X-)

It appears to me that you are an honest correspondent; I appreciate that. You manage to hold your own without resorting to insults, veiled or otherwise. And I see growth in your thinking; or at the least, a willingness to let the conversation grow of its own accord rather than lead it down your own particular path.

Do you have a copy of "On Certainty"?

No, I don't. I don't own any of Wittgenstein's books. I made an attempt to understand Tractatus once but without much luck. I find Bertrand Russell to be more interesting.

No, I don't. — Magnus Anderson

You do now.

"P" is true IFF P. — Banno

So let's take a more useful example to flush out what you could possibly mean by epistemic justification.

"God created the earth and mankind, the Big Bang never happened" is true IFF God created the earth and mankind, the Big Bang never happened.

Fine. In the most question-begging way conceivable, we have set out a truth condition.

But now how would you go about cashing that proposition out? If you claim to be interested in epistemology, then start doing some.

We have two convinced schools of thought - the creationists and the cosmologists. How does "Paris is the capital of France" as your prototypical example of commonsensical truth apply in sorting out how doubt and belief ought now to proceed here.

If you were actually saying anything helpful in pushing that example, its usefulness will be made clear in your very next post.

But now how would you go about cashing that proposition out? — apokrisis

Notice that you are not asking if it is true, but if it should be believed - what justification it has.

That's the trouble with pragmatism. It does not address questions of truth. It pretends they are all questions of justification.

That's why you are not able to agree that it is true that Paris is the capital of France.

I'm off to a jam session.

Way fun! 8-)

That's the trouble with pragmatism. It does not address questions of truth. It pretends they are all questions of justification. — Banno

That's true.

But can you explain to me what the difference actually is as far as you are concerned.

Of course, pragmatism doesn't actually pretend its all just justified belief. Just like it doesn't deny the world exists in some fashion that is separate from our desires and conceptions. So it certainly addresses the question of truth head on and gives its pragmatic answer. But again, the stage is yours. Tell us what the critical difference is here, using the example supplied.

To remind, "God created the earth and mankind, the Big Bang never happened" is true IFF God created the earth and mankind, the Big Bang never happened.

So who speaks the truth here, and in what way is that so?

start a new thread. Let’s try to keep this one clean for Sam.

Grayling:
"My exegetical task is effected by suitably anatomising OC. The view I shall call OC1 and which constitutes a version of a foundationalist refutation of scepticism, and therefore a contribution to the theory of knowledge, has two components, the first of which is that scepticism is answered by appeal to the fact that beliefs inhere in a system, and the second of which is that this system of beliefs rests on foundations which give those beliefs their content. Here are some passages exemplifying the first component of OC1 (all emphases are Wittgenstein's):"

and OC 2 by Grayling:

"OC2 is relativism. Relativism is the view that truth and knowledge are not absolute or invariable, but dependent upon viewpoint, circumstances or historical conditions. What is true for me might not be true for you; what counts as knowledge from one viewpoint might not do so from another; what is true at one time is false at another. Paragraph 97 arguably shows that the relativism implicit in this aspect of OC is of a classic or standard type. Its presence in OC is entirely consistent with its presence elsewhere in the later writings: one remembers the lions and Chinese of PI. What was left open in those earlier relativistic remarks was the degree of strength of the relativism to which Wittgenstein was committed. OC2 constitutes a claim that the framework within which claims to knowledge and challenges of doubt equally make sense is such that its change can reverse what counted as either. That is classically strong relativism."

Continuing with Grayling:

"These considerations rule out relativism. They therefore rule out OC2. There is no other way of taking OC2 than as a seriously strong relativist argument ('the river-bed of thoughts may shift' ... 'a language-game changes with time'). In the ideal state of things, therefore, OC1's offer of a response to scepticism is elected to stand, and OC2 is ditched. But as the text of OC was left to us, Wittgenstein was developing arguments for both, so the next question is: is there any way they could be made to reconcile, further up the road where their parallels meet?"

