Cuthbert and Banno point to something important. I've hinted at it.

Jack cannot speak. He cannot tell us what he believes. We infer that he does. What can be reasonably inferred about Jack's belief and more importantly, upon what ground? What is the criterion for belief such that when it is met we have a case of belief?

I definitely can't say that I haven't been guilty of similar responses.

Soon the rest of you will get to the point of recognizing that no belief, no matter how convicted one is of it, nor the description of one's belief, is beyond doubt. Then you'll have to revisit hinge-propositions and certainty all over again.

Are you certain of that?

Sound familiar? It's the same issue as the certainty of hinge propositions. Knowing how presupposes the stuff of our everyday world. Knowing how to use language is no different.

Now you seem to think there is a problem here for JTB. Please understand that from my reading, OC shows that it is illegitimate to say that we know hinge propositions. That's because they do not admit to justification, and hence are not subject to the JTB definition, and hence not examples of knowledge. No potential to be wrong, no knowledge.

So not only is certainty central to knowing how, it is central to knowing that. — Banno

I wouldn't put it like that; it will only lead to confusion. "Hinge propositions" are like riding a bike; they constitute know-how, so it is not illegitimate to say that we know hinge propositions. Of course knowing how does not require justification, and if knowing that is reducible to knowing how then neither does knowing that require justification. It is beliefs, which come into play in the absence of knowledge, that require justification or at least explanation in terms of what causes them. And any such explanation, being hypothetical (that is being belief, not knowledge) will itself require justification.

The mistake you are making consists in thinking that hinge propositions are beliefs. As I explain above they are not; they are know-how. "Proposition" is a bad choice of term here.

Are you certain of that? — Banno

Definitely not. I've seen you guys go around in circles for weeks before, but I'm thinking maybe this time there will be a break through.

The mistake you are making consists in thinking that hinge propositions are beliefs. As I explain above they are not; they are know-how. "Proposition" is a bad choice of term here. — Janus

Same thing. Haven't you been reading the discussion? Beliefs are know-how.

Same thing. Haven't you been reading the discussion? Beliefs are know-how. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you are collapsing the distinction between beliefs and knowledge. Knowing that is reducible to knowing how, but believing is not. Believing that, with sufficient practice, you will be able to acquire the know-how necessary to ride a bike, or speak a language, is not itself know-how; although of course it presupposes other kinds of know-how that are necessary in order to be able to frame the belief. That is why everything cannot be doubted; because to doubt anything requires know-how which itself is not subject to doubt.

Knowing that is reducible to knowing how, but believing is not. — Janus

Tell that to Banno. who says that belief is demonstrated by actions.

Believing that, with sufficient practice, you will be able to acquire the know-how necessary to ride a bike, or speak a language, is not itself know-how; although of course it presupposes other kinds of know-how that are necessary in order to be able to frame the belief. — Janus

The belief you describe here, is itself a know-how, it is just not a knowing how to ride a bike, as you admit when you say "other kinds of know-how that are necessary in order to frame the belief". How could the belief be anything other than these different kinds of know-how?

I don't get your argument, it seems senseless. You claim that all cases of knowing-that are reducible to knowing-how, but belief is not. So do you think that a person can believe without knowing how to believe?

So do you think that a person can believe without knowing how to believe? — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn't follow from the fact that know-how is required to frame beliefs that particular beliefs are reducible to know-how. If you think it does then produce an argument.

I can say that knowing that, for example knowing that Paris is the capital of France, is reducible to knowing how to speak English, and knowing how to interpret maps, or travel to France or to do whatever I did to acquire the knowledge and represent it to myself. Believing has an extra element, which is the uncertainty inherent in the fallibility of a belief. How can you reduce that uncertainty to know-how when it is on the contrary a not-knowing-how to achieve the certainty of knowledge?

It doesn't follow from the fact that know-how is required to frame beliefs that particular beliefs are reducible to know-how. If you think it does then produce an argument. — Janus

You'll need to clarify what you mean by "frame beliefs". I don't apprehend a difference between a belief and the frame of a belief. What could frame a belief, but another belief. And if this is the case, the framed belief, being supported by the frame, is just as fallible as the frame.

I can say that knowing that, for example knowing that Paris is the capital of France, is reducible to knowing how to speak English, and knowing how to interpret maps, or travel to France or to do whatever I did to acquire the knowledge and represent it to myself. Believing has an extra element, which is the uncertainty inherent in the fallibility of a belief. — Janus

The uncertainty, which you say is an extra element of belief, not found in knowing-how, is actually very evident in knowing-how as well. No matter how many times we've done the same thing over and over again, there is still the possibility we might fail in the next time. That is why those of us who work with machinery must be very careful every day, and never let down our guard, no matter how well we know how to do what we do, lest we be injured.

