I made it up, and, yes, a 'completely random decision' is about all the sense I can make of free will. — mrcoffee

Do you not believe that there are possibilities concerning what will happen in the future, and that your decisions can have an affect in relation to what will and will not happen in the future?

Justice can’t be carried out on the basis that it’s just ‘as if’ they’re responsible. — Wayfarer

Ah, but it already is, I'd argue. Don't we think that badly raised (abused, neglected, ill-fed) children in bad neighborhoods are more likely to be incarcerated? Yet we punish them nevertheless. We don't let them go because they had less of a chance to be good citizens. Maybe the incarceration is less punitive (as we see it) and instead a humane locking away of the 'mentally ill' victim of circumstance. In any case, we don't let murderers and rapists run free.

Another route, which a few here seem to be favouring, is the behaviourist, which declares that the self/mind/subject is actually non-existent, or at any rate ought not to be considered as part of any ‘truly scientific’ analysis but is an artefact of ‘folk psychology’. — Wayfarer

There is a problem for me with this 'or.' A science can't declare an entity non-existent at the same time that it excludes that entity from its consideration, it seems to me. It makes sense to me to 'pre-scientifically' admit that of course there is subjective experience and then (for a maximum of objectivity) focus on the objective aspect of the agent (his actions and words). Of course words are connected with subjectivity in a profound way, but they are public entities that can be counted, etc. We can feasibly predict with some degree of accuracy the words that will be said as a function of the words that have been said (frequencies, etc., come to mind.)

Do you not believe that there are possibilities concerning what will happen in the future, and that your decisions can have an affect in relation to what will and will not happen in the future? — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. When I calculate how others will likely react to prompts, for instance, these prompts will tend to be my actions in pursuit of a goal. If I want to marry someone, I will likely 'calculate' her response to my proposal. If I want to ask for a raise, I will 'calculate' the likelihood that the boss will capitulate.

Behavior has a fuzzy law-likeness, else there could be no knowledge of the human 'soul.' But in this fuzziness lies all of the drama.

Of course. — mrcoffee

So you believe in free will, that the future is not determined. You do not believe in determinism. Why do you claim that we are all naturally soft determinists?

I have no idea what soft determinism is or how it is defined. If there is a single instance of choice or random/unpredictable event, no matter how small, then determinism is demolished. What's left had nothing to do with determinism other than the word. — Rich

I think we should distinguish between random and unpredictable. As science progresses, the once unpredictable becomes predictable. We can then project backwards and say that such and such was theoretical predictable (within a margin of error), but the humans then didn't have Newton's physics, for instance.

Soft determinism is simply probabilistic determinism. Some outcomes (given the situation) are more likely than others. We find this in QM as I was taught it, and I believe we 'live' this in our interactions of with others and in our political conversation.

If believing in free will only means believing that the future is not exactly determined, then I believe in free will. But I'm not sure that that's how 'free will' tends to be used.

I associate it with human behavior in the context of praise, blame, prediction, and control. If we think that humans are somewhat predictable, then I think this works against 'ideal' or 'hard' free will. We might say that 'soft determinism' == 'soft free will.'

Don't we think that badly raised (abused, neglected, ill-fed) children in bad neighborhoods are more likely to be incarcerated? Yet we punish them nevertheless — mrcoffee

That's a valid point, but judges should, and generally do, take an offenders' circumstances into account when judging a case. That is often found to be a mitigation in regard to sentencing.

But if it were true that 'there is no free will' and all our decisions are pre-determined or made despite our intentions on the basis of neural programming over which we have no conscious control, then it would be irrelevant. Nobody would be responsible, because there would be no free agents. This is why the so-called 'scientific argument' that there is no free will is such a complete nonsense. It is simply a way to avoid the hard truth that we are, in fact, responsible, in my view.

We can feasibly predict with some degree of accuracy the words that will be said as a function of the words that have been said (frequencies, etc., come to mind.) — mrcoffee

I'm afraid that's just positivist wishful thinking. There is no way for you to be able to statistically determine what a person might say. So, eggplants to that. ;-)

If believing in free will only means believing that the future is not exactly determined — mrcoffee

I believe we have choices in which direction we move, which are constrained. Such a situation leaves the future unpredictable but still constrained and limited.

