I think that is an excellent question! In one sense, you can say a great deal about consciousness from the perspectives of cognitive science, philosophy of mind, psychology and other disciplines. But on the other hand, as one of the salient characteristics of consciousness is its first-person nature (which is the basis of Chalmer's 'hard problem of consciousness' argument), there is another sense in which consciousness can never be an object of itself. As Hindu sages put it, 'the hand can grasp another but can't grasp itself, the eye can see another but cannot see itself' - a saying I regard as axiomatic.

the reality is that... — anonymous66

So, perhaps there is a "real reality", but whose version should we accept as "real"? — anonymous66

Not yours.

I think the evidence suggests rather that our sense organs are such that they give us the ability to see the world in a way that is beneficial for the survival of our species, not a completely accurate one. — anonymous66

Why believe the evidence that the evidence is not to be believed?

Can "consciousness" even be described by the conscious entity? How do we exteriorize ourselves to our own consciousness so that we can observe it, and still be conscious? — Bitter Crank

This is what consciousness consists of: the interiorization of itself. Thus it is always exterior to itself. One is conscious of being conscious whenever one considers the matter, and that is the description that one can give - the experience of the subject of experience. The illusion, therefore, is that there is some division between experience and the subject of experience such that the subject can be outside or inside.

"But the nature of intelligence and that of consciousness are surely different questions, as there are conscious organisms that are unintelligent."

It is exactly this type of statement that made me ask my question. Which organisms are conscious and unintelligent? Insects display intelligence, bacteria could even be said to display some level of intelligence depending again on how one defines the term 'intelligence'.

On what do we base these terms 'intelligent, and conscious.'.

@unenlightened
I get the sense you're saying that it's not possible to form an opinion about the nature of consciousness. What of evidence and scientific studies? Do you have an opinion about which of the possible choices I gave is closest to what is the case? Or are you suggesting its a waste of time to even attempt to come to any conclusions?

I would describe consciousness as an information architecture - or a model of sensory information for the purpose of modeling one's attention. It is useful to have a real-time model of all the information coming from the senses and how it compares to the information stored in the brain (our memories). This is how we learn - by comparing, in real-time, the information coming from the senses and the information stored in the brain.

Consciousness provides organisms a way of being aware of instinctual behaviors - behaviors that weren't learned but were designed as an inherent part of the system - so that the organism can filter these behaviors, essentially selecting which behaviors benefit them at the moment and which don't.

Not at all. I'm giving my opinion. But evidence is evident to consciousness; evidence of consciousness is evident to consciousness. Therefore consciousness is evidence; evidence is consciousness.

What I was saying before is that one needs evidence to doubt evidence, and there is no other place to obtain it but experience. To doubt the reality of experience one needs the access to reality that one seeks to deny.

Your conclusions do not appear to follow. Anon is right to suspect that if your view has merit... it isn't formulatable.

I guess I only see a couple of options. I can accept naive realism, despite the fact I know there is no known standard way to view the world (all creatures sense the world through their sense organs, all creatures sense the world differently- and the human brain is capable of being fooled) Or I can accept radial skepticism or solipsism.

Or I can accept that there is a reality that we are experiencing, despite the fact I also know about the flaws in the human brain.

Did I miss any other options?

I know I am sometimes mistaken too. I have the evidence. I just painted the garden wall, thinking it was going to continue dry and sunny, but now it's raining. Damn. I know I was mistaken only because it is indubitably raining, and I have indubitably just painted the wall. There can be no evidence for radical skepticism, because it radically undermines itself.

That I am always wrong must be wrong. Therefore my sophisticated realism is that I trust the evidence until the evidence tells me not to, at which point I trust the new evidence. Thus I can say that I was wrong, but it makes no sense to say that I am wrong; that would be equivalent to saying nothing, which is what the genuine radical skeptic and solipsist should do - say nothing.

Can you say where the gaps are in my argument? I might be able to fill them.

@unenlightened
Which of the poll options do you suppose is closer to what is the case? I think Searle is closest.