How can you reduce that uncertainty to know-how when it is on the contrary a not-knowing-how to achieve the certainty of knowledge? — Janus

As I argued earlier, the certainty of knowledge is only produced by separating knowing-that from knowing-how, and allowing that knowing-that obtains levels of certainty not obtained by knowing-how. If you reduce all knowledge to knowing-how, then all knowledge suffers from the fallibility of knowing-how.

Soon the rest of you will get to the point of recognizing that no belief, no matter how convicted one is of it, nor the description of one's belief, is beyond doubt. Then you'll have to revisit hinge-propositions and certainty all over again. — Metaphysician Undercover

And yet ALL doubt is belief based. Therefore, until one holds some belief doubting is itself humanly impossible. Until one has a baseline of belief upon which to ground doubt, doubting cannot happen. Reasonable doubt requires justification. The aforementioned baseline is comprised of belief that hasn't been doubted for it cannot be... yet.

I think that that baseline was Witt's aim with hinge propositions...

One can know how to say that without knowing that. Let that be a statement. It only follows that knowing that is not always reducible to knowing how to say that...

Jeez.

What is the criterion for belief such that when it is met we have a case of belief? — creativesoul

A subject and a statement do not suffice, as I've already argued for without subsequent refutation. Not all behaviour shows the belief of the agent behaving, as I've already argued for without subsequent refutation.

Is there a single case of drawing a correlation between things that doesn't count as thought and/or belief?

I think not.

Is there a single case of imagining, thinking, thought, and/or belief that doesn't consist entirely of drawing correlations between things?

I think not.

What stronger ground is there for holding that the content of all thought and belief is correlation?

And yet ALL doubt is belief based. Therefore, until one holds some belief doubting is itself humanly impossible. Until one has a baseline of belief to doubt, doubting cannot happen. The baseline is comprised of belief that hasn't been doubted for it cannot be... yet. — creativesoul

I don't agree, but this is only because you and I wouldn't agree on what describes "belief". I think that a living being can think without holding belief. And I think that if we allow a distinction between memory and belief, then a lot of what you describe as belief is actually thinking without belief. I also think that doubting is more closely related to thinking than to believing so that one could be thinking and doubting without believing.

One cannot be thinking without drawing correlations... nor believing... nor doubting... nor imagining...

One can be considering while suspending one's judgment. In this case, it is described as thinking. I've no issue with that kind of talk. There is no thought without belief.

All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content, no matter how it is later qualified(imaginary, real, or otherwise)...

I'm not interested in quibbling over the differences between uses of "thought" and "belief". There are often times that those words mean different things. There are no cases of either that do not consist entirely of correlations. Ultimately, I draw and maintain a distinction between thinking(as just considering) and believing(as already considered and decided).

Memory is re-drawing and/or revisiting past correlations... and is notably error prone.

However, learning the names of things requires believing that something is there... One cannot doubt that that is(called) "a tree", while learning how to use the words... There is no just considering whether or not that is a tree during language acquisition. Rather, one first draws a correlation between the tree and the vocalization(the word)... and it's meaningful as a result.

Witty used "slab"... or at least that's the translation. Banno uses "a bishop moves diagonally". These are all examples of a baseline upon which one can doubt something that is said after the baseline is in place. If you doubt that that is a tree, then you simply do not know how to use the words... Same with how a bishop moves, and knowing how to play the game... Same with "slab" and knowing what the mason is asking you for...

"No! Not that... THIS. This is a slab."

Or five red apples...

Call it what you like. Let me know when you find something to call it that does not consist entirely of correlations...

So, the child has lost it's toy. S/he looks here and there. S/he obviously looks where s/he believes it will be found and no place where s/he does not believe it will be.

We can say the same for a cat and it's 'toy' mouse or rat or lizard or moth or....

Does the cat believe that "the toy is under the rug"?

Seems like a fine thing to say, but is it? The cat need not know the name "rug" or "toy" to know that a toy can be under the rug. In this case, it seems Banno's explanation fits. I mean, I think that saying the cat believes the toy is under the rug, in a situation where the cat is looking for the mouse that just ran under the rug seems perfectly acceptable.

The challenge then, for me at least, is to put this in terms of correlation...

Janus also mentioned earlier about the beliefs that are formed and 'held' during the timeframe between having no language and the ability to talk about one's own thought and belief...

The baseline...

One cannot be thinking without drawing correlations... nor believing... nor doubting... nor imagining...

One can be considering while suspending one's judgment. In this case, it is described as thinking. I've no issue with that kind of talk. There is no thought without belief.

