So in my philosophy, there are definitely wives, numbers, hats, red, and moons. But none of those things are simply or purely self-existent, i.e. existing in their own terms independently of the act of cognition (or rather the manner of their existence independent of our cognition of them is perfectly unknowable to us, which is also orthodox Kant). — Wayfarer

Things "independent of cognition" aren't posed to be outside of the meaning of experience though. The direct realist takes orthodox Kant and extends it out into the world: all those independent things are (partly) as we experience them. Rather than arguing things live without what the are to us, the suggestion is that things which are to us live independent of our existence. Instead of wiping out the relevance of subjectivity to the world, it's extending it, saying the things we encounter may and are frequently without us. For an object to be, it needs to be an thing which may be recognised by a subject. What it needs is a meaning in experiential terms, whether or not someone actually exists experiencing it at any time. Independence from existence of experiences, but not the meaning of experiences.

In this respect, the Kantians are all to focused on the empirical world. Supposedly, if it doesn't presently appear in experience (i.e. someone is observing asset of existence), then it doesn't have experiential meaning. The Kantian misses that experiential meaning extends beyond the mere existence of states.

No they aren't, John. We have those words for exactly this situation: pointing out something which is not an existing state, something the passage of time has no role in defining. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The problem here, Willow, is that what I said doesn't hinge on whether these words "point out existing states" ( whatever that might be taken to mean), but that they get their sense from existing states (if that is taken to mean finite human perceptions) even if it is only that the sense consists only in denying or negating existing states.

Your argument is misapplying the propositional to God in this instance: supposedly God is a "mystery" and "beyond" all knowledge because there must "be" something, an ethic, a face, a voice, a thought, a meaning to God which we never pin down, so it may always be there to help us out. In the approach you are taking, God is meant to "be" something, outside out world, yet still of the realm which has profound impact upon the world. It's "magical thinking"-- Oh, how wonderful it would be if the infinite impacted upon are world: the things we loved could live forever. Our wondrous fictions (i.e. the infinite meaning of an idea) would be literal. The sea could be parted even when it was impossible. In the face of horrors of the finite world, there would always be something to fix it. Power we cannot understand always sitting by us, rescuing us from any loss and death of a finite world.

Again, you are putting words in my mouth: I haven't said anything about God, "helping us out", being "outside the world", or even " having impact on the world". I haven't said God is "something" to "fix the horrors of the world", or "sitting by us" or "rescuing us from any loss and death of a finite world". Now God might be all those things in the experience of some, but then that that might be the case would only be a claim about their experience, not about any publically confirmable empirical reality.

The promises of the infinite is nothing but our wishful thinking. In our minds, we can mix the infinite and the finite together, to posit the latter as the former: life which never ends and, has no possibility of ending. The ultimate comfort, life even when death is obvious.

But, the assertion that the "promises of the infinite (whatever they might be taken to be) are " nothing but our wishful thinking" seems to be nothing but your personal opinion. Do you have a decent argument to back up that opinion?

Transformative? No doubt. If you believe it, it removes death. Whether we are being literal or metaphorical, one has a belief which removes fear, grief and pain over the losses of the finite world. Such emotions become unnecessary because their is no problem. Death is just a illusion. We really live infinitely in God. No-one ever really dies.

It's a mirage though. In our efforts to escape our fears and pains, we've tricked ourselves into thinking we are of the infinite. Death is not an illusion. And God cannot save us for, being infinite, God has no power to define the finite.

So, you think that if someone believes strongly enough it transforms them by "taking away death". Would this improve their life, make them happier and less fearful, do you think? If you think so, then what exactly do you think could be wrong with that?

And again, your belief that "God cannot save us" is no more and no less merely an opinion than the belief that God can save us. It is simply not a proposition that can be either empirically confirmed or disconfirmed or logically proven or disproven. Really, I think it is just the articulation of a feeling of redemption that some people live with. Is it better (in the sense of which would be the more positive life influence) to feel ( at least the possibility of being) redeemed or (the inevitability of being) forsaken?

