The beliefs of Smith are based on false premises — BlueBanana

Such as?

If we take the first Gettier case, the premise Smith used to justify his belief that Jones will get the job is that the president of the company assured him that he would, and the premise Smith used to justify his belief that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket is that he counted them earlier. These are true premises.

If we take the second Gettier case, the premises Smith uses to justify his belief that Jones owns a Ford are that "Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford". These are true premises.

By beliefs I only meant the final conclusions that turn out to be true. The premises for them are "Jones will get the job" and "Jones owns a Ford", which turn out to be false. If we look at the premises of those, we see that they are indeed true, but Smith jumps to invalid conclusions from them.

I don't really know what you mean by it was interpreted in some other way. What other way is there to interpret the proposition "Someone I know owns a Ford"?

2) is assumed to be true by Gettier because, as you mention, JTB is just a definition. A person could technically bite the bullet and claim b is knowledge. However, the entire point is to show that the definition leads us to accept conclusions that, for all intents and purposes, are false.

I think I can show why you could not accept b as knowledge under JTB. Smith got lucky; his JTB in b is only true by chance as his justification is disconnected from what actually makes b true. Smith is no different than someone with an unjustified true belief, in that they do have a true belief, but only luckily so. The difference between someone luckily obtaining true belief and Smith is that Smith actually has justification. Smith only has "knowledge" because he is lucky, but still meets the criteria for JTB. If the virtue of luck is enough to carry someone and make their beliefs count for knowledge, then someone with TB also ought to count for knowledge. If we accept that, then JTB is false because it collapses in on itself; one does not require justification for knowledge, only true belief. It's similar to the last statement you made.

It also seems absurd to claim that one cannot be justified by false beliefs. If Smith fakes their vehicle registration for a Ford, pays people to vouch for him about owning a Ford, picks me up in a Ford that he does not own, and shows me pictures on social media of him driving around in said Ford, then I am, by any normal means of the word, justified in believing Smith owns a Ford. The claims are all false- Smith fabricated everything- but I am justified in believing Smith owns a Ford. From the proposition "Smith owns a Ford," I can derive the proposition "Someone I know owns a Ford." The justification from the first transfers over to the other.

@BlueBanana

"The president of the company told Smith that Jones will get the job." Seems like a good evidence, as the president of the company is a reliable source, however, "Jones will get the job" is an assertion about the future and so, it is indeterminate. The president of the company is a reliable source but he cannot predict the future. The mere fact that Jones didn't get the job proves that.

"Smith counts the coins in Jones pocket and sees that he has ten coins. Smith comes to the belief that the person who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket." The problem here is that the person Smith is referring to is clearly Jones because he knows that Jones has ten coins but not that he also has ten coins. He mistakenly thought that a good way to differentiate himself from Jones is to say that, unlike him, Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Therefore, the underlying meaning of "the person who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket" is "Jones will get the job".

Smith believed that "Jones will get the job" which turned out to be false and not "the person who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket" which turned out to be true, so it doesn't debunk the JTB theory.

As for arguments for the JTB theory, well, knowledge is in itself a true belief, the thing is, how can we know that the belief is indeed true? We have to rely on some sort of proof, a justification, hence the true justified belief.

I don't really know what you mean by it was interpreted in some other way. What other way is there to interpret the proposition "Someone I know owns a Ford"? — Chany

If we consider the first case for example, the meaning of "the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket" changes if the person "the man who will get the job" refers to. This is what Lukasz Lozanski used in an article I found to solve the Gettier problem.

However, the entire point is to show that the definition leads us to accept conclusions that, for all intents and purposes, are false. — Chany

That should be done by coming to those conclusions from the definition alone. Taking one's own conclusion as a premise doesn't prove anything.

I think I can show why you could not accept b as knowledge under JTB. — Chany

I know all this to be true, but for either JTB-definition to be shown true or Gettier to be shown correct it should be proven that b is not knowledge, not only under JTB.

It also seems absurd to claim that one cannot be justified by false beliefs. If Smith fakes their vehicle registration for a Ford, pays people to vouch for him about owning a Ford, picks me up in a Ford that he does not own, and shows me pictures on social media of him driving around in said Ford, then I am, by any normal means of the word, justified in believing Smith owns a Ford. The claims are all false- Smith fabricated everything- but I am justified in believing Smith owns a Ford. From the proposition "Smith owns a Ford," I can derive the proposition "Someone I know owns a Ford." The justification from the first transfers over to the other. — Chany

But where is the line drawn? Are logical fallacies enough justification? Is any amount of evidence enough or is proof required? This is all further evidence against JTB. How can knowledge be defined as a justified true belief when the word justified itself is so unclear?

