The past constrains the future, but it doesn't absolutely determine the future. So the past leaves the future only relatively determined in terms of its propensities.

Physical models can of course simplify the situation and treat the dynamics of the world as mechanical and time-reversible. But that Newtonian view is known to be an over-simplification both due to the laws of thermodynamics and quantum theory.

If we put all our physical laws together, they tell us the world is a place where the past does constrain the future, but can't absolutely determine the future.

Then when it comes to freewill, there is further science to inform our metaphysics.

Any living and mindful system is a dissipative thermodynamic structure that employs information to regulate dynamics. It uses a symbolic memory and code - like genes, neurons, words - to step back from the world so as to be able to control that world.

So biology depends on an epistemic cut that is the basis of autonomy or "freewill" in the broadest sense. Physics has no direct or deterministic control over what gets written into the memory of a mind. Biology exists as a state of matter because it uses a semiotic mechanism to divorce its essence as completely as possible as it can from the particular "hardware" on which it runs its "computations".

Of course, biology then can only choose to use that power over nature to act in a self-interested fashion - to build and maintain a body, to function and thrive in an environment. But it is completely unmysterious why organisms exhibit autonomy. We know that biology is dynamics + information. We can see exactly where the disconnect between even the relative determinism of the one, and the almost complete lack of determination of the other, takes place.

That folk continue to think Newtonian determinism is some kind of fundamental problem for complex human psychology some 330 years after the Principia is actually amazing.

Agree with your observations on the limits of determinism, however:

Any living and mindful system is a dissipative thermodynamic structure that employs information to regulate dynamics. It uses a symbolic memory and code - like genes, neurons, words - to step back from the world so as to be able to control that world. — apokrisis

In terms of purpose, the only biological purpose is survival and reproduction, but the end point - the ‘final cause’, so to speak - is the recovery of thermodynamic equilibrium, which is to all intents non-existence, is it not?

In terms of purpose, the only biological purpose is survival and reproduction, but the end point - the ‘final cause’, so to speak - is the recovery of thermodynamic equilibrium, which is to all intents non-existence, is it not? — Wayfarer

Sure. We have to pay for our freedoms in terms of the much greater amount of waste heat that we generate.

So we can have our private purposes that seem diametrically opposed to the largest purpose that is the Cosmos's own project - the drive towards the ultimate simplicity and tranquility of its Heat Death. But those private purposes are ultimately entrained to that general Cosmic purpose. And often - as with global warming - we don't even seem to want to oppose that generalised project. We don't really care about the freedoms we can extract from fossil fuels as we don't really seem to have our own private projects that are actually "diametrically opposed" to the general entropic flow.

So sure. We could spend our freedom more wisely by developing a better sense of purpose. We might want to care more about our long-term flourishing. But still, ultimately, we are part of nature and so constrained by what is, in the largest sense, natural.

If we choose to be a boom/bust extinction event, that is still a pretty routine evolutionary choice.

the drive towards the ultimate simplicity and tranquility of its Heat Death — apokrisis

Well, you see, I think this is ultimately a nihilistic attitude, regrettably, and that it comes from limiting the understanding to only what is physical or natural. So that is where we part company. But don't worry, I am not going to try and persuade you otherwise. ;-)

Well, you see, I think this is ultimately a nihilistic attitude, regrettably, and that it comes from limiting the understanding to only what is physical or natural. — Wayfarer

Technically it is not "nihilism" to believe that Nature has intrinsic purpose and that we also have the freedom, indeed responsibility, to construct our own personal meanings within that.

Also, it is isn't an "attitude" if it is simply what reasoned inquiry shows to be the case. It is accepting how things are having asked the question of how things are.

But yes. Rejecting supernatural explanations that have the epistemic status of being "not even wrong" seems a small sacrifice to make in metaphysics.

Depending on whether it's a good bet, or not.