The etymology for "existence" suggests that it means "to stand out" to be distinct from other things. So that, if something truly doesn't exist, then there never was anything there in the first place to not exist. I favor this way of looking at it.

However:

'There is, monks, an unborn, unbecome, unmade, unfabricated. If there were not that unborn, unbecome, unmade, unfabricated, there would not be the case that escape from the born, become, made, fabricated would be discerned. But precisely because there is an unborn, unbecome, unmade, unfabricated - escape from the born, become, made, fabricated is discerned.'.

The Buddha Ud 8.3

Does 'the unborn' have the same meaning as 'God'? Buddhists will say not. But there are nevertheless convergences between this and the apophatic philosophy (the 'negative way') of early Christian monasticism which has been preserved in at some modern theology. Hereunder a comment on Paul Tillich's conception of the 'negative way':

"Existence" refers to what is finite and fallen and cut of from its true being. Within the finite [i.e. manifest] realm, issues of conflict between, for example, autonomy and heteronomy abound (there are also conflicts between the formal/emotional and static/dynamic). Resolution of these conflicts lies in the essential realm (the Ground of Meaning/the Ground of Being) which humans are cut off from yet also dependent upon ('In existence man is that finite being who is aware both of his belonging to and separation from the infinite') . Therefore existence is estrangement.

(Newport Paul Tillich p.67f)).

There are again convergences between this and the Buddhist conception of Nirvāṇa which is 'blowing out' or extinction. That has often (and understandably) been interpreted as nihilism, however I think a better way of conceiving it is as the 'extinction of the ego', or 'dying to the known' (for example, in Suzuki's commentary on the Lankavatara Sutra, this is described as 'paravritti' which is the 'turning around of consciousness' 1).

The problem in current cultural discourse is that nearly all of this discussion has migrated to the domain of symbolic thought. In other words, we take such terms as God, Nirvāṇa, and so on, to 'stand for something' - and then, of course, there is nothing 'out there' to which they can be shown to correspond. But, strictly speaking, the whole discourse needs to be understood in terms of an alternative mode of cognition; which is why there is such an emphasis on contemplation in the spiritual traditions.

God Nirvana and all that jazz doesn't really stand for anything. we're agreed about that much. :D

Or not seeing the meaning is not the same as it having no meaning.

It means whatever you want, brother... and nothing else. A person didn't make the universe, sorry.

It's a philosophy forum.

Excuse me if I don't want to respond seriously to the buddhist concretizing mystical nothingness, I get it, we've all seen the never ending story, but "lack of ketchup" isn't something that exists in it's own right, or "doesn't exist", but really does *wink wink*. That kind of depth is too unsanitary to wade into, I'll happily remain in the shallows.

OK, I agree the Flying Spaghetti Monster doesn't exist, if that will make you happy.

That's right, as to exist is to merely occupy space and time, within the universal spacetime manifold, but the FSM isn't a thing like that at all, it transcends material physical spacial temporal and even quantum constraints, and occupies a higher realm where it super duper exists!

The question of whether or not something exists is always an uninteresting question, and predicated on a misunderstanding of what existence even is in my view. The only interesting ontological question is "what kind of thing is it?"

What kind of thing is God? God is a character in a book. That's what kind of thing God is.

Do red and numbers exist for those who are blind and inummerate, respectively? — Wayfarer

The question doesn't even make sense, unless interpreted differently. They either exist or they do not, regardless of the fact that there are some people unable to experience them, either at all or at least in the same way that other people do.

This is: that the designation of 'existing' to some object is a mental act. In other words, existence is mind-dependent. — Wayfarer

No, not "in other words". Those two statements mean two completely different things, so you can't rightly pass the latter statement off as a reiteration. Nor does the latter statement follow from the former, so if that was your intention, then that's a non sequitur. If you want to attempt to justify the above, you'll have to at least string together a valid argument, and please do try to make sense, rather than conflating one thing with a completely different thing or jumping to a conclusion.

