It seems to me that one motive for their general temperament is the feeling of being a traveler in a foreign land, or worse, a prisoner in a foreign land depending on how it is determined. — Thorongil
even upon learning them, an element of mystery still remains and eludes us, gnaws at us. — Thorongil
In light of this ignorance, who could bring a child into it or more generally acquiesce to the direction of the crowd? They know scarcely any more than you do about why they're here. — Thorongil
Yet the pessimist will accept despair if they are still able to maintain what I shall call a praxis of humility. This involves never acting hubristically or in ignorance if one can help it, which is the only rational response to the situation of being alive. — Thorongil
This is a passion Thorongil. Just like the optimists, these pessimists are governed by their passions. They don't see the world as it really is, but through the prism of their own feelings. They see the world with tinted glasses, and then they rationalise this seeing saying that it is because they really are, (transcendentally or in spirit, or bla bla) from a different country that they feel this way, instead of realising that they think as they do because they feel as they do. Another instance where feeling determines thought, instead of the other way around. Isn't it a pity that you diagnose the optimists so well for seeing the world through tinted glasses, and yet fail to see that the pessimists also see the world through the prism of their own feelings? The only thing which is different between the two is the tint of the glasses...Let me first note that I include anti-natalists and ascetics when I speak of pessimists. It seems to me that one motive for their general temperament is the feeling of being a traveler in a foreign land, or worse, a prisoner in a foreign land depending on how it is determined. — Thorongil
They only talk of a "fate after death" because they have rationalised their feeling of not belonging to mean something which it doesn't. There's no reason to rationalise that feeling. You feel that way, but why must the fact you feel that way really mean something about the world, and not about you?To them, the very inconceivableness of their existence, not to mention its origin and fate after death, is reason enough to refrain from leaving any deep footprints. — Thorongil
The question is non-sensical once you realise that your "self", sub specie durationis, is a combinatorial product, and just like other such products, it comes into existence fortuitously, and goes out of existence just as fortuitously. So if you accept that, then why ask the question?Who honestly knows the full repercussions of our actions during our brief stay in this strange and often inhospitable world? In light of this ignorance, who could bring a child into it or more generally acquiesce to the direction of the crowd? They know scarcely any more than you do about why they're here. — Thorongil
once you realise that your "self", sub specie durationis, is a combinatorial product, and just like other such products, it comes into existence fortuitously, and goes out of existence just as fortuitously.
A free man is neither pessimist nor optimist. He sees the world as it is. He is a seer; doesn't stamp himself all over the world.
If the self is a combinatorial product of 'chance' then how can this fragmented, random 'self' make sense of/pinpoint or 'see' that which you dub 'reality' (I assume you are a determinist and/or physicalist since you claim reality is an objective, stable entity which can be known)? — Sentient
A free man is neither pessimist nor optimist. He sees the world as it is. He is a seer; doesn't stamp himself all over the world. — Agustino
Schopenhauer's vision is closer to the reality of the human condition which takes into account the restless nature of the human psyche, the deprivation of contentment that motivates us all, and the contingent nature of existence impinging upon us. The contingent nature of reality along with our own inner restless nature is closer to what is going on. — schopenhauer1
And that's what Schopenhauer gets so wrong. Such a condition only applies to those with a restless nature, to those who fear "becoming," who get riddled with anxiety about what is to come, who try to hold the future before its in reach. He is offering justifications, apologetics, for why every life must necessarily be restless, rather than seeing each individual for what they are. The contingent nature of life, the passing and emergence of restlessness and dissatisfaction, at different times, in different people, is what exactly he cannot abide, for it would ruin his explanation of life as necessary suffering. Schopenhauer, in the end, denies nature, life as it exists, because he is more interested in suffering being logically necessitated than he is in describing living people (even considering the fact they will, invariably, encounter some instance of suffering in their life).
