A bunch of normative words

• Justification
• Rational
• Reasonable
• Warranted

The question - and it's not a small one - is what one ought believe. — Banno

Which circles the issue back around to defining this "one" that might ought to be doing anything at all.

Truth is a point of view. So that requires the two things which a theory of truth needs to account for. The facts of the matter, but also the imagined entity that would have some reason to care.

Despite being asked a gazillion times, you always go silent about this other side of the truth equation. And this seems tied into your desire simply to be able to assert truth without having to justify your "self". ;)

Perhaps Rover fits somewhere in between. — Banno

Rover is conscious. That doesn't mean he has truth-apt beliefs.

Truth is a point of view. — apokrisis

No, Apo - belief is a point of view.

No, Apo - belief is a point of view. — Banno

Sure. "Truth" falls out of the picture as we realise there is only actually belief and its justification. We've established that already.

But then justification - why we ought to believe - brings us to the embodiment of some reason. We have to account for the "self" that is having the "point of view".

However carry on deflecting. Let's pretend truth hasn't dropped out of the picture as a transcendent presence which is "truly out there" - freely existent and detached from any point of view.

Well, there is a problem here.

"X is hungry" restricts X to objects that can have the attribute hungry. This includes both humans and dogs. This isn't controversial.

But if we then ask why being hungry leads to eating certain things and not others, we look for explanatory principles. What motivates us turn towards "belief" when we talk about humans, but "instinct" when we talk about dogs?

There are quite complex discussions on that with regards to leaning and coming equipped with the knowledge; it's not the details that matter here. Rather: for our purposes,what we're doing is to position "belief" and "instinct" as rival explanations. So what is the relationship? If "hunger" is roughly the same humans and dogs, why would the underpinnings for eating be so very different?

That is: can we assume belief in human actions, when the behaviour is learned, automatic, uncontroversial, and usually not formulated? My default assumption is that when chosing what to eat, we're not that different from dogs, where it doesn't actually matter whether we had to learn what is "good to eat" or came equipped with it.

I think guessing at beliefs from behaviour, we might actually be overextending the reference for "belief". Or differently put, I'd probably reverse this: "I am hungry. I believe eating X will satiate my hunger. Therefor I eat X." to "I usually eat X to satiate my hunger. Therefore I believe X satiates my hunger."

What makes us do things? Instinct, habit, etc. Belief is a factor, but usually only when we actually contemplate our actions. My hunch is that the belief gets activated only when someone or something casts doubt on the things "we usually do". (Under quotes because I consider thought-habits a form of doing, and I'm not quite sure of the range of referential objects I'd associate with that.)

This would also solve the question of taste, here: if you set an apple and a banana before me when I'm hungry, I'll always go for the apple, because I don't like bananas. No belief comes into it, but there's no significant thought going into that decision either. If you replace the banana with a brick, my mind's not going to be busy thinking "Well, I'll have trouble digesting the brick, so I go for the apple." My mind's going to be busy questioning your motives for offering me a brick. Is this a Monty Python's skit? If I take human agency out of the equation, I'll just ignore the brick completely and take the apple. Basically, my semantic register doesn't tag the brick as food, and doesn't tag the banana as "good", and there's a decision hierarchy in place that makes me pick the apple. Belief might come into it with "brick vs. apple", while taste might come into with "banana vs. apple". But it's essentially the same process of elimination.

I think beliefs are attached to actions, and may sway decisions in the presence of doubt, but they don't motivate decisions. I think it makes more sense to place "belief" into a sort of feedback-control system rather than a motivating system.

Whether or not it's a category error to place "instinct" and "belief" as rival explanations for action depends a lot on how we define things. But my default reaction is to treat it as a category error. In simple terms: I don't think "belief" is something as basic as "instinct"; they operate on different levels.

Both belief and instinct can serve as causes of action.

I think humans eat due to instinct, not belief. But a human can assert the proposition that eating relieves hunger. Belief is often in the realm of reflection.

Clarification question: Are "Belief X causes action A," and "Instinct causes action A," two mutually exclusive propositions?

I'm asking because different definitions of words lead to different slots in a causal explanation: under some definitions "belief" and "instinct" can occupy the same slot.

I have this little narrative in my head:

A: I'm hungry. There's an apple on the table. I eat the apple. I'm no longer hungry.

B: I'm hungry. There's something on the table that looks edible, but I'm unsure. I either choose to take a risk, or I form an ad-hoc belief that surely this is edible (to avoid paralysation from anxiety).