If anything is real, consciousness is... — anonymous66

I'd add to that a pseudo-cartesian 'If anything is unreal, consciousness is real.'

So Searle, I guess.

You said:

Not at all. I'm giving my opinion. But evidence is evident to consciousness; evidence of consciousness is evident to consciousness. Therefore consciousness is evidence; evidence is consciousness. — unenlightened

This part just didn't make much sense to me. You and I might look for evidence of consciousness in regard to a third party. In that case, the evidence we gather would not generally be considered to be consciousness itself.

I have never asked a fellow human "Are you conscious?" Nor have I ever asked myself that. But it seems clear to me that talk of "evidence of consciousness" doesn't have much to do with either case. Interestingly, I'm able to say the preceding with a fair amount of confidence in spite of my inability to clearly define consciousness. My knowledge of it is apparently more in the "know how" department.. that is, the ability to correctly use the word.

What I was saying before is that one needs evidence to doubt evidence, and there is no other place to obtain it but experience. To doubt the reality of experience one needs the access to reality that one seeks to deny. — unenlightened

This was directed at anon's evolutionary theory (which is accepted by a fair number of pretty intelligent people). I think for those who think it all the way through, it's easy enough to posit some special parting with the veil of ignorance supposedly cast by nature. It's actually reminiscent of the concept of gnosis (or maybe revelation.) Every generation thinks they're the first to puzzle this kind of shit out.

"Imagine that we inhabit a two dimensional space and that we ourselves are two dimensional. Consider how it would seem to us if a spoon passed through our world. Perhaps we would eventually evolve to the point of being able to discern the truth that is beyond our powers of perception."

-- the adherent to "special insight"

The point is the belief that there is an independently existent physical brain just like the one we perceive is an example of naive realism.

This part just didn't make much sense to me. You and I might look for evidence of consciousness in regard to a third party. In that case, the evidence we gather would not generally be considered to be consciousness itself. — Mongrel

It's not about looking for evidence. Evidence itself is the point of contention. What exactly is evidence? The term specifies something specific: a particular kind of thing, a showing of the world or logic, such that we can say: "Yes. That claim is accurate. We know something about the world or logic." Evidence is observation, seeing, hearing, touching, thinking, reasoning.

For any instance of evidence to be, something must be demonstrated, must be shown in thought or perception, and understood. All instances of evidence are experience. The only coherent position is that evidence is consciousness itself-- the states of consciousness which are the respective instances of evidence. If there is evidence (the world or an idea shown), then there is a conscious state.

I have never asked a fellow human "Are you conscious?" Nor have I ever asked myself that. But it seems clear to me that talk of "evidence of consciousness" doesn't have much to do with either case. Interestingly, I'm able to say the preceding with a fair amount of confidence in spite of my inability to clearly define consciousness. My knowledge of it is apparently more in the "know how" department.. that is, the ability to correctly use the word. — Mongrel

When dealing with a casualty, the first-aider will typically squeeze an earlobe quite hard to see if they respond to pain. A response is taken as evidence of consciousness. One never needs to ask, because any reply is always sufficient evidence - 'no' serves as well as 'yes' to confirm consciousness, and any question will likewise serve to elicit a response 'what's your name?' for example. Similarly, non-verbal responses are evidence of consciousness (or perhaps you prefer the term awareness here) in an animal such as a dog.

None of this is obtuse philosophical speculation. If you know how to use the word, it will be perfectly understandable.

In one's own case, there is likewise never a need to ask oneself. To be conscious is to be aware of being aware. If one asks oneself any question, one is already aware of being aware, and that question is therefore entirely superfluous.

Again, I am not telling you anything you do not already know perfectly well, and it makes me suspect your motives in your reply. One does not need to look for evidence of one's consciousness, because looking for anything is evidence enough. I don't generally need to look for evidence that it is raining, either; it makes itself evident.