For Schopenhauer, the suffering of life is not enough. He wants suffering to be infinite, as a demonstration of how life consuming it ought to be. — TheWillowOfDarkness
I fail to follow what the self being created, fragmented, and random has to do with perception or understanding - the "self" is a construct, which means that it exists "in the past" as it were, while perception and understanding exist in the present.
The "self" is the bundle of desires/beliefs, etc that one identifies with. To see "reality" means to attend to perception directly, without overlaying your "self" (ie. desires, beliefs, etc.) over it.
No matter how much suffering the world is (and there is inevitably a ton), the contingent nature of the world, of our lives, means we still experience things like joy, happiness and contentment. We are not always lacking something. Sometimes we are content with the present. Even in instances where there is something we want, we are sometimes content: happy exist waiting for it, until its time comes. We do not necessarily suffer. Nor do particular states of the world always impinge upon the individual. I'm happy to wait till my birthday to get my birthday present. I'm not restless with thoughts I must have it now, even if it is something I want. — TheWillowOfDarkness
I do not think Schopenhauer meant by restless that we are anxious for a future event, but that each moment in time we are never fully satisfied or satisfied for long. He did recognize brief moments of satisfaction (happiness/contentment) from achieving a goal, but then the lacking feeling continues. — Schopenhauer
The problem with Schopenhauer's argument is the restless doesn't continue. New states of restlessness emerge. Each of restlessness is a new state of existence rather than a continuation of some infinite necessary foundation of life. The lacking feeling does not continue. It merely, sometimes. even frequently, exists. And then it, frequently, passes out of existence, to be replaced by a state absent restlessness (and not just in response to achieving goals. Sometimes people are just found without restless at a particular time). Then that will pass, maybe bring a new state of restlessness. And so and so. What Schopenhauer fails to recognise is that states of restlessness are also brief moments, fleeting and contingent states of existence, which pass not only in death but also in life. — TheWillowOfDarkness
I imagine here, he would think that contemplating geometric proofs, hypothetical chess games, and working on a new proof for advanced mathematical branches are our salvation and way into realizing "blessedness". — schopenhauer1
Whence it is clearly to be seen, that measure, time, and number, are merely modes of thinking, or, rather, of imagining . It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that all, who have endeavoured to understand the course of nature by means of such notions, and without fully understanding even them, have entangled themselves so wondrously, that they have at last only been able to extricate themselves by breaking through every rule and admitting absurdities even of the grossest kind — Spinoza
I see Spinoza accounting for suffering just as well - humans, as finite modes of nature, are bound to be destroyed in the end and replaced. But their death is the source of the birth of new modes - it is new life. In Spinoza, the suffering of the individual is necessary for the good of the whole. Once it is realised that it is the "eternal decree of God", one can becomes detached from one's selfish ego-centrism, and one realises that, sub specie aeternitatis, one is eternal - the present carries within it all the past and all the future.However, a main difference I see is Schopenhauer's ability to take into account the intractable nature of suffering- that as long as we are alive, there is very little we can do to get around it. Life's eventual realities will confront us. We must seek goals while alive, this will lead to suffering in terms of the journey to obtain the goals, as well as the fact that we are "lacking" in the first place. When we get our goals, we quickly succumb to a sort of existential angst that reflects the instrumentality of existence in terms of the constant need to keep ourselves alive, comfortable, and entertained. Time presses on us and we feel its affects in our need for need and our existential angst when reflected on life itself without anything in particular to strive for. Schopenhauer's understanding is closer to home, it is the life we actually live, not a philosopher's dream of pure intellectual devotion. Schopenhauer's vision is closer to the reality of the human condition which takes into account the restless nature of the human psyche, the deprivation of contentment that motivates us all, and the contingent nature of existence impinging upon us. The contingent nature of reality along with our own inner restless nature is closer to what is going on. — schopenhauer1
