I agree that science does not make such claims concerning "objectivity", as I said, that's what philosophy does — Metaphysician Undercover

So how does philosophy do it then?

But you had made the contrary claim. "Scientists certainly do not consult philosophers to check whether their results are objective. They already know whether their results are objective by the confirmation of others." So that's one thing I objected to, and I'm glad you now realize that what you said wasn't really correct. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, fair enough I was being inaccurate for brevity, what I should have said was that ""Scientists certainly do not consult philosophers to check whether their results are approaching objective"

Why do you think that one is "closer to being likely to be a property of the object"? Each is a description, and as such it is subjective, of the subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

Because if two descriptions match the probability that the descriptions describe properties of the object increase. The probability of two descriptions which entirely made up in the head (ie have no reference to properties of the object) matching are no better than random as there is no reason why they would match. The more they match, therefore, the less likely it is that their matching is a random coincidence, thus is requires an explanation. The theory is that the reason they match is because they describe some property of the object. That theory becomes more and more likely the more people match because it become increasingly unlikely that the match is coincidence.

To gain knowledge about the object, we need to go beyond this, and ask what does it mean to be an object, to exist as an object, and these are the question which ontology and metaphysics are concerned with. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you read my posts, I'm talking specifically about what it is that something meaningful can be said about. Talking about the questions metaphysics "asks" is irrelevant. Theology "asks" questions about religious texts, it doesn't mean their answers are meaningful. The question is not what better techniques do we have than science for 'asking' questions, it is what better techniques do we have than science for answering them.

What a sadly impoverished worldview! — Janus

How does the addition of knowledge make a world view more impoverished. Personally, I think the rejection of knowledge in favour of dwelling on what we want to be the case is impoverished, but if you want to reverse the enlightenment you carry on.

Which is why discussion is pointless - because if that is true then there is no means of ‘persuasion by rational argument’. You can’t change someone’s mind if there’s no mind to be changed. — Wayfarer

Why does the conclusion that the self and free-will are illusions lead to the conclusion that discussion has not impact on beliefs?

When did I say there was no mind?

As such there is no 'ought', there is only what we 'are' going to do. — Pseudonym

I take it this is an attempt to solve the ‘is/ought’ problem by declaring that one ought not to say ‘ought’.

But then:

Science can therefore make predictions (which is its job) about what we 'are' going to do and how we 'are' going to feel in certain circumstances. Therefore, given that we definitely 'are' going to want to bring those circumstances about, science can make statements about what courses of action are most likely to succeed. There's no further debate about whether we 'ought' to do these things because we just will, or will not depending on how convinced we are of them.

I should know better than to tackle any proposition which has scare quotes around ‘are’ - but anyway, the two phrases that stick out here are:

‘Given that we definitely are going to want....’

And

‘Depending on how convinced we are’.

Who is this ‘we’? How does what ‘we’ want come into a ‘fully objective’ description? Why should ‘our’ convictions have any bearing on what ‘we’ are going to do? Surely ‘what we are going to do’ can be predicted by a third party, according to your own argument. But if the outcome depends on ‘what we want’ or ‘how convinced we are’ - then how is science going to predict that?

In neither Plotinus nor Advaita is physical death understood in terms of non-existence or non-being. — Wayfarer

Then I agree with them. Whether reincarnation, or timeless sleep, it isn't nonexistence or non-being.

Only Materialists believe in the non-existence and non-being, though it's unlikely that they know what they mean when they say it.

What it does mean however is obviously not going to be an easy thing to say or to fathom. — Wayfarer

I don't claim to know what it will be like, other than it will be a lot like going to sleep.

Of course, if there is, or isn't, reincarnation, we won't know, because, by that time, we'll be too unconscious to know that there was this life. One thing for sure is that death will involve going to sleep.

After that, if another life begins, it will be like the beginning of this life was, and we'll have no idea that we lived before.

Suffice to say that the common aim of those traditions is to realize an identity that is not subject to death. — Wayfarer

I'm the first to admit that i don't understand that.

Everyone dies.

