Did you ignore the rest of my post intentionally? All of the substantive questions I asked were avoided.

I think philosophers in general ought to be more reluctant to take part in these discussions over "what is X?" questions. The debate about the meaning of the word can be endless and fruitless if there are no criteria for a succesful definition and no purpose served by the defining.

PA

I think philosophers in general ought to be more reluctant to take part in these discussions over "what is X?" questions. The debate about the meaning of the word can be endless and fruitless if there are no criteria for a succesful definition and no purpose served by the defining. — PossibleAaran

Belief is generally considered an element of knowledge, and it therefore is significant. I agree that words are contextual and can be subject to endless defining and redefining, but it's also obvious that we rely upon words as having some form of fixed meaning as well, else we couldn't use them to communicate. So, I think your attempt to jettison the whole debate as pointless isn't entirely fair, but I do think you could prove your point by continuously offering counterexamples to the definitions arrived at if you wished to prove your thesis that this discussion is pointless.

I agree. Without an agreed upon ontology. Any philosophical concept or discussion of a concept must be grounded in some ontology. Without such grounding all you get is an endless series of references to one philosopher or another or some reference to some scientific theory, e.g. beliefs are an illusion.

There's also the in/voluntary aspect of beliefs.

Example of involuntary:
I have troubles choosing to believe, to be convinced, that there are pink elephants in the front-yard (say, maybe just for five minutes sharp).
If I hallucinate them, then I'd likely falsely believe that they're there, though perhaps somewhat justified.

So, there's a part of beliefs that have to be genuine, honest, which also is related to justification, indoctrination, or whatever.
I guess formation of belief is a whole study in its own right.

What are examples of voluntary beliefs?
Is seeing believing?
(Err sorry, not intending to off-track the thread.)

_{seeing is believing (Wiktionary entry)
Seeing & Believing (Raymond Tallis, Philosophy Now, 2013)
Seeing is believing (Nature, Dec 2005)
Seeing Is Believing (Richard I Cook, Annals of Surgery, Apr 2003)}

— Banno

• A belief is a relation between an individual and a proposition.
• The individual must understand the meaning of the proposition in order to correctly be said to believe that proposition.
• The individual thinks the proposition is true.

Given this formulation, how would you distinguish a belief from a working hypothesis?

For example, I'm an atheist. I intuitively reject the proposition "God exists," and so it's not that hard to maneuvre me into situations where I commit myself to saying "God does not exist," is true. Is this already a belief, or is it a clue that I hold a belief that is incompatible with the proposition "God exists?" and it is politically expedient to claim that I believe "God does not exist."

Am I rejecting the proposition "God exists," without commiting to its negative? Is what I'm really rejecting the relevance of the proposition, rather than it's truth value? That is, I don't care and don't want to spend the time to figure out what I believe?

"God does not exist," works well enough for me as a working hypothesis: I act as if God does not exist. But acting as if God does not exist is not the same thing as believing that God does not exist. Imagine that theists don't exist. Obviously, I would not have to be an atheist. In many cases I would act the same as I am now, but in situations where the theism/atheism divide is relevan, I do act differently. A working hypothesis like "God does not exist" is only of use, because theists exist (I'm not motivated to invent theism just to deny its existance).

If we define "belief" as a propositional attitude, I have a problem, here: I wouldn't be able to hold an intuitive belief that I find to express in words, but that's pretty much what I experience. I'm uncertain about a lot of things, and that I react more vehemently against theism than say materialism is at least partly down to a defense mechanism against perceived social control. If it's possible to figure out intuitively held beliefs by making propositions and observing your reactions towards them, then beliefs must precede propositions in some way - that is rather than a belief being an attitude towards a proposition, a belief would have to be something more foundational - something that gives rise to your attitudes to propositions.

I find "belief" harder to define that way, but it addresses a second problem I have, here: namely that you have to understand a proposition to believe in it. Intuitively, I don't think so. You can believe that a proposition is true, because you trust the person who utters it. Now, you can easily rephrase things to make it fit: for example:

I do not understand propisition A.

I understand the proposition "Person B understands propostion A," and think it is true.

I understand the proposition "Person B thinks proposition A is true," and think its true.

With these addtions, I could believe a lot of things to be true without understanding them. All I need to do is "trust an expert".

