The individual must understand the meaning of the proposition in order to correctly be said to believe that proposition.
The individual thinks the proposition is true. — Banno

These are the weak points, in my assessment. You state in your profile that a proposition is a statement which can be true or false. Yet it's conceivable to me that an individual could not understand the statement, "The sky is blue", or any translation of it, yet nevertheless believe that the sky is blue. It does not strike me, prima facie, as an impossibility. If so, it further seems to me that this would also mean that the individual would tacitly think that the statement is true, even if the individual had no conscious understanding of the concept of truth or of statements. If these concepts and their relations and so on were explained to the individual, then one would expect that he or she would affirm that that was indeed what he or she had believed prior to attaining awareness of the fact.

Yet it's conceivable to me... — Sapientia

I think you must do better than just tell me what you can imagine. Some folk say they can conceive of a round square.

Believe Nothing; seek to know

I think you must do better than just tell me what you can imagine. Some folk say they can conceive of a round square. — Banno

No, I think that you must explain why it is supposedly impossible, as one could do with your example of a round square. What more can I do except describe the situation, which I have done already to some extent, and note the absence of contradiction, which again I have already done. Do you want more detail or what?

...an individual could not understand the statement, "The sky is blue", or any translation of it, yet nevertheless believe that the sky is blue... — Sapientia

That's the contradiction. Any test you did to see if the individual believed the sky was blue would by that very fact be teaching them a translation of "the sky is blue".

Yet it's conceivable to me that an individual could not understand the statement, "The sky is blue", or any translation of it, yet nevertheless believe that the sky is blue. — Sapientia

How could you believe the sky is blue if you had no concept of blue or of the sky? If you did have such concepts, which would necessarily be expressed in some language, then you would, with the appropriate help in translating, be able to understand the English sentence "the sky is blue".
Sure, without such concepts, meaning without any language, you could see the blue sky, but that is not the same as believing the sky is blue.

That's the contradiction. Any test you did to see if the individual believed the sky was blue would by that very fact be teaching them a translation of "the sky is blue". — Banno

Not a contradiction. As I said, that would affirm what was the case prior to the learning of the translation. And we know that prior to the learning of the translation, he had no understanding of its meaning.

How could you believe the sky is blue if you had no concept of blue or of the sky? — Janus

Obviously by seeing the actual blue sky. No concept required.

Sure, without such concepts, meaning without any language, you could see the blue sky, but that is not the same as believing the sky is blue. — Janus

So you answered your own question. It doesn't have to be the same. In fact, I agree that the one is not the same as the other. But the one leads to the other, which is all that matters. You see, then you believe. Simples. No concepts required. No linguistic understanding required.

I'm curious as to why this discussion has spanned eight pages.

that would affirm what was the case prior to the learning of the translation. — Sapientia

How? What you will have done is to teach a new game - picking a colour swatch or whatever. Notice that in the very act of teaching the individual to pick a colour swatch you would use multiple examples, and not just of blue. You are teaching a language game.

And that's the point. Belief is a language game. It requires language.

How? What you will have done is to teach a new game - picking a colour swatch or whatever. Notice that in the very act of teaching the individual to pick a colour swatch you would use multiple examples, and not just of blue. You are teaching a language game.

And that's the point. Belief is a language game. It requires language. — Banno

I think that you're missing out steps in your argument which you seem to be simply assuming, so let's break it down.

We start with an individual with no understanding of the statement, "The sky is blue", or any translation of it, yes? He's a lone, primitive, hunter-gatherer type, shall we say?

Now, how on earth will teaching him the meaning of a statement somehow demonstrate that he already knew the meaning which you've just taught him?

I say that he is, in a sense, a blank slate. That the meaning is learnt, not preloaded into his brain or something of the sort. That would be quite absurd when you think about it. How many statements would we already understand the meaning of before we had ever even learnt what the symbols which form the language mean? It seems that there would be an infinite number, yet we wouldn't even at that point have learnt the basic building blocks and methods of construction. How is that plausible?

...how on earth will teaching him the meaning somehow demonstrate that he already knew the meaning which you've just taught him? — Sapientia

Odd; you seem now to be adamantly agreeing with me.

