From Google search of "instinct"
Instinct: an innate, typically fixed pattern of behavior in animals in response to certain stimuli.

So, I don't know what definition you are using, but if its not a fixed (innate) pattern than I do not consider an instinct. So the pleasure instincts, aggression instincts, things like that may be considered instinctual, but more complex behavior would be more than a stretch to include under the category of "instinctual". Raising a child is conceptual. It is something you learn, not something you know or feel right off the bat. It is something you need to be enculturated for. So what you seem to be doing is saying any behavior belongs under the categorical concept of "instinct". This is overmining the concept of instinct. Instinct means something that is innate. Concepts learned through culture do not seem to be innate but learned through the process of enculturation.

As far as utilitarianism, how are you using the term? Usually it means something like trying to maximize happiness for the greatest number as a guiding principle. So what principle are you using to justify why having more life is better than refraining from having more life? What is your justification or teleology that you think justifies it? As I've said, I haven't heard a compelling argument.

Presumably I'm not explaining myself clearly enough. Despite two attempts to explain otherwise, you still seem to be working on the idea that I'm saying all activities related to having children are directly the result of instinct without any other input.

I've said twice now that behaviour is the result of a reaction between instinct and the environment (culture/nature). No matter how much cultural /environmental involvement you posit, desire has to ultimately be innate otherwise we would never do anything. How do you think a culture creates a desire?

So, knowing that all of our behaviour ultimately comes from natural instinct, the question to ask of any apparent desire we find is "what natural instinct is this trying to satisfy?"

What I'm saying with regards to antinatalism is that all of our actions related to having children are based-on the natural instinct to reproduce and so are not behaviours we even consider justifying by their ultimate objective.

People who choose not to have children must still make such a choice ultimately motivated to satisfy some natural instinct, otherwise where did the desire come from? It sounds very much to me like you'd like to reject free-will, but aren't prepared to accept the consequences.

Presumably I'm not explaining myself clearly enough. Despite two attempts to explain otherwise, you still seem to be working on the idea that I'm saying all activities related to having children are directly the result of instinct without any other input. — Pseudonym

Yep, you are not explaining clearly enough I guess. You don't need the whole dramatics of the "despite two attempts".. just say what you are going to say without the unnecessary attacks. At the least I can have more sympathy with your style if not the substance.

I've said twice now that behaviour is the result of a reaction between instinct and the environment (culture/nature). No matter how much cultural /environmental involvement you posit, desire has to ultimately be innate otherwise we would never do anything. How do you think a culture creates a desire? — Pseudonym

Again.. don't need the "I've said twice now..". Do you want to have a pleasant disagreement or a brawl? Your choice. Anyways, now you are changing your terms from instinct to desire. Most desires are not innate but shaped by culture. For example, the desire for eating or pleasure may be innate (very basic desires) but other preferences (which may be built on more basic desires) are shaped by social interaction. Thus, a culture that values anti-natalism might create a more weighted preference for such, and a culture that values natalism (which are most) might have that preference more weighted. Where does society get this from? They are simply preferences that have been passed down. Basketball is another preference that has been passed down. People like playing games. Is basketball innate? There may be some more primary motivations (like for example, survival, boredom, seeking comfort) but how this is channeled is very contingent on cultural institutions.

Maybe it will clarify if you can explain why your apparent view that Aristotelian teleology is "real" rather than "as if."
— praxis

That sentence doesn't make sense as it stands. I'll presume you're asking me to explain why I think Aristotelian teleology (if true) would be a form of real teleology rather than an "as if" teleology?

The reason would be that Aristotelian teleology understands final cause, purpose, function, as intrinsic to nature, whereas when teleological concepts are used in biology, for example, it's just a manner of speaking (that's what I mean by "as if"). — gurugeorge

Teleology is the explanation of phenomena by the purpose they serve rather than by assumed causes. In the field of biology, an example of an intrinsic teleological claim might be that the purpose of a birds wings is for flying. This is "real" or valid teleology. An example of invalid or nonsensical teleology might be something like claiming that mountains exist for the purpose of sking because we know that mountains didn't come to exist for that purpose.

