Is it a matter of practice and habit? We can test that with twin studies, feral child studies, isolated cultures, anthropology etc.. The answer's definitely not there yet, but it's a verifiable statement. — Pseudonym

Yes, but you have to be careful here. It is possible to offer verification within a given system, but that verification is bound to be circular. For example, the standard for determining whether it's a matter of habit or practice is to look at twin studies, feral children studies, isolated cultures, etc. and see what happens in cases where people don't get the practice or habit required for learning. How have we arrived at this standard? It is through habit and practice, which has shown us that to verify this, we must resort to looking at such particular cases as we have established.

And this circularity isn't a problem - it is part of the system. We cannot have a non-circular and complete description of the world, since the world must be, by the very we way conceive of it, a complete, closed whole. So when we're trying to verify A, we can resort to B. When we're trying to verify B, we may resort to A. And this is not a fallacy - but what could we appeal to if our system describes the entirety of reality, but other relations within reality?

What we are, in-truth, doing is that we're establishing relationships between things in the world - how things hang together. That reversibility of direction we encounter with verification - that you can verify A by B, and B by A is just a reflection of the underlying two-way relationship between A and B. You can start with A and end with B, or start with B and end with A, because the two are interconnected.

By this point, we're already way beyond positivism.

Do metaphysical statements describe underlying realities? If they do we'd expect them to be remarkably similar. If we had a theory that they did, one way to verify that theory would be to see if they were indeed similar across cultures. — Pseudonym

We would expect the underlying conceptual structure to be similar, not necessarily the words used.

We have gone directly from requiring a verifiable definition of utility to making verifiable statements about why its meaning should be so universal. At no point so far have we had to rely on a non verifiable statements of fact to derive our meaningful propositions. — Pseudonym

Things are locally verifiable, with reference to other things. Much like Wittgenstein's hinge propositions. You may be able to derive one first principle with reference to other first principles. But the enterprise is circular, because you can equally travel in the other direction.

"all people seem to act as if they believe in the confluence of logic and truth" is a verifiable statement. From that we can theorise in a pragmatic sense, that there is a confluence of logic and truth. We cannot know this of course, but it is a verifiable theory. — Pseudonym

We can know it in a deeper sense than the merely pragmatic, but we need to tie it in to the theoretical (ie, why a confluence of logic and truth would lead to people believing in the confluence of logic and truth).

if metaphysical statements about metaphysics are to be analysed by their own conclusions then every such statement becomes meaningless. — Pseudonym

I have no interest in flogging a dead horse. Positivism is one aspect of the whole tendency towards materialism, reductionism, and 'scientism'. It adopts philosophical terminology, and on that basis appears as philosophy, but actually it is completely antagonistic to philosophy, as it regards humans as animals or automatons and philosophy as meaningless words. There can be no wisdom, as such, in a positivist philosophy - only utilitarian effectiveness or the organisation of means towards some material end.

Someone here said:

Without prejudice, it remains a possibility that science is actually investigating all there is to be investigated.

Well no, because science only studies, investigates and describes (as well as possible) this physical universe and the interactions of its parts. There's more to be "investigated", discussed. That's why there's a topic called "metaphysics".

...an "investigation" or discussion regarding what there is. One metaphysical theory, Materialism, is that the physical world comprises all of Reality. It's just one theory. It certainly isn't the end of the discussion It certainly doesn't preclude additional metaphysical discussion, unless you have proof that Materialism is true.

I've told why, even if there really is Materialism's objectively, fundamentally existent concrete physical world, it would be a superfluous, unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact.

It's generally agreed that a theory like that isn't very convincing, especially when there's an alternative proposal that doesn't have any of those faults..

The sentiment expressed in the above-quoted passage sounds like Science-Worship, a popular faith-based position.

Academic philosophy seems to favor a belief in complete indeterminacy in regards to metaphysics. Conveniently, that allows for unlimited and interminable debate on all metaphysical positions, with the endless publication that that implies. Well, that's understandably-motivated, given the academic saying, "Publish or Perish".

But, at the same time, while still keeping their options always open for endless publication, academic philosophers seem to be emphasizing and favoring Materialism, or at least implying something that sounds like it, maybe usually under a variety of more fashionable names. That's because science has been so successful in its area of applicability, that there's a natural tendency to believe in it as a metaphysics--hence Science-Worship. The success of science in its legitimate area of applicability confers a perceived greater "respectability" for Science as a metaphysics.

Michael Ossipoff

You can no more disprove a presumption of physicalism than you can prove one.

Of course an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact can't be disproved. That doesn't make it of interest or value.

Michael Ossipoff

Of course an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact can't be disproved. That doesn't make it of interest or value. — Michael Ossipoff

Except it is the default position of the mind that has rid itself of superstitious reifications. That's why people are naturally naive realists.