"But if one does not supplement the response to scepticism (OC1) by some such strategy, the exercise in OC is at best partial, at worst self-defeating, with the self-defeat stemming from acceptance of OC2. As OC stands, it stands defeated in just this way, for it only deals with scepticism at the lower, less threatening level, and fails to recognise that scepticism in its strongest form is, precisely, relativism."

Grayling proposes a third option as a way out of the conundrum as he sees it.

"There are hints in OC of an alternative better way out: namely, some version of naturalism–in Hume's, not Quine's, sense; that is, as appealing to natural facts about our psychological make-up (not, as in Quine, as appealing to the deliverances of current theory in natural science: although the latter form of naturalism takes itself to absorb the former). See 287: 'The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well.' This hint is strengthened by 505: 'It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something' and the paradigmatically Humean 277: '"I can't help believing ...".' If one re-reads the practice-cum-form-of-life entries in the light of these–a twist of the kaleidoscope–a plausibly naturalistic thesis comes fully into view."

I agree with Graying that there are competing interpretations within OC, but Banno, my view of OC isn't strictly OC 1 or OC 2, it's a combination. There is a way of fitting Wittgenstein's views within a framework, but one has to be careful about theorizing about what Wittgenstein is saying, which is why I try to be careful about equating some of what I'm saying with Wittgenstein.

There are relativistic views in OC, and there is also a kind of foundationalism in OC, and this can be seen in the quotes in this article... http://www.acgrayling.com/wittgenstein-on-scepticism-and-certainty

For me to completely iron out some of my views would probably take a few hundred pages of writing, because most of my writing on OC has been strictly an exegesis. However, I've also gone beyond the exegesis into my own theory of knowledge. There is no doubt that some of what I've been putting forth in this thread does fit within OC 1 as explained by Grayling, and my views are closer to OC 1 than OC 2, but there are important elements in OC 2 that can be explained in terms of a foundational view. When I say foundational view, I'm talking about my foundational view, which has many elements of Wittgenstein, but with a twist on the prelinguistic.

If you answered things straightaway then life would be simpler.

but the ukulele calls. And it is much more enjoyable than your good self.

Yep. Whenever it comes down to it, you don't actually have an argument. It was simply a posture.

One of the things we need to keep in mind about Wittgenstein's later writings, is his lack of emphasis on sharp boundaries. He emphasizes the changing and fluctuating nature of language, within a kind of continuity, which is based on the logic or rules of language. Sometimes having sharp boundaries keeps us focused to intently on some things. It's like getting tunnel vision, we don't see the periphery which can make all the difference.

Some points against a strictly relativistic view of On Certainty. Much of this comes from the idea that the foundation, which everything is based on, is contingent, and if that is so, then reality could be different from what it is. Thus from this view it seems that the skeptic has an important point about what we claim to know.

The rebuttal to this is that although reality could be different from what it is, it still doesn't mean that anything can count as true. Moreover, within language-games there are still necessary and contingent truths. And our linguistic views arise within a culture of shared experiences and common knowledge, which are as sure as one can get. That said, there are relativistic aspects to all of this, but they fit within the scope of knowledge (some of this knowledge is relativistic), which has many uses across a wide platform of language-games, including the objective and subjective.

youve taken what should be a common curtesy towards Sam as the instigator of this thread and turned it into an excuse for your not starting a thread Of your own.

:-#

My apologies for entertaining Apo on you thread, Sam. I will get back to your well considered comments soon.

He wouldn't know he is only hallucinating? Then is he doubting or not? — Caldwell

If he's not knowing, then I think he's doubting. Agree?

Why must skepticism be refuted? If it is an essential aspect of epistemology then respect it as such. Trying to sweep it under the carpet, or treating it as if it were some irrational illness of humanity which must be eradicated, is not the answer.

youve taken what should be a common curtesy towards Sam as the instigator of this thread and turned it into an excuse for your not starting a thread Of your own. — Banno

Dry up Banno. I made posts that addressed his points about neural states and attempts to find a grounding in something inarguable because it is "natural". If we are now discussing red herrings like whether Paris is the capital of France, it is because of your efforts to deflect from the pragmatism towards which Wittgenstein was moving.