You have taught him to participate in a language game. In order to play, our friend must learn to differentiate blue form other colours; that is, he learns what "blue" is. In so doing he may well form a belief about the sky being blue.

Odd; you seem now to be adamantly agreeing with me.

You have taught him to participate in a language game. In order to play, our friend must learn to differentiate blue form other colours; that is, he learns what "blue" is. In so doing he may well form a belief about the sky being blue. — Banno

No, I don't think that we agree, unless you agree with me that he already had that belief, namely that the sky is blue, despite having had no prior understanding of the meaning of the corresponding statement, or the words which compose it, or any such translation of the statement or the words which compose it.

Teaching him the meaning of a language will do just that, but it doesn't demonstrate this controversial assumption you seem to have about his prior state of understanding. There are two distinct means of formation at play here. He forms the belief that the sky is blue after seeing the blue sky. And he forms an understanding of the meaning of the statement, "The sky is blue", after learning the language. Yet, if he remained a lone primitive until death, then he could go his whole life without ever having gained the latter formation. And, furthermore, if he did so, say, at some point later in life, then that would affirm nothing from your side of the debate, but it would on the contrary affirm what I've been saying on my side of the debate, as I expect the individual would attest.

But the one leads to the other, which is all that matters. You see, then you believe. — Sapientia

Seeing the blue sky is not believing that the sky is blue. Actually, there is a sense in which a pre-linguistic percipient could be said not to even see the blue sky since s/he has no concept of blue or sky. Of course, from our linguistically conditioned point of view it makes sense to us to say she sees the blue sky. But believing that the sky is blue is, whatever the case might be regarding the mere seeing of the blue sky, a further reflective step that is not possible without language.

...he already had that belief, despite having no understanding of the meaning of the corresponding statement, or the words which compose it, or any such translation of the statement or the words which compose it. — Sapientia

:wink:

Pretty cool things, these beliefs that do nothing.

SO, on your account, water believes it is cold, and hence decides to freeze.

Seeing the blue sky is not believing the sky is blue. — Janus

Did you not read what I just said? I haven't claimed otherwise. I am not claiming equivalence. I am claiming entailment. Don't waste my time.

Actually, there is a sense in which a pre-linguistic percipient could be said not to even see the blue sky since s/he has no concept of blue or sky. — Janus

Sure, a lot of absurd things can be said, especially in philosophy. The right thing to do, I feel, is to set the record straight, not embrace such twaddle.

Of course from our linguistically conditioned point of view she sees the blue sky. — Janus

No, she sees the blue sky regardless. Is there the sky? Yes. Is it blue? Yes. Does she see it? Yes. That's what is required, and as a matter of fact; not these additional false requirements that you're positing about language or concepts or points of view or whatnot.

But believing that the sky is blue is, whatever the case might be regarding the mere seeing of the blue sky, a further reflective step that is not possible without language. — Janus

You have yet to demonstrate to me that this further step of ascertaining belief is not possible without language. Asserting it won't do.

Asserting it won't do. — Sapientia

But

...despite having no understanding of the meaning of the corresponding statement, or the words which compose it, or any such translation of the statement or the words which compose it. — Sapientia

will?

Seriously?

Seeing is believing. Literally.

Pretty cool things, these beliefs that do nothing. — Banno

SO, on your account, water believes it is cold, and hence decides to freeze. — Banno

Well that conversion went down hill quickly. Is this an indication from you that you have nothing substantial to say in reply? Because that's how I'm interpreting it.

will?

Seriously? — Banno

Okay, so I have an assertion to match your own. I'm willing to explore it, and defend it and so on, but it's down to yourself and others to ask me questions about it, and offer up scrutiny. That's how dialogue works, right?

And remember! I broke it down and ran it by you. Don't blame me for what you've disregarded in haste. Perhaps if you engaged more when given the opportunity...

We start with an individual with no understanding of the statement, "The sky is blue", or any translation of it, yes? He's a lone, primitive, hunter-gatherer type, shall we say? — Sapientia

Do you accept the above? If so, why wouldn't he believe that the sky's blue if he has seen it with his own eyes? You might posit that language is necessary, but how so?

