What possible criterion is there for judging whether something is really "there" or not other than that we can all see it? — Janus
What do we make of someone who doubts that this is a hand? They have not understood the game.
There is a way of understanding "This is a hand" that is not explained in yet more propositions - "this is this". Understanding is shown by behaving in a way that agrees that this is a hand. The sceptic has not understood how to use the word "hand". — Banno
What if someone doubts that there is anything there at all? — PossibleAaran
What if someone doubts that there is a 'this' to which you are referring? — PossibleAaran
Belief needs justification. So does doubt. — Banno
I am not sure how to assess this, since you didn't answer any of my questions — PossibleAaran
For me the issue is that it does not bother to explain or elucidate truth, but instead ignores it, to the extent of changing our language n order to avoid talking about it.
In other words pragmatism is not about truth but justifying belief. — Banno
Belief needs justification. So does doubt. — Banno
This means that anytime when certitude cannot be justified, then doubt is justified ... Accordingly, doubt is justified anytime the possibility of mistake cannot be logically excluded. Agree? — Metaphysician Undercover
I agree, but to say this is to say something very different to saying that propositions like "this is a hand" are constitutive rules which need no justification. — PossibleAaran
That our hands are there (when they are) would seem to be, or more aptly, be an exemplification of, a "constitutive rule", in the sense of being part of the 'background' of implicit understanding without which no belief or doubt would be possible. — Janus
No, simply recognizing our fallibility--i.e., the fact that certitude can never truly be justified, since the mere possibility of mistake cannot be logically excluded for any of our current beliefs--does not warrant genuine doubt. It is only justified when one has a positive reason to question a currently held belief, regardless of whether one has certitude toward it; e.g., because of a surprising experience or disappointed expectation. — aletheist
The critical issue seems to be identifying the mind as the part that has some understanding that can’t be wrong. — apokrisis
So the material world itself is re-imagined as lacking in counterfactual definiteness. It is at base vague or indeterminate. It requires the mind-like thing of developed functional habits to give it definite shape and direction. — apokrisis
If the possibility of mistake cannot be ruled out with respect to any particular belief, then this is a positive reason to question that particular belief, i.e. doubt is warranted. — Metaphysician Undercover
What you say doesn't make sense. You are claiming that the possibility of mistake is not grounds for questioning a belief. — Metaphysician Undercover
You misunderstand the nature of constraints. The free actions of the world are only limited to some threshold variety of differences that don’t make a difference. So it is the probabilistic view built into science. No two events are the same. But the question is whether they are similar enough? Is the variety essentially random rather than significant, that is due to some further undiagnosed cause? — apokrisis
Suppose then that I suspend judgement about whether this is a hand. More exactly, I doubt that there is a this at all. I suspend judgement on whether or not there is anything that I am looking at. What is wrong with this doubt? I think in some sense you want to say that I can't do what I say that I am doing. But why can't I? — PossibleAaran
The trouble with the account you propose is that Constitutive Rules are supposed to be regress stoppers. Suppose I say "whatever is going on right now, the correct thing to say is 'this is a hand', and anyone who doubts this must be not understanding how I use the word 'hand'". Now note that it isn't accurate to say that, no matter what is going on, the correct thing to say is 'this is a hand'. Rather, there is a very specific set of circumstances in which it is correct to say 'this is a hand'. Anyone who takes the regress seriously is going to ask why you believe that those specific circumstances have actually obtained. We can grant that if certain circumstances obtain, the correct thing to say is 'this is a hand', but we can still question whether those circumstances have in fact obtained. The idea that 'this is a hand' is a constitutive rule of the 'game' does nothing to prevent this question and so doesn't stop the regress.
Another way to put the point which is a little quicker is this. The idea that in this particular circumstance the correct thing to say is 'this is a hand', blatantly presupposes knowledge that I am in some particular circumstance and not another, and this needs justification. — PossibleAaran
What justification is there for believing that I am in any particular circumstance whatsoever, as opposed to any other? — PossibleAaran
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