But I think if I do this something gets lost. I have an ill-thought-through hunch that we generalise "trusting experts" from childhood on (the first probably being our parents), so that there's always some sort of social component already included. That is: "belief" may be a mechanism to restrict doubt, so that we don't find ourselves eternally unable to make decisions.

In other words, maybe by judging "propositions" we tag as "important" we're really picking our team; maybe "beliefs" are prepositional predispositions rather than attitudes? The likelihood to respond to a certain preposition either favourably or disfavourably? That way, you wouldn't form an ad-hoc belief everytime you say "that's hogwash!"

I apologise if this doesn't make much sense. It's just that if I see my shoe laces come untied I bend down and tie them. If someone were to formulate that in propositions, like "Your shoulaces are untied" (fact: true/false), "You should tie them," (value judgement: true/false) I can have attitudes to those propositions, but I have a hard time to consider them beliefs just on the ground that they've been formulated. However, when you formulate those propositions beliefs do come into play. So I sort of think that beliefs are pre-linguistic and valuable even if not (fully?) understood.

(I've actually considered that we substitute understanding for belief - that is, we ignore things we don't quite understand in order to contain doubt enough to render us capable of decisions - people with a greater tolerance for doubt would need less belief [tautology?], and we would be predisposed to defend our beliefs because losing them would render us incapable of decisions. The tolerance for doubt might differ not only by person but also by topic. But all that's even more tentative than the rest of my post.).

If behavior were belief you could, but it's not. Belief references a conscious state, — Hanover

That's the whole point of my example. What are we defining if we insist that belief requires a concious state (a state which we cannot even reliably identify since no-one is agreed what conciousness is anyway)? I see little point in playing philosophy with our cups already full, to decide in advance what sort of thing we want belief to mean and then play this charade of pretending we're doing doing some meaningful investigation discovering exactly what we set out to 'discover'.

If you think a belief requires conciousness in order to define it, in order to separate it meaningfully from other similar states without conciousness, then what is the job that adding conciousness as a condition is doing for our definition? What error would we be making if we were to describe the thermostat as 'believing' it was cold on the basis of it's behaviour (turning the heating up) other than insulting your anthropocentric view that humans must have a whole series of special words to describe their states of being?

That's the whole point of my example. What are we defining if we insist that belief requires a concious state (a state which we cannot even reliably identify since no-one is agreed what conciousness is anyway)? — Pseudonym

We all know that we are conscious, and we subjectively have no doubt about it. That we can't precisely define it makes it like any other term, including "belief," the term we're trying to identify here.

If you think a belief requires conciousness in order to define it, in order to separate it meaningfully from other similar states without conciousness, then what is the job that adding conciousness as a condition is doing for our definition? What error would we be making if we were to describe the thermostat as 'believing' it was cold on the basis of it's behaviour (turning the heating up) other than insulting your anthropocentric view that humans must have a whole series of special words to describe their states of being? — Pseudonym

It's just a misuse of language to say a thermostat believes, and it's clear that something different is happening when I believe it's too hot and the thermostat switches on the furnace. Surely our language can support a particular word that distinguishes between thermostat behavior and human behavior.

Behavior is not what defines belief. It's just evidence of an internal state. If I'm shivering and exhibiting every sign of being cold, it is not necessary that I believe I'm cold. I might think I'm warm because I've become unable to distinguish cold from hot, or maybe I'm entirely numb, with no feeling at all and my body is reactively shivering.

And as I've also said, even when we look to behavior to decipher particular mental states, we are usually very adept at it and we notice clear signs that an entity is not conscious. That is, the behavior of a thermostat would not lead anyone to actually believe it has a belief or that it is conscious. We can figure out (just as we can when computers submit to a Turing Test) when an entity is mimicking conscious like behavior and when it is truly conscious.

To say the thermostat "believes" it's cold is no different than saying the tree believes it's windy because its leaves wave in the wind. You have just misdefined a word to a way no one uses it.

What error would we be making if we were to describe the thermostat as 'believing' it was cold on the basis of it's behaviour (turning the heating up) other than insulting your anthropocentric view that humans must have a whole series of special words to describe their states of being? — Pseudonym

Yes, you've discovered it. I don't believe a word I'm saying, but I feel the need to keep humans in their esteemed place in the world so I'm insisting upon an anthropomorphic definition of belief. No, I do believe that cats and dogs have beliefs too, but not thermostats or waving trees.