Right, the metaphysical form of naturalism is synonymous with scientific materialism.
— praxis

No, scientific materialism is one form of metaphysical naturalism, it's not "synonymous" with it, it's a subset or sub-type of it, one form of it. — gurugeorge

The other types of naturalism that you've mentioned, if I recall correctly, are of their own type, not subtypes of metaphysical naturalism.

I meant that a fully satisfactory story about the Universe has to be complete, and ultimately grounded in self-evidence. — gurugeorge

Religious narratives are far from offering a complete account for everything in the universe. They don't need to. They just need to be meaningful.

Why is an overarching narrative necessary to ground our values?
— praxis

Because values partly pertain to the world around you that's not-you, yet values you merely create for yourself have no necessary connection to the world that's not-you. — gurugeorge

You're not explaining why an overarching narrative is necessary to retain values. You're only saying that an individual's values may not jive well with the world around them. That is obvious and unenlightening.

I apologise if my tone had offended you, it was not my intention.

I just don't think you can suggest with any authority that the desire to raise children is not a natural instinct. Any creature which did not have the desire to both have, and successfully raise, young hard-wired into their DNA would simply have become extinct long ago. It is absolutely without doubt that if anything at all is a natural instinct then raising children is.

Basically your position boils down to the fact that the scientific explanation for why things are as they are is insufficient because it cannot (does not even attempt to) demonstrate that they necessarily are that way, just that that is they way they seem to be. I'm with you so far, that's a perfectly sound definition of science. — Pseudonym

Then what's been your problem all through our conversation? You've professed to be baffled by the difference between the two positions, you've furrowed your brow in puzzlement, you don't understand, etc., etc. So now you're telling me you do understand after all? Huh. So what was all that rigmarole about then?

And in this context of your newly revealed understanding, what was all that stuff about seeking "external authority" a few posts back? You do understand there's a difference between a system's attempt to demonstrate logical necessity and give a complete picture grounded in self-evident, necessary truths, on the one hand, and the kind of reliance on "external authority" that you were bloviating about in your bit of junior psychoanalysis back there, right?

But then you go on to say that various metaphysical positions do give reasons why things are the way they are necessarily because of some metaphysical mumbo-jumbo, which you can't quite remember but nonetheless believe profoundly is the case. — Pseudonym

All I was required to do for you was to point out the difference, that's what you were asking for, that's what you professed to be so puzzled about.

I don't "believe profoundly" in the classical philosophy (or any of the other analogues I've offered that form alternatives to the materialist worldview), I simply understand that there is an alternative understanding of the world available, and roughly what the difference consists in. And I also understand that if it's true, if the arguments are sound, then the classical philosophy (and the analogues from other systems) would certainly counter the alienation and nihilism that's been a direct result of the materialist/mechanistic philosophy, and do so on a rational basis. If you're interested, you can pursue the topic yourself instead of second-guessing that it's "metaphysical mumbo-jumbo."

I've only recently started getting into the classical/scholastic philosophy myself, that's why, while I've read some arguments, and I find the difference between the classical philosophy and the modern philosophy fascinating, I'm not confident enough to be sure I understand the classical philosophy well enough to even reproduce it, let alone defend it. It's not as firm in my mind as the general line of modern philosophical arguments - it's actually (for most of us in today) a new topic with its own concepts that you have to learn on its own terms.

In the field of biology, an example of an intrinsic teleological claim might be that the purpose of a birds wings is for flying. This is "real" or valid teleology. — praxis

Not for science it isn't, there is no real or valid teleology for science at all. I've just explained to you, teleological talk in science as it stands today is just a convenience, a manner of speaking, a compressed explanation, etc. Since I've been through this several times already with you, and more recently with Pseudonym, I'm not going to repeat myself.

An example of invalid or nonsensical teleology — praxis

Invalid or nonsensical is not the opposite of real in this context.

Religious narratives are far from offering a complete account for everything in the universe.They don't need to. They just need to be meaningful. — praxis

They generally do try to, that's the whole point of them. People seek a complete, satisfying sense of reality and their place in it. As you said yourself, fiction is meaningful, but it's not usually held to be a true picture of reality.

