Yes, I presume the trend will continue. But what was the reason again?

Yes, I presume the trend will continue. But what was the reason again? — unenlightened

Because the trend is already there, and nothing else is there and so you have no reason that could ground your doubt with regards to its continued existence. That's the reason.

Perhaps it's worth noting that inductive arguments are invalid by definition. — Michael

Every single inductive argument can be presented as a deductive argument without any kind of significant loss.

Here's an example of an inductive argument:

1. All swans we have seen in the past are white.
2. Therefore, every single swan we will see in the future will also be white.

This argument can be presented as a deductive argument in the following manner:

1. All swans we have seen in the past are white.
2. The future mimics the past to the best of its ability.
3. Therefore, every single swan we will see in the future will also be white.

The reverse is also true. You can present any deductive argument as an inductive argument.

Here's the common example of a deductive argument:

1. All men are mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Both premises can be presented as an inductive argument. In fact, that's how they are derived. "All men are mortal" simply means that every single man we have observed in the past eventually died. "Socrates is a man" simply means that what we know about Socrates is typically associated with traits that are characteristic of men. The conclusion is reached by joining these two inductive arguments.

Deduction and induction have far more in common than most people are willing to admit.

There are two types of thinking: on is focused on similarities (holism) and the other on differences (reductionism.) I prefer to focus on similarities.

There are two types of thinking: on is focused on similarities (holism) and the other on differences (reductionism.) I prefer to focus on similarities. — Magnus Anderson

Bohm once wrote that creativity is about finding differences within similarities, similarities within differences, and resolving paradoxes that arise.

Tell it to the bitcoin investors, I'm sure they'll agree. Here's a reason to ground doubt: things change, trends reverse. But I am consenting to play your game here, as if trends changing will continue. So even your best reason, which amounts to throwing up your hands and saying 'what else?' is double-edged to say the least.

It is impossible to find evidence for determinism in science — Rich

LOL.
That's like saying its impossible to find evidence of pages of paper in the content of a book.

BTW. This "." is a period. You said period period.

Don't buy into this free will clap trap, as this flies in the face of the massive advances in science of the last 250 years which assert determinism. — charleton

I have to take issue with this statement. The ‘massive advances of science’ have been made in respect of objective and physical discoveries about many subjects, which might or might not have any bearing whatsoever on the nature of the will, and whether it’s free or not.

There is also the case that prior to the 1920’s, there was a widespread belief in physical determinism - that everything was literally the outcome of the ‘collocation of atoms’ (Bertrand Russell’s term). But that was torpedoed by the discovery of the uncertainty principle and the indeterminate nature of sub-atomic matter. You can’t make an obvious connection to the question of ‘free will’ but the general point remains, that the notion of complete physical determinism has been torpedoed.

Suffice to say, a lot of the rhetoric about science having undermined free will, is based, I believe, in the fact that the freedom is actually scary, something we can’t handle. Maybe the notion that ‘science proves’ that we’re not free is an apparently-respectable way of avoiding what Erich Fromm described as the fear of freedom.

So his empiricism rests on his taking experience as the starting point for knowledge instead of basing it on innate ideas or a priori thinking. — Perplexed

Of key importance is Kant’s reaction to Hume’s scepticism. That is very lengthy topic and I won’t try to summarise it. But ask yourself this question: is rational ability or language ‘learned by experience’? I think the answer is obviously ‘a bit of both’. Children learn language, but human children learn it very easily, like no other species. That is the subject of Chomsky’s ‘universal grammar’ and the like. Another big topic. But I think it is important to get some understanding of Kant’s criticism of Hume (e.g. here.)

The difficulty is that if inductive knowledge is purely contingent on repetition then it isn't really true knowledge because no matter how many times we do the experiment it could always fail the following time. — Perplexed

Of course considered merely logically it could always fail the next time. But could it really? Not if invariablility is really established in nature. Does our experience seem to indicate that it is? The answer would seem to be that all of human experience points to the reality of established invariances. Is it rational to believe there are established invariances if all our experience indicates that there are?

Tell it to the bitcoin investors, I'm sure they'll agree. — unenlightened

Some trends reverse, I thought it was obvious we were talking about the continuation of things like the laws of nature, not Bitcoin price trends...

Here's a reason to ground doubt: things change, trends reverse. — unenlightened

That's a (logical) possibility, but you must have reasons to think it actually will reverse (not merely as a possibility) in order to rationally make that bet.

But I am consenting to play your game here, as if trends changing will continue. So even your best reason, which amounts to throwing up your hands and saying 'what else?' is double-edged to say the least. — unenlightened

No, logical possibility isn't sufficient to ground a doubt. In the case of the Bitcoin trend, we had actual reasons to doubt it would continue: price cannot keep going up infinitely, we've seen bubbles in the past, price grew exponentially in the absence of any solid reason and this was associated with bubbles before, etc. MANY reasons.

But that was torpedoed by the discovery of the uncertainty principle and the indeterminate nature of sub-atomic matter. — Wayfarer

This is just a failure of the atomistic paradigm, it does not refute the simple fact that effects are the result of causes.

Why is it reasonably probable that the past predicts the future? Because the constraints or deep structures that generate patterns tend to have been built up bit by bit over a long history. For that historic weight of constraints to change, it seems probable that it would therefore have to be picked apart slowly in the same fashion - bit by bit.

But also, we know from empirical observation of nature, and now logical models of that nature, that catastrophic collapse can occur. What took a long time to build up, can also collapse in sudden and predictably unpredictable fashion.

So the world is actually far more interesting than Humean and Newtonian notions of determinism and probability could know.