I think you should read Spinoza's letter 12 (http://www.sacred-texts.com/phi/spinoza/corr/corr27.htm) :p Spinoza does not have a very good view of pure mathematics: — Agustino
Schopenhauer's vision of reality doesn't take into account the whole, except from an anthropocentric point of view -> the Will must be denied by the individual because it brings suffering to him. But why should the whole care about the suffering of the individual in the first place? — Agustino
I will take this into account, thanks. Even if it is not math per se, his use of geometric proof and wanting to have an intellectual love of god indicates a preference for logic-related ways of internalizing nature (and thus being "blessed"). — schopenhauer1
I'm not sure I quite get this the way you phrased it. The Will does not care for the individual, and I think that is Schopenhauer's point. Since it care not one bit for individual suffering, one must try to deny it, as that is the root of the suffering in his model. — schopenhauer1
It's not that which saves - but rather Spinoza's therapy of the emotions which diminishes ego-centrism and develops a love for the world which makes the self see itself as the production of Nature - Nature is more "the self" than the self itself is. Thus, when Nature chooses to destroy the self - the self loves this, for through its death, the triumph of Nature shows itself.I don't see how understanding that we are one part of a bigger whole solves much of the suffering more than reading a good book about science satisfies us that we learned something new. — schopenhauer1
Thus, when Nature chooses to destroy the self - the self loves this, for through its death, the triumph of Nature shows itself. — Agustino
Nature doesn't care about its greatness. We do, because we love God. Remember God cannot love us back. — Agustino
Amor Dei Intellectualis is one way - our love for God, without the expectation of any love back, simply because God cannot love us back. — Agustino
What gives this particular idea (whatever that is really) anything more that solves the problem of suffering or is of extreme ethical import? — schopenhauer1
Nothing. The point is not that it can solved. Rather the point is: the expectation it will be solved is nonsensical and only makes us needlessly anxious. It is to desire a fantasy world which will never be. Better to direct our attention towards mitigating suffering and enjoying the moments we are given respite from it. Pining for a suffering-less world which we will never (worse, a world we know we will never have; to expect a world without suffering is our own wilful ignorance about life) have only results in more suffering than there need be. — TheWillowOfDarkness
I don't follow. It clearly doesn't for many people. Unless you can prove that this necessarily follows, then you are engaging in a hasty generalisation. Pessimism is an attitude, and as an attitude, it emerges from how one feels regarding life. But one doesn't necessarily have to feel repulsion when put face to face with life's inevitable difficulties. It may be a struggle to run, but that doesn't mean that one necessarily doesn't enjoy running, or doesn't look forward to it.The fact that we have to deal with life in the first place leads to philosophical pessimism. — schopenhauer1
There are logical problems with this. It presupposes that new individuals could possibly not deal with life. It is impossible, it's not in the set of possible propositions. As such, it's opposite, is a tautology, and thus has no explanatory value compared to a mere restatement of a personal dislike towards bringing other beings into existence. Perhaps a projection of one's insecurities as a parent onto the world.The idea that we don't want to make new individuals have to deal with life leads to antinatalist stances — schopenhauer1
There is nothing wrong with taking account of the situation and explicating about it. If you don't want to see it, then don't engage with it. However, saying "stop writing about it and deal with it" doesn't make the statements any less true. Trying to ignore it won't make it go away — schopenhauer1
By definition, whether one acknowledges it in some cohesive theory or not, people must deal with life- its responsibilities, burdens, and suffering. — schopenhauer1
I don't follow. It clearly doesn't for many people. Unless you can prove that this necessarily follows, then you are engaging in a hasty generalisation. Pessimism is an attitude, and as an attitude, it emerges from how one feels regarding life. But one doesn't necessarily have to feel repulsion when put face to face with life's inevitable difficulties. It may be a struggle to run, but that doesn't mean that one necessarily doesn't enjoy running, or doesn't look forward to it.