I don't understand that goal. I have no such goal. The Neo-Advaita teachers, who probably have counterparts among Buddhist teachers too, offer the drive-through Enlightenment that Westerners want to buy. I have no idea what Enlightenment is. That's ok, because I'm sure that it isn't time for it,

I agree with the Hindus when they say that life-completion comes after many lifetimes, during which a person eventually improves his lifestyle.

Instead of "not subject to death", maybe it's "eventually not predisposed to rebirth".

Plotinus, that is through seeking the identity of the soul with the One - very similar to Vedanta. — Wayfarer

I think there's reason to believe that there's good intent behind what is,

...and cause for gratitude because of how good what-is is.. That's an impression, not something to argue, debate, or convince anyone about (...so if anyone disagrees, don't ask for proof, description, explanation, justification or debate) This paragraph isn't about metaphysics, by which I mean the topic of what discussably, describablly is.

Anyway, that impression is all I know about meta-metaphysics. What you referred to in the above passage that I quoted--That's meta-metaphysics, rather than metaphysics, isn't it?

If it's true, it isn't knowable to me.

...unless you're talking about a metaphysical position that can be explained. But it doesn't sound like that. I've always gotten the impression that sages were referring to an emotional, attitudinal understanding, and that isn't metaphysics. But that advanced attitudinal, emotional understanding might only be for the longtime life-completed person.

Some Neo-Advaitists think that if they attend enough lectures or satsangs, they'll "get" it. I have no idea what they're talking about, or what they want or mean.

It seems to me that the experiencer--the primary component of the hypothetical reality that is his/her experience-story, the protagonist that it's about, the reason why it's an experience-story--could be what is meant when people refer to a soul.

So the purpose of the spiritual discipline or sadhana is to ‘realize the Self’ (in Vedantic terms) instead of identification with ego and sense-objects. — Wayfarer

I don't know what they mean about realizing the Self, but maybe part of the eventual life-completion would include less egoism, subconscious and conscious wants, needs and recently-earned feelings of guilt.

Realizing that identity is called mokṣa. — Wayfarer

...something that I have no understanding about the meaning of, and which will probably only be for, and understood by, the longtime life-completed person.

Michael Osspoff

What do you mean by meta-metaphysics? — Metaphysician Undercover

By metaphysics I mean general discussion of the limits of what describably, discussably is.

By meta-metaphysics, I mean what else is.

But I emphasize that some people think that everything that is, is discussable and describable, and that i'm not making any claim about that matter, or arguing a position about it, or inclined to debate it, or qualified to explain it or give details about it.

I'm the first to admit that I don't claim to know about the matter.

Michael Ossipoff.

I've always gotten the impression that sages were referring to an emotional, attitudinal understanding, and that isn't metaphysics. But that advanced attitudinal, emotional understanding might only be for the longtime life-completed person. — Michael Ossipoff

Well, that's true. If you read Plotinus, you will discover he is very similar to the Advaitin sages, like Ramana Maharishi who died in 1950, and who has a large readership in the West. Such sages really do appear, although very rarely, I'm sure.

Metaphysics is like the preserved sayings of such individuals. Because of their great insight, they will utter various things, which from their perspective is completely clear and obvious, but from the viewpoint of those around them are profound and seemingly impossible to fathom. So the students write down their talks and lectures and try and organise them into a body of ideas (which is exactly how we come to have the teachings of Plotinus, as they were written down by his student Porphyry.) That is where metaphysics comes from. But the sages themselves are by no means attached to metaphysics, nor do they see them as profound. Ultimately their teaching is silence and their actual presence. (That is why actually meeting with a sage is regarded as more effective than any book-learning in the traditions; such an encounter is called a 'darshana', a 'seeing'. Also in India, their teachings are called 'darshanas'. Actually sages are quite dismissive of metaphysics and philosophy. Ramana Maharishi used to say, they're like a stick you use to get the fire going - once it's burning, you throw the stick into the fire.)

Here, I'm certainly not claiming any special insight or knowledge of profound truths. All of what I've said above is available in many of the popular books available on such topics. And I do agree that there are traps and pitfalls such as 'pseudo-Advaita' and other pop versions. It's unavoidable that these occur, but as the saying goes, 'there would be no fool's gold if there were no gold.'