We all know that we are conscious, and we subjectively have no doubt about it. — Hanover

Not at all, there are many perfectly rational people (myself included) who consider consciousness to be an illusion, that we are distinguishable from thermostats only in the number of such computations we can carry out at any one time. In fact, I would go as far as to say that, if we allow for some phenomenal emergence, then actually most philosophers of mind agree that our brains work in this way. There is nothing ontological to distinguish us from thermostats other than volume of data processed.

It's just a misuse of language to say a thermostat believes, and it's clear that something different is happening when I believe it's too hot and the thermostat switches on the furnace. — Hanover

As I said, if you've already made up your mind as to what 'believe' should mean and what is apparently "clear" about the differences between the state of our brains when we believe something and the state of the bimetallic strip in a thermostat when is 'believes' it is cold, then what purpose is there to your involvement in this discussion?

Behavior is not what defines belief. It's just evidence of an internal state. If I'm shivering and exhibiting every sign of being cold, it is not necessary that I believe I'm cold. I might think I'm warm because I've become unable to distinguish cold from hot, or maybe I'm entirely numb, with no feeling at all and my body is reactively shivering. — Hanover

Indeed, and the thermostat, if broken, might turn the heating off despite 'beliving' that it is cold, but we would in both cases be equally able to judge that something has gone wrong. I'm still not hearing anything of this magical difference between humans and thermostats which actually makes any difference to the meaning and use of the term 'belief'.

We can figure out (just as we can when computers submit to a Turing Test) when an entity is mimicking conscious like behavior and when it is truly conscious. — Hanover

Firstly, no we can't figure it out, but that's an entirely different debate and unnecessary herebecause, secondly you're talking here about consciousness (which I agree it is easy to see the thermostat doesn't have). You have yet to establish why you think it necessary for belief to be linked to consciousness. What job does such a restriction do to the meaning and use of the word?

No, I do believe that cats and dogs have beliefs too, but not thermostats or waving trees. — Hanover

So what about insects, bacteria, unconscious people, philosophical zombies, AI... Where do you draw the line on what can have beliefs and why?

Not at all, there are many perfectly rational people (myself included) who consider consciousness to be an illusion, that we are distinguishable from thermostats only in the number of such computations we can carry out at any one time. In fact, I would go as far as to say that, if we allow for some phenomenal emergence, then actually most philosophers of mind agree that our brains work in this way. There is nothing ontological to distinguish us from thermostats other than volume of data processed. — Pseudonym

Do you suppose thermostats have phenomenal states?

As I said, if you've already made up your mind as to what 'believe' should mean and what is apparently "clear" about the differences between the state of our brains when we believe something and the state of the bimetallic strip in a thermostat when is 'believes' it is cold, then what purpose is there to your involvement in this discussion? — Pseudonym

I guess having an opinion bars one from discussing that opinion with someone who has an opposing view? I do think it is very clear that your claiming that a thermostat has a belief is not how the word belief is used among speakers of English.

Indeed, and the thermostat, if broken, might turn the heating off despite 'beliving' that it is cold, but we would in both cases be equally able to judge that something has gone wrong. I'm still not hearing anything of this magical difference between humans and thermostats which actually makes any difference to the meaning and use of the term 'belief'. — Pseudonym

I don't get why you put belief in quotes unless you're using it in a strained figurative sense and not literally. My understanding of your thesis was that thermostats had beliefs in the literal sense.

Firstly, no we can't figure it out, but that's an entirely different debate and unnecessary herebecause, secondly you're talking here about consciousness (which I agree it is easy to see the thermostat doesn't have). You have yet to establish why you think it necessary for belief to be linked to consciousness. What job does such a restriction do to the meaning and use of the word? — Pseudonym

Empirically, no computer makes it past a few minutes in a Turing Test. A belief is a product of consciousness. A comatose patient doesn't form beliefs.