Depending on whether it's a good bet, or not. — Wayfarer

Is a good bet one that is reasonable, or did you have some other definition of a good bet?

Something like Pascal’s Wager (although not quite the same).

Something like Pascal’s Wager (although not quite the same). — Wayfarer

But there's your problem. If it ain't your Heaven and Hell version of a Biblical creator, then which of the umpteen varieties of speculative supernaturalism should I pretend to treat as if it were a real constraint on my everyday life? A Muslim one? An Aztec one? A Satanist one? An Eastern reincarnation one?

And if it winds up being your kind of divinity - one with all the rough edges knocked off to make it some kind of vague and bland feel-good generality - doesn't it also then loose all its bite? It doesn't in fact make a difference. We all wind up in the same place anyway?

So your "good bet" needs some actual fleshing out here.

which of the umpteen varieties of speculative supernaturalism should I pretend to treat as if it were a real constraint on my everyday life? — apokrisis

The one that means something to you. And none of them do, then the answer is ‘none’.

Well great. But then why shouldn't natural philosophy be the default position?

If supernaturalism is not a real theory in that you agree it has no particular form, let alone any particular consequences, how could we reasonably ever believe in some or other version of it? What on earth justifies a belief for which there is neither a theory nor the evidence?

As usual, the only argument you can make is that - in some specified way - current natural theory fails to explain some kind of observable that matters.

That kind of criticism is important. But what did my account of natural teleology leave out exactly?

If there is no big daddy god with his own mysterious purpose in mind, what more is there to the Cosmos than what I've outlined? If you believe it to be the Platonic Good, then put it on the table as a counter-argument.

And the funny thing is that these supernatural alternatives - either the unpatterned bliss of Nirvana or the frozen eternal perfection of Platonia do sound remarkably like a Heat Death cosmology. Is a life without contrast and challenge really ever going to be that exciting or fullfilling?

In order to pursue the question, it has to be meaningful, but if you’re sure at the outset that it can’t be, then indeed it will not be. That is the role of belief - not clinging to a proposition for which there is no evidence, but a disposition. And if you don't have it, then you don't.

I do have an objection to the way that biosemiotics claims to incorporate the Aristotelian sense of ‘final purpose’ however. And that is because from the biological perspective, the only purpose can be to survive and pro-create. Whereas for Aristotle himself, the final goal of the philosophical quest was something much more ethereal - the philosopher contemplating the eternal Ideas (or something along those lines). In that sense, nature herself is teleological, directed towards some ultimate end, other than just quiescence or non-existence. What that end is, however, might be unimaginable from the physical perspective. I think many of the ancient philosophers were ‘religious’ in that sense - I mean, Aristotle is counted as a ‘pagan philosopher’, but it was a different age, and had a very different mentality.

This is the subject of an essay I often mention, Thomas Nagel's Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament. He puts it as follows:

Plato was clearly concerned not only with the state of his soul, but also with his relation to the universe at the deepest level. Plato’s metaphysics was not intended to produce merely a detached understanding of reality. His motivation in philosophy was in part to achieve a kind of understanding that would connect him (and therefore every human being) to the whole of reality – intelligibly and if possible satisfyingly. He even seems to have suffered from a version of the more characteristically Judaeo-Christian conviction that we are all miserable sinners, and to have hoped for some form of redemption from philosophy.
....
The important thing for the present discussion is that if you have such a belief, you cannot think of yourself as leading a merely human life. Instead, it becomes a life in the sight of God, or an element in the life of the world soul. You must try to bring this conception of the universe and your relation to it into your life, as part of the point of view from which it is led. This is part of the answer to the question of who you are and what you are doing here. It may include a belief in the love of God for his creatures, belief in an afterlife, and other ideas about the connection of earthly existence with the totality of nature or the span of eternity. The details will differ, but in general a divine or universal mind supplies an answer to the question of how a human individual can live in harmony with the universe.