You're not explaining why an overarching narrative is necessary to retain values. You're only saying that an individual's values may not jive well with the world around them. That is obvious and unenlightening. — praxis

No that's not it, it's not that the individual's values may not fit with the world around them - obviously the individual is free to hold whatever values they wish. It's that people generally (as evidenced by religious systems and the classical philosophical systems) want the same values to be an integral part of reality AND an integral part of themselves, so that they are bound to, at home in, the world around them. What's wanted is values that are mirrored in the individual and in the external reality surrounding them. That's why subjectivity of value is unsatisfactory - even shared subjective value for a community. That's the difference between values and whims, or shared whims.

I apologise if my tone had offended you, it was not my intention. — Pseudonym

Thank you for toning it down a bit!

I just don't think you can suggest with any authority that the desire to raise children is not a natural instinct. Any creature which did not have the desire to both have, and successfully raise, young hard-wired into their DNA would simply have become extinct long ago. It is absolutely without doubt that if anything at all is a natural instinct then raising children is. — Pseudonym

I don’t see how this necessarily must be the case in humans. All that needs to take place for procreation is any functional process that creates more humans. The avenue can be instinctual (I.e. innate like other animals) or it can be cultural (like humans). If institutions in society perpetuate certain preferences for procreation then these preferences will work their way into individual preferences. The goal being people channel their activities towards the preferred social preferences. The thing is “raising a child” and “birth” are conceptual. That is these are linguistically-based. That is, they are derived socially through more complex learning. They are not innate. In fact, very few behaviors or cognitive processes (like concepts) are innate. There maybe predispositions for certain moods, dispositions, tendencies, etc, but no one is born with full blown complex conceptual notions.

Then what's been your problem all through our conversation? You've professed to be baffled by the difference between the two positions, you've furrowed your brow in puzzlement, you don't understand, etc., etc. So now you're telling me you do understand after all? Huh. So what was all that rigmarole about then? — gurugeorge

I never professed to be baffled by the suggestion that there was any difference at all. What I'm baffled by is your difference. Your suggestion that one provides a utility to humanity that the other does not.

Youve demonstrated that one approach is different to the other. Nobody has disputed there exist some differences between scientific explanations and aristolelian ones, it would be near miraculous if there weren't. What you've yet to demonstrate is that the differences actually result in a loss of utility.

Youve jumped from some epistemological difference (namely that aristolelian 'natures' are necessarily the case whereas scientific descriptions only 'appear' to be the case, to talk about 'meaning' and I've yet to understand how you got from one to the other.

How exactly does a thing 'necessarily' being the way it is rather than merely 'appearing' to be the way it is have a negative impact on the meaning we assign it, and what evidence do you have that this is happening?

All that needs to take place for procreation is any functional process that creates more humans. — schopenhauer1

No, because we are in competition with other humans and animals, that's the nature of evolution. If all we did was produce children, but another tribe produced them, taught and kept them healthy and generally well cared for, the latter tribe would soon out-breed the former.

The avenue can be instinctual (I.e. innate like other animals) or it can be cultural (like humans). — schopenhauer1

Yes, but it's a vastly more likely and a simpler explanation to say that humans have the same instinct to successfully raise young adults any other animal, why would we invent a new reason for our own apparent desire?

The thing is “raising a child” and “birth” are conceptual. That is these are linguistically-based. That is, they are derived socially through more complex learning. They are not innate. — schopenhauer1

I just don't understand how you can say this in the face of the overwhelming evidence from evolution that this is not the case. Am I missing something? It sounds like you're trying to make an argument that despite the urge to successfully raise young being evident in literally every living thing that has ever been, and it being an absolute necessity for a species to survive, the human version of it is entirely cultural, that we're the only animal to have ever lived that doesn't have an instinctive desire to raise children but luckily (for our survival thus far) we just happen to have replaced our missing instinctive desire with a culturally imposed one. You realise that sounds crazy.

I never professed to be baffled by the suggestion that there was any difference at all. — Pseudonym

But you pouted, for example, that science does too show that things have natures, etc., etc., so why was I making a fuss? I know it was a few posts back, but come on, your mind can't be that much of a drawing on water.

