So, just what, apart from linguistic ability, are those mysterious "intellectual capacities"? Explain how someone could be said to believe something is the case, if they are not capable of conceptualizing. We already know that we are able to do it if we are able to conceptualize (which obviously requires language use), so how are you going to argue that we would be able to do it in the absence of the ability to use language? — Janus

No, I don't take it as a given that conceptualisation requires language use, rather than that language is a tool necessary to express concepts. You can't beg the question or put the cart before the horse. Perhaps you should first break down what exactly you think conceptualisation is.

And again, I am going to draw attention to the fallaciousness of basing your argument on your consideration that we are able to believe if we are able to conceptualise. Cum hoc ergo propter hoc.

I don't see why I should humour you when I've just gone into detail describing the circumstances of a situation in which a pre-linguistic human would plausibly believe something to be the case. It's reason enough that those circumstances would be enough to convince the vast majority of humans that something is the case, so, without compelling evidence to the contrary, which it's down to you to provide, it stands to reason that the situation would be no different in the case of a pre-linguistic human. The burden lies with you.

I already made the distinction between believing as a basic disposition to act, which is what some sufficiently intelligent animals (and thus presumably pre-linguistic humans) seem to be capable of doing, and holding beliefs in the sense of 'believing that'. — Janus

If you haven't seen it, then I suggest that you go and look again, because it's there for all to see. I have confirmed to you once already that I was talking about 'believing that', which is blindingly obvious, given that the example I have used time and again is the example of believing that the sky is blue. So you can do away with your talk of belief as a basic disposition to act, whatever that means. Don't make me repeat myself.

On the other hand if you want to reject any distinction between pre-linguistic believing and linguistically mediated believing that (which some of comments would seem to indicate); then you need to give cogent reasons for the rejection of what seems to be perfectly valid distinction. — Janus

I don't fully understand the distinction you're making, to be honest, as I've told you once already. This belief as a disposition to act which you've introduced to the discussion doesn't sound like what I've been describing. You'll have to make your meaning plain, provide examples, and demonstrate that that's what I have in fact been talking about, despite all evidence to the contrary, and my own repeated affirmations that I'm talking about belief-that, as in the belief that the sky is blue. My suspicion is that you're trying to pigeonhole me into a stance that you're more comfortable attacking.

How could there be a colour that we know of as blue, without the word "blue"? Remove the word "blue" and we wouldn't know of that colour as blue. The person without language might recognize the colour of the sky, and compare that to objects of a similar colour, but this is completely different from believing that the sky is blue. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that you've missed the point. I wasn't arguing that there could be a colour that we know of as blue, without the word "blue". I was arguing that the pre-linguistic human would be able to see and distinguish the colour which I am now referring to as "blue". We are not in the thought experiment. I am not in the thought experiment. I am only referring to the colour as "blue" so that you know what I'm talking about.

And I never argued that the person without language recognising the colour of the sky, and comparing that to objects of a similar colour, is the same as believing that the sky is blue. If you read what I've been saying, you'll see that I've made an effort to dispel that misreading. That's just a description of the first step, or the perquisites, to forming belief. It's nothing new; it's called empiricism. It has been around for quite some time.

When water is cold, it freezes.

Now if the water did not freeze, at a suitable temperature we might justifiably seek an explanation; and that explanation would be found in things like atmospheric pressure, or more likely impurities in the mix.

When John is cold, he puts on a coat.

If John does not put his coat on, we might look for explanations in terms of where his coat is; but if his coat is at hand, we might look to John's beliefs about cold and coats and such.

While we can make a reliable rule about water freezing at zero degrees, we can't make the same sort of rule about John putting on his coat.

But we could make a reasonably reliable rule about John shivering when his core body temperature drops.

Beliefs form part of the explanation for an action.

Why did John put on his coat? John was cold. John believed that putting his coat on would make him warm.

So was have an explanation for John's act in terms of a belief and a desire.

