It does not exist just because you imagine it does, and there is nothing more to be said on that matter.
So why bother?

Another example, coming up with a fictional character and telling a story about them is a lot different from having an imaginary friend you believe is real. — fdrake

What you believe is of no consequence at all.

I don't understand the context of the response. Do you think you're debunking a theist?

Your belief does not make a thing true. In an "ontological" argument, as in any other belief is of no consequence.

Yeah, Charlie I don't think you understand what's going on at all.

I'll have to get back to you later on - I'm heading overseas in a few hours and might be MIA for a while. In the meantime, here is why God is a lobster [pdf].

Another example, coming up with a fictional character and telling a story about them is a lot different from having an imaginary friend you believe is real. — fdrake

NOT in matters of ontology.

↪charleton Yeah, Charlie I don't think you understand what's going on at all. — StreetlightX

You can believe what you like. If it helps you to think the fault is with me, then think that. But as with all cases belief is useless, unless grounded.

And you read me as supportive of ontological arguments and the idea that concepts alone can vouchsafe a being's actuality?

The point of changing 'is' to 'would be' is to expose the fact that 'existence in the understanding' is hypothetical to begin with. — StreetlightX

Why?

It equivocates on the whole concept of existence, confusing, from the very beginning, ideality and actuality — StreetlightX

That's your mistake. Ideality and actuality are different only in finite beings. But for the infinite being, God, there is no gap between ideality and actuality. So of course, if you treat God as a finite thing - as one more being amongst other beings - then the argument fails. That's precisely the reason why the argument doesn't work for the perfect island.

I think it's quite clear that existence in the understanding is not hypothetical - God really exists in the understanding, that is the claim of premise (1).

I have an idea of being with some ideality and actuality in it - as all beings -, brought about by the gaps of unfulfilled potentials. In my head, I imagine the rotation of a button on my oven, turning the heat down from 9 to 0, thus the unfulfilled potentials vanish and a being is born. The most real of all beings. I shall call this being God.

God is defined as a being than which none greater can be imagined. — Michael

God is rather defined as maximally great.

If a being that is imagined to exist in reality is greater than a being that is imagined to exist in understanding alone then the first premise of the argument is: — Michael

The being is not imagined to exist in reality. "Imagined" is not a useful word. To exist in the understanding is to exist qua thought & concept (which is similar to your imagination). To exist in reality is to be an instantiation of whatever the corresponding thought or concept is. The argument is not talking about imagining God as existing in reality.

And you read me as supportive of ontological arguments and the idea that concepts alone can vouchsafe a being's actuality? — fdrake

You've been spewing a lot of nonsense in this thread, but this mistaken understanding is precisely the problem. You treat God as another being amongst beings - as finite. Sure, for a finite being, concept and actuality are not identical.

Nah. God's infinite, obviously. That's how I understand him. That's why God is real.

The being is not imagined to exist in reality. "Imagined" is not a useful word. To exist in the understanding is to exist qua thought & concept (which is similar to your imagination). To exist in reality is to be an instantiation of whatever the corresponding thought or concept is. The argument is not talking about imagining God as existing in reality. — Agustino

But the premise is that we can imagine something greater. So we have two different concepts: G1 and G2. How do these concepts differ such that G2 is greater than G1? The claim of the argument is that G2 is imagined to exist in reality and G1 is imagined to exist in understanding alone. This is the mistake that the argument makes. G1 isn't imagined to exist in understanding alone: G1 is imagined to exist in reality. It's just that, as a matter of fact, it doesn't exist in reality.

The argument conflates the content of a concept (e.g. God is imagined to be real/unreal) with a fact about that concept (e.g. God is real/unreal).

That's your mistake. Ideality and actuality are different only in finite beings. But for the infinite being, God, there is no gap between ideality and actuality. So of course, if you treat God as a finite thing - as one more being amongst other beings - then the argument fails. That's precisely the reason why the argument doesn't work for the perfect island. — Agustino

LOL.
Here's why I make the point.

I shall call this being God. — fdrake

Has he got big ears and a fluffy tail? Does he tend to hop and love carrots?

The argument conflates the content of a concept (e.g. God is imagined to be real/unreal) with a fact about that concept (e.g. God is real/unreal). — Michael

As I say, belief makes no difference to an ontological argument.
It does not make it 'greater'.

God really exists in the understanding, that is the claim of premise — Agustino

Yeah, and the premise is nonsense, or at least worded in a purposely misleading way. That a cake 'exists in the understanding' means precisely that the cake doesn't exist, or rather, what exists is the 'understanding' of a cake. This is elementary school grammar, and it's insulting and embarrassing that this needs to be explained to anyone over the age of 10: the understanding of the cake, and not the cake, is the subject of the sentence. The wording of the premise is absolute sophistical bullshit. As ever, God is a grammar mistake. As for the hand waving distinction between 'finite and 'infinite beings', that's just what you're trying to prove, so to invoke that distinction in the argument's defence is just question begging claptrap. Next.

