You aren't taking the time to read my posts. I already explained in my first post what a "set of instructions for interpreting sensory impressions" is.I'm not sure what you mean by "...a set of instructions for interpreting some sensory impression..." When we talk about knowledge, we are talking about how it is that we come to say that we have knowledge. Not all knowledge is about sensory impressions, as I've mentioned before. For example, how is it that we come to say "I know algebra," isn't it because I've studied algebra and have taken the appropriate tests that verify my knowledge of algebra. Thus, I'm justified in saying that I know algebra, because there is an objective way of measuring my knowledge. It's not a matter of just saying one knows, it's a matter of justifying the belief, i.e., I have good reasons for making the claim. Hence, the definition of knowledge is justified true belief. The key word is justified. — Sam26
The point that Wittgenstein seems to be making is that doubting the existence of one's hands, or doubting the existence of the external world, fall outside the language-game of use for these particular words. — Sam26
When we try to say what it means to exist, all sorts of logical problems arise. How can one say without doubt, "my hands exist", when one cannot say without doubt what it means to "exist"? So it becomes evident that we use words within language-games without actually knowing what the words mean. — Metaphysician Undercover
When we criticise the use of a certain word or phrase, we are not criticising the language as a whole, just that particular use of it. There's no inconsistency in regarding language use in general as a useful, meaningful activity while criticising the use of certain word or phrases as having no use or meaning. David Borland's advocacy of the language E-Prime exemplifies that attitude and I find it refreshing and helpful.If we criticize the use of language in the absence of an ideal justification (a definition of exist, for instance), then we are using that same unjustified language to do so, implying that we expect to be understood --implying that we trust the language in practice as we question it in theory. — mrcoffee
When we criticise the use of a certain word or phrase, we are not criticising the language as a whole, just that particular use of it. There's no inconsistency in regarding language use in general as a useful, meaningful activity while criticising the use of certain word or phrases as having no use or meaning. — andrewk
You asked whether 'hand', 'demand' or 'definition' are as problematic as 'exist'. Empirically they are not, as people tend not to disagree over what they mean, whereas they constantly disagree over what 'exist' means - including non-philosophers. — andrewk
I like to use ostension as the root of meaning - that if we can trace the meaning of a word through a tree whose nodes are various other words until we reach terminal leaves, each of which is given meaning by ostension, then we know what the word means. Otherwise not. — andrewk
A simpler approach though would be that if everybody agrees on what a word means, and that agreement is borne out by experiment (e.g. Simon says 'raise your hand' and everybody raises their hand), then we can consider that we know the meaning. — andrewk
The point that Wittgenstein seems to be making is that doubting the existence of one's hands, or doubting the existence of the external world, fall outside the language-game of use for these particular words. — Sam26
We know how to use words without being able to conclusively describe how or what that know-how is. — mrcoffee
If we criticize the use of language in the absence of an ideal justification (a definition of exist, for instance), then we are using that same unjustified language to do so, implying that we expect to be understood --implying that we trust the language in practice as we question it in theory. — mrcoffee
This is not to deny the strangeness of our situation. A person could say that we don't really know anything. But as soon as words move toward such absolutes they lose their power to distinguish situations in practical life. If I'm not even certain that I have hands, then of what use is 'certainty' except to mark the impossible hope of infinitely itchy philosophers? — mrcoffee
It doesn't seem possible to get 'behind' this know-how or form of life. I have to use it if I want to try to do so. My objections to the inexplicitness of my knowhow are also thereby made possible. If I demand a definition of 'exist,' why not demand a definition of 'definition' and 'demand'? Why not of 'hand'? Surely we can problematize the use of 'hand' with a little imagination. — mrcoffee
In many cases the skeptic fails to understand how to use the word doubt, and it is also true that the non-skeptic fails to understand why this is the case. Therefore, the non-skeptic will argue against the skeptic making the same mistakes in their use of the word know. Both Moore and the skeptics have fallen into the trap of not understanding the rules of the game. The rules are not spelled out, they are implicit, one must come to understand the rules by thinking about the many uses of words like know and doubt. — Sam26
Yes this is what Socrates is famous for demonstrating, many people know how to do things without really knowing exactly what they are doing. — Metaphysician Undercover
I would not claim that we "don't really know anything", unless you define "know" as requiring absolute certainty. But I don't think that knowing requires absolute certainty, and this is evident from the fact that I proceed with my endeavours, knowing how to proceed, despite the fact that I know that I may not be successful with any particular attempt. And, I never know at what time something may interfere and prevent me from being successful. This fact, that I am not completely sure of my success, inspires me to seek possible avenues of failure, to eliminate them. — Metaphysician Undercover
Once something is deemed as certain, it is called upon, and used in our actions, without question, just like a habit. — Metaphysician Undercover
Suppose we have a failure, we need to determine the cause of the failure. If "x" has already been determined as certain, then "x" will not be considered as the cause of the failure. But we've already excluded the possibility that "x" is absolutely certain, so ought we not consider the possibility that "x" is the cause of the failure, despite the fact that "x" has been determined as certain? — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, that's exactly the point, we ought to demand such definitions, this is how we prevent misunderstanding and mistake. In daily usage, if we don't adequately understand, we simply ask the speaker to clarify what was meant. But in specialized fields of education, like medicine, and biology which deals with parts of animals, you cannot just point to your hand, and say this is a hand, because the extent of the object pointed to is vague. So we need to refer to things like fingers and the wrist, to create boundaries for that specific object, "the hand", and we do this with definitions. — Metaphysician Undercover
The split is determined by the definition used for the word. Every word in the definition that is not already clearly understood gives rise to a new branch leading to a node that is the definition of that word.I understand the appeal of that view, but what exactly happens away from the terminal nodes? How do you decide how to split a nonterminal node into other nonterminal modes? How does 'justice' split? How does 'rationality' split? 'God'? — mrcoffee
Why do you think that if someone uses a word it must have a meaning? — andrewk
The split is determined by the definition used for the word. Every word in the definition that is not already clearly understood gives rise to a new branch leading to a node that is the definition of that word. — andrewk
I like your choices of other problematic words. All three of those are controversial, and have given rise to great debate over the years. — andrewk
The first part of Plato's Republic is devoted to debate over what Justice is. — andrewk
I find debate over such words as meaningless as debate over the use of 'exist', and I try to avoid use of those words as well. — andrewk
When I do use them, I use them with a meaning I prefer, to which I can give a definition, but it will be a meaning that many people would not accept. — andrewk
I'll add 'free will' as another example of something that people argue furiously over even though none of them know what they mean by the term. — andrewk
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