Why did the water freeze? The water was cold.

That's is. No explanation in terms of belief and desire is available.

Why did the thermostat trigger? The thermostat was cold, and it believed that by triggering, it would turn on the heater, thereby warming the room it was in.

There's something unhappy here. Can we pinpoint what it is that makes a causal explanation in terms of belief and desire work for John but not for the thermostat?

Is it that while John might have acted otherwise, the thermostat had no choice?

Is this not just a rehashing of the point about ants, which has been dealt with already - except that instead of ants, it's a thermostat?

IS it? So how did that work out?

You tell me. You can see what I've said on the matter. What's the difference between the talk of ants and your talk about a thermostat? There's a limit on how far I'm willing to play along. Are you, or are you not, getting at agency? If so, please elaborate. If not, how about spelling it out?

So where is the stuff about ants?

TBH, it seems to me you are more intent on trying to make it appear that you have already won the argument, than you are on actually arguing for your position. I'll respond if you provide some actual arguments or address any of the points I've raised. If you don't want to, that's OK with me.

Over there.

I'll respond if you provide some actual arguments or address any of the points I've raised. — Janus

Been there, done that. Still waiting for you to fulfill your end of the bargain. Let's see:

We know that it is possible to be convinced that something is the case if you are a language-user; and it is very clear how language enables that. — Janus

No, it's not at all clear that it's language which enables the possibility of being convinced that something is the case. That's a controversial claim. Why do you think that it's a subject of debate within philosophy? I grant that there is a correlation, but, as you should know, correlation does not imply causation. — Sapientia

We already know that we are able to do it if we are able to conceptualize — Janus

Once again, I am going to draw attention to the fallaciousness of basing your argument on your consideration that we are able to believe if we are able to conceptualise. Cum hoc ergo propter hoc. — Sapientia

(which obviously requires language use) — Janus

No, I don't take it as a given that conceptualisation requires language use, rather than that language is a tool necessary to express concepts. You can't beg the question or put the cart before the horse. — Sapientia

I put it to you that advanced functionality, not language, determines the possibility of being convinced that something is the case. — Sapientia

Belief is being convinced that something is the case. If someone sees that the sky is blue, then that's convincing enough for most people, I think it's safe to say. I don't see how taking language out of the equation would change that, as it seems you'd have to maintain.

Consider that it's not language which convinces; it's seeing the blue sky. Were primitive peoples not convinced upon seeing the blue sky that there is a sky, and it is the colour that we know of as blue? There were humans before language developed, correct? We didn't begin with language; that came later. These early humans must surely have looked up at the blue sky and noticed its colour in contrast to the colours of its surroundings, yes? So why then would they not believe what they've seen? You must answer that question. — Sapientia

The "something more" after the seeing is whatever intellectual faculties are involved in becoming convinced that something is the case. Does that require language? No, I don't think so. Not in every conceivable case. If Henry, the pre-linguistic human, sees the blue sky, and he can distinguish its colour from others, such that it is identifiable as being of that particular colour, and not of any different colour, such as red, and if he has the intellectual capacity to connect the dots, then why would he not have the belief that the sky is blue, whether he's aware of it or not? Where is language in all of that? I think that it's absent, and therefore unnecessary. — Sapientia

Nor is [belief] necessarily composed of concepts. That's simply not characteristic of belief as a whole, or in essence. It's also, and I would argue, more fundamentally, about raw experience, like for example, a splash of water on your face. I don't need to understand "splash" or "water" or "face" to believe that water splashed my face. Can't you see how absurd that philosophical thinking is? How far removed from reality it is? The nitty gritty world of lived experience is not a world full of abstractions. — Sapientia

believing as a basic disposition to act, — Janus

I have confirmed to you once already that I was talking about 'believing that', which is blindingly obvious, given that the example I have used time and again is the example of believing that the sky is blue. So you can do away with your talk of belief as a basic disposition to act, whatever that means. — Sapientia

No, it's not at all clear that it's language which enables the possibility of being convinced that something is the case. — Sapientia

I'm not going to waste more time than necessary, so I'll address just one point at a time. It is obvious that language enables holding beliefs since there is no ot..her way to express or formulate a belief to ourselves and others, and since in the absence of being able to express or formulate a belief such as the example in question "I believe the sky is blue", there would be no way to know or show that I held any non-linguistic belief equivalent to "I believe the sky is blue". The onus is on you to show how, in the absence of language, it could be shown that anyone held any such belief or kind of belief.