Youve jumped from some epistemological difference (namely that aristolelian 'natures' are necessarily the case whereas scientific descriptions only 'appear' to be the case, to talk about 'meaning' and I've yet to understand how you got from one to the other.

How exactly does a thing 'necessarily' being the way it is rather than merely 'appearing' to be the way it is have a negative impact on the meaning we assign it, and what evidence do you have that this is happening? — Pseudonym

"meaning we assign."

If a thing (up to the Universe as a whole) necessarily is the way it is then WE DON'T ASSIGN THE MEANING. That's the difference - in that case the Universe is FOUND to be meaningful, not ASSIGNED meaning. On the other hand, if the Universe is just a stupendous case of "shit happens" then any meaning we "assign" is just lipstick on a pig.

We're going round in circles now. I give up.

No, because we are in competition with other humans and animals, that's the nature of evolution. If all we did was produce children, but another tribe produced them, taught and kept them healthy and generally well cared for, the latter tribe would soon out-breed the former. — Pseudonym

I just meant that all that needs to take place for procreation is for a functional process to be in place. Competition can be part of that process if you like. I don't see how competition negates what I meant, and is sort of a non-sequitor.

The avenue can be instinctual (I.e. innate like other animals) or it can be cultural (like humans).
— schopenhauer1

Yes, but it's a vastly more likely and a simpler explanation to say that humans have the same instinct to successfully raise young adults any other animal, why would we invent a new reason for our own apparent desire? — Pseudonym

It's not about simpler or not simpler, it is simply about what is occurring. You have to see how you are using these phrases. What do you mean by "desire"? Desires in humans, manifest in language. Now, there are basic drives like hunger, warmth, pleasure, fear, etc. but beyond these basic emotions and physical necessities, desires have a linguistic nature to them. "I desire to do x" is a linguistic event. What evidence have you that "I desire to raise a child" is anything but a linguistic notion where first you have to have a notion of self, world, other, caring for, reproduction, etc. etc. These are all complex concepts, and are not innate. These are not primal emotions like fear, hunger, etc. In other words, they are not things which you can say are pre-linguistic or at the least, pre-conceptual (if you want to divorce the two).

Rather what probably happens is, reproduction, caring for, etc. is considered valuable by the community. This becomes encultrated by the individual and desirous to them. It's like if there is a family that puts a lot of emphasis on sports, I bet you the children in that family will also take on sports as something that is desirable as they grew up with this being valuable to their close-knit family community. Thus, why would this work any different? Just because reproduction is important to the propagation of the species, does not mean that it is innate. As long as there is something that functionally perpetuates the species (like encultration of values), it will keep going.

I just don't understand how you can say this in the face of the overwhelming evidence from evolution that this is not the case. Am I missing something? It sounds like you're trying to make an argument that despite the urge to successfully raise young being evident in literally every living thing that has ever been, and it being an absolute necessity for a species to survive, the human version of it is entirely cultural, that we're the only animal to have ever lived that doesn't have an instinctive desire to raise children but luckily (for our survival thus far) we just happen to have replaced our missing instinctive desire with a culturally imposed one. You realise that sounds crazy. — Pseudonym

Well, evolution comes in the picture in that humans evolved language/conceptual abilities (along with other cognitive tools that bolstered this). This separated behavior that is purely motivated by innate instinct with cultural transmission to a very high degree. Then, survival becomes a "virtual world" of cultural integration mediated through the primary language of the community. Thus, biological evolution does play a role in this in shaping our cognitive faculties to have a conceptually-wired brain. This same brain being the one that helps produce cultural practices that maintain the tribe, etc. A more interesting question perhaps is why is it that reproduction/procreation became so important for the tribe. Clearly, children were a utility and perhaps a source of pride, but again, that all circles back tot he fact that it is still conceptual and based on the communities values in the first place. What we can say is it is a strong preference for human communities that gets enculturated as the values of the individuals of the community and then gets passed down the generations.

