Thanks for the reply. It seems that you are of the view that I cannot really get what I am asking for. You might be right. — PossibleAaran
I think our discussion has spun off in too many different directions to be useful. I'll try to simplify, if you will follow me in this. Imagine a dialogue between you and I:
PA: What reliable method is there for determining that things exist unperceived?
GG: If you want to know whether a piece of paper in the drawer exists when you aren't perceiving it, put a camera in the drawer and take a picture.
PA: A camera is an extension of perception. Your camera procedure shows that the paper exists when photographed. Does the paper exist when unperceived and un-photographed? How can that be reliably determined?
I am not sure what you would say at this juncture. — PossibleAaran
We just throw possible natures, possible essences out there and see what sticks - and by this, I mean that we can devise tests on the hypothesis that the object has the nature we project for it, and if those tests pan out then we can say (with whatever degree of confidence, depending on the rigour of the tests) that the object has that nature. And howsoever rickety and lacking in absolute certainty that process is, well we're stuck with it — gurugeorge
Does the paper exist when unschmerceived and unphotographed? How can you tell? — PossibleAaran
If that account is right, the best we can say about the paper is that it exists when schmercieved. — PossibleAaran
There can be no "paper" for schmerception, nor does "photograph" make any sense either. You might be able to single out some portion of the schmerceptual field (my "present kaleidoscope" idea) in some way (perhaps by awareness of shifting boundaries or something like that), but you can't help yourself to the idea that the "paper" portion of the shcmerceptual field has any physical qualities at all — gurugeorge
Therefore the question of whether "it" "exists unperceived" doesn't even make any sense UNTIL you bring in the normal physical backstory — gurugeorge
the normal meaning of "exists unperceived" applies, and the normal tests are sufficient. — gurugeorge
Another way of saying this might be that the more you chase absolute certainty — gurugeorge
about which we're punting some possible nature or character, meaning that we've already left the narrow, presuppositionless realm of schmerception, we're already positing that there's more to the world than just schmerception, just the present kaleidoscope. — gurugeorge
Take the dream tree, does it exist? Well, if it doesn't exist then what is it that you are aware of when dreaming? Nothing? But it sure seems like you are aware of something doesn't it? Some qualities are there before your consciousness are they not? If I were to ask you about the dream tree, couldn't you tell me about it? You could tell me "it had a trunk 500 metres high and purple leaves", for example. If you told me that, you would be describing what you were aware of when you dreamt, and you couldn't do that if there were nothing you were aware of when you dreamt, could you? This is what leads me to insist that the dream tree does exist and that the only difference between it and a real tree is that a real tree can be perceived by others and exists unperceived also. In fact, I would go as far as to say that what I mean by "real tree" is " a tree that can be perceived by others and which exists even when no one is perceiving it". — PossibleAaran
Our perceptions aren't infallible. I can make mistakes in perception, as when I think that a tree is 'real' but it isn't. But what this mistake amounts to is that I thought the tree was such that it could be seen by others and existed even unperceived, and I was wrong on both counts. But, even when I was hallucinating, I couldn't be mistaken that I was seeing a tree - even if it turned out to be a mere hallucination tree. This is essentially Descartes' view that he cannot be mistaken that he seems to see a fire, even though an evil demon might trick him into thinking that there 'really is' a fire. I have just tried to explicate what I mean by 'real' and used this concept instead of Descartes' terminology, because I think his terminology encourages the veil of perception doctrine (I do not think that he actually espoused that doctrine, but his phrasing in an English translation makes it very tempting). Whether you mean the same thing by 'real' I am not sure. It would be interesting to find out what you do mean by 'real' if not my explication, and equally interesting to determine whether dream trees or ordinary trees are 'real' in your sense, and what bearing this would have on our present subject matter.