But Nagel also notes that 'the religious temperament is not common among analytic philosophers, but it is not absent. A number of prominent analytic philosophers are protestant, catholic, or jewish, and others, such as Wittgenstein and Rawls, clearly had a religious attitude to life without adhering to a particular religion. But I believe nothing of the kind is present in the makeup of Russell, Moore, Ryle, Austin, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Strawson, or most of the current professoriate.' So it is in a secular culture.

In order to pursue the question, it has to be meaningful, but if you’re sure at the outset that it can’t be, then indeed it will not be. — Wayfarer

Huh? My pragmatic approach is open to revision. All it says is that to be meaningful, it has to make a difference. So if you want to talk about what lies "beyond" our current understanding of nature, you have to speak about something that might make an actual causal difference.

I don't have to make up my mind in advance. Or rather, epistemically my mind is organised to have this open-ended approach to inquiry. So if you can tie some theory to to some evidence, go for it. It is your claim after all.

I do have an objection to the way that biosemiotics claims to incorporate the Aristotelian sense of ‘final purpose’ however. And that is because from the biological perspective, the only purpose can be to survive and pro-create. — Wayfarer

Biology is larger than you allow. Is there no sense in which an eco-system flourishes? Does biology not get the value of a rich community with a nested hierarchical structure and resilience or ascendency?

So you are simply arguing based on a Darwinian caricature of nature red in tooth and claw. It's like you believe the Scientism you are so fond of attacking.

Whereas for Aristotle himself, the final goal of the philosophical quest was something much more ethereal - the philosopher contemplating the eternal Ideas (or something along those lines). — Wayfarer

Hmm. You may be projecting here. Plato or even Pythagoras would make a better target of this particular fantasy. :grin:

I mean, Aristotle is counted as a ‘pagan philosopher’, but it was a different age, and had a very different mentality. — Wayfarer

Yep. Our ideas advance. We ought to bear that fact in mind.

if you want to talk about what lies "beyond" our current understanding of nature, you have to speak about something that might make an actual causal difference. — apokrisis

Naturalism as a philosophy is generally pretty clear about what kinds of causal differences it is willing to contemplate, and they're generally objective in nature. Like, it is not concerned with the kinds of philosophies that aim for a qualitative difference in the life and mind of the practitioner, as for example Pierre Hadot described in his books on 'philosophy as a way of life'.

Whereas for Aristotle himself, the final goal of the philosophical quest was something much more ethereal - the philosopher contemplating the eternal Ideas (or something along those lines).
— Wayfarer

Hmm. You may be projecting here. — apokrisis

Not so.

Aristotle develops his argument by incorporating the life of the Gods' in...his theory. He is careful in making sure that the Gods are seen as beings that have reached fulfillment of life and "above all other beings blessed and happy". According to Aristotle, since continuous activity is what provides continuous pleasure and fulfillment of life, he believes that the Gods do not sleep, therefore allowing them to be in a constant state of contemplation. Furthermore, Aristotle states that Gods do not have the concerns and troubles that plague human thought, these things are "trivial and unworthy of the gods". The question which then arises is if the gods do not sleep, and do not occupy their minds with the concerns of humans, then how do they remain active. To this, Aristotle replies by saying that they must simply live in a state of contemplation; "and you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation?" Furthermore, Aristotle argues that since Gods are the happiest of us all and they live a fulfilling life of contemplation, then the life of contemplation will be the happiest for us humans as well; "Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness"

Of course, as I acknowledged, this was very much part of the cultural milieu in which Aristotle lived and taught. But what I'm saying is that, retaining the Aristotelian idea of a 'final cause', but then omitting the theistic basis for it, changes its meaning altogether. Now, it might be that Aristotle was mistaken in this regard, but that is not really the point at issue.

Remember how "hard free will" appeared as complete randomness? Nobody wants that. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's true, but I had the 'anxiety of influence' in mind. I don't think we like to be boring or cliche. I'll grant that especially fearful types might prefer that to jutting out in an embarrassing way.