All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content, no matter how it is later qualified(imaginary, real, or otherwise)... — creativesoul

Let's say that thinking is drawing correlations. One can do this without believing. The content is memories. Belief is a certain type of judgement, such that not every judgement is a belief. The judgement which results in an action doesn't necessarily require belief. Knowing-how doesn't necessarily imply belief.

I'm not interested in quibbling over the differences between uses of "thought" and "belief". There are often times that those words mean different things. There are no cases of either that do not consist entirely of correlations. Ultimately, I draw and maintain a distinction between thinking(as just considering) and believing(as already considered and decided).

Memory is re-drawing and/or revisiting past correlations... and is notably error prone. — creativesoul

The issue is to establish some criteria to determine what qualifies as "belief". There is much mental activity, and we need to make some distinctions, to proceed in an analysis or else we just assume that all mental activity requires belief. If we don't want to assume all mental activity involves belief, then we need to make some distinctions.

Memory is a good place to start. I think you would agree that not all memories qualify as beliefs. But if we revisit our memories, dwell on them, correlate them to other memories, and pass a type of judgement, then maybe we have formed a belief.

However, learning the names of things requires believing that something is there... One cannot doubt that that is(called) "a tree", while learning how to use the words... There is no just considering whether or not that is a tree during language acquisition. Rather, one first draws a correlation between the tree and the vocalization(the word)... and it's meaningful as a result. — creativesoul

I don't agree with this use of "believing that something is there". If "believing" in this sense constitutes "belief", then I think all mental activity would require belief. That is because there could be no content without believing that something is there. Consider dreaming for example, there is a form of certitude, of "believing that something is there", which is proper to dreaming. The dreamer is convinced, within the dream, that all these things are really happening. But this type of certitude, whatever it is, is extremely fallible, so I wouldn't class it as "belief".

So I do not believe that learning the names of things requires "believing that something is there". All it requires is the experience, the same type of experience as dreaming, and the same type of certitude, that I am experiencing something, which we have in dreaming. I would not call this belief, it is just a basic aspect of mental activity. The difference though, is that in learning words, we have people demonstrating the use of words. And contrary to your claim, we can and do doubt that that is called a "tree" when learning a language, because we are exposed to many different people using the language in many different ways. So if one person calls it a tree, and another a shrub, there is doubt.

If you doubt that that is a tree, then you simply do not know how to use the words... — creativesoul

Right, there is doubt which precedes the use of words. And the use of words is filled with doubt. Anytime you have to think about what to say, prior to saying it, this is doubt. So the idea that we cannot doubt the "baseline" is just nonsense. There really is no such baseline, or hinge propositions, there is just the shifting sands of language use. It's all shifting because of doubt.

So, the child has lost it's toy. S/he looks here and there. S/he obviously looks where s/he believes it will be found and no place where s/he does not believe it will be. — creativesoul

Again, I do not think that this is a proper use of "believe". The child has memories. The child thinks about where the toy might be, and looks there, behaving according to memories. But the toy is lost to the child. The child has no belief about where the toy is. This is the same thing as your examples of Jack the cat. Jack has memories concerning the food dish, and acts accordingly, but Jack has no belief about this. If we use "belief" in this way, we'll only find that all mental activity requires belief, because all mental activity requires content, and you just refer to all content as belief.

I think that belief requires a high level of stability in the mental content to produce the conviction required for what we call "belief". This stability is only provided for by the use of words, as things which maintain the same appearance time and time again. Prior to the use of words, memory could only consist of mental images, which would be very hard to maintain because of the detail, and differences, therefore very fallible as you say. So I think that "belief" in the proper sense of the word, referring to conviction and certitude with significant temporal extension, can only be understood as a result of the use of words.

As I finish writing this, I now see that the key here is the temporal extension. There is a certitude which accompanies the immediate experience of "now", and this is the certitude found in the dream, the certitude of "believing that something is there". But I think that this is not "belief". Then there is the certitude of a very recent memory, what just happened. And neither is this "belief". "Belief" refers to a certitude or conviction which maintains stability over time. If we dismiss this requirement, of temporal extension, then all the certitude, beginning with the certitude that I am experiencing something right now, is belief, and all mental activity is composed of belief.

Putting correlations on display... and not believing them. It's an odd thing.

Step 1. Grant the terms...

Sam, if you remember pages ago, I warned of the above when it comes to Meta... S/he has shown a historical propensity for arguing against someone by virtue of using a different linguistic framework. Semantic twaddle.

Excuse me while I go look into my next door neighbors' top dresser drawers... I've lost my car keys. Or no... maybe they're in the dish of brussels' sprouts in the fridge. I've no idea where they are. I do not believe that they are anywhere... I'll go look in Brussels... or Afghanistan... They'll certainly be found there... I've lost them... I do not believe that they are anywhere...