So what about insects, bacteria, unconscious people, philosophical zombies, AI... Where do you draw the line on what can have beliefs and why? — Pseudonym

Sure, when is a chair a chair. Some things are clearly not chairs and some things clearly are, but that I can't tell you the exact dividing line hardly means there are no chairs. But, back at you, the same question. When is a belief a belief? Does the tree waving in the wind believe the wind is blowing? Does the ice forming in the freezer believe the temperature fell to 0 degree Celsius? Does the grape crushed on the floor believe that people are heavier than grapes?

Apparently metal expanding and flipping a switch is a belief, so I'm not real clear why all physical reactions aren't beliefs.

Do you suppose thermostats have phenomenal states? — Hanover

No, but then I don't really hold with phenomenalism in humans either.

guess having an opinion bars one from discussing that opinion with someone who has an opposing view? — Hanover

I wasn't opposed to your coming to this discussion with an existing opinion (I certainly have), what I couldn't understand the purpose of was your arguing against my position simply by stating that it does not tally with yours. Either there are some steps wrong can take to ascertain which position is most tenable or we might as well be arguing about whether blue or green is the best colour.

If you wish to assert that "it's clear that something different is happening when I believe it's too hot and the thermostat switches on the furnace.". I'd like to hear an argument as to why you think that, I'm not going to just take your word for it.

I do think it is very clear that your claiming that a thermostat has a belief is not how the word belief is used among speakers of English. — Hanover

My use of the thermostat was never intended as an Ordinary Language proposition about how the word 'belief' is used (the single quotes are to indicate reference to the word as opposed to its accepted meaning, by the way). The example is to explore whether our restriction of the term 'belief' to conscious creatures is justified analytically. This is a philosophy forum, not a linguists forum, I'm not so interested in how the word is used so much as what we can learn from it. That's why I keep coming back to the question of whether there is any meaningful job being done by restricting the word belief to conscious creatures. What is it about consciousness that makes belief data different from any other data (such as that which is stored in the position of a bimetallic strip)?

Apparently metal expanding and flipping a switch is a belief, so I'm not real clear why all physical reactions aren't beliefs. — Hanover

A belief is an attitude to a proposition in some way, I think perhaps we can all agree on that (although maybe not). The question is whether there is any need for the holder of that attitude to be aware they are holding it.

What differentiates a thermostat from the examples you give is that in the examples, there is no outside observer to whom the data is relevant. We're all quite comfortable with the idea that a computer hard drive contains data, it's all just diodes, but we call it data because the outcome is unpredictable to us. The ice in some way 'contains' the data that it's below freezing point, but that data was not unpredictable to us, the thermostat's data is.

I'm a determinist, so as far as I'm concerned, a person putting a coat on is a direct mechanistic consequence of the environment acting on their biological system. No different to the air temperature acting on the thermostat and causing it to switch the heating on. Yet at some point in time, we want to be able to say that the person 'believes' it is cold and it is this belief that causes them to put a coat on.

In order to be a cause, this belief must be a prior state of the biological system. More specifically it must be exactly that particular state which causes the coat putting on activity. If that state is what a belief is, then logically, that same prior state must also be a belief in the thermostat.

No, but then I don't really hold with phenomenalism in humans either. — Pseudonym

I can't make any sense of this statement.

If you wish to assert that "it's clear that something different is happening when I believe it's too hot and the thermostat switches on the furnace.". I'd like to hear an argument as to why you think that, I'm not going to just take your word for it. — Pseudonym

The thermostat isn't conscious, although I thought we've already been discussing that.

This is a philosophy forum, not a linguists forum, I'm not so interested in how the word is used so much as what we can learn from it. — Pseudonym

A meaningless distinction.

That's why I keep coming back to the question of whether there is any meaningful job being done by restricting the word belief to conscious creatures. What is it about consciousness that makes belief data different from any other data (such as that which is stored in the position of a bimetallic strip)? — Pseudonym

So are you admitting that there is a distinction between my belief and the thermostat's, yet you just don't think it's relevant enough to warrant it having a different term attached to it? If you're acknowledging my distinction, yet you just want to lump both as "beliefs," then we just disagree on terminology, not concepts.

What is it about consciousness that makes belief data different from any other data (such as that which is stored in the position of a bimetallic strip)? — Pseudonym

If consciousness exists in belief(1) but not belief(2), they are different.