For an object to be an object, it needs to be recognised as such by a subject (which is basically orthodox Kant.) — Wayfarer

It's orthodox nonsense. That's what it is. You can't just invent necessities where there are none.

You'll have to prove that there exists no object which hasn't been recognised as such by a subject, which you can't do in any non-superficial way. (It is superficial to redefine terms so as to make this exclusion). Whereas all I have to do is appeal to ordinary language-use and logic to demonstrate that it is indeed possible, contrary to the logical consequences of your assertion.

And, furthermore, by appealing to facts and statistics, I can demonstrate that not only is it possible, but probable. There is a whole universe full of innumerable things, and we've already discovered a whole load of things. The most plausible explanation, given what we know about the world, is obviously that these things were there, unrecognised as such, prior to being discovered, rather than bizarrely popping into existence at the moment of discovery. And we can infer from this that there are likely other yet-to-be-discovered or "recognised as such" things out there.

You'll have to prove that there exists no object which hasn't been recognised as such by a subject, which you can't do in any non-superficial way. — Sapientia

I had hoped to do that by way of philosophical argument, although I have obviously failed in this instance. But, thanks for your reply.

I had hoped to do that by way of philosophical argument, although I have obviously failed in this instance. But, thanks for your reply. — Wayfarer

Or perhaps you really think that I'm overlooking some important part of your lengthy reply in which you've succeeded, but if so, you might have to bring it to my attention.

But, in any case, we've clearly digressed from the topic of discussion, which is about whether or not God exists.

I do note, however, that you accept that numbers and colours like red exist, but you still haven't answered the question of what they're composed of. And remember, you claimed that whatever exists is composed of parts.

I will try again. But I know, this is a difficult subject, it has been central to the philosophical project I have been working on since I first started posting on forums in 2009 so I apologize in advance, and thanks for allowing me to try again.

Just consider one example, a natural number. Does the number 7 exist? Of course, you will say, you just wrote it. But what I have written is a symbol which could also be written as seven, VII, and so on. So the symbolic form is arbitrary - it could be anything. But whatever the symbol is, it always must signify the same number. So the number is not the symbol. What is the number, then?

Now I'm not going to propose an answer to that question, because the nature of number is really a very difficult question - even though it seems intuitively obvious, something that everyone would know. Suffice to say here that the Wikipedia entry on Philosophy of Mathematics lists more than ten major schools of thought about questions including the nature of numbers.

For the purposes of my argument, notice that amongst these many schools, are those of mathematical realists:

A realist holds that mathematical entities exist independently of the human mind. Thus humans do not invent mathematics, but rather discover it, and any other intelligent beings in the universe would presumably do the same. In this point of view, there is really one sort of mathematics that can be discovered; triangles, for example, are real entities, not the creations of the human mind.

Many working mathematicians have been mathematical realists; they see themselves as discoverers of naturally occurring objects. Examples include Paul Erdős and Kurt Gödel. Gödel believed in an objective mathematical reality that could be perceived in a manner analogous to sense perception 1.

But even mathematical realists aren't inclined to say that numbers are material objects. So, therefore, if realists are correct, numbers are real, but they're not material; they are in some sense 'intelligible objects', that is, things that only exist in and for a mind, but are not simply the product of a mind.

So my argument is that they are mind-dependent, not in the sense that their existence depends on a mind, but that they can only be perceived by a mind. Therefore their existence is of a different order to that of material objects.

Now the point about that is, that it indicates there are different modes or kinds of existence. If numbers are real but mental, then they're real in a different way to tables, chairs, and rocks. But I don't think that modern philosophy recognises different modes or kinds of existence; as far as it is concerned, things either exist, or they don't; so tables exist but unicorns don't; the number 7 exists but the square root of 2 does not. Imaginary things are in the mind, real things are 'out there somewhere', or are discoverable or infereable on the basis of what is out there (which goes for such ideas as fields and the like).

