaphysician Undercover

The causality is mutual according to my systems account.

No, words cannot function as constraints, the interpreter is free to interpret words in any way one desires, at the risk of misunderstanding what was meant. — Metaphysician Undercover

If interpretation is all there really is - there is no dualistic interpreter that is the soul exerting it’s further point of view - then my account describes the situation.

If you believe in souls, then you insist on a dualistic ontology.

How do you think I use them?

If you are going to pretend it is a mystery, you will have to tell me in what sense. It’s not as if I haven’t repeated myself on the subject a million times now. So this is simply further evasion.

A clue. In multiple posts I’ve said that truth is the limit of rational inquiry. So it is belief exhausted in that regard for all practical purposes. And the limit is thus defined by the principle of indifference. We have no good reason to worry about the possible remaining differences or exceptions.

So on to your next deflection I guess. Anything to avoid having to make some actual counter argument of any kind.

Yeah, yeah, I'm the one being evasive.

So, is it true that this thread is in English?

I say yes.

You say...?

If interpretation is all there really is - there is no dualistic interpreter that is the soul exerting it’s further point of view - then my account describes the situation. — apokrisis

There is no such thing as interpretation without something which is doing the interpreting. This is where Peirce and Pattee have lead you into nonsense.

Well according to Pierce, English stands in a triadic relation to symmetry, so therefore the epistemic cut that Pattee speaks of means that you need to dichotomize it with Chinese, so it is put into a limit relation with another language. Then, you need to consider the fact that firstness stands in a symbolic relation to secondness, which makes the whole thing a question of pragmatism. After that, it's just habit all the way down, which places a constraint on what kind of language you're speaking. So finally, it's just a question of modeling the vagueness of the proposition 'is it true that this thread is in English?', so that you really bring out its biosemiotic dimension, and demonstrate its informational nature, especially with respect to its onticness.

Simple really.

Something like that. 8-)

Let's see the master's answer.

Actually, what would be cool would be to answer in French... 8-)

So I gave you your answer on definitions. How does this next deflection relate?

There is no such thing as interpretation without something which is doing the interpreting. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sounds legit.

I laughed so hard.

↪Banno So I gave you your answer on definitions. How does this next deflection relate? — apokrisis

No, you gave me a clue:

A clue. In multiple posts I’ve said that truth is the limit of rational inquiry. So it is belief exhausted in that regard for all practical purposes. And the limit is thus defined by the principle of indifference. We have no good reason to worry about the possible remaining differences or exceptions. — apokrisis

My bolding.

So, is this post in English? You see, I don't think you can say "yes" consistently here. You have to say something about approximating to being in English and so on. If I am correct, it might serve to show how pragmatism as a theory of truth leaves something to be desired.

It's the elephant in the corner.

You got a definition, so what is your point?

No, you gave me a clue, not an answer.

OK, if you prefer, I say it is true that Paris is the capital of France.

Again, from your answer, you can't say that. You can only approximate it in some way - and I'm not going to guess how.

That looks to be a rather large pachyderm.

No, you gave me a clue, not an answer. — Banno

As I said, in multiple posts I’ve given the answer - truth is the limit of rational inquiry.

So where is the problem with that position exactly?

So where is the problem with that position exactly? — apokrisis

The problem is - is it true that Paris is the capital of France?

It cuts to the core of our differences. You see, Paris is the capital of France. And I understand truth as follows: "P" is true just in the case that P. So I can conclude that it is true that "Paris is the Capital of France".

Now, as I understood you, I don't think you can say the same. You will need something a bit longer; though hopefully a bit clearer than @StreetlightX's suggestion.

Tell me again how I am being evasive. Or tell me if it is true that this post is in English. Or if it is true that Paris is the Capital of France.

OK, if you prefer, I say it is true that Paris is the capital of France.

Again, from your answer, you can't say that. You can only approximate it in some way - and I'm not going to guess how. — Banno

There's a distinction between a definition of truth and whether some particular statement is true. Apo can say it is true. But (hypothetically) if the final consensus says that it isn't, then he just would have been wrong about that (on Peirce's definition).

The Peircean idea is that exhaustive inquiry by a community would lead to a single agreed conclusion which, by definition, would be true.

The Peircean idea is that exhaustive inquiry by a community would lead to a single agreed conclusion which, by definition, would be true. — Andrew M

Thanks - I am aware it is something like that. The trouble is, even after the extensive process proposed, the community might be wrong.

So that is not what we mean by "....is true".

So you seem to think that a capital called Paris or a language named English somehow creates a dreadful epistemic issue for pragmatism - bad enough that you are now officially a former pragmatist.

But you won’t now explain how proper names are truths of reality and hence something that pragmatism might expect to arrive at as the limit of rational inquiry into the facts of the world.

Well I’m sure you believe you have an argument in there somewhere. Now if only we could flush it out.

I am aware it is something like that — Banno

Just something?

The trouble is, even after the extensive process proposed, the community might be wrong. — Banno

In what sense is that “trouble”?

Especially given that in the limit, they would have no reason to care? If it makes no odds, it makes no odds.

So, is it true that Paris is the capital of France?

Again, I apologise for being so evasive by bringing in the issue of names and such; or by not setting out what the trouble might be. :-}

Thanks - I am aware it is something like that. The trouble is, even after the extensive process proposed, the community might be wrong. — Banno

Yes the community might be wrong. But consider how that could be possible on the Peircean view. It implies there is further information that the community hasn't uncovered in their investigation. The true conclusion is the agreed result of the investigation in the limit (i.e., exhaustive), not necessarily when an investigation plateaus or reaches earlier consensus.