And, it's quite evident in communication, and most social activity, we make an effort to be predictable. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think we both provided half the truth here. As a courtesy, we try not to scare people off. Living in crowded cities, we need a background of 'programmed' interactions. The alternative would be maddening. But the foreground would be our intimate relationships and our creative work. Here we very much want to be unique in a positive way. Here being predictable is failing. The creative class wages a war against cliche.

Constraints of the past restrict the reality of what one can get, or bring about, create, in the future, but they do not put restrictions on what one can want, or desire. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not so sure about this. I think we learn what's possible from the past. We learn a set of acceptable desires. If we have nonconforming desires, we probably justify such desires in terms of still another part of our heritage, the ideology of the philosophical rebels, for instance.

In reality though, thinking is not necessarily clear, accurate, or correct. We often use thinking to rationalize goals which are really irrational. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I use the words, a goal cannot be irrational. I do think I understand what you mean. We want things that are not good for us or won't really make us happy. I understand rationalization to be a kind of self-deception. Our intellectual hygiene can fail when we want something more than this hygiene (and at other times.) And then perfect rationality might be a sort of mirage or ideal. I mentioned formal systems in another thread because I think this is where we get quite close to perfect rationality ---but at the cost of reasoning about intrinsically meaningless symbols.

I agree that thinking can be unclear. In fact it is perhaps usually unclear and only clear enough for this or that purpose. I like a metaphor from computer science. If you want a better floating point approximation of the irrational real number, that will cost you.

This implies that thinking is really a process whereby intentions for the future incline us to make a representation of the past (memory), and bring this representation to bear upon future possibilities. Therefore it is not the actual past which is doing the constraining in the act of thinking, it is really just the representation of the past (memory), and this is why we are prone to making mistakes. — Metaphysician Undercover

How about we put it this way? Memory in the present is a function of the past, and the constraints we project on the future are a function of memory and therefore a function of the past (by composition of functions)? As to why we make mistakes, I think there are lots of reasons. We work with partial information, for one thing, and our 'operating system' which is 'ordinary language' or a 'form of life' is for the most part in-explicit.

So when we make decisions concerning free will and determinism, we must be careful not to consider these representations (memories) as the past constraining the future in a determinist way, because the memories are produced and employed in a free way. The consequence, mistakes. — Metaphysician Undercover

For me constraint and determinism are one and the same. A constraint determines. I still would argue, also, that it is not a given that memories are produced and deployed in a free way. Indeed, I think the continuity of personality, a familiar fact, suggests otherwise. Would you not agree, also, that desires are largely experienced as 'givens'? I find that I am thirsty or attracted to so and so. I cannot decide to be thirsty, though I can decide on an interpretation of an unclear desire. ('I'm in this mood because of X.') The tools I reach for to satisfy this or that desire are usually in memory. Occasionally someone clever combines techniques or even dreams up a new technique.

I'm not so sure about this. I think we learn what's possible from the past. — mrcoffee

Well, I disagree. I think we learn what's impossible from the past, not what's possible. We make up possibilities with our minds, logical possibilities, they are all imaginary and not things of memory, they are creations of the mind. We make up logical possibilities and our experience from the past allows us to eliminate some of them as physically impossible. But we don't learn what's possible from the past, we make that up.

Memory in the present is a function of the past, and the constraints we project on the future are a function of memory and therefore a function of the past (by composition of functions)? — mrcoffee

This is not really a case of the past constraining the future though. Our memories are selective, always incomplete, and sometimes wrong. So it's really a case of the person in the present attempting to use past experience to constrain the future, for the sake of some purpose.

As I use the words, a goal cannot be irrational. — mrcoffee

Why would you think that a goal cannot be irrational? Irrational means unreasonable or illogical. Do you not think that a person may at sometime set as a goal something which cannot be obtained by that person? Wouldn't that goal be irrational?