Did you not read what I just said? I haven't claimed otherwise. I am not claiming equivalence. I am claiming entailment. — Sapientia

So you are claiming that seeing the blue sky entails believing that the sky is blue? I think you're just playing with words, or perhaps with yourself, here; you can define terms to suit your own argument, for sure; and continue to ignore more cogent definitions if that's what turns you on.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that ants can see the colour blue; if seeing entails believing, does that mean that ants believe the sky is blue?
If seeing and believing are not equivalent, then is the seeing one cognitive state and the believing another, in your view?

The right thing to do, I feel, is to set the record straight, not embrace such twaddle. — Sapientia

Fuck, man, that's a brilliant argument!

No, she sees the blue sky regardless. Is there the sky? Yes. Is it blue? Yes. Does she see it? Yes. That's what is required, and as a matter of fact; not these additional false requirements that you're positing about language or concepts or points of view or whatnot. — Sapientia

So, seeing the sky is blue is not equivalent to believing the sky is blue; and yet nothing more is required? :roll:

You have yet to demonstrate that to me. Asserting it won't do. — Sapientia

And how would I go about demonstrating that to you, seemingly so mired in your own simplistic commonsensical prejudices, that you would not accept the premises of any account I might offer? You can always say "No, no no!", to anything I say; so why should I continue to waste my time if I detect no real desire to learn in the interlocutor?

Really, so, we never believe anything we cannot see?

I was being sarcastic

Thank God for that!

If so, why wouldn't he believe that the sky's blue if he has seen it with his own eyes? — Sapientia

No; because he does not know what "blue" is.

So you are claiming that seeing the blue sky entails believing that the sky is blue? I think you're just playing with words, or perhaps with yourself, here; you can define terms to suit your own argument, for sure; and continue to ignore more cogent definitions if that's what turns you on. — Janus

Yes, I've been claiming from the start that the one entails the other, as I made clear. Or, better put, that the one leads to the other, as I said originally. You could've picked that up sooner had you paid closer attention. But I suppose you think that that's somehow my fault.

Anyway, let's move on, please.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that ants can see the colour blue; if seeing entails believing, does that mean that ants believe the sky is blue?
If seeing and believing are not equivalent, then is the seeing one cognitive state and the believing another, in your view? — Janus

Well, no, ants don't believe that the sky is blue, but when I said what I did, I did so with the understanding that we were speaking in the context of humans, not ants. If you suddenly change the underlying context without warning, then don't be surprised if you "catch people out". Well done, but that seems like something a sophist would do to gain a hollow victory.

To be clear, ants don't believe shit. They differ drastically from humans, and to such an extent that the comparison is clearly an inappropriate one: a category error.

So, moving on...

Let's see what else you have up your sleeve.

If seeing and believing are not equivalent, then is the seeing one cognitive state and the believing another, in your view? — Janus

They're obviously different. One is the visual process, the other the state of becoming convinced that something is the case.

So, seeing the sky is blue is not equivalent to believing the sky is blue; and yet nothing more is required? — Janus

Required for what? In the context of what you quoted, I was referring to what was required for it to be the case that she is seeing the blue sky, not what was required for belief. So if that's different to how you've interpreted it, then you've misinterpreted my meaning. I made that point in response to your bringing up of points of view, as if differing points of view can somehow alter the fact of the matter.

And how would I go about demonstrating that to you, seemingly so mired in your own simplistic commonsensical prejudices, that you would not accept the premises of any account I might offer? You can always say "No, no no!", to anything I say; so why should I continue to waste my time if I detect no real desire to learn in the interlocutor? — Janus

You can do what you want. You can either set out your case, or focus on what you perceive to be my motives. Play the ball or play the man. Get to the point or waste both of our time. The choice is yours. I'm not going to beg. It's no skin off my back either way.

No; because he does not know what "blue" is. — Banno

But he doesn't need to know what "blue" is. Why would he? He does, however, need to know what blue is. That is, he doesn't need to know anything at all about the word, "blue". He doesn't need to know any words at all, in fact. Why would he? He just needs to recognise that the sky is the colour blue.