I think we should distinguish between random and unpredictable. — mrcoffee

We can. And in either case it leaves us with zero evidence for determinism. Belief in determinism is tantamount to deep faith, comparable to Calvanism, which hold similar beliefs contrary to all observations and evidence.

As science progresses, the once unpredictable becomes predictable. — mrcoffee

Actually, as of 100 years ago, it is going in the opposite direction.

Probabilistic determinism only preserves the word, other than that, the concept of determinism perishes. Some events are more probable, but still precisely unpredictable.

If believing in free will only means believing that the future is not exactly determined, then I believe in free will. But I'm not sure that that's how 'free will' tends to be used.

I associate it with human behavior in the context of praise, blame, prediction, and control. If we think that humans are somewhat predictable, then I think this works against 'ideal' or 'hard' free will. We might say that 'soft determinism' == 'soft free will.' — mrcoffee

Well hard free will, in the way you described it as completely random acts, doesn't really make sense. And I've never heard a description of "soft determinism" which makes sense. Some people profess "compatibilism" but I find this to be incoherent. So I guess we're left with free will (call it soft if you like).

Well hard free will, in the way you described it as completely random acts, doesn't really make sense. And I've never heard a description of "soft determinism" which makes sense. Some people profess "compatibilism" but I find this to be incoherent. So I guess we're left with free will (call it soft if you like). — Metaphysician Undercover

As I mentioned before, 'soft' free will strikes me as equivalent to 'soft' determinism. I understand soft determinism simply as a constraint on the future determined by the present and past. If I drop a heavy object, I do not expect a future in which the rock floats away. If I sexually harass a bodybuilder's wife in the grocery store, I do not expect him to walk away bored. My thesis is that we largely understand both people and objects in terms of such constraints (of what they will do as a function of their place in a network of people and objects.) We can include the past in this network in terms of present memory.

We can. And in either case it leaves us with zero evidence for determinism. Belief in determinism is tantamount to deep faith, comparable to Calvanism, which hold similar beliefs contrary to all observations and evidence. — Rich

I think you have a scarecrow in your target here. I'm not arguing for strict or exact determinism. I'm making the smaller point that we already behave as 'soft' determinists. I'm not too attached to the terminology.

A second point is that observations and evidence can have no weight unless we believe the future is constrained by the past. (Hume's famous problem.) If anything can happen at anytime, with equal probability, then experience is worthless for predictive purposes. I believe this would also obliterate the intelligibility of objects. For instance, I would not be able to say that an apple was a kind of food. It could poison me one minute and cure cancer the next. It would not even be a fruit. Apples could spontaneously appear, or emerge from dirty snow. But in such a chaos the word would have no stable meaning. So language itself depends, I'd argue, on a soft determinism. Or it implies and manifests a soft determinism that is akin to rationality itself.

That's a valid point, but judges should, and generally do, take an offenders' circumstances into account when judging a case. That is often found to be a mitigation in regard to sentencing. — Wayfarer

Indeed, and we approve of such mitigation precisely because we are soft determinists, I'd say. We are also less impressed by the success of a child with affluent and loving parents.

But if it were true that 'there is no free will' and all our decisions are pre-determined or made despite our intentions on the basis of neural programming over which we have no conscious control, then it would be irrelevant. Nobody would be responsible, because there would be no free agents. This is why the so-called 'scientific argument' that there is no free will is such a complete nonsense. It is simply a way to avoid the hard truth that we are, in fact, responsible, in my view. — Wayfarer

I don't think we're far apart here, really. This reminds me of left and right politics. The right tends to lean into 'free will' and personal responsibility. The left, on the other hand, emphasizes the individual as embedded in a determining social structure. As a matter of opinion, I think the individual is ennobled by insisting on personal responsibility, even if he or she 'knows' otherwise. Of course he or she could view the ennobling insistence on personal responsibility as a kind of effective tool. A culture as a whole could also insist on its responsibility or 'freedom.' Because life is only indirectly about reliable prediction and fundamentally about control of the subjective situation, our best objective theories are not morally binding. Instead they are 'if then' statements. The 'then' we pursue, I'd say, is ultimately (inter-)subjective.