The presence of belief in the sense of "disposition to act" can be shown by the presence of the relevant actions. If you want to claim the kinds of beliefs shown by the presence of actions should be understood to be of a propositional kind like those which are expressed linguistically then you need to give an argument as to why they should be thought to be so.

If an animal looks surprised or puzzled, did it have a prelinguistic belief?

Surely a belief would be positively held if it can be revealed as an expectation which can be positively contradicted. That seems evidence enough it is held in a counterfactual fashion.

I don't think anyone was arguing that animals do not believe in the sense of expecting and being disposed to act; the point at issue seems to be whether such non-linguistic believings are propositional in the sense that linguistically formulated beliefs are, and, in consequence of that, whether or not they should be considered equivalent to linguistically formulated beliefs.

the point at issue seems to be whether such believings are propositional — Janus

Well propositional just means that a belief can be asserted in a way that makes it true or false.

So if we leave out the asserting bit - which is where you definitely need linguistic structure - then we can see some degree of continuity between animals and humans in terms of holding beliefs open to falsification.

The animal has the semantics, if not the syntax. And that is where I would draw the sharp line.

The proposition could not be expressed in some timeless and placeless fashion. The belief is embodied. But I wouldn't deny the animal a semantic state that is counterfactual in nature.

Well propositional just means that a belief can be asserted in a way that makes it true or false. — apokrisis

I see what you're saying, but I think it's more than just that. 'Propositional' I would say means formulated as 'I believe that'; this way a belief is given a definite form. And not all beliefs can be shown to be true or false, either.

Over there. — Sapientia

Can't see it. Don't believe you.

The animal has the semantics, if not the syntax. And that is where I would draw the sharp line. — apokrisis

Is there such a sharp distinction between syntax and semantics? How is it drawn?

Under these definitions: do I have to understand the proposition "God exists," to be an agnostic? Or differently put, is not understanding the proposition "God exists," sufficient to make me an agnostic? Is the difference between not understanding a proposition, and understanding a proposition but believing it to be undecided (or undecidable) relevant? — Dawnstorm

This is good.

Thinking it through, there are four possibilities:

• John believes that God exists
• It is not the case that John believes that God exists
• John believes that God does not exist
• *] It is not the case that John believes God does not exist

Add "but John does not understand the proposition "God exists",

• John believes that God exists, but John does not understand the proposition "God exists"
• It is not the case that John believes that God exists but John does not understand the proposition "God exists"
• John believes that God does not exist but John does not understand the proposition "God exists"
• *] It is not the case that John believes God does not exist but John does not understand the proposition "God exists"

The first looks like Moore's paradox - so let's dismiss it.

The second looks reasonable.

The third looks Moorish, as well.

The last looks reasonable.

SO my account of agnosticism needs work.

Agnisticism:

• It is not the case that an agnostic believes that God exists, and
• It is not the case that an agnostic believes God does not exist, and
• An agnostic understands the proposition "God Exists".

Maybe?

More evidence that one must understand the proposition entailed by a belief.

looks like Moore's paradox — Banno

Moore's paradox: I believe p, but p is not true.

Compared to: I believe p, but I do not understand p.

SO the further issue raised by @Dawnstorm still stands: can one believe something one does not understand?