How about we put it this way? Memory in the present is a function of the past, and the constraints we project on the future are a function of memory and therefore a function of the past (by composition of functions)? — mrcoffee

No, this is where I don't agree. Memory is a function of the living being, at the present. It's not a function of the past, it's how we relate to the past. And those properties of memory which I mentioned, that 'it's selective and sometimes wrong, indicate that it's really not a function of the past, but a function of the living creature, now. The fact that we make mistakes in our memory, and we act on those faulty memories toward constraining the future, as if the memories were correct, indicates that it's not really the past at all which is constraining the future in this way. It is the actions of the living being, to remember and to act on those memories, which is constraining the future in this way.

But we don't learn what's possible from the past, we make that up. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK, I don't deny a kind of pure creativity. But I think our imaginations mostly manifest influence, and that's what I had in mind.

This is not really a case of the past constraining the future though. Our memories are selective, always incomplete, and sometimes wrong. So it's really a case of the person in the present attempting to use past experience to constrain the future, for the sake of some purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be more exact, I was suggesting that the past constrains the expected future via memory. The expected future is just an image, of course. I don't claim that the future is 'actually' constrained by the past, though I do in fact believe this on a gut level.

I agree with the last sentence quoted. We presently use the past to constrain the future in order to attain some goal. Or rather this is common state. Sometimes we are just daydreaming, of course.

Why would you think that a goal cannot be irrational? Irrational means unreasonable or illogical. Do you not think that a person may at sometime set as a goal something which cannot be obtained by that person? Wouldn't that goal be irrational? — Metaphysician Undercover

Our disagreement here is at most a matter of word usage. I cede that your usage is quite common & I agree that the kind of goal you describe above could be described as 'irrational.'

It's not a function of the past, it's how we relate to the past. And those properties of memory which I mentioned, that 'it's selective and sometimes wrong, indicate that it's really not a function of the past, but a function of the living creature, now. — Metaphysician Undercover

I may have asked for trouble by using a mathematical metaphor. I had f(m(p)) in mind. The expected future is a function of memory which is a function of the past. Hence the expected future would be indirectly a function of the past, mediated by memory, which is obviously not the identity function. And of course these are only mathematical metaphors, which I mention not for you but others.

The past constrains the future, but it doesn't absolutely determine the future. So the past leaves the future only relatively determined in terms of its propensities.

Physical models can of course simplify the situation and treat the dynamics of the world as mechanical and time-reversible. But that Newtonian view is known to be an over-simplification both due to the laws of thermodynamics and quantum theory.

If we put all our physical laws together, they tell us the world is a place where the past does constrain the future, but can't absolutely determine the future. — apokrisis

Right. That's my understanding, too.

It uses a symbolic memory and code - like genes, neurons, words - to step back from the world so as to be able to control that world. — apokrisis

That makes sense. It definitely reminds me of the conscious intention of human individuals. Philosophy, for instance, is (among other things) a kind of conquest of confusion and essential danger. The confusion part is obvious. The conquest of essential danger would include rhetorical strategies for making peace with the 'evils' of life, such as personal mortality, perceived unfairness, etc. This is the 'spiritual' side of philosophy, and I'd say that non-objective side.

On the lower levels though, I imagine some codes just replicating more than others. Would control not be metaphorical here? Or a synonym for successful as opposed to unsuccessful replication? (I haven't studied biology closely.)

I don't claim that the future is 'actually' constrained by the past, though I do in fact believe this on a gut level. — mrcoffee

It's not the future that is constrained by memory, it is the choices that we might make. One may choose not to try to walk through a brick wall. However, there are many possible choices that the person (mind) may take and the choice itself is not determined until it is actually made (walk around the wall, jump over the wall, break through the wall, etc). Choices are constrained. Precision in describing the actual creative process reveals that we have memory, creative thought, and will, which evolve into the future through duration.