I should know better than to tackle any proposition which has scare quotes around ‘are’ - but anyway, — Wayfarer

Wierd, that's the second time someone's commented in that way on my use of single quotations. Do they mean something different in America? In England (in academic writing anyway) they just mean that the definition of the term is contested and is being used in the specific sense. I'm acknowledging that we probably don't agree on the meaning of the term.

Who is this ‘we’? — Wayfarer

The organism involved. The limits of this organism might be hazy (do we include the bacteria on our skin?), but that haziness doesn't make any difference here.

How does what ‘we’ want come into a ‘fully objective’ description? — Wayfarer

The same way as any scientific theory, probabilistically. We can't say with certainty that the earth orbits the sun, its just our observations make it increasingly likely it does. Most people seem to want the same broad set of things, neuroscience can refine and improve on these observations making any theory based on them even more likely to be accurate. I don't see what's so magic about morality that makes it uniquely immune to scientific investigation.

Why should ‘our’ convictions have any bearing on what ‘we’ are going to do? Surely ‘what we are going to do’ can be predicted by a third party, according to your own argument. — Wayfarer

Yes, given a complete set of a person's 'convictions' and details of the environmental influences, a third party could predict my actions. Advertising agencies are already remarkably good at predict people's reactions to stimuli and we're only at the very beginning of modern neuroscience.

But if the outcome depends on ‘what we want’ or ‘how convinced we are’ - then how is science going to predict that? — Wayfarer

Because 'what we want' just isn't that much of a mystery. Why do you think advertising works so well, why are there only two main political parties in most democracies, why is it that if you landed in a high street in any developed country in the world you won't even be able to tell where you were (other than by meaningless differences like language).

Again, the more we investigate, the more we know about the things, I really don't understand what you are finding so hard to grasp about that concept.

The probability of two descriptions which entirely made up in the head (ie have no reference to properties of the object) matching are no better than random as there is no reason why they would match. The more they match, therefore, the less likely it is that their matching is a random coincidence, thus is requires an explanation. The theory is that the reason they match is because they describe some property of the object. That theory becomes more and more likely the more people match because it become increasingly unlikely that the match is coincidence. — Pseudonym

That descriptions reference objects does not mean that the descriptions aren't entirely made up in the head. You seem to think that the descriptions are somehow outside of the head, as properties of the object. In logic, as in grammar, there is a subject and a predicate. Predication is of the subject. So we have a clear separation between what is in the head, and what is not. That a specific object is designated as corresponding to that subject, requires a different judgement.

By metaphysics I mean general discussion of the limits of what describably, discussably is.

By meta-metaphysics, I mean what else is. — Michael Ossipoff

So you are positing something which is, which is other than that which is. Isn't that contradictory? I know that you say the one "is" refers to what we can talk about, and the other "is refers to what we can't talk about, but haven't you just talked about it by saying it "is". So if it's not contradictory, it's at the least, very hypocritical. How is it possible that you can mention the thing, and have a meta-metaphysics to talk about the things which we can't talk about?

, I really don't understand what you are finding so hard to grasp about that concept. — Pseudonym

I grasp it alright, I just say it is muddled. It is such a melange of mixed metaphors and misunderstood ideas that it’s not worth spending more time on.

What you refer to is not knowledge, but an attitude which rules out much more than it includes. It is better characterized as an ignorance than as a knowledge.

But what really changes is the properties of an object, and what it means to exist as an object remains the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

But we are addressing human understanding and knowledge of these things, neither of which remain the same. What does remain the same is the fact that the basic common sense understandings always precede the understandings and knowledge that come from further comprehensive investigations and dialectical developments.

So we have a clear separation between what is in the head, and what is not. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not suggesting that the two are literally the same thing, but that the are sufficiently similar.

There is a way that the world is, even if you're a solipsist and consider the world to be entirely a construct of the mind, then that is the way the world is.

This world is divisible into parts, if we allow the divisions to be arbitrary.

Each part of the world (a thing) will therefore have a "way it is" (its properties), because it is a part of the world, which has a "way it is".

I can either form my opinion about the way a thing is (its properties) somehow from the thing (physical properties eminating from it, or mental states caused by it), or I could make them up (by which I mean form them from stimuli which did not in any way come from the thing.