A belief is an attitude to a proposition in some way, I think perhaps we can all agree on that (although maybe not). The question is whether there is any need for the holder of that attitude to be aware they are holding it. — Pseudonym

Is a proposition a linguistic statement? Are you now saying the thermostat has an attitude toward a linguistic statement? As best I can tell, all the spring does is expand, and that's what you call an "attitude"?

What differentiates a thermostat from the examples you give is that in the examples, there is no outside observer to whom the data is relevant. We're all quite comfortable with the idea that a computer hard drive contains data, it's all just diodes, but we call it data because the outcome is unpredictable to us. The ice in some way 'contains' the data that it's below freezing point, but that data was not unpredictable to us, the thermostat's data is. — Pseudonym

I don't follow any of these distinctions. The water freezes at 0 degrees and forms a barrier around our home to insulate us through the miracle of nature. I notice it does all that. Does the ice now have a belief it can insulate me? I can put mercury in a test tube and watch it rise with the temperature and use that for whatever purpose I choose, so now does the mercury have a belief? And if the thermostat exists in a house that no one enters, and the data it provides is relevant to no one, does it no longer have a belief? If I believe I'll have a ham sandwich for lunch, do I have a belief if that belief is irrelevant to everyone else.

I'm a determinist, so as far as I'm concerned, a person putting a coat on is a direct mechanistic consequence of the environment acting on their biological system. No different to the air temperature acting on the thermostat and causing it to switch the heating on. Yet at some point in time, we want to be able to say that the person 'believes' it is cold and it is this belief that causes them to put a coat on. — Pseudonym

And was it submitted that determinism was incompatible with having a conscious or forming a belief?

In order to be a cause, this belief must be a prior state of the biological system. More specifically it must be exactly that particular state which causes the coat putting on activity. If that state is what a belief is, then logically, that same prior state must also be a belief in the thermostat. — Pseudonym

This is an antiquated view of determinism, but regardless, it's irrelevant whether the thermostat's reaction and the human reaction are pre-determined. I've not argued that beliefs arise from an other world miracle substance.

My use of the thermostat was never intended as an Ordinary Language proposition about how the word 'belief' is used (the single quotes are to indicate reference to the word as opposed to its accepted meaning, by the way). The example is to explore whether our restriction of the term 'belief' to conscious creatures is justified analytically. This is a philosophy forum, not a linguists forum, I'm not so interested in how the word is used so much as what we can learn from it. That's why I keep coming back to the question of whether there is any meaningful job being done by restricting the word belief to conscious creatures. What is it about consciousness that makes belief data different from any other data (such as that which is stored in the position of a bimetallic strip)? — Pseudonym

The significant difference between the thermostat and the human belief is that the thermostat necessitates action, and in the human being belief doesn't necessarily result in action. One may or may not act on a belief. That's free will.

It would be more accurate to depict the thermometer itself as the thing with belief, such that the thermometer shows what it believes the temperature to be, and leaves it to the mechanism of the thermostat as to whether or not action ought to be taken on that belief, but the problems with this are twofold. The temperature shown by the thermometer still needs to be interpreted for meaning, while in human beings, belief is inexplicably bound to meaning. Also, the thermostat has no choice about acting on the belief, while the human being does.

The significant difference between the thermostat and the human belief is that the thermostat necessitates action, and in the human being belief doesn't necessarily result in action. One may or may not act on a belief. That's free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd take this a step further and eliminate the issue of free will. I can have a belief without any behavioral correlate. I can believe I'm going to the store tomorrow and no one would ever be able to know it. A thermostat cannot have a belief without a behavioral correlate because there's complete identity between the behavior and the belief in the thermostat.

I don't think that you can actually get rid of free will like that. Suppose you are "determined" to go to the store, in a determinist sense. What allows you to put off your trip to the store until tomorrow, rather than right now, other than will power? And if you're not so sure that you will actually go to the store tomorrow, then why do you believe it?

If consciousness exists in belief(1) but not belief(2), they are different. — Hanover

So are you admitting that there is a distinction between my belief and the thermostat's, yet you just don't think it's relevant enough to warrant it having a different term attached to it? — Hanover

Yes, that is exactly what I'm doing. There is a distinction between my cat and my next door neighbour's cat but not a significant enough one that they are not both still cats. Their 'catness' is do to with necessary characteristics which distinguish them from other animals in a useful way not an arbitrary one. The fact that one has long fur and one has short fur might well be the most obvious difference between the two, but it has no meaning, they could still breed and produce offspring (presumably with medium length fur).