As I say, belief makes no difference to an ontological argument. — charleton

It does, as the key premise of the argument is "we can imagine something greater". The content of our concepts are an integral part of the argument.

It does, as the key premise of the argument is "we can imagine something greater". The content of our concepts are an integral part of the argument. — Michael

But that is simply rubbish. Imagining a thing does not help it to become real. This is so obvious. This is a no brainer. The entire argument is absurd for this simple reason; imaginings add no weight.
What is wrong with you?

Can you stay your anti-theist murderboner for one second and realise that I've spent most of the thread comparing the ontological argument to chaos magic's idea of summoning rituals, then criticising the 'greater than which' and modal forms for equivocating ideality and actually - spelling out why they're similar to chaos magic and how they function in analogous ways.

After that I wrote that I literally summoned a God through the power of my imagination... I mean my understanding of God as an infinite being with no un-actualised potentials...

Apparently some mod deleted my post detailing how chaos magicians think of summoning rituals for being off topic, but didn't delete the posts where I made the analogy explicit (which don't make as much sense without the original post), ah well. I'll make it less interesting more conceptually rigorous.

Basically the idea behind chaos magic summoning rituals is that the being they're trying to summon is given actuality through the actuality of their representative symbols, the representation is treated as an embodiment in a symbolically appropriate form. Then this embodiment is equated with the creative act of imagination, and since the being is already actual (in the symbols) they're brought into actuality.

It's a real equivocation between an ideal being and an actual one. The way I was analogising it is as follows: an ontological argument is a collection of symbols which becomes a literal sufficient condition for the existence of a being.

For modal forms of the argument, this is done by making imagined necessary entities possibly necessary entities, then possibly necessary entities necessary entities, and of course necessary entities are actual entities. For 'greater than which cannot be conceived' versions, ideal and actual entities are opposed to each-other in a premise (like 'God exists in the imagination'), then ideal and actual entities are joined as the domain of quantification in the argument, then demonstrating that something belongs to this domain of quantification is re-interpreted as being actual.

For the Aristotelian versions, the conceptualised version of the entity is imbued with actuality by an operation of the understanding - as if imbuing something with the concept of actuality was the same as it being actual. This is legitimised since the concept and the entity are thought of as equivalent in a manner of actual operation, not through mere ideation. To put it another way, ideation about the being with no unactualised potentials renders them (through philosophical demonstration) as actual. Really though, they are already posited as actual through the equivocation of map and territory in this case; in Agustino's terms there's no difference between the infinite idea of God and the infinite actuality of it.

The Aristotelian will say that they're disclosing things about an already existent entity, not bringing about their existence through ideation. It's just an operation of understanding after all, not imagination. The latter of which, imbuing something with the concept of the actuality through ideation being the same as something's actualisation, is the way chaos magic summoning is purported to work. Only the terms for chaos magic are magical sigils, the 'magical sigils' for philosophers here are argument forms. It's still not going to allow non-ideal things to be brought forth through ideation alone.

But that is simply rubbish. Imagining a thing does not help it to become real. This is so obvious. This is a no brainer. The entire argument is absurd for this simple reason.
What is wrong with you? — charleton

I'm not claiming otherwise. I'm arguing that one of the argument's premises is false. As others have suggested, your criticisms seem to be directed at the wrong people.

After that I wrote that I literally summoned a God through the power of my imagination... I mean my understanding of God as an infinite being with no un-actualised potentials... — fdrake

Crazy talk.

Read the rest of the freakin' post you trigger happy wing-nut.

I'm not claiming otherwise. I'm arguing that one of the argument's premises is false. As others have suggested, your criticisms seem to be directed at the wrong people. — Michael

You are busting your own balls arguing over nothing whatever. The ontological argument cannot survive the most cursory glance at the opening premise.
Case closed.

Read the rest of the freakin' post you trigger happy wing-nut. — fdrake

It's full of bollocks. I just pulled out a crazy sentence. I have no need to remark on every silly line.
All your efforts are worthless, and just give succour to the theists, since the "OA" falls at the first hurdle as I have pointed out. A thing which we all know. Why bust your balls and encourage Agustino?

There's more than one way to skin a cat.

You are just enabling those that think the argument has legs.

I'm surprised you think criticisms of ontological arguments in general are bollocks. You actually read me as someone who believed they could summon a God into actuality through an operation of thought; surprising, to say the least.