Smith believed that "Jones will get the job" which turned out to be false and not "the person who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket" which turned out to be true, so it doesn't debunk the JTB theory. — Abaoaqu

Except if we claim Gettier was incorrect and Smith does know that the person who gets the job has ten coins in their pocket.

knowledge is in itself a true belief — Abaoaqu

Yes, by JTB-definition. We can also take it as a premise that false knowledge exists.

how can we know that the belief is indeed true? We have to rely on some sort of proof, a justification — Abaoaqu

What is adequate justification?

Ie. any claim is an expression of an opinion (for example "God exists"="I believe God exists"), I believe in God, if God exists then God exists, God exists, therefore God exists. Therefore my belief in God is justified, so I know God exists.

If we consider the first case for example, the meaning of "the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket" changes if the person "the man who will get the job" refers to. This is what Lukasz Lozanski used in an article I found to solve the Gettier problem. — BlueBanana

Alright, so what does it matter? So long as I can derive the proposition that Gettier uses for his conclusion from the earlier beliefs, then the problem stands.

That should be done by coming to those conclusions from the definition alone. Taking one's own conclusion as a premise doesn't prove anything. — BlueBanana

Not all arguments require a super in-depth look into each premise. Gettier is assuming we will find b to not count for knowledge in the same way that we do not need to show that merely having belief as knowledge. I can define "knowledge" as "whatever I would like to be true," and you can't really show that definition to be false. As you note, it's a definition. We reject the definition because it clearly doesn't conform to how we use and think about the word. In the same way, b doesn't really conform to our understanding of knowledge and no one has presented a convincing argument as to why it should count.

I know all this to be true, but for either JTB-definition to be shown true or Gettier to be shown correct it should be proven that b is not knowledge, not only under JTB. — BlueBanana

But my argument is that if we accept b to be knowledge, then that means one can have knowledge purely through luck. If one can have knowledge purely through luck, then the TB (true belief) theory of knowledge is true, as the main reason we want justification and rejct TB in the first place is to avoid merely being lucky in our beliefs. Therefore, the JTB theory is false because the "J" part is not needed. And, obviously, if we do not accept b to be knowledge, Gettier stands. So, either way, JTB is finished.

And, honestly, I don't think we should really have to argue why having unjustified beliefs being luckily true count as knowledge. It's so prima facie wrong that it's not worth discussing unless someone brings out a really good case for it.

But where is the line drawn? Are logical fallacies enough justification? Is any amount of evidence enough or is proof required? This is all further evidence against JTB. How can knowledge be defined as a justified true belief when the word justified itself is so unclear? — BlueBanana

What counts as justification and whether or not it is what is really needed is a major point of discussion in epistemology, so I am not really sure that it matters. JTB could be true, but no one actually meets the requirements for justification for most beliefs, so therefore no one has knowledge. I do think that Gettier is within his bounds, however, to assume skepticism to be false and show that, even if we assume normal, everyday parameters for justification, JTB is fundamentally flawed.

I agree with you that Gettier was not successful in what he wanted to achieve, but I disagree with the claim that JTB is not what we need for knowledge, because one can make a lucky guess and be right. This is typically addressed by reference to a person buying a lottery ticket, that he just "knows" is the winning ticket, and he turns out to be right. Absent some insider information, the person most definitely did not know he had the winning ticket, he just got lucky. What you are claiming is that the "knowledge" of a lottery ticket winner in "knowing" he held the winning ticket I equivalent to the knowledge a physicist ha regarding why a bridge will stay in place. I strongly disagree with that position.

I disagree with the claim that JTB is not what we need for knowledge, because one can make a lucky guess and be right. — LD Saunders

I didn't say that the "justified" part was the problem though. I think both "true" and "belief" are bigger mistakes with the definition. First of all knowledge doesn't need to be true for multiple reasons, for example the existence of the words "false knowledge", and subjectivism redefining the term "truth". Belief, on the other hand, isn't enough to make something knowledge. One also needs to at least consider their beliefs to be objectively correct knowledge.

