Science says the universe is intrinsically meaningless. — gurugeorge
Where does 'science' say that? I've scanned through my Encyclopaedia of Science, can't find any pronouncements to that effect. Is it in a paper I've missed? — Pseudonym
That the Universe is intrinsically meaningless is a logically necessary implication of the materialist/mechanistic worldview, — gurugeorge
What properties would a 'meaning' have that you're finding absent in materialism? — Pseudonym
No, I just said no in the very passage you quote. But perhaps the "phrasing" was too "unique" for you ;) — gurugeorge
(I'm beginning to wonder if you think I'm a religious believer? It seems like you're arguing as one might argue against a religious believer. Just because I have some kind, positive things to say about religion, and I don't think the standard rationalist counter-arguments to the classical arguments for God are as slam-dunk as rationalists tend to think they are, doesn't mean that I am myself a believer :) ) — gurugeorge
Naturalistic and mechanistic/materialistic are pretty much synonymous in this context, are they not?
— praxis
No, as implied by the word "alternative." — gurugeorge
It doesn't need to be true. It only needs to be meaningful.
— praxis
Well that's just where we disagree. People trust that science is true. — gurugeorge
You mentioned yourself that some sort of naturalistic understanding of the world could replace a "specifically religious stance" and avert a drift into nihilism.
— praxis
Yes I think that's possible, but it couldn't be the current mechanistic/materialistic version of naturalism. — gurugeorge
BUT, again, these kinds of alternatives would only be a viable counterweight to nihilism if they were true. — gurugeorge
That the Universe is intrinsically meaningless is a logically necessary implication of the materialist/mechanistic worldview,
— gurugeorge
I don't understand your logic here. What is the thing you're looking for like? What properties would a 'meaning' have that you're finding absent in materialism? — Pseudonym
So how does doing what makes you happy because we seem to like being happy miss that criteria? Are you specifically looking for meaning outside of the human experience? — Pseudonym
you said something about "real" teleology. — praxis
Metaphysical naturalism is synonymous with scientific materialism. — praxis
Religious or metaphysical beliefs don't need to be true to be meaningful. — praxis
For some strange reason, he doesn't seem to believe that values exist once a materialist/mechanistic worldview is adopted. They just magically disappear. — praxis
Of course happiness has several possible meanings. There's the momentary happiness of consumption (in all its forms), and we certainly have lots of that, but that's different from what one might call happiness as satisfaction, or fulfillment - the deep, profound satisfaction of a life well-lived, a life of creativity, of goals fulfilled; which is different again from the happiness of _ataraxia_ or a Buddhist sort of desireless state. All these latter kinds of happiness might even require momentary unhappiness in the former sense, or perhaps better to say discomfort, but they seem to be worth it. Generally, the satisfaction of long-term goals seems to give that deeper sense of fulfillment - perhaps even long-term goals beyond one's individual span, the happiness of raising kids, or of contributing to society, planting trees, etc. — gurugeorge
But the further you go from the kind of happiness that depends on the satisfaction of range-of-the-moment whim, the less there seems to be any point, unless there's a point to the over-arching context of existence. — gurugeorge
some meaning or significance to the fact that anything exists at all, some over-arching context that gives our individual stories a meaningful place, to get the full spectrum of the best possible life. — gurugeorge
I agree with your separation of the different types of happiness, but I'm still not getting the connection with materialism. You mention raising kids as an example of just that kind of long term selfless sense of deeper fulfillment and I'd agree entirely, but you can't get much more materialistically hard-wired into our DNA, than the desire to raise kids. It's a direct result of a chemicals pre-priming neurons to fire in a particular way, but it creates on hell of a powerful meaning to life. — Pseudonym
What would be an example of a meaning or significance to the fact that anything exists at all? — Pseudonym
We're still fairly close to a time when people had over-arching meaningful contexts, so there's still the habit of it in society. But eventually, over time, that habit will fade (so long as that worldview is believed to be true). Already, one has the sense that talk about meaning is fading into pious nostrums that glide off one's mind, commodified in books, chatted about by Oprah for 5 minutes, and forgotten. — gurugeorge
These possibilities are all foreclosed by materialism/mechanism - which boils down to sequences of quantifiable efficient causes without any sort of over-arching context (i.e. stuff just happens to happen the way it happens, the Universe is a stupendous accident, destined for an ignominious end). — gurugeorge
you said something about "real" teleology.
— praxis
Yes, as contrasted with the "as if" teleology I was talking about several posts back when we were talking about teleology. — gurugeorge
Metaphysical naturalism is synonymous with scientific materialism.