I'm afraid that's just positivist wishful thinking. There is no way for you to be able to statistically determine what a person might say. — Wayfarer

I think we can use this forum as an example of my point. Why do we have handles if there is no continuity of personality from post to post? Do you in fact have no information to offer about posters you have long observed? Do you really think you couldn't predict some of the keywords that will appear in the their future posts? At a level that is above random guessing?

Some posters will always drag in their favorite philosopher. Others will drag in the same system again and again with tweaks. Others will complain about the same social evil again and again. Etc. Now this is informal, but I think we could do statistics on their key words. We could compare the proportion of these key words among the rest of their words to the proportions of other posters, etc.

Of course I do not at all think that we have the means to predict the specific sentences of individuals. Personality is just way too complex. It is vaguely and hazily conceivable that a very superior extraterrestrial species could get surprising accuracy, but I would expect the ET to have a far more complex nervous system in order to do so as well as use technology that scans the brain in ways we haven't thought of. (That brains are related to subjective experience is something we imply with the use of the caffeine molecule for pleasure.)

Probabilistic determinism only preserves the word, other than that, the concept of determinism perishes. Some events are more probable, but still precisely unpredictable. — Rich

You can say that. I'm not that attached to the word. But 'free will' also vanishes. Roughly, soft determinism is the same as soft free will, and IMV this is the default and reasonable position. It is perhaps unavoidable and therefore trivial in practice. This would place both determinists and 'freewillers' in similarly counterintuitive positions.

Of course I do not at all think that we have the means to predict the specific sentences of individuals. Personality is just way too complex. — mrcoffee

Sorry, I took that to be what you were driving at with the statement that I was responding to. But I agree, we're probably not that far apart. (I was shooting at someone standing behind you ;-) )

I'm not arguing for strict or exact determinism. — mrcoffee

Ok. Then let's drop the word, because it is inapplicable, unless there is something about the word that needs saving. If the universe is not deterministic we have to figure out what it is.

future is constrained by the past. — mrcoffee

Based upon my own observations, our actions are constrained. The future is simply a possibility in our minds. We take actions based upon the possibilities.

But 'free will' also vanishes. — mrcoffee

I agree. An equally unobservable and that is unsupportable by evidence and phenomenon. I just wonder why it is still discussed.

There is nothing soft. What we have are choices and we make choices all the time like choosing to drop Free will and determinism.

If the universe is not deterministic we have to figure out what it is. — Rich

I would say that we largely figure out what it is by detecting regularities in experience (determining it more sharply, finding tighter constraints). To be fair, this could be called 'how' as opposed to what it is. Still, an apple is largely (for us) a system of probabilistic relationships. If I eat one every day, it'll probably keep the doctor away, or so they say.

Based upon my own observations, our actions are constrained. The future is simply a possibility in our minds. We take actions based upon the possibilities. — Rich

I agree. The future exists as possibility, and in that sense (because we are future-directed) possibility is higher than actuality. The actual is framed and used in pursuit of the possible, and the possible is itself a function of the actual (including the memory of what was once actual.)

I would say that we largely figure out what it is by detecting regularities in experience — mrcoffee

I agree. There are habits everywhere in the universe, like a pendulum.

I agree. The future exists as possibility, and in that sense possibility is higher than actuality. The actual is framed and used in pursuit of the possible, and the possible is itself a function of the actual (including the memory of what was once actual.) — mrcoffee

I agree. Memory becomes an important concept in understanding actions and habits.

I agree. An equally unobservable and that is unsupportable by evidence and phenomenon. I just wonder why it is still discussed. — Rich

I think it figures into certain religious and political visions. Sartre believed in something like free will or pure consciousness, at least earlier in his life. It is an ennobling myth. It also justifies punishment and helps the rich understand some of their luck as achievement. On the flip side, a total denial of free will justifies sloth, despair, apathy. As I understand it, life is a game of both chance and skill, like poker or monopoly. The ideal general strategy may still lead to disaster, and a bad strategy in general could work in the particular case.

