A question, though - is being useful the very same as being true?

I don't think it is. What's your opinion? — Banno

For me, they are absolutely not the same thing. That's my whole point in this thread - we shouldn't act as though certain questions, which I have been calling metaphysical, but which might be something else, can be considered facts which are true or untrue. I see them as tools that we choose depending on the work we have to do.

Cool. No argument from me then.

Hmmm, I'll have to think on that for awhile. I don't really get it.

I don't think I understand the difference. I believe that the concept of objective reality is one way, not the only way, and not the only good way, to think about our perceptions, knowledge, and understanding of how the world works. — T Clark

It depends what is being built into the concept of "objective reality" here, but I fear we are straying from the metaphilosophical topic.

Yes, it's a pretty good summary. Now the question is whether your approach is true while mine is false or whether mine is just more useful than yours. — T Clark

I would not say that my approach is "true". I don't think my approach is "the nature of philosophy" or something lofty like that. Take various questions I would call metaphysical:

Is there anything which exists unperceived by anyone?
Are there any other minds than my own?
Does God exist?
Is my mind separate from my body/brain?
Is the future in some sense fixed?

I interpret these questions in what I think is a straightforward fashion - to wit - as questions just like "Is the earth round?", " Did Plato teach Aristotle?" and even "Is there any milk in my fridge?". I think they are questions about which there is fact of the matter, even if they are difficult to answer. That's basically how modern philosophers saw "special metaphysics" and I share that with them.

Now look at some of your questions:

Is there an objective morality? — T Clark

This one I would happily include in my list above. I think there is a fact of the matter about whether anything is ever a right or wrong action, or a virtuous or non-virtuous person. I am open to the possibility that there is nothing which is correctly described as right or wrong - nothing which we really ought to do; if that were the case, that would be the fact of the matter. I don't think the question is just whether it is useful to think one way or the other.

Is the mind the same as the physical organs and mechanisms of thought? — T Clark

I have this question in my list already. I think there is a fact of the matter about whether the mind has properties which nothing else in the physical world has - a fact about whether Dualism or Monism is true. I don't think its just a matter of whether it is useful to believe that the mind has different properties.

Is truth correspondence between a proposition and actual facts? — T Clark

I think this question is a semantic question about the ordinary meaning of the word "truth". I'm not particularly interested in that kind of question. I would be interested in the question whether it makes sense to think that propositions can correspond to "the way the world is", and I'd call that a metaphysical question and say that there is a fact of the matter about whether this is really coherent.

How many pins can you stick in the head of a dancing angel? — T Clark

If there are angels, I take it that there is a fact of the matter about this too, and that, if there are angels, how many pins you could stick an angel's head would not just be a matter of how many pins it is useful to believe you could stick in (I have trouble making sense of that last interpretation).

Do we live in a multiverse? — T Clark

A question much like "Is there milk in my fridge?", not a question about what it is useful to believe.

Like I said, I don't think my interpretation of these questions is "the true" interpretation. I'm not sure that even makes sense. But the interpretation I put on those questions is the one I find interesting. There is, perhaps, also a question about what it is useful to believe in each of these cases, but I've never thought of philosophy as in the business of providing useful answers to questions - just true ones.

I suspect that our disagreement isn't just that I take the questions one way and you take them another way and we can both happily trot off in our own pursuits. That's the position I would take, but from your remarks, it sounds like you wouldn't be so liberal. It sounded like you would say that there is something wrong with my interpretation of the questions. Is that right?

Love this post. Lots of meat for me to chew on.

It depends what is being built into the concept of "objective reality" here, but I fear we are straying from the metaphysical topic. — PossibleAaran

Yes, differences and misunderstandings about definitions make these questions messy to deal with.

Is there anything which exists unperceived by anyone?
Are there any other minds than my own?
Does God exist?
Is my mind separate from my body/brain?
Is the future in some sense fixed?

I interpret these questions in what I think is a straightforward fashion - to wit - as questions just like "Is the earth round?", " Did Plato teach Aristotle?" and even "Is there any milk in my fridge?". I think they are questions about which there is fact of the matter, even if they are difficult to answer. That's basically how modern philosophers saw "special metaphysics" and I share that with them. — PossibleAaran

Generally, I disagree that these are questions like "Did I just eat onion soup for lunch?" with the exception of the one about God. I'll look at each of your questions.

Is there anything which exists unperceived by anyone? Unperceived or unperceivable? If you mean just unperceived, then do you mean "Do things cease to exist when no one's watching?" or "Are there hidden things?" If you mean unperceivable even in theory, then I'm not sure whether that is a metaphysical question or just meaningless.

Are there any other minds than my own? There is no way to finally know this. People have been arguing about it forever. So, no, it does not have a yes or no answer. On the other hand, there is no philosophy I'm interested in that doesn't acknowledge the existence of others.

Does God exist? As I said in my original post, I find this question frustrating because I think it's really two questions - one a matter of fact with a yes or no answer and the other not.

First question - Does any particular God, e.g. Allah, exist as an actual sentient entity which created and can influence the physical world. To me, that is a question which should have a yes or no answer.

Second question - Is the idea of god a useful way of understanding the world we live in? Here’s a one of my favorite verses from the Tao Te Ching:

The Tao is like a well:
used but never used up.
It is like the eternal void:
filled with infinite possibilities. It is hidden but always present.
I don't know who gave birth to it.
It is older than God.

So, God is one of the 10,000 things – like Cocoa Puffs and the mind.

Is my mind separate from my body/brain? The first philosophy course I took 45 years ago was called "The Mind/Brain Identity Question." I thought "How could anyone spend so much time on such a silly, unfruitful question?" I still feel the same way. I don't think it has a yes or no answer, but I think not acknowledging the existence of the mind separate from the brain is misleading.