There is actually an amusing contrast here. Peirce started off as a quietist and then became keen on a metaphysical-strength epistemology. So how that pans out could be instructive for someone actually wanting a foundational story.

If you are not interested, fine. Butt out.

" it can be frustrating when people continually misunderstand what I'm writing. This happened a lot in my thread on Wittgenstein, so I'm use to it."
The irony of attempting to achieve agreement over the notion of language as being public or shared understanding, and continually finding that so-called public speech is understood slightly differently by each participant within a speech community. No amount of clarification of terms will overcome that fundamental untranslatability of language.

No amount of clarification of terms will overcome that fundamental untranslatability of language. — Joshs

But when you say something that actually reaches past a conventional or habitual level of understanding, isn't that the feature rather than the bug? Isn't that how philosophy or understanding generally manages to stay creatively open and progress?

So every sentence of any interest remains open to fresh interpretation - even to oneself. We can twist it and turn it in the light to see new possibilities of what might be meant. The meaning is not fixed but already open to another point of view.

This is one of the things that flips a theory of truth on its head. Language is not a system of frozen meanings, petrified semantic commitments. At the creatively open edge of reason, even the same sentence can be understood many slightly different ways by its own speaker. And that is a good thing. It is how language can both stretch itself elastically while also aiming at some tightest possible fit.

I see that as the dichotomistic tendency of Grayling's OC1 vs OC2 which Sam cites here. Plasticity vs stability. Novelty vs habit. A basic relational freedom combined with the possible discovery that there is some eventual metaphysical-strength limit.

All this talk about belief vs doubt. Sam was saying something that didn't make much sense to me about neural states. But the neurobiological story of the brain is how it is organised by the dichotomy of the habitual vs the novel.

If we want proof that knowledge is built on a "background" of unquestioning belief, then we can read that story into the way the brain is founded on the accumulation of useful and embodied habits. And then in complementary fashion, the brain is also designed to "doubt" - apply its attentional resources - whenever this general backdrop of belief fails to predict the world in suitable fashion.

So a naturalistic basis is right there to be seen. However its logic is dialectical. Which is where things start to go all uncomfortably Hegelian for some. :)

And then in complementary fashion, the brain is also designed to "doubt" - apply its attentional resources - whenever this general backdrop of belief fails to predict the world in suitable fashion. — apokrisis

Doubt is not only the result of failed prediction. Whenever something doesn't seem quite right, there is cause for doubt. So doubt precedes action in the attempt to avoid failure. It is more like an intuition, that I may be wrong, than a realization that I was wrong, after the fact.

Whenever something doesn't seem quite right, there is cause for doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

But how could you know something wasn't quite right unless you were making a prediction that it would be otherwise in some sense?

So yes, the prediction might not be a vivid and specific expectation - an attention driven prediction. But it could still be a prediction in the sense that you have some habitual expectation about things, and then that more general expectancy is the background against which surprises can pop out and catch your attention.

"P" is true IFF P. — Banno

Is this redundancy theory or correspondence theory? Ramsey or Tarski?

So do you mean that "P" and "'P' is true" mean the same thing, or do you mean that "P" is true if the state-of-affairs designated by the sentence "P" obtains?

But how could you know something wasn't quite right unless you were making a prediction that it would be otherwise in some sense? — apokrisis

Doubt is not knowing, so it's not a case of knowing that something isn't quite right, I'd say it's more like an intuition. Intuition is not a knowledge in the sense of JTB. I think that most participants in this thread completely misunderstand and misrepresent doubt, claiming that doubt, like certitude, must be justified. Intuition is not justifiable but it plays a role in epistemology.

Whether a doubt feels vaguely intuited or crisply expressed is a separate issue. And one that makes no essential difference except that a doubt has to be made concretely counterfactual to achieve the status of being part of a rational argument.