To be clear, ants don't believe shit. They differ drastically from humans, and to such an extent that the comparison is clearly an inappropriate one. — Sapientia

The consideration has been of believing in the context of pre-linguistic beings. Ants see, just as humans do; and we can coherently say that they see the blue sky in the restricted context of our own way of talking about ants. If you claim pre-linguistic humans can believe the sky is blue, then what about chimps, or dogs, or tigers? Where, and on the basis of what, pre-linguistically speaking, would you draw the line?

They're obviously different. One is the visual process, the other the state of becoming convinced that something is the case. — Sapientia

And being convinced that something is the case does not require language? We know that it is possible to be convinced that something is the case if you are a language-user; and it is very clear how language enables that. So, what argument do you have to support your contention that it is possible in the absence of language ability? Give an account of how it is possible absent language. Just to make my position clear, I don't deny that some 'higher animals' can, and pre-linguistic humans could, believe; but believing in that basic sense of 'disposition to act' is not the same as the propositional 'believing that something is the case' or, in other words, 'holding a belief'.

Required for what? In the context of what you quoted, I was referring to what was required for it to be the case that she is seeing the blue sky, not what was required for belief. — Sapientia

You said that seeing entails holding beliefs, but that they are not the same cognitive state. So, something more than merely seeing must be required to get from one cognitive state to the other. What is it? You don't get something for nothing. If you claim that nothing more is required for holding beleifs than for seeing then it follows that "what was required for it to be the case that she is seeing the blue sky" would be exactly the same as "what was required for belief".

The consideration has been of believing in the context of pre-linguistic beings. — Janus

Whose consideration? Yours, but not mine. My understanding, as I explained in my last reply, was that we were talking exclusively about humans, and that's the way that I'd like to keep it. I see no reason to discuss ants. Banno is the creator of the discussion, and I saw no mention of ants from him. He spoke of agents, and I somehow doubt that Banno considers ants to be capable of agency in relation to belief, language, and so on. These are obviously beyond the capabilities of ants, so that's that.

What next?

Ants see, just as humans do; and we can coherently say that they see the blue sky in the restricted context of our own way of talking about ants. If you claim pre-linguistic humans can believe the sky is blue, then what about chimps, or dogs, or tigers? Where, and on the basis of what, pre-linguistically speaking, would you draw the line? — Janus

Pre-linguistic humans are considerably more advanced than dogs and tigers, as well as, to a lesser extent, chimps. So there's no comparison to be made on equivalent terms. The former have a far superior intellect which enables them in ways beyond lesser species. Whether animals besides humans have the capacity for belief is for another discussion. I see no need to go into that here.

And being convinced that something is the case does not require language? — Janus

Correct. Why would it?

We know that it is possible to be convinced that something is the case if you are a language-user; and it is very clear how language enables that. So, what argument do you have to support your contention that it is possible in the absence of language ability? Give an account of how it is possible absent language. Just to make my position clear, I don't deny that some 'higher animals' can, and pre-linguistic humans could, believe; but believing in that basic sense of 'disposition to act' is not the same as the propositional 'believing that something is the case' or, in other words, 'holding a belief'. — Janus

No, it's not at all clear that it's language which enables the possibility of being convinced that something is the case. That's a controversial claim. Why do you think that it's a subject of debate within philosophy? I grant that there is a correlation, but, as you should know, correlation does not imply causation.

I put it to you that advanced functionality, not language, determines the possibility of being convinced that something is the case.

I don't make this distinction that you do between belief as disposition to act, and belief that something is the case. I'm not even really sure what you mean by the former. But the latter is part of what I am talking about. We've been discussing Banno's example of the belief that the sky is blue, after all, which is an instance of that sort of belief.

Belief is being convinced that something is the case. If someone sees that the sky is blue, then that's convincing enough for most people, I think it's safe to say. I don't see how taking language out of the equation would change that, as it seems you'd have to maintain.