But that would result in it's own definition that has something to do with the bracketing of risk. You might - under such a scenario - model belief as the deciding factor in a battle of basic emtions (e.g. fear of starving vs. fear of poison). It's not that you think A or B is true: if you're completely honest you have no idea. You've just decided to chose A over B, because inaction is disastrous either way and psychologically unable to face the risk head-on. Belief mitigates the risk of inaction and drives you to act. (In a slightly different take, the ability to form believes might keep Burridan's Ass from starving.)

If you think that blief is something more basic, though, this won't work - for example, what decides which "belief" you form? The belief that what you see is nutritious? The belief that what you see is poisonous? Certain learned cognitive preconditions might come into it (in addition to the relative strength of the respective fears), and you might want to call those part of "belief". But in that case, they wouldn't be just "propositional attitudes".

Am I making any sense?

My hunch is that the belief gets activated only when someone or something casts doubt on the things "we usually do". — Dawnstorm

I've considerable sympathy for that. Perhaps we only need express our belief when there is room for doubt.

There's an aspect of belief that is post hoc. We go back to our desire and our belief in order to explain what we did.

I'm thinking of words that can mean something similar to belief: faith, trust, confident, and expect. In each case we can add that P.

Wouldn't we distinguish instinct by the fact that it doesn't link up to any proposition? Or would you say that it actually does?

So instinct is not a propositional attitude - not an attitude to a proposition. Good point.

That is, there is a sense of choice in believing one thing rather than another, that is absent in instinct. We might have believed something else.

Wouldn't we distinguish instinct by the fact that it doesn't link up to any proposition? Or would you say that it actually does? — frank

No, I agree. Instinct is just an impulse to execute a specific behaviour. I think belief is more complex than that.

It's just when I go back to the edited original post and read:

So, that John is hungry, and that John believes eating a sandwich will remove his hunger, we have a sufficient causal explanation for why John ate the sandwich. — Banno

I personally run into a problem, because I think both eating and believing are component actions that branch off the same development. We recognise a sandwich as edible the moment we see it; it's not an instinct, because a sandwich is an artefact we create. That is, if I follow the section about action I end up with belief as an internal modelling of the world (a concept already brought up in this thread) rather than with belief as a propositional attitude. But at that point it's not much more complex than an instinct, sort of the flip-side of one: if the instinct is to eat food, the associated belief would be simply the ability to recognise food. That precedes any proposition, though.

Interesting.

There are apparently two opposing views in the literature at present. The first has it that belief is a part of the language of thought (LOT), such that there are literally representations in the mind of the sort described in the OP. Such a language would treat beliefs in a logical fashion something akin to first order predicate language. The second is that there is a map of the world in the mind that somehow models one's beliefs. Beliefs here would be treated more holistically.

I think there are great problems with both these theories of belief, and am wondering if there is another possibility. Both LOT and Maps treat beliefs as a part of, and hence internal to, the mind. From earlier discussions it may be clear that I do not think this a good approach. I have developed some sympathy for eternal approaches, in which the belief is treated not as part of the mind but as to some extent involving things outside the mind.

Yes, I think we generally operate in a space of knowledge rather than belief. This is the working knowledge of familiarity, of knowing-how, not knowledge-as-infallibility or deductively certain knowledge. It is when, in the context of critical reflection, our unreflective faith in our knowledge is questioned in terms of demanding deductively certain criteria to justify it, and we realize that our knowledge is not infallible, that we begin to think of ourselves as holding beliefs rather than as possessing knowledge.

Think about Dawn's 'sandwich' example. In the everyday context it is more accurate to say that I know the sandwich is edible rather than to say I believe it is edible. It is only when we start raising objection such as that the sandwich might be a fake made of plastic or whatever scenario, that we start to think of ourselves in the context of believing rather than knowing.

Good lord! The 1970s just flashed before my eyes.

Not sure what you are suggesting here.

knowing-how, not knowledge-as-infallibility or deductively certain knowledge. — Janus

Are you juxtaposing these two?

My own view is to reject knowledge as justified true belief, in favour of a different picture. I would differentiate knowing-how from knowing-that, as is commonly done, but add that knowing-that is not opposed to knowing-how, but a subset of it. To know that something is the case is to know how to act, given that it is the case.

So to know that the cat is on the mat is to know how to step over the mat to avoid disturbing it, how to pick the cat up form the mat, how to clean the mat, feed the cat, and other related activities.

This seems to me to be a corollary of accepting that meaning is use, al la Wittgenstein. To know that the cat is on the mat is to participate in a way of life that takes it as granted that the cat is on the mat.

You're taking an approach that could be called belief-holism. Perhaps all beliefs are interconnected and the foundation of a belief complex is instinct, reflex, and a natural confidence in object constancy.

Perhaps beliefs result from an evolution of sense and reflex. If so, which came first: belief complex or language?