This was directed at anon's evolutionary theory (which is accepted by a fair number of pretty intelligent people). — Mongrel

I am not a democrat of the understanding; many intelligent people have held to all sorts of nonsense.

"Imagine that we inhabit a two dimensional space and that we ourselves are two dimensional. Consider how it would seem to us if a spoon passed through our world. Perhaps we would eventually evolve to the point of being able to discern the truth that is beyond our powers of perception."

-- the adherent to "special insight" — Mongrel

Nowhere have I suggested that evidence cannot point beyond itself. One does not need to imagine another world; footprints in the sand point to unseen feet. A A Milne's seminal work goes into this in the chapter 'Where the woozle wasn't'.

It still seems to me that I can either conclude that we know virtually nothing of reality- so solipsism or radical skepticism, or that what mankind is (and has been) doing when we explore the world around us, is akin to a drunken man, prone to hallucinations, stumbling around in total darkness with a faulty flashlight while trying to explore a beautiful mansion.

And exploring consciousness is rather like a man crawling around outside his car trying to diagnose the problems with his car(engine and suspension problems), in total darkness, while it's hurtling down the highway at 100 miles an hour.. oh, yeah, and he has a faulty flashlight.

I'm not sure if I'd call that naive realism, but that's where I'm at. And it seems most similar to Searle's view than any other.

That's a very enlightened if somewhat old-fashioned position.

"The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing."
Socrates.

My unenlightened and more fashionable way of saying the same thing is that all knowledge is provisional and fallible, rather than absolute. I usually know when it is raining, but I might be fooled by a well aimed garden hose. Still, if there is a suspicion of a problem with the car, I'd suggest slowing down and pulling to the side of the road.

Apparently you didn't understand anything I said. So we're even.

@unenlightened
I think we're on the same page, as I often speak of provisional knowledge and fallibility. but in my analogy, to stop the car would be analogous to trying to study consciousness while unconscious.

Yes, that probably wouldn't work too well. But it might be possible to stop the car without switching off the engine, or to stop the rushing chatter of thought without becoming unconscious.

Well, regardless of the analogy used, yes, I think we can compensate for the fact we're using our brains to examine our brains. And I think we both acknowledge that there is something of a learning curve (provisional knowledge and fallibility).

And regarding the other analogy, even a drunk man prone to hallucinations can presumably keep records of his progress while exploring the dark mansion (and we can imagine that he's not always drunk... even drunks have moments of lucidity).

I think that with all of our modern technological advances, the fact that we are no closer than Descartes to having the answer might mean that we are looking at the question wrong. We still simply do not know enough about the nature of our physical universe to give an answer right now any more accurately than Locke or Berkeley could have.

I am starting to believe in a new, yet not fully defined, form of dualism that I believe eventually the scientific community will find no alternative other than to accept the possibility of. If one point of light can exist in 2 places at the same time, as the quantum guys have proven, or if atoms exist in all places at once until you 'observe' them, which they are trying to prove right now, how can the door to dualism not be opened and properly explored?

@Jamesk
Regarding a new form of dualism... I think you may have something there. I mentioned earlier that Searle accepts both physical and mental properties... and that certainly sounds like dualism- and may even hint of pluralism (if physical and mental, what other properties?)

It seems, no matter how strange, that the evidence suggests there are mental and physical properties. So, monism, when it comes to substance, but dualism in regards to properties. And yet Chalmers is no closer to convincing me that consciousness is a fundamental property.- so not panpsychism.

We first need to recognize the human brain / mind as the crowning achievement of evolution / creation / the universe as we know it so far. To fully understand the brain, the mind and ultimately ourselves is just as hard as fully understanding the deepest questions in physics.

The fact that it is only by virtue of having minds in the first place are we able to even ask the mind body question, or to allow us to ask questions about relativity or gravity.

The three biggest questions in philosophy, as I see it, are; "what is the universe made of?", "What are we? (the mind body problem) and "How are we supposed to behave as human beings?" . The answer to the second question can only really be found in the answer of the first question.