Consider that it's not language which convinces; it's seeing the blue sky. Were primitive peoples not convinced upon seeing the blue sky that there is a sky, and it is the colour that we know of as blue? There were humans before language developed, correct? We didn't begin with language; that came later. These early humans must surely have looked up at the blue sky and noticed its colour in contrast to the colours of its surroundings, yes? So why then would they not believe what they've seen? You must answer that question.

You said that seeing entails holding beliefs, but that they are not the same cognitive state. So, something more than merely seeing must be required to get from one cognitive state to the other. What is it? You don't get something for nothing. If you claim that nothing more is required for holding beleifs than for seeing then it follows that "what was required for it to be the case that she is seeing the blue sky" would be exactly the same as "what was required for belief. — Janus

Look, forget "entails". My original wording, as I've said, was better, which was that the one leads to the other. I now expect you to be charitable enough to stick to my preferred wording, after I've pressed the point a few times now. And I would further qualify, despite any previous impressions that I might have given, that the one doesn't necessarily lead to the other. However, it would in the vast majority of cases, and in fact does so in the vast majority of cases, which is good reason, in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, to think that it would be no different in the case of pre-linguistic humans.

The "something more" after the seeing is whatever intellectual faculties are involved in becoming convinced that something is the case. Does that require language? No, I don't think so. Not in every conceivable case. If Henry, the pre-linguistic human, sees the blue sky, and he can distinguish its colour from others, such that it is identifiable as being of that particular colour, and not of any different colour, such as red, and if he has the intellectual capacity to connect the dots, then why would he not have the belief that the sky is blue, whether he's aware of it or not? Where is language in all of that? I think that it's absent, and therefore unnecessary.

I think that it would help if you didn't think of belief as a string of words, like a mirror image of a statement in mental form, or some sort of self-reflective internal monologue. Nor is it necessarily composed of concepts. That's simply not characteristic of belief as a whole, or in essence. It's also, and I would argue, more fundamentally, about raw experience, like for example, a splash of water on your face. I don't need to understand "splash" or "water" or "face" to believe that water splashed my face. Can't you see how absurd that philosophical thinking is? How far removed from reality it is? The nitty gritty world of lived experience is not a world full of abstractions. (It makes me think of Plato, as depicted in the School of Athens, pointing up to the sky, head in the clouds, full of wild ideas, instead of gesturing downwards, more closely grounded in reality, like his more astute student, Aristotle, depicted alongside him).

The "something more" after the seeing is whatever intellectual faculties are involved in becoming convinced that something is the case. — Sapientia

So, just what, apart from linguistic ability, are those mysterious "intellectual capacities"? Explain how someone could be said to believe something is the case, if they are not capable of conceptualizing. We already know that we are able to do it if we are able to conceptualize (which obviously requires language use), so how are you going to argue that we would be able to do it in the absence of the ability to use language?

Nor is it necessarily composed of concepts. That's simply not characteristic of belief as a whole, or in essence. — Sapientia

I already made the distinction between believing as a basic disposition to act, which is what some sufficiently intelligent animals (and thus presumably pre-linguistic humans) seem to be capable of doing, and holding beliefs in the sense of 'believing that'. But you are claiming that non, or pre-linguistic, beings are capable of both, and I haven't seen any account of how that would be possible coming from you. On the other hand if you want to reject any distinction between pre-linguistic believing and linguistically mediated believing that (which some of comments would seem to indicate); then you need to give cogent reasons for the rejection of what seems to be perfectly valid distinction.

Consider that it's not language which convinces; it's seeing the blue sky. Were primitive peoples not convinced upon seeing the blue sky that there is a sky, and it is the colour that we know of as blue? There were humans before language developed, correct? We didn't begin with language; that came later. These early humans must surely have looked up at the blue sky and noticed its colour in contrast to the colours of its surroundings, yes? So why then would they not believe what they've seen? You must answer that question. — Sapientia

How could there be a colour that we know of as blue, without the word "blue"? Remove the word "blue" and we wouldn't know of that colour as blue. The person without language might recognize the colour of the sky, and compare that to objects of a similar colour, but this is completely different from believing that the sky is blue.