If I form my ideas about the thing the latter way, and you do too, then our ideas about the thing are unlikely to be the same because they are formed from some other source (in case I actually need to explain probability, this is because there are more things that aren't the thing in question than there are which are it).

It follows, therefore, that if you and I both have the same idea about the thing, we would naturally look for some explanation, the similarity is not what we'd expect by chance. One explanation is that we might have discussed our ideas and deliberately made them similar, but if we can rule that out, the next most plausible explanation is that our ideas both have the same cause - that they in fact reflect something about the way the thing is.

What you refer to is not knowledge, but an attitude which rules out much more than it includes. It is better characterized as an ignorance than as a knowledge. — Janus

What nonsense, are you trying to claim that theories of neuroscience which have considerable empirical evidence do not even count as knowledge? Then what does?

Also, let it just be noted here, that Sam Harris’ purported expertise in neuroscience is based on his completion of a questionable PhD thesis written (with co-authors) on the subject of ‘neural correlates of religious belief’. The methodology and pre-suppositions of the thesis have been subject to much criticism of for example cherry-picking and confirmation bias, quite aside from the possibility of the topic itself being entirely questionable.

After finishing his PhD., Harris has never lectured in neuroscience, nor authored any scientific papers in that subject, nor been employed as a neuro-scientist. His entire career has been in popular philosophy (if you can call it that) and the ‘evangelical atheism’ on which he made his name, as one of the so-called ‘four horsemen of new atheism’.

For a cold hard look at the pretentions of neuroscientism in respect to philosophy, one standard critical text is The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Bennett and Hacker.

You are conflating the science as practical knowledge with its interpretation as worldview.

But we are addressing human understanding and knowledge of these things, neither of which remain the same. — Janus

No, we were discussing objectivity, what it means to be an object regardless of human understanding. Perhaps you joined into this discussion a bit later, but human understanding is a property of the subject, "subjective".

I'm not suggesting that the two are literally the same thing, but that the are sufficiently similar. — Pseudonym

What? The logical subject is sufficiently similar to the physical object? No, there is a categorical difference between them. They do not have the same type of existence at all.

This world is divisible into parts, if we allow the divisions to be arbitrary.

Each part of the world (a thing) will therefore have a "way it is" (its properties), because it is a part of the world, which has a "way it is". — Pseudonym

You demonstrate inconsistency here. If the divisions are arbitrary, then the "way it is" of the part is dependent on the division. The description of the part is dependent on the division made. This we can know. That there is a "way it is" of the world as a whole, is just an assumption, so we cannot actually know that. And, relativity theory assumes as a premise that there is not such thing as the "way it is" of the world as a whole. It assumes that the "way it is" is dependent on the perspective of the part. So there really isn't any support for your assertion that there is a "way it is" of the world as a whole.

No, we were discussing objectivity, what it means to be an object regardless of human understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

"What it means to be an object regardless of human understanding" seems to be hopelessly incoherent.

Perhaps, but I was just trying to get a handle on what is meant by "objective", in the sense of "of the object". I take it that you think this to be hopelessly incoherent.

'Objective' and 'subjective' are categories of human understanding; so nothing wrong with trying to clarify the differences ever more precisely. Nothing incoherent about that!

By metaphysics I mean general discussion of the limits of what describably, discussably is.

By meta-metaphysics, I mean what else is — Michael Ossipoff

So you are positing something which is, which is other than that which is. Isn't that contradictory? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. It's completely contradictory.

Of course I didn't say it. :D

I didn't say that metaphysics is the discussion of all that is. I said that metaphysics is the general discussion to the limits of what discussably and describably is.

I know that you say the one "is" refers to what we can talk about, and the other "is refers to what we can't talk about

No, the "Is" s don't have different intrinsic meanings. But one of them is accompanied a limiting-quailfier.

.
, but haven't you just talked about it by saying it "is". So if it's not contradictory, it's at the least, very hypocritical. How is it possible that you can mention the thing, and have a meta-metaphysics to talk about the things which we can't talk about?

If I tell you that there are national secrets, things that aren't allowed to be discussed, and you say, "But you've just discussed them by saying they are. That's hypocritical.", how much sense would that make?

Are we grasping at straws?