In the field of biology, an example of an intrinsic teleological claim might be that the purpose of a birds wings is for flying. This is "real" or valid teleology.
— praxis

Not for science it isn't, there is no real or valid teleology for science at all. I've just explained to you, teleological talk in science as it stands today is just a convenience, a manner of speaking, a compressed explanation, etc. Since I've been through this several times already with you, and more recently with Pseudonym, I'm not going to repeat myself. — gurugeorge

Please don't repeat yourself again. Try explaining what you're trying to communicate with sufficient reasoning. A flat denial doesn't explain anything.

You say teleology in science is a "compressed" explanation. Yet another one of your idiosyncratic terms that makes it difficult to communicate with you. Are you doing this on purpose? Anyway, technically all explanations are compressed as no explanation can account for everything, so it's only a matter of how compressed. Any teleological explanation is going to be "compressed." Compression, or the lack thereof, is not what distinguishes a teleological explanation. What distinguishes a teleological explanation is that it explains phenomena by the purpose it serves rather than by assumed causes. Any explanation that does this is a "real" teleological explanation. It may or may not be a valid explanation but it will nevertheless be an actual teleological explanation.

Invalid or nonsensical is not the opposite of real in this context. — gurugeorge

You're the only one who knows what you mean by "real" in this context. Though given your inability to explain what you mean, maybe even you don't know. You did just write, "there is no real or valid teleology for science at all," which suggests that the terms 'real' and 'valid' are commensurate in your mind.

... people generally want the same values to be an integral part of reality AND an integral part of themselves, so that they are bound to, at home in, the world around them. — gurugeorge

You're right about the binding aspect, indeed the etymology of the word 'religion' goes back to religare (to bind), but you appear rather confused about what is being bound. The function is to bind the group or tribe in common values and goals through rituals, icons, etc, and a coherent narrative. In the vast majority of human history being part of a group was a matter of life and death. Being an integral part of a group increased the odds of gene propagation, so in terms of evolutionary psychology, it's a successful adaptation. Ultimately, the goal of our desire for meaning and the grand narratives it inspires is gene propagation.

What evidence have you that "I desire to raise a child" is anything but a linguistic notion where first you have to have a notion of self, world, other, caring for, reproduction, etc. etc. — schopenhauer1

That literally all other animals raise young - some in quite complex and long-term ways. How on earth do you think they do this without a desire to do it motivating them. Are you suggesting that Elephants spend 16 years nurturing, feeding and protecting their young entirely by accident?

That literally all other animals raise young - some in quite complex and long-term ways. How on earth do you think they do this without a desire to do it motivating them. Are you suggesting that Elephants spend 16 years nurturing, feeding and protecting their young entirely by accident? — Pseudonym

Yes, it is an instinct for the elephant parent. For the human it is cultural to raise a child. Again, for the human (which is redundant as other animals do not even have the capacity for language), how is "I desire to raise a child" anything but a linguistic notion? Does the concepts of "child" or "taking care of" happen pre-linguistically? I do not think so. These concepts are picked up through interaction with other linguistic users in a cultural environment. Other animals do not need to pick up concepts through interaction with their cultural environment as much of their parenting behaviors and "desires" are innate.

Yes, it is an instinct for the elephant parent. For the human it is cultural to raise a child. — schopenhauer1

Why? For what sound logical reason are you proposing (insisting, in fact) that humans, despite having evolved in exactly the same way as all other animals, mysteriously lack an instinct present in all other animals, even though the evidence for it is so clearly present that you've had to come up with some other explanation for it.

You keep insisting that the desire to raise children is cultural in humans but instinctive in all other animals without providing any reason at all why that should be the case.

Why? For what sound logical reason are you proposing (insisting, in fact) that humans, despite having evolved in exactly the same way as all other animals, mysteriously lack an instinct present in all other animals, even though the evidence for it is so clearly present that you've had to come up with some other explanation for it. — Pseudonym

I explained it here:

Well, evolution comes in the picture in that humans evolved language/conceptual abilities (along with other cognitive tools that bolstered this). This separated behavior that is purely motivated by innate instinct with cultural transmission to a very high degree. Then, survival becomes a "virtual world" of cultural integration mediated through the primary language of the community. Thus, biological evolution does play a role in this in shaping our cognitive faculties to have a conceptually-wired brain. This same brain being the one that helps produce cultural practices that maintain the tribe, etc. A more interesting question perhaps is why is it that reproduction/procreation became so important for the tribe. Clearly, children were a utility and perhaps a source of pride, but again, that all circles back tot he fact that it is still conceptual and based on the communities values in the first place. What we can say is it is a strong preference for human communities that gets enculturated as the values of the individuals of the community and then gets passed down the generations. — schopenhauer1