Conciousness is nothing but a CCTV camera of our brain, watching a selection of the activity therein. What I'm arguing is that a belief is just a particular type of data, one that determines what an action will be in certain circumstances. any device capable of holding this type of data can have a belief. The fact that in our data holding device there is a feature that watches some of the activity makes no meaningful difference to the function of that data. It does exactly the same thing as it does in any machine, it causes us to act in a certain way in response to certain stimuli.

So what difference does conciousness make to the holding of a belief?

Is a proposition a linguistic statement? Are you now saying the thermostat has an attitude toward a linguistic statement? As best I can tell, all the spring does is expand, and that's what you call an "attitude"? — Hanover

I thought it would have been obvious that we were discussing the philosophy of mind (seeing as that is what the whole topic is about) and as such I thought is self-evident that the term 'proposition' would be understood in that context where a proposition relates to the brain state equivalent to a truth. I'm using the terms we would normally apply to humans in describing the thermostat to highlight the fact that there are no meaningful differences other than volume of data. I've yet to hear an argument explaining how the differences between the 'belief' in a human mind and the state of some other data holding device relative to how it will then act actually cause any meaningfully different ontology.

This is an antiquated view of determinism, but regardless, it's irrelevant whether the thermostat's reaction and the human reaction are pre-determined. I've not argued that beliefs arise from an other world miracle substance. — Hanover

It's only been five years since I left academia, but if in the meantime, some updated version of determinism has arisen other than the concept that all things have prior cause I'd love to hear it. If you are not arguing that the the relevant difference between the human's response to the cold and the thermostat's is that one can freely decide what to do about it and the other cannot, then what are you arguing is the difference?

To summarise - what difference is conciousness making to the properties of the data we're calling a 'belief'?

The significant difference between the thermostat and the human belief is that the thermostat necessitates action, and in the human being belief doesn't necessarily result in action. One may or may not act on a belief. That's free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

So explain to me how this works then. A human has a belief that it is cold and no other beliefs at all. The human 'decides' nonetheless to ignore the belief that they are cold and take off their jumper. Where did the thought to take off the jumper come from? Did it just magically appear in the brain?

A thermostat cannot have a belief without a behavioral correlate because there's complete identity between the behavior and the belief in the thermostat. — Hanover

I've already explained how a broken thermostat can have a belief (hold data related to an action), that it is cold, but fail to act on it because it's switch is broken or (for a more complex thermostat) it has been wrongly programmed. How is that any different from your brain holding the data we're calling a 'belief' but due to some other data (presuming we're being deterministic about it) arrives at the net result that you will not go to the store.

The only way you can say that your not going to the store is not the direct and necessary consequence of some belief is if you invoke dualism to say that the notion of not going to the store arose spontaneously in your mind. Otherwise it must have come directly and with absolute certainty, from some previous brain sate ('belief')

All that is different in more complex devices such as the human brain/body is that we have to produce a net result from many, often competing, beliefs. The thermostat only has 'it is cold' and 'when it is cold the heating is to be switched on', so it's action derives predictably. A human might have 'it is cold', 'when it is cold I should put my coat on' and 'my coat makes me look foolish because it is not fashionable'. So whether the human puts the coat on is now a moot point determined by the fourth belief 'maintaining my temperature is more important than maintaining my fashion status'.

In reality, of course, there will be hundreds (if not thousands) of such beliefs in a human at any one time which is what makes them so fascinatingly unpredictable, but at no point in time do any of these 'belief' magically become something else in a human system to what they are in any other system which both holds and responds to data.

Presumably water also has beliefs. So for example it demonstrates its belief that it is cold by freezing.

So explain to me how this works then. A human has a belief that it is cold and no other beliefs at all. The human 'decides' nonetheless to ignore the belief that they are cold and take off their jumper. Where did the thought to take off the jumper come from? Did it just magically appear in the brain? — Pseudonym

That doesn't work. What kind of ridiculous question is that?