In any case, all this is going well off-topic re the thread. — Janus

You're right, if you want to start a new thread, I will answer there, otherwise I may consider doing so myself in a few days, as I should like to try and understand your position better.

I don't think anyone was arguing that animals do not believe in the sense of expecting and being disposed to act; the point at issue seems to be whether such non-linguistic believings are propositional in the sense that linguistically formulated beliefs are, and, in consequence of that, whether or not they should be considered equivalent to linguistically formulated beliefs. — Janus

Cornell University researchers studying Elephant Language since 1986 have concluded "We believe that very complex information is communicated acoustically, including emotive state, physical characteristics, intention, and perhaps reference to abstract concepts."

Prairie Dogs give alarm call which reliably convey predator type, size, colour, speed and direction of a predator, as do several types of primate. African hunting Dogs and Wolves also convey similar signals about threats and opportunities appropriate to carnivores. These activities cause appropriate defensive behaviour. How could appropriate defensive behaviour possibly be taken if the the animal doing the communication does not 'believe' the predator does have the properties it's describing and the listeners do actually 'believe' that too?

Since these beliefs are vocalised, they fall on the same side of the sharp distinction you're trying to make. Yet, these action are not present in only the most intelligent of animals, there is no pattern to their evolution, there's no ecological significance that has been noted. It just seems that in some circumstances there is an evolutionary advantage to vocalising the beliefs about predators/dangers. Is it not, therefore, the much simpler theory to presume that all 'beliefs' are of the same type, human or other animal, and it is merely appropriate sometimes to vocalise them?

I'm not going to waste more time than necessary, so I'll address just one point at a time. It is obvious that language enables holding beliefs since there is no other way to express or formulate a belief to ourselves and others, and since in the absence being able to express or formulate a belief such as the example in question "I believe the sky is blue", there would be no way to know or show that I held any non-linguistic belief equivalent to "I believe the sky is blue". The onus is on you to show how, in the absence of language, it could be shown that anyone held any such belief or kind of belief. — Janus

Okay, let's start by examining the premises of your argument:

1) "There is no other way to express (or formulate) a belief to ourselves and others than through language".

It's trivially true that there is no other way to express (or formulate) a belief to ourselves and others than through language. That demonstrates nothing of relevance.

2) "In the absence of being able to express (or formulate) a belief, such as "I believe the sky is blue", there would be no way to know or show that I held any non-linguistic belief equivalent to "I believe the sky is blue"".

Now, it's another trivial truth that, in the absence of my being able to express any such belief, there would be no way that I could show that I held any non-linguistic belief equivalent to "I believe the sky is blue". That's yet another pointless truism which demonstrates nothing of relevance.

These premises of yours might as well say that in the absence of the ability to speak, then I won't be able to talk; or that there's no way that I can see, other than through vision. Utterly pointless! Although somewhat amusing.

However, that said, there is another aspect to your second premise, which is about knowledge. Focusing solely on this aspect, I'd argue that your second premise would be false, since one could indeed know that someone under such circumstances obtained a belief. That's just what I've been arguing.

And as for your conclusion:

C) (Therefore), "language enables holding beliefs".

It's a complete non sequitur!

The presence of belief in the sense of "disposition to act" can be shown by the presence of the relevant actions. If you want to claim the kinds of beliefs shown by the presence of actions should be understood to be of a propositional kind like those which are expressed linguistically then you need to give an argument as to why they should be thought to be so. — Janus

Look, I'm not saying anything complicated. It is a relatively simple matter of knowing what the facts are and what they logically entail. I've been over this a number of times now, and I don't know why you seem to be having so much trouble with it. Does Henry see the blue sky? Yes. That's a fact. Now, given this fact, and given what we know about what it would likely take to convince a person that the sky is blue, we can reasonably infer that Henry obtains such a belief, that is, Henry believes that the sky is blue. I have yet to see you provide any serious objections or counters to this argument. You'd need to throw a spanner into the works, but all you've come up with so far amounts to nothing.