I have developed some sympathy for eternal approaches... — Banno

An epiphany! Recognizing the Platonism inherent within your own mind. That's rich!

Good lord! The 1970s just flashed before my eyes. — apokrisis

LSD flashback. Banno meets Timothy Leary.

I would differentiate knowing-how from knowing-that, as is commonly done, but add that knowing-that is not opposed to knowing-how, but a subset of it. To know that something is the case is to know how to act, given that it is the case. — Banno

Yes, that's pretty much just what I have been saying. First is the knowing of familiarity, which builds into knowing-how, which makes possible the reflective formulation of knowings-that. We only think of ourselves in terms of believing when we become critically aware that at least some kinds of what we think of as knowings-that are patently falliblistic. This category of patently fallibilistic knowledge has greatly increased with the rise of theoretical science.

That is, there is a sense of choice in believing one thing rather than another, that is absent in instinct. We might have believed something else. — Banno

Why would you insist that belief is present in instinctive behavior? What evidence is there for this?

LSD flashback. Banno meets Timothy Leary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hah no. Just a flashback to undergrad cognitive science.

Even then it was astounding that Fodorian language of thought nonsense was such a bandwagon. An embodied or semiotic view - what Banno seems to be calling externalism - was already obvious.

But you did have to scratch around to connect the dots on that.

This category of patently fallibilistic knowledge has greatly increased with the rise of theoretical science. — Janus

But it is not the whole of knowledge, nor of belief.

Why would you insist that belief is present in instinctive behavior? What evidence is there for this? — frank

I don't. Not sure why you think I did.

That's right, it's only a part of knowledge. But is there any belief apart from fallabilistic knowledge? Or to put it another way, don't we say that we believe rather than say that we know, only where there is some doubt? And is it not the case that doubt is relevant only in the context of fallibilistic knowledge?

That's right, it's only a part of knowledge. But is there any belief apart from fallabilistic knowledge? Or to put it another way, don't we say that we believe rather than say that we know, only where there is some doubt? And is it not the case that doubt is relevant only in the context of fallibilistic knowledge? — Janus

Language takes belief and doubt to another (semiotic) level.

It is personal and unvoiced in animals. It may be there as part of cognition, but it not present in some depersonalised and metacognitive sense.

Then along comes language and belief~doubt can be socially constructed to achieve cultural purposes. There is a medium to make its cognitive mechanism something explicit and communal.

So as usual in any debate, views founder on accounting for the emergent discontinuity while maintaining also the underlying continuity. Once we were animals. And now we are still animals - but linguistically structured all the way down in a fashion that makes a big psychological difference.

Language takes belief and doubt to another (semiotic) level.

It is personal and unvoiced in animals. It may be there as part of cognition, but it not present in some depersonalised and metacognitive sense. — apokrisis

I agree with this, but I think that what is at issue is how we should talk about the differences between animals and ourselves. That is why I have come to favour talking about animals in terms of expectation and frustration of expectation rather than belief and doubt. I think it just makes the non-linguistic/non-propositional// linguistic/ propositional distinction clearer. I mean it's not as though there are empirically observable things: beliefs and doubts, out there that we could discover to be had, or not to be had, by animals.

don't we say that we believe rather than say that we know, only where there is some doubt? — Janus

Every time?

What we can't sensibly do is to say that we believe something that is not true.

What do you mean by "fallibilistic knowledge'? Falsifiable statements? Doubtful statements?

@Banno
Because you said:

That is, there is a sense of choice in believing one thing rather than another, that is absent in instinct. We might have believed something else. — Banno

It seemed that you were saying belief is present in instinct, but without choice.

If you agree that instinctive action is action that has no belief as its cause, then you agree that animal behavior could be explained without mentioning belief.

What we can't sensibly do is to say that we believe something that is not true. — Banno

It's quite possible for people to believe things that are not true. It doesn't make sense to say that we believe something that we do not believe to be true, if that is what you meant.

What do you mean by "fallibilistic knowledge'? Falsifiable statements? Doubtful statements? — Banno

Knowledge that could be wrong. According to the theory of JTB there is no such thing. But if you define knowledge as familiarity and know-how then fallibility doesn't come into it. If I know how to do something, it makes no sense to say that I might not know how to do it. It is only in the context of thinking about deductive certainty, where it is logically possible that I am dreaming that I know how to do something when I really don't, or whatever other silly, logically possible scenario could be imagined, that it becomes possible to doubt such things.

That is why I have come to favour talking about animals in terms of expectation and frustration of expectation rather than belief and doubt. — Janus

That makes sense.

And this kind of thread only goes 1000 posts as it is designed not to accept that kind of sense. :)