You're falling into the same mistake again. There can be freedom in cogitans,(the mind) because the mind freely chooses one reason over another. There can be no freedom in extensa (the brain) because its processes are determined by physical causes. These two explanations are parallel; they are both right, but only within their own perspectives. There can be no 'crossover', so the mind cannot influence physical processes; just as physical processes cannot influence the mind.

For me this is the only kind of 'compatibilism' that can make any sense at all.

This doesn't contradict what I have been saying at all. I haven't said the two account become one at all. But they do not "express a unity" ( you ar contradicting yourself if you say they do). The two accounts cannot be unified; although we think the two attributes which give rise to the two accounts are unified. But we cannot discursively understand that unity; and why should we be able to since any such understanding would be from the one side of cogitans. That cogitans can understand only extsnesa in terms of causality and not itself; that is natural, because the essence of cogitans is reason, not cause. It is because it cannot understand itself in terms of cause that it cannot understand, but may only non-discursively intuit or blindly posit, the unity of cogitans and extensa.

Spinoza's point is exactly the opposite: we can understand unity. Rather than approached by understanding many things, it's a different instance of knowledge entirely, one which doesn't even require naming any particular thing.

We can understand unity because knowledge of any attribute is not required. To know there is togetherness, we don't even have to name the attributes of cogitans and extensa. Attributes and states are not the foundation of unity. That's why it doesn't take knowledge of everything to understand unity. Substance is understood without referring to any state of the world or other logical expression.

If I only know about cogitans, extensa, the history of France, my computer or what my friend had for breakfast, I may understand the presence of a unified world. Knowing unity depends on knowing about unity, not all states of the world and every logical truth.

Cogitans cannot understand anything at all. A logical meaning is not an existing person. All instances of human understanding are extensa: a state of the world which is understanding of something.

The essence of cogitans is not reason, at least in terms of how it is usually considered, for it is not an act of thinking.

Are you claiming there could be a concept of unity without an apprehension of diversity?

General relativity is isomorphic with the statement that Reality is a stationary block spacetime. — tom

It's five-dimensional, with the beings with free will being capable of controlling their movement in the fifth dimension.

Well, that's just an example of that theory being compatible with free will. I personally don't buy that because your space-time block doesn't explain causality.

Assuming we all agree that the concept of Free Will is a coherent concept, then....

Is belief in, or rejection of free will a matter of faith? Is it even possible to be agnostic on the issue? — anonymous66

I've abstained from voting, as I'm not clear about the meaning of the question.

For one thing, it's not at all clear what "free will" is supposed to mean. Neither is it clear that each person said to "believe in free will" has the same conception of "free will" in mind.

For another thing, it's not clear what it means for a belief to count as "a matter of faith". We might treat faith as in general synonymous with belief, and then say there are different grounds or reasons for belief. Accordingly, we might say a belief is a matter of faith (alone), in other words a matter of "pure faith", if it is belief without any reasons, or belief even in the face of reasons to the contrary. (Of course in this context "having no reasons" for a claim doesn't mean that there is no reason one has the claim -- there may be a psychological motive or some other "cause" of a belief in one without one being able to cite a reason in support of the claim.)

Along such lines, I should suppose that some people believe in a thing they call free will as a matter of pure faith, and that other people believe in a thing they call free will on the grounds of what they consider to be satisfying reasons.

Of course believing something on the grounds of what one considers to be good reasons does not entail that the reasons are good. And having a conception does not entail that the conception is clear or coherent, or that anything in the world corresponds to the conception.

(Edit: How would someone who is agnostic about free will act?)

Is Belief in, or Rejection of Free Will a Matter of Faith? — anonymous66

All else equal, I suppose one who believes he has a conception of free will and is agnostic about whether there is such a thing as a free will corresponding to his conception, would act the same as one who has a similar conception but is not agnostic about the question, and the same as one who believes he has no such conception, and the same as one who's not sure whether he has the relevant sort of conception.... except that each of these individuals will speak a bit differently from the others as this particular subject is approached in conversation.

Are you claiming there could be a concept of unity without an apprehension of diversity? — Janus

What happened, did you suddenly wake up after one year and a half to continue the convo? :snicker:

I noticed I hadn't replied and wondered what happened to @Willow. Revived the thread if not Willow anyhow! :joke:

Edit: briefly revived the thread