This is the 'spiritual' side of philosophy, and I'd say that non-objective side. — mrcoffee

Speaking personally, I’m only interested in philosophy in the sense of the Western tradition of critical thinking. So it is all about de-subjectivising our belief systems, for me.

On the lower levels though, I imagine some codes just replicating more than others. Would control not be metaphorical here? — mrcoffee

Sure. But still, the key point is that life gains organismic autonomy in being able to use information to regulate physics. So the basis of freewill - that is intelligent, selfish and goal directed behaviour - is there right from the ground up. As soon as a molecule becomes a message, we are talking about life being freed from the kind of strict Newtonian determinism that causes all the metaphysical angst about human freewill.

Now, it might be that Aristotle was mistaken in this regard, but that is not really the point at issue. — Wayfarer

This is straying from the topic, but it seems a contradiction that Aristotle starts by defining flourishing in terms of self actualisation and building a life through rational action, then you want to make this the final takeaway - that contemplation is an “ethereal” ultimate stage of development.

It might be highly abstract, but that’s different in my book.

It's not the future that is constrained by memory, it is the choices that we might make. — Rich

I remember that there's a ripe avocado on the counter downstairs. It wasn't ripe enough last night, so I left it there. I'm likely to make my way downstairs today, and I expect the avocado to be there. So my image of the future is constrained my the memory of this avocado. (My image of the future is something like a branching tree of possibilities, which could be phrased in terms of if-then statements, perhaps.)

So the basis of freewill - that is intelligent, selfish and goal directed behaviour - is there right from the ground up. As soon as a molecule becomes a message, we are talking about life being freed from the kind of strict Newtonian determinism that causes all the metaphysical angst about human freewill. — apokrisis

I see that you are pointing out a fascinating phenomenon. I'm a little uneasy about calling lower level replication goal-directed and selfish, but that's a quibble. I realize also that 'God plays dice' (or I trust the physicists on this), so strict determinism does seem like a dead issue.

So my image of the future is constrained my the memory of this avocado. — mrcoffee

This is why absolute precision is required. The image is getting the avocado.

The future is seen as virtual (possible actions). Your choices are: when to get it (initiation of will), how to get it (directional action), what to do with it once you get it.

Your future is not avocado. Your future is what you are going to do with it but once you get it. All require memory, will, and creative thought (a salad?).

If one wishes to understand life and nature, one needs to set aside all biases and just observe with skill. Besides memory, will, and creative mind, this also requires lots of patience.

The future is seen as virtual (possible actions). Your choices are: when to get it (initiation of will), how to get it (directional action), what to do with it once you get it. — Rich

I agree that possible actions are at the center of our concern, but the future is also the background of possible actions, their context. Certain actions are possible or not according to whether this 'background' is one situation or another. Because I believe the avocado is down there, I can decide ahead of time whether to eat it rather than something else that is also down there.

he future is also the background of possible actions, their context. — mrcoffee

Yes, we create an image based upon possible actions.

Certain actions are possible or not according to whether this 'background' is one situation or another. — mrcoffee

Yes, we create images of possibilities and that images (possible choices) guide our actions.

By observing life closely, we begin to understand it. The more we observe, the more skilled we become, and the more we understand. This is philosophy.

This is straying from the topic, but it seems a contradiction that Aristotle starts by defining flourishing in terms of self actualisation and building a life through rational action, then you want to make this the final takeaway - that contemplation is an “ethereal” ultimate stage of development. — apokrisis

Beats the hell out of being a heat sink. ;-)

Beats the hell out of being a heat sink — Wayfarer

Hmm. If you checked, what would would be your daily kilojoule production?

https://cncf.com.au/carbon-calculator/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIubWR-dzP2QIV0o6PCh3K7gt0EAAYASABEgJNKvD_BwE

And it wouldn’t make the least difference, regardless of whether I was a philosopher or a physicist.