The problem with that answer is that, until about .04 seconds ago (in evolutionary terms) we had zero concept that there were either brains or galaxies. We had no idea of the big bang, evolutionary biology, or neuroscience. Yet, 2,500 years ago, Socrates read the inscription over the gates of the Temple of the Oracle of Delphi, 'Man, Know Thyself'.

When dealing with a casualty, the first-aider will typically squeeze an earlobe quite hard to see if they respond to pain. A response is taken as evidence of consciousness. One never needs to ask, because any reply is always sufficient evidence - 'no' serves as well as 'yes' to confirm consciousness, and any question will likewise serve to elicit a response 'what's your name?' for example. Similarly, non-verbal responses are evidence of consciousness (or perhaps you prefer the term awareness here) in an animal such as a dog.

None of this is obtuse philosophical speculation. If you know how to use the word, it will be perfectly understandable.

In one's own case, there is likewise never a need to ask oneself. To be conscious is to be aware of being aware. If one asks oneself any question, one is already aware of being aware, and that question is therefore entirely superfluous. — unenlightened

I wouldn't be so sure you know how to use the word. A robot can be programmed to respond to pain stimulus in a certain way. Why would a dog be conscious and a robot not?

You then claim that to be conscious "is to be aware of being aware". Do you believe a dog is capable of that? How about a robot? There is certainly no evidence that dogs or any other non-human animal is "aware of being aware".

I have no idea what the correct technical terms are, but "consciousness", as in what we lose when we go to sleep, is certainly a property shared among higher animals. But "consciousness", as in the qualia that exist at a particular time, is uniquely human. They are distinct attributes.

A robot can be programmed to respond to pain stimulus in a certain way. — Tom

...one could easily conceive of a machine that is made in such a way that it utters words, and even that it would utter some words in response to physical actions that cause a change in its organs—for example, if someone touched it in a particular place, it would ask what one wishes to say to it, or if it were touched somewhere else, it would cry out that it was being hurt, and so on. But it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do. The second means is that, even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than anyone of us, they would infallibly fail in others. Thus one would discover that they did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action.

— René Descartes
Discourse on Method in Discourse on Method and Related Writings (1637).

There is certainly no evidence that dogs or any other non-human animal is "aware of being aware". — Tom

See the mirror test. True, it might not indicate 'awareness of being aware' but it does indicate that at least some animals (and birds) recognise their image in the mirror.

I wouldn't be so sure you know how to use the word. A robot can be programmed to respond to pain stimulus in a certain way. Why would a dog be conscious and a robot not? — tom

In common parlance, which is where I deliberately started, the word 'conscious' is used in relation to humans and higher animals, and is not clearly distinguished from 'awareness. Such beings are said to be conscious or unconscious. Whereas when I contact the emergency geeks, they do not ask whether the patient is conscious and breathing, they do when I dial 999.

Later, I make a distinction for philosophical purposes between 'awareness' and 'consciousness' exactly for the purpose of clarifying the difference between human and animal. This is a stipulated distinction and not a matter of common usage. I am exactly not claiming that dogs are aware of being aware, but merely that they are aware, when they aren't in common parlance 'unconscious'.

Whether these terms might have an extended application to a hypothetical robot, I rather doubt, but am open to persuasion. At the moment, I am of the opinion that awareness is not a computation, so I tend (with the rest of the world) not to say when my computer freezes, that it has become unconscious.

Searle already answered this question. Even if the robot can seemingly 'display' consciousness, it only a syntactic display of consciousness lacking and semantic understanding as shown in the 'china room' theory. A jelly fish can 'respond' to outside influences and so is 'conscious' on some level, but you cannot compare a dog or robot feeling pain to a ballet dancer dancing.

Right. Searle points out that there is a huge difference between simulating consciousness, and actually creating an artificial intelligence that is actually experiencing consciousness. In a computer simulation of a rainstorm, no one gets wet.

The problem is, we currently have no way to determine the difference between a simulation of consciousness(behaviors), and the real thing (the subjective experiences that make up consciousness).