I agree. There are habits everywhere in the universe, like a pendulum. — Rich

Right. 'Habits' is a nice word. We think of the universe as habitual and therefore in terms of laws. In the human case, however, we see that humans have a habit of changing their habits. We might then try to find a regularity in the rate or the nature of such changes. We might speak of paradigm changes as involving the change in a dominant metaphor.

Memory becomes an important concept in understanding actions and habits. — Rich

Indeed. Memory seems to be near the center of what it is to be human. The future is a cloud of desired and feared possibility that is shaped from the stuff of memory, one might say. Memory is (one might say) actuality chasing possibility and generating more actuality in this pursuit, and so more memory. Memory is the stain of the actual that has ceased to be actual, in this vocabulary. The memory is itself actual, as memory. The table will not fit in a closet. A memory of the table takes up far less space, and indeed lives in a virtual space that still (as we see it) constrains the future along with the conditions obtaining in physical space.

we see that humans have a habit of changing their habits. — mrcoffee

Humans makes choices and have will (energy applied in a specific direction) that they can exercise to effect that choice. The choices are constrained but unpredictable whichever creates the possibility of creative evolution.

Memory is (one might say) actuality chasing possibility and generating more actuality, more memory. — mrcoffee

I agree.

Humans makes choices and have will (energy applied in a specific direction) that they canexercise to effect that choice. The choices are constrained but unpredictable whichever creates the possibility of creative evolution. — Rich

Yes, I agree. Creative evolution is a good description of personality. It can reasonably be extended to a description of reality itself, which (especially in or through us, so far as we know) is creatively evolving.

Yes, I agree. Creative evolution is a good description of personality. It can reasonably be extended to a description of reality itself, which (especially in or through us, so far as we know) is creatively evolving. — mrcoffee

I agree.

I understand soft determinism simply as a constraint on the future determined by the present and past. If I drop a heavy object, I do not expect a future in which the rock floats away. — mrcoffee

Free will and determinism are different ways of seeing human actions, human existence. The fact that the rock will fall has nothing to do with determinism. One can believe the inanimate world to be deterministic without believing in determinism, which relates to human acts. This just requires that one accepts such a fundamental difference between human beings and inanimate things.

If I sexually harass a bodybuilder's wife in the grocery store, I do not expect him to walk away bored. My thesis is that we largely understand both people and objects in terms of such constraints (of what they will do as a function of their place in a network of people and objects.) We can include the past in this network in terms of present memory. — mrcoffee

Do you recognize that it is much more difficult to predict human behaviour in a particular situation then it is the behaviour of the inanimate object? And, do you recognize that even though you can assume with a high degree of certainty that the bodybuilder will not walk away bored, it would still be very difficult for you to predict exactly what that person would actually do? That you can predict what a person won't do is not a good argument against free will.

I'm making the smaller point that we already behave as 'soft' determinists. — mrcoffee

I'm still not seeing where you get this idea from. I think it's quite clear that we behave as if we believe in free will, not as if we believe in any type of determinism. When something is important we take our time to deliberate and make a responsible decision.

One can believe the inanimate world to be deterministic without believing in determinism, which relates to human acts. This just requires that one accepts such a fundamental difference between human beings and inanimate things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that this is theoretically possible. At times, I read Sartre to be saying something like that. Consciousness is pure freedom, so I can't really be any of my roles, not even the defender of free will. So Sartre now cannot truly be Sartre five minutes ago. He has to drag his past actions along.This is an attractive theory. It's almost a painting of the ideal situation. We want be to freer and less predictable. We strive to increase our options and the complexity of our behavior. But we do this among others who are somewhat predictable, which is to say among personalities with a certain amount of continuity. The alternative is lots of bodies with 'brand new souls' who aren't essentially tied to what those bodies have done before they arrived (always just now.)

I'm still not seeing where you get this idea from. I think it's quite clear that we behave as if we believe in free will, not as if we believe in any type of determinism. When something is important we take our time to deliberate and make a responsible decision. — Metaphysician Undercover

But what are these same deliberations? Do they not largely involve the likely responses of others to our own actions? Deliberation is a kind of possibility machine. If I try this, then approximately X results. If I had tried this, then maybe I'd have Y rather than Z. We do this in a network of both objects and people. Of course people are far more complicated, and we have more feelings about people. But the calculation in both cases seems to involve a probabilistic constrain on the future in terms of the past. The softness of both determinism and free will is in this 'probabilistic.'