I like the old Zen saying " Before I practiced Zen mountains were mountains and rivers were rivers, when I began practicing mountains were no longer mountains and rivers no longer rivers, and when I gained enlightenment mountains were again mountains and rivers again rivers". (Paraphrased)

The philosophically reflective person just takes physical objects to be physical objects made of 'stuff'. When she begins to study philosophy she thinks they are illusions of, or constituted by, the mind in one of the countless elaborate ways that have been devised by philosophers. When she returns to realism and materialism it will not be a naive realism and materialism, though. It will be a realism and materialism that incorporates, and makes corporeal, both mind and spirit. Nothing will be left behind.

I’d said:
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Of course an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact can't be disproved. That doesn't make it of interest or value.

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Janus replied:
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Except it is the default position

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“My belief is the default position, so there!”
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…of the mind that has rid itself of superstitious reifications.

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Alright, get out the dictionaries—what’s he saying?
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Merriam-Webster:
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Superstitious:
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Of, relating to or swayed by superstition.
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Superstition:
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1a) A belief or practice resulting from ignorance, fear of the unknown, trust in magic or chance, or a false conception of causation.
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[Sounds like empty namecalling, unless Janus can justify it]
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b)Any of several “attitudes of mind” specified by Merriam-Webster resulting from superstition as defined above.
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2.) A notion maintained despite evidence to the contrary.
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[What’s Janus’s evidence for Materialism?]
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Reification:
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The process or result of reifying.
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Reify:
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To regard (something abstract) as a material or concrete thing.
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[Speaking for myself, I don’t claim that the abstract facts, or inter-referring systems of them, that I speak of are “concrete” or “material” (except in the sense of being the basis of what’s called “material”). I’ve been emphasizing that those systems neither need nor have objective or “concrete” “reality” or “existence”, or “reality” or “existence” other than in their own local inter-referring context.]
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Houghton-Mifflin:
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Superstition
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A belief, practice or rite held in spite of evidence to the contrary…
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[Again, what’s Janus’ evidence for Materialism?]
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…resulting from ignorance of the laws of nature [physical laws]…
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[The “laws of nature” describe the workings of the physical world, but they in general don’t support Materialism over other metaphysicses, and in particular don’t contradict the metaphysics that I propose.]
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Reification:
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Same as Merriam-Webster. See above.
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That's why people are naturally naive realists.

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I now avoid the words “Realism” and “Anti-Realism”, because “Realism” is used with different definitions.
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By my metaphyisics, there’s the individual’s life-experience possibility-story. That individual and hir surroundings are two mutually-complementary halves, and so your surroundings are as “real” as you are. That story is about the individual’s experience.
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In any case, “real” isn’t metaphysically-defined.
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Maybe people could be called naïve Materialists because, as a practical matter, our material surrounds are what we must deal with. So then, why don’t you get off the Philosophy Forum, and take up the study of Engineering.
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But some people are interested in the matter of what is, even if it isn’t a physically-practical topic.
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I like the old Zen saying " Before I practiced Zen mountains were mountains and rivers were rivers, when I began practicing mountains were no longer mountains and rivers no longer rivers, and when I gained enlightenment mountains were again mountains and rivers again rivers". (Paraphrased)

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When we were kids, and believed as we were taught, we believed in the brute-fact of the objectively and fundamentally existent physical world, with its objectively-existent physical things.
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Some of us still do. They’re called Materialists or Science-Worshippers.
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But, as I’ve been saying, among the infinity of complex systems of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals, there inevitably is one whose events and relations are those of your experience.
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There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.
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So I suggest that what metaphysically is, is all abstract if-then facts. How real is that? Arguably the only element of metaphysics, the only metaphysical thing, that’s really “real” is the Nothing that is the quiescent background of those abstract facts.
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So, first there was a mountain, then there is no mountain!
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But, because this world and its things are the context of my life, I call it real. (As I said, “real” isn’t metaphysically-defined anyway, so we can call “real” whatever we choose to.)
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If it’s as real as me, if it’s my experience and my life, that’s real enough.
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Lo, there is no mountain, then there is!
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The philosophically reflective person just takes physical objects to be physical objects made of 'stuff'. When she begins to study philosophy she thinks they are illusions of. or constituted by, the mind

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I didn’t say it was “constituted by the mind”.
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…in one of the countless elaborate ways that have been devised by philosophers. When she returns to realism and materialism it will not be a naive realism and materialism, though. It will be a realism and materialism that incorporates, and makes corporeal, both mind and spirit.

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So now she’s a Dualist or Spiritualist? Speak for yourself.
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And if you advocate or subscribe to something other than Materialism, then no you aren’t a Materialist, and you haven’t returned to Materialism.
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For example, as I said above, I only call this world “real” in the sense that it’s the context of my life, and as real as me, and that’s real enough.
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Michael Ossipoff

I think we should both be grateful to Laurence Krauss because he provides a subject on which we can wholeheartedly agree, ie that he is an annoying, philosophically shallow, Reductive Scientismist that is best ignored.

Isn’t this him?



He was good on Seinfeld. Should have stuck to comedy, IMO.

Excellent idea, lets just ignore people we disagree with. I don't know why philosophy didn't think of that earlier, it really would have saved a lot of work.