We have new models of probability - non-linear and chaotic ones - that change the good old Humean debate beyond recognition anyway ... even after we have abandoned rigid deduction in favour of Bayesian induction as an epistemic foundation.

This is just a failure of the atomistic paradigm, it does not refute the simple fact that effects are the result of causes. — charleton

So you have a simple deterministic account of the quantum eraser experiments that doesn’t involve retrocausality or some kind of outlandish multiverse metaphysics?

Something has to give when faced with the evidence of quantum contextuality as a causal thing.

The abrogation of causality in quantum mechanics was what caused Einstein to exclaim that he couldn't accept that 'God plays dice'. (Bohr repiled, 'stop telling God how to do things.')

*

"Why is it reasonably probable that the past predicts the future?" That's the wrong question. The right question is "What grounds do you have to think that the future will be different?"

What ground do you have for supposing that the sun will not rise tomorrow?

What ground do you have for supposing that the sun will not rise tomorrow? — Banno

Nothing and we have no grounds for expecting things to happen for no reason, particularly when it comes to large, complex objects like the sun.

It's like asking how do we know the sun won't turn into a giant teapot tomorrow. We can't prove that it won't deductively, but we have nothing that says stars have a means of turning into teapots.

Indeed, habit, as Hume himself says; but it is a leap that reason cannot justify. — unenlightened

Why is reason defined as deductive logic? Seems that animals and humans rely heavily on inductive reasoning. Deductive is something we came up with rather recently, but our ancestors didn't use it to survive, communicate and utilize tools, etc.

Yes; doubt requires justification, too.

Yes; doubt requires justification, too. — Banno

Maybe you can bring that up on the unperceived things not existing thread? OP is looking for a reason not to doubt. He mentions the idealist Stace who argued that there is no reason for thinking that unperceived objects and events exist.

One would think it a simple point; but it is being doubted interminably in @Sam26's thoughts on Epistemology

Why is reason defined as deductive logic? Seems that animals and humans rely heavily on inductive reasoning. Deductive is something we came up with rather recently, but our ancestors didn't use it to survive, communicate and utilize tools, etc. — Marchesk

You can also say we came up with both inductive and deductive reasoning just recently. You think that induction isn't about "deducing" what's going to happen in the future? You think it's not about eliminating alternative possibilities in favor of a single possibility (or a narrow set of possibilities)? I was never much of a fan of this inductive/deductive division. I mean, sure, I understand the differences between the two, but I think that these differences are rather insignificant. The same with the claim that thinking (or reasoning) is necessarily a conscious activity. It's like saying that apples are necessarily conscious . . . it's sort of hilarious. Are apples necessarily conscious? Not really. There are apples out there whether we are aware of them or not. We don't make a distinction between "conscious apples" and "unconscious apples" based on whether we are aware of them or not.

Different question. I was emphasising what makes it reasonable to believe in causal continuity. You are now asking the empirical question of where is the counterfactual that would cause you to doubt that continuity in some particular circumstance.

You also seem to miss the important point. We do know that catastrophes can befall even sunrises. Supernovas are just one such possibility.

And yet, even then, we now have mathematical-strength accounts that make predictions even about such unpredictability.

Different question. — apokrisis

I much prefer my question. One hopes not to need celestial mechanics and Bayesian Inference in order to plan one's breakfast with confidence.

I much prefer my question. One hopes not to need celestial mechanics and Bayesian Inference in order to plan one's breakfast with confidence. — Banno

Focus, Banno. Breathe deeply and focus. :)

Apo must be having a bad day. It usually take three or four posts to goad him into an ad hom. 8-)

(Sorry, Mum.)

Apo must be having a bad day. It usually take three or four posts to goad him into an ad hom. — Banno

Bad day? Every laugh at your expense must surely be an entry in the credit column of the great ledger of life. And now you admit that your aim is to goad. Checkmate, mate.

So, the necessary Banalities having been completed, let’s get back to you explaining to me how empirical correspondence operates in the absence of conceptual coherence.

You prefer the one, and hope to avoid mentioning the other. But sadly, even induction relies on a coherent metaphysics back in the real world of pragmatic knowledge.

And I just demonstrated that fact in mentioning the need to incorporate catastrophe theory into any full view of the probabilistic basis of reasonable inference. These days (well, for these past 40 years at least), you would need a positive reason to believe your phenomena actually inhabit a stable linear realm of constraints. You would need to know there was no parameter slowly creeping into critical territory.

So how do you work that discovery into your own personal worldview I wonder? (Well not really, as it’s obvious.)

X-)

(Y)

What ground do you have for supposing that the sun will not rise tomorrow? — Banno

Well, has been said already, that’s not really the point. There is no logical reason why the Earth might not be annihalated by some cosmic catastrophe. And recall that Hume is conducting an enquiry into the ‘nature of human understanding’; he’s not really concerned with the niceties of common-sense realism.

But in thinking about the OP, I came across ‘Hume’s fork’ once again, and now understand the point. Everything, says Hume, falls into the category of either a priori - things that tautologically true - or experiential - things we know from experience. These, Hume holds, are exhaustive and exclusive - every kind of true statement is one of the two. So the belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, not being an analytical statement, such as 2-2=0, but being based on experience and observation, can only be an inductive prediction based on experience.

But, said Kant, what of the synthetic a priori? Those are cases where there a logical or so-called tautological argument leads to a conclusion which is not necessarily stated in the premises. Such cases have proven especially abundant in mathematical physics, where some whole class of phenomena has been predicted purely as a result of mathematical reasoning. So such discoveries have the force of logical necessity, but nevertheless rely on observation to validate.

‘Hume’s fork’ — Wayfarer

Back to two dogmas. The fork is more like a spoon.