But for mathematical realism, the 'domain of number' is actually a realm or domain (see for example Tyler Burge Frege on Knowing the Third Realm).

you claimed that whatever exists is composed of parts... — Sapientia

Quite right! Think of something that isn't. There is no material object that is not composed of parts.

(You might refer to the objects of physics, such as fields and sub-atomic particles - so-called - but then the question becomes, to what extent are they actually material objects? But do note that the reason 'the atom' was held to be foundational in the first place, was precisely because it too was not composed of parts - atom means 'indivisible' - and it did not go in and out of existence, being of eternal duration.)

The point that I would make is that the natural numbers are the same for all observers, and they don't come into and go out of existence in the way that material objects do; 7=7 all over the universe. Because they represent formal relationships and objects, they are in some sense 'above' or detached from the merely material. Or that, at any rate, is the intuition of the Platonist tradition, which said that, therefore, numbers and geometrical objects belong to a different order than do material objects (see The Analogy of the Divided Line. Much of this kind of thinking was abandoned in the medieval period, due to the debates between the Realists and the Nominalists, not that it was ever fully worked out or articulated).

Anyway I know this is all getting into some very difficult and murky territory, so let me try and come to some kind of point. I think the 'mode of the existence of numbers' is an indicator of the nature of reality. This is not because 'nature is mathematical', but because our experience and knowledge of the world is structured according to mathematical, logical and rational thought.

We have an intuitive belief that the real world is 'out there', and our thinking mind is 'in here'. Whereas in fact, reality is that discursive process of analysis, rationalising, speaking, thinking, measuring, and making sense of the world. Numbers (and the like) are fundamental to how we make sense of reality - but it's not really as if they're either 'in here' or 'out there'. The bifurcation of the world into 'in here' and 'out there' is part of that process itself. So that is the sense in which reality is constructed by the mind - not that the world comes into and goes out of existence, but the kind of existence it has, outside of its construction by the mind, is something we will never know (see Our Mental Universe by Richard Conn Henry.)

So that is the sense in which the world is 'mind-dependent' - not that it goes out of existence if you're not looking at it, but that there's no 'it' outside this cognitive/mental process which is categorising experience according to its various abilities (which is the philosophy of mind-only Buddhism).

So - God does not exist; he's not 'out there' in the phenomenal realm. But according to the mystical tradition, God was never 'out there' in the first place (although, I guess, the medievals thought that the Heavens were literally that, and God was indeed 'up there'.) But I think the God depicted as That Guy in the Sky, a cosmic film director, certainly is a projection of the imagination. In that sense, I'm quite in agreement with Richard Dawkins, except for the fact that I have never believed in what he believes doesn't exist, but I don't think that it makes me an atheist.

Hope that clears it up.

I've have come late to this discussion as I have only just found this forum.

I would like to point out that the God of man(and woman) is a conceptual construct, albeit a concept which is regarded as the subject of a serous consideration about the reality we find ourselves in. However if one does think about it seriously, whether God does exist or not, one ought to consider our, or your, or humanity's limitations in having knowledge or understanding of existence and what is encountered. Namely that we have no idea what is going on, where and how it is going on and that logic, and therefore philosophy cannot be used to address it, other than in what can be deduced from what we do know. Also that what we do know, or experience may only be an appearance of what we know of and may be something else etc.

This leaves us with only one other course of enquiry, that of an internal, or experiential inquiry, what is generally known as mysticism. What his adds to the mix is that of the self and it's being. From the position of the self one can consider what may have existence by having equivalence to that self, also that if one's self is itself a construct, or effect, what has existence of which one's self is a reflection, or construct.

Thus one can address the issue seriously, i.e. If an actual God(one which is not a conceptual construct, but is actually in existence) or its equivalent, exists and what form it takes, and what relation it has to one's self. This results in a realisation that the mystic is in the position of being face to face(or not, i.e. mistakenly) with God and all else in one's existence is consequential.

Unfortunately if that mystic discovers the existence of God, it remains impossible for that existence to be communicated between people, other than by one person trusting another to be correct in their affirmation. This suggests that the only way to answer the question of the existence of God requires one to go beyond reason on a quest of discovery.