What you are claiming is that the "knowledge" of a lottery ticket winner in "knowing" he held the winning ticket I equivalent to the knowledge a physicist ha regarding why a bridge will stay in place. — LD Saunders

I'd actually say that other way around: I consider the knowledge of physicists to be equivalent to the knowledge about the lottery ticket in its lack of proper justification.

BlueBanana: When you state that knowledge doesn't have to be true, then how can it be knowledge? If I "know" the capital of the USA is Portland, Oregon, then how could I really know the capital of the USA when I am wrong? If I think 2 + 2 = 5 in a base-ten system, then how could I have actual knowledge of what 2 + 2 equals in base-ten, since I would be so clearly wrong? Once you claim that knowledge need not be true, aren't you then claiming that all claims are the equivalent of one another?

Except if we claim Gettier was incorrect and Smith does know that the person who gets the job has ten coins in their pocket. — BlueBanana

Umm... I really don't understand what you mean, how is that an exception?

What is adequate justification? — BlueBanana

That's a good question.

What you are claiming is that the "knowledge" of a lottery ticket winner in "knowing" he held the winning ticket I equivalent to the knowledge a physicist ha regarding why a bridge will stay in place. I strongly disagree with that position. — LD Saunders

Yes, the lottery ticket winner only had a feeling he would win, he only believed he would win, nowhere did he know that he actually would.

First of all knowledge doesn't need to be true for multiple reasons, for example the existence of the words "false knowledge" — BlueBanana

"False knowledge" is a misuse of the word knowledge. That is what you call a false belief.

Belief, on the other hand, isn't enough to make something knowledge. — BlueBanana

I agree, it isn't enough, they also have to be true, which should be verified with some sort of proof.

Edmund Gettier made the following two assumptions:

1) b is a justified, true belief (JTB-definition of knowledge)
2) b is not knowledge
And therefore, JTB theory is false.

However, this is circular reasoning. Nowhere did Gettier actually prove that b is not knowledge. Gettier's own examples are evidence of knowledge being justified true beliefs. — BlueBanana

It isn't circular. What Gettier does is describe a number of thought-experiments in which the person has justified, true belief. But Gettier is inclined not to use the word "knowledge" to describe those cases. He thinks you will agree with him that it would be odd to use the word "knowledge" to describe those cases. Hence, "knowledge" does not mean "justified true belief".

Incidentally this whole method of doing philosophy I find unhelpful. Arguments of this sort produce vast and endless debates about the "ordinary" meaning of words. Empirical methods are better suited to figuring out whether there is such a thing as the "ordinary" meaning of "knowledge".

Incidentally this whole method of doing philosophy I find unhelpful. Arguments of this sort produce vast and endless debates about the "ordinary" meaning of words. Empirical methods are better suited to figuring out whether there is such a thing as the "ordinary" meaning of "knowledge". — PossibleAaran

Are you suggesting that there's an alternative approach to the problem, or that the problem isn't really a problem at all?

I think one of his examples where a person looks at a broken clock, that just happens to be stating the correct time, to then say someone does not have a justified true belief in the correct time. But, how does that really create an attack on JTB as being a basis for knowledge? Almost anyone relying on a broken clock will soon figure out the clock is broken and then look at a functioning clock to figure out the correct time. I just don't see how such examples undermine JTB as a general proposition as for what is required to have knowledge.

Umm... I really don't understand what you mean, how is that an exception? — Abaoaqu

Gettier argues he doesn't know that.

"False knowledge" is a misuse of the word knowledge. That is what you call a false belief. — Abaoaqu

I consider that knowledge also requires the believer considers their beliefs knowledge, or at least objectively correct.

He thinks you will agree with him that it would be odd to use the word "knowledge" to describe those cases. — PossibleAaran

And why is that usage odd? Because, (Gettier claims,) b is not knowledge.

Once you claim that knowledge need not be true, aren't you then claiming that all claims are the equivalent of one another? — LD Saunders

The logical conclusion we can draw from that is that either all claims are equivalent, OR all knowledge is NOT equivalent. Since knowledge can be either true or false, I claim the latter. You can know 2+2=5, but you're wrong and it doesn't make the correct knowledge that 2+2=4 any less right.

BlueBanana: I'm not sure I understand your point. Since you are claiming that knowledge can be false, which contradicts the JTB assertion, then how can you say that a false claim is worse than a true one, since, according to you, even a false claim may amount to knowledge?

How not? False knowledge is worse than correct knowledge because it's false.

BlueBanana: That's been my point, but you are the one claiming that false claims amount to knowledge. That is what you wrote. Perhaps you made a mistake in writing it?