You keep insisting that the desire to raise children is cultural in humans but instinctive in all other animals without providing any reason at all why that should be the case. — Pseudonym

Again, how do concepts like "child" or "taking care of" occur before pre-linguistically? What does a desire for any X thing look like prior to language? I cannot conceive of such complex ideas being "desired" prior to language in humans. Basic things like hunger, thirst, warmth, pleasure, fear, etc. I can see being pre-linguistic, but how is something as complex as "I desire to raise a child" anything but linguistically-based? How does that kind of complex statement work prior to language? You need a conception of self, other, the idea of raising something, etc. These are all linguistically derived. I don't see how it is otherwise.

We're just going round in circles here.

Does an elephant desire to raise a child? Yes. If it did not desire to raise a child it would not raise a child. They clearly do, so such a desire must be present.

Do elephants have complex language? No, probably not.

It must therefore be possible for a species without complex language to have a desire to raise young.

We don't have to be going around in circles if you understood the difference between instinct (i.e. innate behaviors) vs. culture (i.e. socially learned behaviors mediated through language transmission).

Your argument there is a classic false equivalence and strawman. I never said that the elephant doesn't desire to have children in its own way. What I did was make a distinction in how these desires manifest.
The elephant's "desire" to raise a child is instinctual. The desire is present due to instinctual origins. The human's desire to raise a child is cultural. The desire is present due to cultural origins. What I also said was for humans, desire for raising children, being that it is not instinctual, does not have a pre-linguistic origin. The cognitive process for humans works through linguistic mediation where the cognitive process for other animals works through pre-set instinctual mechanisms that happen non-linguistically.

I understand the distinction you're making I don't understand why. It doesn't matter how many times you keep repeating it it doesn't magically make it true.

I understand the distinction you're making I don't understand why. It doesn't matter how many times you keep repeating it it doesn't magically make it true. — Pseudonym

I'm not sure why you think it's untrue. I am trying to understand where you think that humans have an "innate" desire to raise children by asking

Again, how do concepts like "child" or "taking care of" occur before pre-linguistically? What does a desire for any X thing look like prior to language? I cannot conceive of such complex ideas being "desired" prior to language in humans. Basic things like hunger, thirst, warmth, pleasure, fear, etc. I can see being pre-linguistic, but how is something as complex as "I desire to raise a child" anything but linguistically-based? How does that kind of complex statement work prior to language? You need a conception of self, other, the idea of raising something, etc. These are all linguistically derived. I don't see how it is otherwise. — schopenhauer1

I'm not sure why you think it's untrue. I am trying to understand where you think that humans have an "innate" desire to raise children by asking — schopenhauer1

This is exactly what I mean by going round in circles. I'm not sure why you think it's true and I'm trying to understand why you think humans don't have an innate desire to raise children.

My argument is simple - all animals must have an innate desire to raise children otherwise they would have become extinct, humans are animals, therefore humans have an innate desire to raise children.

All I've gleaned from your posts is an assertion that the desire to raise children is not innate in humans, that it is language-based and culturally inherited. You've argued succinctly how it would be possible for this to be the case (evolution acting on culture), but something being theoretically possible does not make it true. Its obviously theoretically possible for the desire to be innate too (after all, we've just established it is exactly that in elephants). What you still haven't explained is why you've chosen your new possibility, when the existing one already explains everything.

I think that this perspective in itself is wrong - because if one were to measure life-based upon pleasure and suffering, it would be pretty easy to fall for persuing suffering fundamentally. I think that the root of living intact with the good implies that you always see the higher value of things rather than focusing on potential conditions that you may approach. Life is good when one finds sense in following ethical and moral guidelines instead of living to find pleasure - it is in some way to change the thought of what constitutes a good life by implying that logic and moral values stay higher than immediate pleasure.