The best you can hope for is there may or may not be a god but I will live my life as I choose. Lack of evidence does not prove something doesn't exist.

if that mystic discovers the existence of God, it remains impossible for that existence to be communicated between people, other than by one person trusting another to be correct in their affirmation. — Punshhh

But what about communities of faith, discourse and practice? For example monastic and ecclesiastical movements and organisations. These provide the means to validate individual experiences, which is fundamental to the teacher-student relationship in a religious order.

If you're acquainted with the subject of mysticism in the Christian tradition, there is a long tradition of interpretation going back millenia. The writings of the Syrian monastic now known as 'pseudo-Dionysius' (called 'pseudo' as a consequence of his mis-idenfication by many generations of scholars) are foundational to Christian mysticism and familiar to generations of practitioners.

Of course you're correct in saying that such experiences (for that matter, any experience!) is strictly speaking incommunicable, but given a cultural and spiritual milieu with shared understandings, beliefs, and praxis, a degree of communal validation is possible.

if that mystic discovers the existence of God, it remains impossible for that existence to be communicated between people, other than by one person trusting another to be correct in their affirmation. — Punshhh

But what about communities of faith, discourse and practice? For example monastic and ecclesiastical movements and organisations. These provide the means to validate individual experiences, which is fundamental to the teacher-student relationship in a religious order. — Wayfarer

I see no conflict between these two statements. In other words I agree with them both except that I see no need for the 'But' at the beginning of the second one. The members of a spiritual community validate one another's experience because they trust each other's affirmations to be correct, which was the 'out' offered by Punshhh. I would imagine that that atmosphere of trust is one of the great attractions of living in a spiritual community.

Personally, I like the mystical approach and the idea of a quest of discovery. But there is another alternative which is to just believe the affirmations of those around you, provided one feels comfortable with that. Not everybody wants to be a mystic or a philosopher, or to go on a quest. It's OK to just believe simple scriptural stories if that is enough to satisfy the individual. It only causes problems when those stories and communities generate anti-social effects, like inquisitions, persecution of non-conformers, or anti-infidel jihads.

@Wayfarer
"But what about communities of faith, discourse and practice? "

I agree with you about this, however a degree of faith and acceptance is required in theses communities. Which is all well and good and enables people to experience divinity, spirituality etc. However in my response to the OP I was thinking of proofs for the existence of God, philosophical proofs. These communities don't provide proof in the philosophical sense and neither should they, it is not their business. I was pointing out the reality of the inability to apply philosophy to the question of the existence of God.

Now a practitioner may achieve a mystical union with God through being a member of such a community, in much the same way as the lone mystic I refer to. This is largely the purpose of these communities, but for some people this doesn't supply sufficient proofs for them and relies more on faith and trust. This was the case for me when I explored such communities, although finding God was not actually that important for me, or whether he/she exists. For me finding an intellectual route to an understanding of existence was what I seeked and still do seek and who I am and what is going on. In this quest I have left behind these communities and found a study of literature(including mystical literature), art, communion with nature and treading a personal mystical path to be the most appropriate.

I found the communities I entered to be lacking in the intellectual philosophical attitude and understanding necessary for my requirements. Something which I realised they are not in the business of disseminating, as their business is bringing people to God and the benefits of a spiritual and religious life, in good faith, rather than with philosophical rigour.

However in my response to the OP I was thinking of proofs for the existence of God, philosophical proofs. These communities don't provide proof in the philosophical sense and neither should they, it is not their business. I was pointing out the reality of the inability to apply philosophy to the question of the existence of God. — Punshhh

Right! Now I get you. I was responding more to your point about the 'impossibility of communication to other people'. But I do see what you mean.

Yes, I did once experience an insight of the subtly of the communion of forms of divinity, well on more than one occasion, in the presence of a guru I knew well during Puga. To communicate this to someone who had not experienced it would not be easy and if it were possible in some way verbally, it would still not convey the experiential dimension. A dimension which would encompass a personal mystical process of revelation, again something not easily communicable.