Fucking idiots...

So the idea that we cannot doubt the "baseline" is just nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nonsense that is borne out each and every day - all day long - across the globe...

There are no rules for chess. There are no laws of thought. There are no rules for grammar. There is no baseline(initial worldview) upon which one makes sense of his/her experience by virtue of situating themselves in the world...

:-}

There are children all over the world who are currently doubting that that is called an imbecile... while first learning what counts as an imbecile...

Prima facie evidence that knowing how to say that isn't equivalent to knowing that...

We clearly haven't determined what counts as a belief. So what makes you think that anyone has determined what counts as an imbecile?

What is really the case is that we assume that there is such a thing as an "imbecile", that there is such a thing as a "belief", that there is such a thing as a "world view", that there is such a thing as a "baseline", because people use these words. But such assumptions don't make it true that one can say without a doubt, what an "imbecile", a "belief", a "world view", or a "baseline" is. Nor do these assumptions make it true that there even is such things.

Here's the problem creativesoul. You say there must be a "baseline". Sam26 says there must be "hinge-propositions". I think that you guys are just making up names to account for something that you don't understand, so that your names really just indicate misunderstanding.

Suppose I see the sun set in the west in the evening, and rise in the east in the morning, so I claim that a "dragon" carries the sun around from its setting point to its rising point every night. This word, "dragon" refers to my explanation of what happens to the sun every night, just like "baseline" and "hinge-proposition" refer to what is foundational to epistemology. They are nothing but words which refer to non-existent nonsense, indicating that the people using these words misunderstand what is really going on.

You'll need to clarify what you mean by "frame beliefs". I don't apprehend a difference between a belief and the frame of a belief. What could frame a belief, but another belief. And if this is the case, the framed belief, being supported by the frame, is just as fallible as the frame. — Metaphysician Undercover

The same beliefs can be framed in different languages. Languages cannot be fallible or infallible they are just tools, just know-how. We cannot frame a belief without a language, but it doesn't follow from this that we cannot believe without a language.

The uncertainty, which you say is an extra element of belief, not found in knowing-how, is actually very evident in knowing-how as well. No matter how many times we've done the same thing over and over again, there is still the possibility we might fail in the next time. That is why those of us who work with machinery must be very careful every day, and never let down our guard, no matter how well we know how to do what we do, lest we be injured. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that uncertainty consists in our belief that we know how to do something, not in our knowing how to do something. People can certainly believe that they know how to do things that they do not know how to do. Your 'operating machinery' example is not relevant; the kinds of failures you are referring to are failures of attention, not failures of know-how.

As I argued earlier, the certainty of knowledge is only produced by separating knowing-that from knowing-how, and allowing that knowing-that obtains levels of certainty not obtained by knowing-how. If you reduce all knowledge to knowing-how, then all knowledge suffers from the fallibility of knowing-how. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the separation of knowing-that from knowing-how produces only doubt (out of which certainty cannot ever be derived). There is no fallibility in knowing-how, but only in believing that you know-how; if you know-how, then you know-how, end of story.

The same beliefs can be framed in different languages. Languages cannot be fallible or infallible they are just tools, just know-how. We cannot frame a belief without a language, but it doesn't follow from this that we cannot believe without a language. — Janus

So the belief is framed by language. I assume then, that know-how is required to frame a belief. With know-how we put a belief into language.

So I don't understand what a belief is then. My beliefs are in language, I believe this, and I believe that, all statements of language. They are formed in language and they exist in language. Never do they exist in any other form, needing to be framed in language, because they are created in language. How do you think that the belief is framed in language, when the belief itself is created out of language?

Your 'operating machinery' example is not relevant; the kinds of failures you are referring to are failures of attention, not failures of know-how. — Janus

Well that's nonsense. A failure in attending to what you are doing, when you are doing it, is obviously a failure in your know-how. What could 'know-how" be, other than the capacity to attend to what you are doing, and get it done? If you can't attend to it and get it done, then clearly you don't have the know-how. Being able to focus your attention on the task at hand is an integral part of know-how.

There is no fallibility in knowing-how, but only in believing that you know-how; if you know-how, then you know-how, end of story. — Janus

OK, that's your assertion then. If someone has the know-how to carry out a particular procedure, then it is impossible that the person will ever make a mistake, and fail in carrying out that procedure. However, evidence demonstrates that this assertion is wrong. People make mistakes and fail in tasks that they have already been successful at numerous times before. And to say that the person's failure is a failure of something other than the person's know-how, like a failure in the person's attention, is just nonsense. Because if in some instance, the person cannot maintain one's attention long enough to get the job done, then that's a failure in the person's capacity to do the job, and therefore a failure in the person's know-how.