The only way you can say that your not going to the store is not the direct and necessary consequence of some belief is if you invoke dualism to say that the notion of not going to the store arose spontaneously in your mind. Otherwise it must have come directly and with absolute certainty, from some previous brain sate ('belief') — Pseudonym

Looks like you're arguing for dualism now. But it's not the case that "not going to the store" is spontaneous, there's a reason for that. What is the case, is that one can decide to go to the store, but not at the present moment. so the person holds the seemingly contradictory beliefs, "I am going to the store", and "I am not going to the store (right now)". This allows that the decision to actually go to the store (and this is the source of the action), can be truly spontaneous. The person is all ready to go to the store, and chooses a time to leave, randomly.. .

the person holds the seemingly contradictory beliefs, "I am going to the store", and "I am not going to the store (right now)" — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the person could be said to hold the entirety complementary beliefs 'I am not going to the store right now' and 'I am going to the store at some point in the future'. As soon as the belief 'I am not going to the store right now' is removed or replaced as a direct consequence of external or internal stimuli, then they go to the store.

The person is all ready to go to the store, and chooses a time to leave, randomly.. . — Metaphysician Undercover

So how do they do that? Have they got a random number generator in their brain? Where does the random element come from?

What's more, if there is a truly random element (say quantum uncertainty) then that's not free-will is it. We're no more in charge of the randomness than we are of the causal chain.

No, the person could be said to hold the entirety complementary beliefs 'I am not going to the store right now' and 'I am going to the store at some point in the future'. As soon as the belief 'I am not going to the store right now' is removed or replaced as a direct consequence of external or internal stimuli, then they go to the store. — Pseudonym

OK, I'll accept that representation. The point is that the act of going to the store is not derived from, or caused by the belief. When "I am not going to the store right now" is removed, you are left with "I am going to the store at some point in the future". However, in reality you are actually going to the store right now. So your representation has created a separation between the belief "I am going to the store at some point in the future" and the action, going to the store right now.

So how do they do that? Have they got a random number generator in their brain? Where does the random element come from?

What's more, if there is a truly random element (say quantum uncertainty) then that's not free-will is it. We're no more in charge of the randomness than we are of the causal chain. — Pseudonym

That's why dualism is required, as you implied in your earlier post. Without dualism these features of the human being cannot be understood.

To summarise - what difference is conciousness making to the properties of the data we're calling a 'belief'? — Pseudonym

Consciousness mediates data by adding the ability to act on account of believing in different ways. This is what differentiates animals from machines.Everything may be reducible to mere data in the case of machines, but not in the case of animals. Machines do not believe, they merely respond to input (data) with output (action) mechanically. Animals transform input (sensation) into disposition to act (believing), but the nature of those acts is not mechanically determined. The next, linguistically mediated, step is to be reflectively self-aware of believing, and to formulate those dispositions to act as held beliefs.

That's why dualism is required, as you implied in your earlier post. Without dualism these features of the human being cannot be understood. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, we've reach a point where we fundamentally disagree on axiomatic grounds so I don't see we can go any further. You seem to be so unwilling to question your idea of what a human is that you have to invent a magical realm with it's own laws of physics and mess with the obvious determinacy of our own macro world, just to maintain your belief.

Personally, I think ten thousand years of presuming the world is deterministic and having that presumption work is pretty good evidence that it is, in fact, deterministic (at least at the scale we're looking at). Rather than invent magical realms, I'd rather first explore the far simpler possibility that what we think it is to be a human being is maybe wrong.

Consciousness mediates data by adding the ability to act on account of believing in different ways. — Janus

So, lay out for me exactly how conciousness does this. Lets simplify things and take a simple man, John. John has only three beliefs - that it is cold, that putting coats on alleviates cold, and that he does not like being cold. A computer would take these propositions and lead directly to putting a coat on by IF(it is cold) THEN(do the thing that alleviates cold), considering it holds the data - it is cold, and the thing that alleviates cold is putting a coat on.

So, if John has only those three belief (the if-then belief about what he ought to do, the belief that it's cold and the belief that coast are the thing that alleviate cold), how does conciousness do anything meaningful to his belief, his actions, or in fact, anything meaningful at all?

In other words, if you're claiming "the nature of those acts is not mechanically determined", by what are they determined?

So, lay out for me exactly how conciousness does this. — Pseudonym

Consciousness enables animals to perform unpredictable acts, and to an even greater degree, it enables humans, to perform not only unpredictable acts, but completely unpredictable kinds of acts.