There are I suspect issues with tying down transcendent experience into communicable means. Although I have had some success in close interaction with a fellow traveller, but even here, I was aware of a gulf between us in conception, which left us world's apart in personal understanding.

And yet I have had understandings with gurus I have encountered across a crowded room, for the briefest of moments, which were at the heart of my deepest ponderings and which I am at a loss to communicate verbally. Although I suspect that if I turned to that guru and referred to that interaction, he/she would know exactly what I meant and not much verbiage would be required. There is a deep significance with respect to face to face verbal traditions here I sense.

Thinking about the existence of a deity seems pointless, unless I also know what this deity might want from us, if anything.

I think it might make more sense to try and figure out what the universe is like, and if this particular universe is such that behaving in certain ways has desirable benefits.

Stoicism is attractive to me. Their views of the deity are difficult to summarize. Suffice it to say that they believe there is a benevolent Creator who created the universe such that living a life of virtue will lead to the best life possible (Eudaimonia).

Indeed! An encounter with an enlightened sage is called in India a 'darshan', a 'seeing' of the guru, which in and of itself is spiritually efficacious. The various schools are referred to as 'darshana'.

You'll have to prove that there exists no object which hasn't been recognised as such by a subject, which you can't do in any non-superficial way. (It is superficial to redefine terms so as to make this exclusion). Whereas all I have to do is appeal to ordinary language-use and logic to demonstrate that it is indeed possible, contrary to the logical consequences of your assertion. — Sapientia

How can language use and logic be used to show that there can exist objects which haven't been recognised as such by a subject?

It seems to me that the very premise of realism is that the existence of objects is independent of semantics, which makes using the latter to prove the former a contradiction. Indeed the realist would say that independent objects exist even if ordinary language use implied idealism.

Or are you just saying that you can use logic to derive the realist's conclusion from some self-evident or otherwise justified premises? Then what are those premises?

How can language use and logic be used to show that there can exist objects which haven't been recognised as such by a subject? — Michael

By our very inability to detail or describe objects we don't know.

With logic we can tell there may be things we don't know about-- the presence of something we have not experienced or been told. What are these things we lack knowledge of? We cannot say for we don't even have the idea to distinguish them until we have knowledge. One of those objects we do not know might be right in front of our noses this very moment and we would be oblivious. That's what it means for an object not to be recognised by a subject.

So unless we necessarily recognise every object, there may be objects which haven't been recognised by a subject .

With logic we can tell there may be things we don't know about-- the presence of something we have not experienced or been told. What are these things we lack knowledge of? We cannot say for we don't even have the idea to distinguish them until we have knowledge. One of those objects we do not know might be right in front of our noses this very moment and we would be oblivious. That's what it means for an object not to be recognised by a subject. — TheWillowOfDarkness

You're just repeating the claim that objects might exist that we don't know about. You haven't explained how ordinary language use or logic have shown this to be the case.

By our very inability to detail or describe objects we don't know.

You're assuming your conclusion.

No, Michael. I'm not.

Logic shows that it being otherwise is a contradiction-- it would require all objects to be necessarily be known by a subject. That's the only way it would be impossible for an unknown object to exist.

This is impossible because the presence of a knowing subject is defined by existence. The presence of knowledge cannot be necessary. It takes a state of the world, something which may or may not be.

You are just ignoring the argument here. You are applying empirical reasoning in a context where it makes no sense.

You're assuming your conclusion.

I'm stating the premise that we can't describe or detail the objects we don't know, yes. There's certainly no outside evidence or "deriving" from another outside presence. But then I don't need one. Pay attention to the content of the argument.

How exactly would we describe or detail objects we don't know? It's impossible. To avoid a contradiction, one would have to place the supposedly unknown object within knowledge-- in which case it would be a known object.

Rather than assuming a conclusion, I'm pointing out being unable to detail or describe an object is lack knowledge of it. Unless, subject necessary recognise every object, unrecognised objects may exist.