I'm going to contrast my reading of OC with other readings, so in that vain I'm going to start by discussing Dr. D. R. Prichard's reading of OC as presented in the IEP (which is peer reviewed). Many of my thoughts are similar to Dr. Prichard's, so I will start here.

As a side note, I did have a short email conversation with Dr. Prichard about something I wrote.

Quotes are taken from this link: http://www.iep.utm.edu/witt-epi/

"Wittgenstein’s reflections on the structure of reason have influenced a more recent “Wittgenstein-inspired” anti-skeptical position, namely Pritchard’s “hinge-commitment” strategy (2016b), for which “hinges” are not beliefs but rather arational, non-propositional commitments, not subject to epistemic evaluation."

Here I agree with Prichard's account of OC that hinges are "...arational, non-propositional commitments, not subject to epistemic evaluation." However, where we disagree is with the idea that hinges are not beliefs. My position is that they do reflect beliefs, but not stated beliefs, beliefs that are shown by our actions; and I point to Wittgenstein's statements in OC 284 and 285 as such examples.

"The question that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were the hinges on which those turn [….] that is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted [...] If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (OC 341–343).

"As per Pritchard, here Wittgenstein would claim that the same logic of our ways of inquiry presupposes that some propositions are excluded from doubt; and this is not irrational or based on a sort of blind faith but, rather, belongs to the way rational inquiries are put forward (see OC 342) . As a door needs hinges in order to turn, any rational evaluation would then require a prior commitment to an unquestionable proposition/set of “hinges” in order to be possible at all."

The idea that some propositions (non-propositions, non-propositional beliefs for me, non-propositional commitments for Prichard) rest on what is immune from doubt. These arational hinges, are the foundation for any commitment to epistemological constructs. They are also foundational to doubt itself, that is, we start with certain commitments or beliefs, and this allows us to construct an epistemological inquiry, or to raise doubts.

"A consequence of this thought (2016b, 3) is that any form of universal doubt such as the Cartesian skeptical one is constitutively impossible; there is simply no way to pursue an inquiry in which nothing is taken for granted. In other words, the same generality of the Cartesian skeptical challenge is then based on a misleading way of representing the essentially local nature of our enquiries."

"But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put (OC 343)."

"This maneuver helps Pritchard to overcome one of the main problems facing Williams’ “Wittgensteinian Contextualism.” Recall that, following Williams, the Cartesian skeptical challenge is both legitimate and unsolvable, even if only in the more demanding philosophical context. On the contrary, argues Pritchard, as per Wittgenstein, there is simply nothing like the kind of universal doubt employed by the Cartesian skeptic, both in the philosophical and in the, so to say, non-philosophical context of our everyday epistemic practices. A proponent of Cartesian skepticism looks for a universal, general evaluation of our beliefs; but crucially, there is no such thing as a general evaluation of our beliefs, whether positive (anti-skeptical) or negative (skeptical), for all rational evaluation can take place only in the context of “hinges” which are themselves immune to rational evaluation."

I wholly agree with Prichard here. For someone to properly understand this, it is crucial to understand the Wittgensteinian connection between knowledge and doubt, which Grayling also mentions.

An excellent post.

From your source:

Crucially, our basic certainties are not subject to rational evaluation; for instance, they cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence and thus they would be non-propositional in character (that is to say, they can be neither true nor false). Accordingly, they are not beliefs at all; rather, they are the expression of arational, non-propositional commitments.

So if you are to maintain that hinge propositions are beliefs, you must maintain that they are propositional.

That's close to my criticism; that pre-linguistic beliefs are statable, even if unstated.

Ya, Prichard thinks they're beliefs too, but again I disagree.

I disagree that these "non-propositional commitments" are necessarily certainties. It is just as likely that an individual is committed to an attitude of doubt, as to an attitude or certitude. And, since the attitude of doubt is what inclines us to demand justification, not the attitude of certitude, then knowledge as JTB must be based in a commitment to doubt.