In other words, if you're claiming "the nature of those acts is not mechanically determined", by what are they determined? — Pseudonym

They are organically determined.

Personally, I think ten thousand years of presuming the world is deterministic and having that presumption work is pretty good evidence that it is, in fact, deterministic (at least at the scale we're looking at). Rather than invent magical realms, I'd rather first explore the far simpler possibility that what we think it is to be a human being is maybe wrong. — Pseudonym

Huh? You think that free will has been consistently denied in favour of determinism for the last ten thousand years? Are you blind to the evidence?

Consciousness enables animals to perform unpredictable acts, and to an even greater degree, it enables humans, to perform not only unpredictable acts, but completely unpredictable kinds of acts. — Janus

I asked how, you've simply re-asserted your belief that it does, not how it does it.

They are organically determined. — Janus

How? What is the actual mechanism by which something no-physical causes a physical action? Where in the causal chain does it intercept?

Huh? You think that free will has been consistently denied in favour of determinism for the last ten thousand years? Are you blind to the evidence? — Metaphysician Undercover

What evidence?

I'm saying that the whole rest of the universe apart from our personal experience is demonstrably deterministic so the simplest theory that does not require us to invent new realms is that we too are deterministic and any impressions of ourselves to the contrary are wrong.

The evidence that would be required to falsify that theory would be evidence that it is not possible, that there is no mechanism by which our actions could be predetermined. I see no such evidence, so I continue with the simplest theory, that's the scientific method that has proven so successful thus far.

There is, however, a great deal of evidence in support of the fact that our actions are not the result of 'free-will'. The Libet experiments for example, showing that the sub-concious brain prepares to take physical action before the concious part of the brain is aware of the decision to. Experiments on hypnotic suggestion which have shown that when subjects have an hypnotic suggestion implanted, say to crawl on the floor when the hypnotist clicks their fingers, they will invariable come up with some justification for their desire to do so in terms of a free choice "I'm just going to check if I've dropped something" or "what a fascinating floor tiles, I'm just going to take a closer look", all the while the experimenter knows full well that these are post hoc stories and the real driver of the action is the hypnotic suggestion, yet to the subject the feeling is entirely that they are checking if they've dropped something, or interested in the floor tile.

So the simplest theory is that our actions are entirely deterministic and our feeling of free-will is mistaken, and we have considerable evidence that what we think is us choosing something is actually just a post hoc story.

Who said consciousness is non-physical? Think of Spinoza's cogitans and extensa being one thing understood two ways.

What evidence? — Pseudonym

The whole legal system is designed around intention and free will.

I'm saying that the whole rest of the universe apart from our personal experience is demonstrably deterministic so the simplest theory that does not require us to invent new realms is that we too are deterministic and any impressions of ourselves to the contrary are wrong. — Pseudonym

I think we know our own actions better than we know "the whole rest of the universe". So if our own actions display free will, and we design the legal system for dealing with our actions as if we have free will, then even if the rest of the universe displays determinism, I would tend to think that we don't know the rest of the universe very well. And, it is quite evident that we do not understand the rest of the universe very well, as is evident from concepts like quantum uncertainty, spatial expansion, dark matter, and dark energy.

The Libet experiments for example, showing that the sub-concious brain prepares to take physical action before the concious part of the brain is aware of the decision to. — Pseudonym

The Libet experiments support the existence of will power, the capacity of the conscious mind to prevent "caused" physical action. Preparing to take physical action, and actually taking that action is two distinct things. That we have the capacity to consciously prevent a caused physical action from occurring, until the desired time, indicates the existence of free will.

Experiments on hypnotic suggestion which have shown that when subjects have an hypnotic suggestion implanted, say to crawl on the floor when the hypnotist clicks their fingers, they will invariable come up with some justification for their desire to do so in terms of a free choice "I'm just going to check if I've dropped something" or "what a fascinating floor tiles, I'm just going to take a closer look", all the while the experimenter knows full well that these are post hoc stories and the real driver of the action is the hypnotic suggestion, yet to the subject the feeling is entirely that they are checking if they've dropped something, or interested in the floor tile. — Pseudonym

I don't see how placing an individual in a hypnotic trance is relevant to the issue of conscious free will. That's like arguing that a person has no conscious free will within one's dreams.