Do you recognize that it is much more difficult to predict human behaviour in a particular situation then it is the behaviour of the inanimate object? — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course.

The softness of both determinism and free will is in this 'probabilistic.' — mrcoffee

It's not that either concept is soft, it is that neither has ever been observed, so maintaining either simpler muddles an inquiry. Best to jettison both.

What we do observe it's that we do make choices on how to act based upon memories of the past that are projected as possible actions into the future. From this observation about ourselves we can now begin to develop an ontology based upon memory. will, and some creative mind that projects the possibilities and initiates actions.

The concepts of free will and determinism get one no where except further into endless confusion. I'm amazed that such concepts have endured so long in the face of so much evidence that neither exist.

agree that this is theoretically possible. At times, I read Sartre to be saying something like that. Consciousness is pure freedom, so I can't really be any of my roles, not even the defender of free will. So Sartre now cannot truly be Sartre five minutes ago. He has to drag his past actions along.This is an attractive theory. It's almost a painting of the ideal situation. We want be to freer and less predictable. We strive to increase our options and the complexity of our behavior. But we do this among others who are somewhat predictable, which is to say among personalities with a certain amount of continuity. The alternative is lots of bodies with 'brand new souls' who aren't essentially tied to what those bodies have done before they arrived (always just now.) — mrcoffee

That's the nature of time, it makes reality rather complicated. But it's not necessarily true that "we want to be freer less predictable". In reality we general strive to be less free and more predictable. Remember how "hard free will" appeared as complete randomness? Nobody wants that. And, it's quite evident in communication, and most social activity, we make an effort to be predictable. We allow ourselves to be educated, and this is the free will tending toward conformity. Perhaps in reality we want to be less free, and more predictable.

Of course people are far more complicated, and we have more feelings about people. But the calculation in both cases seems to involve a probabilistic constrain on the future in terms of the past. The softness of both determinism and free will is in this 'probabilistic.' — mrcoffee

There's more to the complication of human beings, than just a constraint on the future imposed by the past, because there is also a necessity to consider within human beings what is wanted in the future in the first place. Constraints of the past restrict the reality of what one can get, or bring about, create, in the future, but they do not put restrictions on what one can want, or desire. So we can desire things which are impossible. Intention has a great influence over one's thinking and if we don't properly distinguish between what is possible, and what is impossible, physically, our thinking may be corrupted.

I think it is incorrect to represent thinking, deliberation, and calculation as the past putting constraints on the future, because thinking is driven by intention. And intention allows fundamentally that we can want anything, almost to the point of hard free will. So it appears to you, as if thinking is an act of the past (memories) putting constraints on what is wanted for the future. In reality though, thinking is not necessarily clear, accurate, or correct. We often use thinking to rationalize goals which are really irrational.

So we need to characterize thinking in a way which allows this as a reality. This implies that thinking is really a process whereby intentions for the future incline us to make a representation of the past (memory), and bring this representation to bear upon future possibilities. Therefore it is not the actual past which is doing the constraining in the act of thinking, it is really just the representation of the past (memory), and this is why we are prone to making mistakes. So when we make decisions concerning free will and determinism, we must be careful not to consider these representations (memories) as the past constraining the future in a determinist way, because the memories are produced and employed in a free way. The consequence, mistakes.

What you refer to is not knowledge — Janus


I didn't say theories are not knowledge — Janus


So now I'm confused. Are you saying the the idea we do not have free-will or that the 'self' is an illusion is not a theory? — Pseudonym

The idea that we do not have free will or that the self is an illusion is a hypothesis that may count as a theory if it can produce predictions that can be adequately tested.

I didn't say theories are not knowledge, I said they are not knowledge-that, but knowledge-how; specifically knowledge-how to make predictions and devise ways to test them. So, no matter how well tested the theory that we don't have free will or that self is an illusion is; it can never constitute knowledge that we don't have free will or that self is an illusion. It always remains a conjecture, which may be thought by different interpreters to be more or less adequately formulated and/ or more or less adequately testable and/ or more or less adequately actually tested.