Propositional' I would say means formulated as 'I believe that'; this way a belief is given a definite form. — Janus

Yes. I agree that language puts it out into a social space where there is then the further fact of the “I” that is doing the asserting.

But still, the guts of the issue for me is that a belief has this counterfactual structure.

Is there such a sharp distinction between syntax and semantics? — Banno

Colourless green ideas sleep furiously. Apparently.

think that you've missed the point. I wasn't arguing that there could there be a colour that we know of as blue, without the word "blue". I was arguing that the pre-linguistic human would be able to see and distinguish the colour which I am now referring to as "blue". We are not in the thought experiment. I am not in the thought experiment. I am only referring to the colour as "blue" so that you know what I'm talking about. — Sapientia

But you're referring to the belief, as the belief that the sky is blue as well. And there cannot be the belief that the sky is blue without "blue". So where does this leave the belief?

very complex information is communicated acoustically, including emotive state, physical characteristics, intention,and perhaps reference to abstract concepts."

How could appropriate defensive behaviour possibly be taken if the the animal doing the communication does not 'believe' the predator does have the properties it's describing and the listeners do actually 'believe' that too?

Since these beliefs are vocalised, they fall on the same side of the sharp distinction you're trying to make. — Pseudonym

I haven't denied that animals are capable of signaling in quite complex ways, but any assertion like the one underlined would need to be supported by strong argument. I not it is only a "perhaps". It is symbolic language which enables abstraction, and to return to our example the belief that the sky is blue arguably involves abstraction.

A pre-linguistic percipient may be able to see the blue sky, but it would be a perversion of the term "belief' to say that she therefore necessarily believes that the sky is blue. She sees the blue sky, and if she associates the colour with other objects she has seen, say flowers, we may be able to say that she doesn't merely see the blue sky, but that she sees that the sky is like the flowers. No belief is necessarily involved in this merely associative 'seeing that'.

An association between the colour of the sky and the colour of the flowers is established, but for a belief regarding the colour of the sky to obtain she must be able to form the abstract concept of colour. I don't think it is plausible that a percipient could form such an abstract concept in the absence of linguistic capacity. In any case how could we ever know that they were able to formulate abstract concepts in the absence of symbolic language? We know we can do it, and that it is done using symbolic language; can we imagine another way to do it?

So, I have been arguing all along that the kind of "believing" animals and pre-linguistic humans do at most consists in association that leads to expectation, and that we should distinguish between that and the kind of propositional 'believing that' or 'holding and/or asserting beliefs' that we.

It is significant that in your second paragraph above you place "believe" between inverted commas; it seems to show that you are not counting it as fully fledged belief.

But still, the guts of the issue for me is that a belief has this counterfactual structure. — apokrisis

Are you suggesting that animals might imagine alternative scenarios?

Provide some arguments to back up your assertions and aspersions and if it is good enough I might respond.

Belief is being convinced that something is the case. If someone sees that the sky is blue, then that's convincing enough for most people, I think it's safe to say. I don't see how taking language out of the equation would change that, as it seems you'd have to maintain. — Sapientia

If someone sees the blue sky that does not entail that they see that the sky is blue; the latter would involve association with other experiences involving blue objects. But even seeing that the sky is blue in this associative sense cannot sensibly be said to lead to conviction that something is the case; because the conception of something being the case requires the abstractive ability to consider that it might not have been the case, and it is most plausible that such reasoning is possible only with symbolic language.

In any case conviction or belief is redundant when we see. If we see the blue sky it is redundant to say that we believe the sky is blue unless we are speculating about whether we might be deceived, that it might be an illusion or a dream, and so on. In the presence of such questions it might be appropriate to say we believe.

And this kind of belief is different than the kind of expectation your dog, pre-linguistic child or pet troglodyte child might experience when s/he hears the sound of your car arriving in the driveway. Do you seriously believe that she considers the possibility that her expectation might be mistaken?