Notice that pessimism does play a psychologically defensive role, just like optimism - in order not to be disappointed, one must avoid the world, through a variety of mechanisms: not engaging in so and so actions because they can lead to sorrow; not believing so and so, because one may be disappointed; not forming relationships because it creates vulnerabilities, etc. — Agustino
There are logical problems with this. It presupposes that new individuals could possibly not deal with life. It is impossible, it's not in the set of possible propositions. As such, it's opposite, is a tautology, and thus has no explanatory value compared to a mere restatement of a personal dislike towards bringing other beings into existence. Perhaps a projection of one's insecurities as a parent onto the world. — Agustino
Well some of us don't have to ignore it, simply because we don't feel this way about the world. Just because you feel so about the world, doesn't mean everyone ought to feel so. I understand that there is a large temptation for those who hold minority positions to attempt to enforce them as necessary on others, in an effort to convert others to their own faith, and thus have more people whom they can relate with, and whom they can feel good around. It happens to me too. I much rather prefer traditional societies to today's overly liberal societies - what that means is that I would like to live in a community of people following these values - but that is not to say that I ought to convince everyone else to follow me. In fact, even if I tried, I would never succeed. Arguments do not convince people. I'm much better off looking for those few people who are already convinced, and learning to live without them until I find them. This is integrity, and courage. — Agustino
The fact that we have to deal with life in the first place leads to philosophical pessimism. The fact that we are dealing with it, is just a given if we are alive and awake. The idea that we don't want to make new individuals have to deal with life leads to antinatalist stances. There is nothing wrong with taking account of the situation and explicating about it. If you don't want to see it, then don't engage with it. However, saying "stop writing about it and deal with it" doesn't make the statements any less true. Trying to ignore it won't make it go away. By definition, whether one acknowledges it in some cohesive theory or not, people must deal with life- its responsibilities, burdens, and suffering. People will also, whether they acknowledge it, seek positive experiences, pleasure, happiness, contentedness or what have you thus I am acknowledging people make do with what they are given. — schopenhauer1
That being said, Spinoza's solution is also a non-starter. I don't see how understanding that we are one part of a bigger whole solves much of the suffering more than reading a good book about science satisfies us that we learned something new. We walk away from the interesting book with a bit of a buzz from the interesting insights we have learned, but then we are met with the problems of life. Nothing metaphysically changes. — schopenhauer1
Philosophical pessimism is a certain state in addition to all other states (including suffering) of their life. — TheWillowOfDarkness
I'm not arguing anyone should needs to stop writing about the inevitable suffering of life and "just deal with it." My point is that Schopenhauer's philosophy turns philosophical pessimism into a state of anxiety. Rather than accept that suffering is an inevitable part of life, he ties himself up in knots over our inability to avoid it. To Schopenhauer we are failures because we cannot compete the task of eliminating suffering.
I am specifically arguing Schopenhauer's philosophical pessimism is a state of needless suffering. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Why chastise ourselves for being incapable of a life without suffering? Do we not already suffer enough, without adding restlessness and anxiety over our inability to avoid suffering? Why not a form of philosophical pessimism which recognises we cannot escape suffering, but avoids the practice of beating ourselves up for that inability? — TheWillowOfDarkness
Schopenhauer's philosophical pessimism is a manifestation of pining for this impossible world. It is not a description of how life is suffering. It is a demand for extra suffering; that we ought to be restless and anxious, on-top of any (other) states of suffering we might encounter, because there is suffering we can't avoid. — TheWillowOfDarkness
It doesn't solve much suffering at all. Maybe it might change someone understanding of the world such they experience a little bit less suffering, such as replacing anxiety over not belonging to the finite, but it is a description of ourselves and the world, rather than a means which will necessarily resolve suffering in the world. With respect to preventing most suffering, it has no role. Spinoza isn't even a "non-starter" with regards to solving the inevitable suffering of life. Such a goal was never the point and isn't attempted by the argument.
And of course nothing "metaphysical"changes. "Metaphysics (i.e. logic)" never changes. The metaphysical is the infinite, unlike any state of suffering, which is of the world, which is finite. — TheWillowOfDarkness
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