What you still haven't explained is why you've chosen your new possibility, when the existing one already explains everything. — Pseudonym

I was trying to get at that by asking: What does a desire for any X thing look like prior to language? You still have not answered this question fully but seem to avoid it. I say that there is nothing for how it looks like, because it does not exist for humans. I have never seen a human have a pre-linguistic thought as such. How are we to tell? Language is already encoded by the time we are 2 years old, so it's pretty hard to judge a pre-linguistic desire. Also, what empirical evidence is there that "I want to raise a child" is hard-wired? Rather there is much more evidence that one sees other people have babies, the media, friends, family, and just the desire to experience something one has not experienced, or do something that gives more meaning to a life, to have a child. But all these reasons are linguistically and culturally mediated. In other words they come from interactions with society and mediated through language. They are not standalone innate thoughts. Almost all thoughts that are linguistic have a culturally inherited element. Due to our shared cultural nature, much of who we are, the very linguistic adaptation of our brains, and the preferences that we strive for are mediated through interaction with society. Clearly procreation is a very valued preference of society that people take on as something worth pursuing.

What does a desire for any X thing look like prior to language? — schopenhauer1

It looks like someone acting in such a way as to bring the object of that desire about. If someone acts in such a way as to eat cake, we can can presume they desire to eat cake, if someone books a holiday in the Algarve, we can presume they desire a holiday in the Algarve. We might need to do some work to get at what the underlying desires might be, but that's not scientifically unusual. Evolutionary biologists make completely unremarkable educated guesses as to what a particular limb or organ is 'for' in evolutionary terms. It's really no big deal to do the same with apparent desires.

have never seen a human have a pre-linguistic thought as such. How are we to tell? — schopenhauer1

You realise this is self-immunising don't you? If you can't tell whether someone is having a pre-linguistic thought, then how do you know they're not?

Also, what empirical evidence is there that "I want to raise a child" is hard-wired? — schopenhauer1

I've already given you the evidence (out of respect for your preferred tone I'm not going to tell you how many times). It is that every single other animal on earth has such a desire hard-wired. How much more evidence do you need than it being the case for literally every other example in existence?

If you have some religious conviction that humans are special, that's fine, but it makes it easier to discuss if you make that clear from the outset.

I've enjoyed reading your posts in this thread and elsewhere. Some of what you say here reminds me of the following recent speech by W.L. Craig I saw, which might be relevant to the thread:

It looks like someone acting in such a way as to bring the object of that desire about. If someone acts in such a way as to eat cake, we can can presume they desire to eat cake, if someone books a holiday in the Algarve, we can presume they desire a holiday in the Algarve. We might need to do some work to get at what the underlying desires might be, but that's not scientifically unusual. Evolutionary biologists make completely unremarkable educated guesses as to what a particular limb or organ is 'for' in evolutionary terms. It's really no big deal to do the same with apparent desires. — Pseudonym

Right, but the desire for a holiday in Algrave is not innate. It is exactly something that would only be known through cultural mediation and a linguistically-wired brain. The preference for a holiday, let alone a "holiday at Algrave" is not something that just wells inside of us like some primal desire.

You realise this is self-immunising don't you? If you can't tell whether someone is having a pre-linguistic thought, then how do you know they're not? — Pseudonym

I've had vague longings perhaps, maybe over hunger, maybe other vague urges, but nothing as complex as "wanting such and such specific thing" has welled up inside me without some linguistic label attached to it. "I have a desire to sit on the couch and eat potato chips" for example, is not something waiting inside me that just comes out de novo. I needed a) language b) a culture with couches, potato chips c) a preference for such things. Now, you can say, that there is a primal desire to have fatty foods. Fine, I'll accept that, but the higher level aspect of exactly what kind, in what place, is mediated through higher levels of cognitive processes- like language/conceptual integration, etc.

I've already given you the evidence (out of respect for your preferred tone I'm not going to tell you how many times). It is that every single other animal on earth has such a desire hard-wired. How much more evidence do you need than it being the case for literally every other example in existence?