— praxis
No it's not, and I just explained how it's not. Scientific materialism is one form of naturalistic thinking. — gurugeorge
For non-mechanistic forms of naturalism, meaning and value are intrinsic to the Universe, such that nature doesn't just happen to be the way it is, it's the way it is for a reason (a reason that's ultimately self-explanatory or self-evident in a deep way, thus making the whole intelligible through and through). — gurugeorge
Obviously religious people don't believe their religions are works of fiction. — gurugeorge
For a religious worldview, or a non-mechanistic type of naturalism, "is" and "ought" are very much linked, you ought to precisely because the world is a certain way. — gurugeorge
They [values] don't magically disappear, rather it's that they don't have any roots in the way reality is. — gurugeorge
Maybe it will clarify if you can explain why your apparent view that Aristotelian teleology is "real" rather than "as if." — praxis
Right, the metaphysical form of naturalism is synonymous with scientific materialism. — praxis
But the whole isn't intelligible through and through, in any narrative. This is anthropomorphism. Meaning can't be intrinsic to the universe without an intelligence or subjective experience. — praxis
Why is an overarching narrative necessary to ground our values? — praxis
Firstly we need to establish what you mean by meaning. I understood it to mean purpose, but you seemed not to be happy with the proximate purpose evolution gave us (to propagate our DNA). It seems you want there to be some other purpose, but I'm not sure why. — Pseudonym
The purpose of our lives, according to materialism is to secure the survival of our DNA. — Pseudonym
We all have to stop asking "why?" at some point, even the religious. — Pseudonym
If God made the world, then why? — Pseudonym
I have not yet heard a compelling argument why making another existence is better than refraining from making a new existence. — schopenhauer1
Because we are compelled to either make a new being or assist in the raising of one relatively related to us, by the very chemicals which run our brains and bodies.
Given the complexities of the environment and the multitude of effects it may have on us, what some people deduce is the best way to assist in the raising of young can be quite varied to say the least, but I'm convinced that remains the driving force.
The problem is you're starting out presuming it's a choice we make, to have these desires which is really ironic considering your moniker.
“Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills” — Pseudonym
You seem to have some meaning of the word purpose, which you are not making clear, which the apparent goal of DNA does not fit, but which the apparent goal of a God would fit. — Pseudonym
The goal of successful replication simply derives mechanistically from the chemical properties of DNA. — Pseudonym
Your idea that it is simply instinctual drive doesn't really answer much. A) We can choose not to. B) People have chosen not to. C) People can go against "natural" instincts. D) How do you answer the "is" "ought" problem- just because its instinctual (if that is even the case) why should one ought to follow the instincts? — schopenhauer1
From any naturalistic or religious point of view that accepts purpose, meaning, etc., as intrinsic to the Universe, things have natures, and their behaviour follows with logical necessity from their nature. Consider: it's "logically possible" that if I walk out the door the floor will turn into jelly. But it's not actually possible - the materials of which the ground is constructed have a limited range of possible things they can do, and turning into jelly isn't one of them. — gurugeorge
From that point of view, it just happens to be the case that the ground doesn't turn into jelly, that's simply a regularity that we observe, and nothing more can be said about it. — gurugeorge
From this point of view anything that's logically possible is materially possible, we must simply observe and note whatever causal regularities exist, and talk in terms of probabilities (i.e. the floor turning to jelly cannot be ruled out entirely, it just has a vanishingly small probability of occurring, based on the mass of other observed regularities). — gurugeorge
I'm baffled as to what the distinction you're trying to make is here. The fact that things have 'natures' is entirely what science, and therefore by extension materialist philosophy, has confirmed. — Pseudonym
Physical things are bound by the laws of physics to behave the way they do, — Pseudonym
How does a thing's Aristotelian 'nature' not just happen to be the case? Why are you allowing philosophical ideas to just 'be the case' for no reason, but when scientific ideas try to just 'be the case' for no reason, you think they've somehow lost something? — Pseudonym
The difference is that science goes on to say that this is just our best current theory and if a better theory turns up or if something unexpected happens then the floor might well turn to jelly. It's just that our best current theory is that it won't. — Pseudonym
Sorry for the pop-psychology, but it's crucial to understanding where I'm coming from. — Pseudonym
I entirely agree with you that there is no logic whatsoever to creating new life under an assumption of both utilitarianism and free-will, which seem to be the assumptions you're working under. Entirely for the arguments you've put forward, there cannot be argued to be any net utility gain, which is exactly what Schopenhauer said. — Pseudonym
A) We cannot choose not to, what some people choose is a lifestyle which (at an instinctive level) some part of their brain is telling them will support other people who are raising new life and whose DNA will be similar to theirs. — Pseudonym
B) See above - You might want to look at people like Edward Wilson for some ideas as to how non-breeders could have evolved despite the disadvantage of not passing on their DNA, but it's basically to do with increasing the life chances of closely related people.
C) Only if you already believe that's what they're doing. Otherwise, this is a non sequitur. How do you know they're going against their 'natural' instincts? Have desires got little labels on them that we can check? Do 'natural', ones show up in a different colour on fMRI scans?
D)The 'is' 'ought' problem is only a problem for those who believe in free-will. abandon free-will and there is only 'is'.
no, that's not an appeal to "authority" — gurugeorge
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