I've often used the additional adverbial qualifiers "accurately and completely" with "discussable and describable".

Add that, if you like.

Michael Ossipoff

If I tell you that there are national secrets, things that aren't allowed to be discussed, and you say, "But you've just discussed them by saying they are. That's hypocritical.", how much sense would that make? — Michael Ossipoff

I think that makes a lot of sense. So my objection holds. Why would you mention, or bring up for discussion, something which you claim cannot be discussed. That's nonsense. Either they really cannot be discussed, in which case you wouldn't be able to mention them for discussion, or your assertion that they cannot be discussed is false. Clearly your assertion is false because you are saying "I cannot talk about the national secretes which I am talking about".

Therefore, I think that unless you can explain your distinction between metaphysical and meta-metaphysical, in a way which makes sense, you are just talking nonsense.

If I tell you that there are national secrets, things that aren't allowed to be discussed, and you say, "But you've just discussed them by saying they are. That's hypocritical.", how much sense would that make? — Michael Ossipoff

I think that makes a lot of sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

To each their own :D

So my objection holds.

It must--You say so yourself :D

Why would you mention, or bring up for discussion, something which you claim cannot be discussed.
That's nonsense.

Indeed it is. I didn't bring it up for discussion.

(...but it seems to be getting lots of discussion :D )

I define meta-metaphysical matters as regarding whatever is, but doesn't come under my definition of metaphysical matters.

But I don't assert that not all of Reality can be accurately and completely discussed and described. I don't assert it, and I'm not going to debate it. I've already said that. Perhaps you missed that part :D

Are you clear about that yet?

Either they really cannot be discussed, in which case you wouldn't be able to mention them for discussion

I didn't mention them for discussion. You insist on discussing them, but don't blame me for inviting you to or telling you to.

, or your assertion that they cannot be discussed is false.

I don't assert that there's anything that you can't accurately discuss and describe. As I said, I don't make assertions on the matter, and I'm not going to debate it.

Clearly your assertion is false

I didn't make an assertion. I stated a definition. See above.

because you are saying "I cannot talk about the national secretes which I am talking about".

You're getting yourself all confused. Re-read my definitions of metaphysics and meta-metaphysics.

In those definitions I don't talk about matters of meta-metaphysics other than to define them as "What else is."

That definition isn't a statement about "whatever else is". A definition of a topic isn't a statement about that topic's matters..

Therefore, I think that unless you can explain your distinction between metaphysical and meta-metaphysical, in a way which makes sense

My definitions of metaphysics and meta-metaphysics state their distinction.

Only you know what makes sense to you. I won't tell you what should make sense to you. That's entirely your business.

You know, we've been over this several times, and you keep repeating already-answered claims. Continuing this conversation would serve no purpose.

It's time to just agree to disagree.

Michael Ossipoff

But the sages themselves are by no means attached to metaphysics, nor do they see them as profound.

Actually sages are quite dismissive of metaphysics and philosophy. Ramana Maharishi used to say, they're like a stick you use to get the fire going - once it's burning, you throw the stick into the fire.) — Wayfarer

Yes, certainly. But there are two people at these forums who are giving me humungous flak for even suggesting a word for a matter of what is, but isn't covered in metaphysics, and isn't a subject for assertions, argument, debate, or accurate, complete descriptions.

Michael Ossipoff

'Objective' and 'subjective' are categories of human understanding; so nothing wrong with trying to clarify the differences ever more precisely. Nothing incoherent about that! — Janus

I define "objective" as "perceieved by more than one individual, and, in some (not necessarily specified) manner, more than hypothetical".

Michael Ossipoff

Also, let it just be noted here, that Sam Harris’ purported expertise in neuroscience is based on his completion of a questionable PhD thesis written (with co-authors) on the subject of ‘neural correlates of religious belief’. The methodology and pre-suppositions of the thesis have been subject to much criticism of for example cherry-picking and confirmation bias, quite aside from the possibility of the topic itself being entirely questionable.

