It's just as invalid as your argument, with the benefit of being briefer. :P — Banno
That's exactly the point I'm making. I'm not saying that our beliefs can either be justified or not (that's an entire epistemological position) I'm disputing that there is any good grounds for specify that science cannot justify the passions, as if there were some other group of things that it could justify. If there's nothing that science can justify (in that way) then the comment is entirely specious, claiming to provide some in formation about 'the passions', when in fact it is merely reporting the limits of science in general. — Pseudonym
This rather presumes a position on conciousness which is far from agreed upon. — Pseudonym
'Hungry' would be typically held as being that disposition which (in the absence of competing forces) would cause a person to eat. It is perfectly possible that your brain could be in that state, but the part of your brain responsible for generating the epiphenomenon of concious awareness erroneously reports that you are not. In that sense you would be incorrect about your assertion 'I'm hungry'. — Pseudonym
Are you then a dualist in asserting that the mind is something distinct from the brain? — Perplexed
The problem still remains that if the activity of the mind is the source of the creative process we need some way of distinguishing between truths inherent in the world and patterns created by the mind. — Perplexed
This still does not sound like enough to qualify as being "objectively invariant" — Perplexed
I had a quick look and Peirce hardly gets a mention in Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery. Pragmatism is only mentioned in passing. — Banno
As to Peirce's influence on Popper; I seem to remember reading about it in Unended Quest, but its a helluva long time since I read it and I could be mistaken. — Janus
I suppose 18th century science could be said to "assert determinism". The question is, does our modern science allow for non-deterministic events to take place? — Perplexed
This still does not sound like enough to qualify as being "objectively invariant". — Perplexed
One could imagine many things that are reliably observed and intersubectively corroborated that are not objectively true. — Perplexed
The thing is, if we concede that knowledge is only practically rational does this not mean that there is truth only with regards to certain ends? — Perplexed
The basis is not purely rational (unless you follow Kant's solution) but practically rational. What more do you want? — Janus
The glass that pragmatism knows to be 99.99 percent full is always going to be frustratingly empty for those who still ache for Platonic certainty. — apokrisis
The thing is, if we concede that knowledge is only practically rational does this not mean that there is truth only with regards to certain ends? — Perplexed
...the fact that he may not have had much (acknowledged) influence on the mainstream thus far says more about the mainstream than it does about Peirce. — Janus
And finish with a question: if there is a legitimate inductive logic, someone ought be able to set it out. What we have seen is some handwaving towards statistical analysis, but of course that is not induction. It has a base firmly in deductive mathematical logic. — Banno
What other possible criteria for judgements of objectivity could we employ, other than intersubjective criteria? — Janus
How would you know they are not "objectively true" though, other than by reliable observation and intersubjective corroboration? — Janus
I don't understand this question. Humans desire knowledge in order to accomplish practical ends, and they also desire knowledge just for its own sake. — Janus
I was not suggesting to look outside of intersubjective criteria, but rather that we may need a better method of assessing those criteria. Otherwise we could be in a position where I can objectify as true anything with which I can obtain consensus. — Perplexed
My point was that those two things alone are not enough to confirm or deny objectivity. — Perplexed
In which case is the truth not an arbitrary product of the particular ends which we select? — Perplexed
So yes, this is not the good old fashioned truth of the transcendental kind - that which is true even despite there being no one around doing the knowing. — apokrisis
It is truth defined in terms of the concerns of a knower. It is a search for justified answers to the point of exhaustion - which itself is in turn a search to the point that further details cease to matter. — apokrisis
Was Kant's transcendentalism not rationally derived from the foundation of all possible forms of intuition? "Empirically real but transcendentally ideal" — Perplexed
Do we have to assume here that the concerns of the knower are paramount? How can we be justified in stating that further details cease to matter? — Perplexed
Of course one could just get on with the business of science without any need for contemplating its foundations and why it works but this always strikes me as avoiding the most interesting questions. — Perplexed
It seems you are conflating truth with knowledge. The knowledge we have of how to do things is not "arbitrary"; it is based on workability. The knowledge-for-its-own-sake we have of how the world is is not arbitrary either: it is based on observation, conjecture, experiment and intersubjective corroboration. — Janus
We know that further details cease to matter because they cease to make a difference. How we understand things to be has become sufficiently invariant. — apokrisis
Well, the very fact that science gets along quite well with little or no metaphysics - and in particular, without ever needing to resolve the question of metaphysical determinism - is suggestive. Are such questions really meaningful, or are they spurious pseudo-questions that a conceptual analysis can dissolve? — SophistiCat
But how can tell you're not just seeking whatever path happens to be favourable to you. i.e.. because it confirms your biases rather than has genuine merit. — Perplexed
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.