you're simply labelling portions of schmerception with tracking labels. ( — gurugeorge
And then you get to Wittgenstein's point - you can't be sure you're using the same tracking label in the same way now as you did 5 minutes ago, in fact you can't even help yourself to any normal notion of time.) — gurugeorge
Hrmm... I think you're coming close to contradicting yourself here. Either our perceptions are infallible, in which case I cannot be mistaken when I see a fire, or they are fallible, and I can be mistaken when I see a fire. — Moliere
There is no contradiction. Is Descartes contradicting himself in holding that although he might be mistaken about whether there is really a tree because he might be dreaming, but he cannot be mistaken about whether it seems that there is a tree? I hold the same view but put it differently. His 'seeming tree' is my 'tree'. I cannot be mistaken about whether there is a tree, since, even when I am dreaming, I am directly aware of a tree. I could be mistaken about whether the tree I am aware of is a dream tree or a real tree. I then have an explication of the difference between 'real' and 'dream'. — PossibleAaran
You say you can't give any definition of "real". That isn't necessarily a problem, but tell me this. Supoose in your dreams last night you saw a dream tree (or seemed to see a tree, if you prefer). It was 200ft tall and had large purple leaves with different animals on every branch. You wake up and go to see some friends. To your surprise, one of them starts telling you about this dream they had. They dreampt about a tree 200ft tall with large purple leaves! Another friend pipes up and begins to describe animals that were in the tree, exactly as you remember it. A last friend, getting very excited, explains that he dreampt the tree too, and he describes faithfully the buildings that surrounded the tree.
Over the next several days each of you dreams about the same tree again, each time sharing the same story with one another. If this happened, would you still insist that the tree which all of you keep dreaming about isn't a "real" tree? What would be the meaning of that?
The reason I can't do it is because my memory might deceive me. — PossibleAaran
I can know that X has some property P only if I am/was aware of that property at some time — PossibleAaran
I think that it's a little sloppy to split "tree" into types -- it's not like "dream tree" and "real tree" are species of the genus "tree". "Real" does not work exactly in that way. Even when it comes to a logical display of these terms it's not a matter of kinds and categories, but is an operator which ranges over a domain -- some set. — Moliere
I'd probably hesitate to use dreams as a contrast class to reality. — Moliere
My earliest memory is of playing with a toy train at Christmas. Neither the train nor the room exist now; I'd have as much difficulty knowing about those things' non-existence outside my present experience as I supposedly have re. knowing about the existence of something outside my present experience. — gurugeorge
both the existence AND the non-existence of things outside my present experience are as problematic as each other - which is to say, not problematic at all. — gurugeorge
you can know by inference. That's what happens with things like the camera test. You might have never seen the piece of paper in question, but be shown a photograph of it that demonstrates its existence. — gurugeorge
I agree you can know by inference. What is the inference? Is it inductive, dedective, inference to the best explanation, what? I've been trying to get you to spell out this inference for me for some time, but you never say what kind of inference it is. It is hard to evaluate the strength of an inference when one doesn't know what the inference is. — PossibleAaran
It's deductive inference. This goes back to my point that we posit (punt, bet, conjecture) identities (natures, essences, etc.) for things, then we deduce what ought to eventuate for experience if we have identified the thing correctly (i.e. if the thing has the identity, nature or essence that we think it has) and then we check experience to see if things pan out as we'd expect them to if the thing has the identity we're positing for it.
So for example, if it's a piece of paper, which like all material things, is defined as having the property of existing while we're not perceiving it, then (we deduce that) a camera ought to inform us of the fact that it exists while we don't perceive it. — gurugeorge
This is my point exactly. Showing that something exists unperceived and such that others can perceive it settles the interesting issue. If a philosopher continues to ask "ah but am I dreaming it?", I don't really know what he wants. — PossibleAaran
Yes, I have read Quine. Why do you mention that?
Apply this to the view that things exist unperceived (unschmerceived if you like), and unphotographed. The thought would be that we have never experienced anything which refutes that hypothesis, although there is nothing by way of positive reason to support it. Is that your idea? — PossibleAaran
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