After finishing his PhD., Harris has never lectured in neuroscience, nor authored any scientific papers in that subject, nor been employed as a neuro-scientist. His entire career has been in popular philosophy (if you can call it that) and the ‘evangelical atheism’ on which he made his name, as one of the so-called ‘four horsemen of new atheism’. — Wayfarer

Vilayanor Ramachandran also considers there to be a neurological correlate of religion, he's a professor at the University of California, teaching and researching for 36 years.
Bruce Hood also agrees with Sam Harris's work, a doctor of Philosophy and professor of psychology teaching and researching for 27 years.
Michael Persinger is also of this view, a Neurologist actively researching, publishing and teaching for 43 years.
Robert Sapolsky takes Harris's opinion even further yet he's a neuroscientist of 47 years teaching and research experience and has won several awards for his contributions.
Michael Inzlicht, professor of psychology and neuroscience 25 years, Jordan Grafman, neuroscientist 38 years, Patricia Churchland, neuroscience teaching and research professor of 35 years.

Since we're on the subject, the Statistician who supposedly investigated Sam Harris's paper is a Gun-For-Hire self-appointed "Statistician to the stars", recently found to have misunderstood the most basic of statistics http://gregladen.com/blog/2012/02/01/william-m-briggs-has-misunders/.

Check your facts before you start engaging in your pathetic ad hominem attacks.

You are conflating the science as practical knowledge with its interpretation as worldview. — Janus

No, I'm saying that evidence-based theories are as good a definition of what constitutes knowledge as any other. There are evidence-based theories which suggest that free-will and the self are both illusory and are not what we think they are. Therefore, learning about them constitutes knowledge, not ignorance.

Ignoring them because we don't like their conclusions is ignorance, the clue's in the name.

It is nevertheless a fact that Sam Harris has never worked as a neuroscientist, but as a pop philosopher - and that’s not an ad hominem but a statement of fact. Whether the concept of ‘the neural correlates of religion’ is even meaningful is an open question, and to anyone who is interested in either subject, might even be a meaningless question.

What? The logical subject is sufficiently similar to the physical object? No, there is a categorical difference between them. They do not have the same type of existence at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm saying that the similar things are the properties as contained within the 'idea of the thing' are similar to the properties of the thing. In the same way as a photograph of the Eiffel tower is similar to the Eiffel tower in some important aspects despite being in a different medium (2D paper as opposed to 3D reality). Everyone would still recognise the Eiffel tower from a photograph of it, no-one is going to say "well I don't know what this is at all, the Eiffel tower is a massive three dimensional steel structure, this is a piece of paper with some photographic ink on it, the two thing are completely unalike".
Moreover, everyone would recognise that a photograph of something else entirely was totally unrelated to the Eiffel tower in a way that the photograph of it was not.

The blue prints for the Eiffel tower would represent it even more accurately, despite still being ink and paper rather than three-dimensional steel structure, as would the blueprints for another building be totally unrelated.

So it is with our 'idea of the thing' and 'the thing in itself'. If our 'idea of the thing' comes in some way from 'the thing itself' then it will likely be similar to everyone else's 'idea of the thing' because all 'ideas of the thing' will have had the same cause and so will be similar, like if everyone took a photograph of the Eiffel tower, they might be from different angles or photographic quality, but all recognisably similar.

But if my 'idea of the thing' differs radically from yours, then it is more likely that the ideas have been causes by something other than 'the thing itself' because how could 'the thing itself' cause in us two such radically different ideas? It would be like seeing two radically different photographs and claiming that they were both of the Eiffel tower. Not impossible, but unlikely.

It is nevertheless a fact that Sam Harris has never worked as a neuroscientist, but as a pop philosopher - and that’s not an ad hominem but a statement of fact. — Wayfarer

The claim of ad hominem does not depend on the attack being a lie, the fact that your assessment of Harris's CV is accurate has nothing to do with it. It's ad hominem because you placed this attack in an argument about a subject matter on which Sam Harris also speaks. You're clearly trying to say that this line of argument is likely to be false because one of it's proponents lacks teaching experience, without paying any attention to all of its other proponents, and you accused him of cherry-picking.

If you have an actual line of argument then lay it out and defend it, please, as many have asked before me, stop making wild accusations against physicalists and then hiding behind long historical anecdotes or ad hominem attacks when you are asked to support your claims. It makes for a very poor discussion, which is what this site is all about.