If you have some religious conviction that humans are special, that's fine, but it makes it easier to discuss if you make that clear from the outset. — Pseudonym

This is a bit ridiculous to me. I can easily reverse this. Can animals paint the Sistine Chapel? So, does that mean that humans don't have this ability because they are the only animal to do this? So you seem to like studying evolution. I do as well. Have you ever heard of convergent evolution? Two types of similar evolutionary adaptations (wings on a bat, wings on a bird) that came about through completely different evolutionary trajectories. No doubt, our ancestors had a more or less, instinctual/innate instinct to raise young. It literally came from a hard-wired programming. However, somewhere along the way, procreation continued but through cultural means. Why? Because humans by-and-large survive through cultural learning. The concept of raising a child that is one's own progeny, looks like other animals having instinctual behaviors to take care of children, but it is learned from childhood onwards what this practice of raising a child is, how it is done, why it is important, etc.

You say teleology in science is a "compressed" explanation. Yet another one of your idiosyncratic terms that makes it difficult to communicate with you. Are you doing this on purpose? Anyway, technically all explanations are compressed as no explanation can account for everything, so it's only a matter of how compressed. — praxis

So do you or do you not understand what I mean by "compressed explanation?" If you do, then it's not so "idiosyncratic" after all, is it? ;)

What distinguishes a teleological explanation is that it explains phenomena by the purpose it serves rather than by assumed causes. — praxis

Yes, so that can't be a scientific explanation; a scientific explanation JUST IS an explanation in terms of causes, NOT purposes.

There are increasingly, as I said to Pseudonym, some philosophers who are prepared to re-think all this, precisely because teleological explanations seem so unavoidable in biology (in particular, but also with non-living systems, like the rock cycle and the water cycle). But the point is, so long as one is strictly following the materialist/mechanistic metaphysical point of view that distinguishes modern science from the older scientific understanding that was based on classical philosophy, there can be no real purpose.

Some of what you say here reminds me of the following recent speech by W.L. Craig I saw, which might be relevant to the thread — Thorongil

Thanks for the heads-up. Yeah, I used to be a strong Atheist in my youth, and I disliked all religions; but now at 58, I've become more of a Spencerian Agnostic, and I'm much more ... tolerant of religion :D

A small detail question first;

The preference for a holiday, let alone a "holiday at Algrave" is not something that just wells inside of us like some primal desire. — schopenhauer1

So how do birds migrate then, if nothing as complex as the desire to journey to a specific other place on the earth for a set period of time before journeying back again could never evolve without language?

Regarding your main argument.

So humans, like all other animals, at one time had a set of genes that coded for the innate desire to raise young, if we hadn't have had we would have become extinct. You're suggesting that at some point in our evolutionary history, we lost that set of genomes entirely but immediately (it must have been immediate otherwise we would have become extinct within one generation) it was replaced with a convergently evolved set of genomes coding for complex language functions which allowed us to develop cultural preferences for raising children, just in time to save the human race from extinction.

So a few questions arise.

1. What would have been the competitive advantage of the mutation that replaced our genetic sequences coding for an innate desire to raise young? Presumably, not having answered my religion question, you believe in evolution by natural selection. Whatever it was must have been an incredibly strong influence for the new mutation to have swept through the entire species, but I can't quite see how it would have given anyone a competitive edge over those naturally invested in raising young.

2. If there was a competitive advantage to not having a desire to raise children, how come it was immediately replaced with a cultural desire to have children, wouldn't those cultures have faded away almost immediately as a result of whatever competitive force was driving this massive shift in genetics?

3. When did this sea change in our genetic coding take place. It must have been after complex language and culture because it needed to be replaced immediately with the cultural urge to have children in order to avoid extinction, yet paleobiology has yet to turn up any significant change in the human genome since then. Is this something you predict we're gong to find out in the next few years of genetic research?

4. You mention convergent evolution, but this refers to the novel arrival of features via two evolutionary paths, what you're proposing here would not be an example of this. We've established that it is a biological necessity that humans had a genetically innate desire to raise young at some point in their evolutionary history. What you're proposing here would be the the novel emergence of a trait already present in the organism, but emerging as a result of a different force and then entirely supplanting the original gene(s). This is, to my knowledge, completely unprecedented. Are there other examples of this happening in the animal kingdom you're working from, or is this the first time this has happened in evolutionary history?