I mean it's still knowledge. There's correct knowledge and false knowledge, and the word knowledge refers to both, yet they're not "worth" the same.

The reason for this is that this definition actually describes the everyday usage of knowledge most correctly. We can never prove anything, except our own existence, and even that to ourselves, strictly speaking, so either nothing is knowledge, or there exists a theoretical possibility of that knowledge being false, while we can still refer to it as knowledge.

BluBanana: If it's false, how could it possibly be knowledge? Saying we can't prove anything doesn't really matter, that's a given in first semester philosophy, and then we all move on from there and ignore it because it serves no purpose as a practical matter.

If it's false, how could it possibly be knowledge? — LD Saunders

Because I define knowledge so that it can be false. It's the most correct definition because most things called knowledge aren't certain. Knowledge is a belief that one considers knowledge, or subjectively believes to be an objectively true fact - as opposed to beliefs that one objectively recognizes as subjective ones.

If the information about the truth value of a thing that was referred to as knowledge changes, whether it is knowledge in the colloquial sense cannot change because whether it was, at the time, justified to refer to it as knowledge defines whether the belief was knowledge. A word means what it refers to, and false information is quite often referred to as knowledge.

BlueBanana: I'm not following you, but I really have no interest in spending any more time on the issue you are trying to raise.

Are you suggesting that there's an alternative approach to the problem, or that the problem isn't really a problem at all? — Michael

In a way both. If you want to know what the usual meaning of "knowledge" is then go out and ask people. Do some surveys. Don't just consider thought-experiments among philosophers and assume that those judgements are representative. A number of philosophers have actually taken to using surveys for this recently.

But I also don't really see why some philosophers care so much about what regular people mean by "knowledge". Different people find different things interesting I guess.

The issues with Gettier cases are many, and they all involve the classical notion of belief. Belief, to the JTB theorists, has propositional content. Gettier, perhaps unknowingly, capitalizes on this mistake.

The 'official' formulation of JTB is as follows:S knows P if S is justified in believing P and P is true.

Gettier argued against that formulation by stating that if S is justified in believing P, infers Q from P, then S is justified in believing Q. In both Gettier cases, it is claimed that Q is true, S is purportedly justified in inferring and thus believing Q, but given the case specifics, no one would reasonably assert that S knows Q.

The first case involves Gettier effectively changes S's belief that S will get the job to another slightly different belief that Gettier could show fault with. He does so by virtue of saying that S has ten coins in his pocket, and so S's belief changes(according to Gettier) from S believing that S will get the job, to S believing that "the man who has ten coins in his pocket will get the job", by virtue of S inferring Q from P where Q is "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job. Well, according to Gettier and completely unbeknownst to S, the other guy also had ten coins in his pocket, and got the job. So, at first blush, it seems that S's belief that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job is both justified and true, but not a case of knowledge, for S believed that he(S) would get the job not the other guy. The problem here is that Gettier changes S's belief to 'The man with ten coins will get the job' using the notion of entailment. Originally it was 'Smith(the believer himself) will get the job'. So, in the first case, "the man" is equivalent to S, not the other guy. Gettier is unjustified in implying that "the man" is equivalent to Smith. Truth conditions matter. If Q has a different set of truth conditions than P, the inference thereof is highly suspect, and perhaps outright unjustified/invalid. Hence, the first case is no problem for JTB, but is a problem for the notion of entailment if Gettier followed all of those rules.

The second case involves a disjunction. That is, Q is a disjunction derived from P. P is a justified belief. The problem with the second case, just as in the first, is had in Gettier's failure to properly account for S's belief, although this one is more convincing to most. Being justified in believing that Q(a disjunction) is true, requires that S consider the truth conditions for Q. S can know that if either P or Q is true, then so too is (P or Q). S can validly infer (P or Q) from a belief that P, and already knowing that if P is true then so too is (P or Q), which is exactly what S does in the second case.To be clear, S's belief is that (P or Q) is true because P is true. Gettier leaves out the belief content that matters most.

That's Gettier problems in a nutshell...

But then again, some folk hereabouts just think I'm an idiot so...

:yum:

That's Gettier problems in a nutshell... — creativesoul

You call that a nutshell? You lost my attention after about four sentences - pretty long sentences at that.

Look at the op. Conclusion b is drawn from the belief a, which is a false belief, in the first place. Therefore conclusion b is not a justified belief. That's the nutshell.

Strong opening Meta.