Is the future in some sense fixed? General (metaphysical) principle - If a question is not answerable, even in theory, it does not have a yes or no answer. It's either metaphysical or rhetorical. So, if we're talking about a block universe and you think it can be established physically, then, sure, it's a yes/no, factual question.

Ran out of time for now. I'll get back to the rest of your post later.

So, where was I?

Is there an objective morality?
— T Clark

This one I would happily include in my list above. I think there is a fact of the matter about whether anything is ever a right or wrong action, or a virtuous or non-virtuous person. I am open to the possibility that there is nothing which is correctly described as right or wrong - nothing which we really ought to do; if that were the case, that would be the fact of the matter. I don't think the question is just whether it is useful to think one way or the other. — PossibleAaran

I don't see this at all. Morality is a matter of human value - I like this, I don't like that.

Is the mind the same as the physical organs and mechanisms of thought?
— T Clark

I have this question in my list already. I think there is a fact of the matter about whether the mind has properties which nothing else in the physical world has - a fact about whether Dualism or Monism is true. I don't think its just a matter of whether it is useful to believe that the mind has different properties. — PossibleAaran

I believe strongly that the mind should be considered different from electrical impulses moving through the brain and nervous system. Let me think about that... No, even though I believe as I indicated, I can't see how it is a matter of fact. The real question to me is "Is the idea of mind a useful way of describing human behavior." Some people definitely think the answer to that is "no."

Is truth correspondence between a proposition and actual facts?
— T Clark

I think this question is a semantic question about the ordinary meaning of the word "truth". I'm not particularly interested in that kind of question. I would be interested in the question whether it makes sense to think that propositions can correspond to "the way the world is", and I'd call that a metaphysical question and say that there is a fact of the matter about whether this is really coherent. — PossibleAaran

You're right, that's probably a matter of definition rather than metaphysics, unless definitions are metaphysical. Let's not get into that. I'll change the question - "Given that truth means correspondence between a proposition and actual facts, is the idea of truth central to our understanding of the nature of reality. Or something like that. My answer to that question is "Not necessarily." We can go into that further another time.

Do we live in a multiverse?
— T Clark

A question much like "Is there milk in my fridge?", not a question about what it is useful to believe. — PossibleAaran

I'm not sure about this. Some people, on this forum and elsewhere, have said that the multiverse is a matter of fact, others that it is not. I'll go back to my criteria for the existence of a fact - If a phenomenon cannot be observed or verified, even in principal, then whether or not it exists is not a question of yes or no. It's either metaphysical, rhetorical, or meaningless. Some thoughts:

• The idea of the multiverse to address questions about the anthropic principal seems silly to me.
• My feelings about the idea of a multiverse as an interpretation of quantum mechanical theory hinge on whether or not it is possible, even in theory, to distinguish between the various interpretations of QM. If it isn't, then it's a meaningless question.
• TimeLine and Apokrisis duked it out a few weeks ago about the idea of a multiverse as a consequence of cosmic inflation in the very early universe. I didn't understand it well enough to have an opinion.

Like I said, I don't think my interpretation of these questions is "the true" interpretation. I'm not sure that even makes sense. But the interpretation I put on those questions is the one I find interesting. There is, perhaps, also a question about what it is useful to believe in each of these cases, but I've never thought of philosophy as in the business of providing useful answers to questions - just true ones. — PossibleAaran

Suddenly it seems like you're agreeing with me, although I don't think you think you are.

I take the questions one way and you take them another way and we can both happily trot off in our own pursuits. — PossibleAaran

That's exactly what I think.

Thank you for this. It's been really helpful.

Thanks for the detailed reply.

One thing that comes out in your discussion is your commitment to a certain kind of Verificationism - although perhaps a kind weaker than the once very popular doctrine. Here are samples of the commitment (I leave aside one quote in which you maintain that if people argue a lot about P, then there is no fact about whether or not P. I do not think you meant this literally, and perhaps it was just shorthand for what you say in these other quotes?):

If you mean unperceivable even in theory, then I'm not sure whether that is a metaphysical question or just meaningless. — T Clark

I'll go back to my criteria for the existence of a fact - If a phenomenon cannot be observed or verified, even in principal, then whether or not it exists is not a question of yes or no. It's either metaphysical, rhetorical, or meaningless. — T Clark

In these quotes you infer from the premise that X is unverifiable in principle to the conclusion that X is either "metaphysical or meaningless". I suspect you have your own definition of "metaphysical" in mind, according to which a question is metaphysical if and only if it is a question about how it is useful to think. Then your phrase "metaphysical question or just meaningless" equates to "a question about what it is useful to believe or just meaningless". If that is what you mean, then you hold the following doctrine:

VERI: For any question, Q, Q is either (a) a question the answer to which is verifiable by perception, (b) a question about how it is useful to think, or (c) just meaningless.

I am not sure why you accept VERI. Do you have any argument for it? Relatedly, unless VERI is a useful thing for us to believe, then VERI is itself meaningless by its own standards, because it isn't verifiable by perception. I am not sure, however, what VERI would be useful for. Of course, an awful lot depends on your notions of "verification" and "meaningless", both of which might benefit some further definition.

Motivations for VERI aside, in some places, you hold views which are just incompatible with VERI, and so you hold views which, according to your own principle, are meaningless. The most clear case is the question "is there an objective morality?". If you really hold to VERI, what you ought to say here is that the answers to that question are unverifiable in principle, and so it must either be a question about whether it is useful to think of morality as objective, or meaningless. What you say, however, is very different:

Morality is a matter of human value - I like this, I don't like that. — T Clark

Saying that there is nothing more to morality except what different people like and dislike is the very same as saying that there is no objective morality - answering "no" to the question "is there an objective morality?". But if your answer is "no", then you presumably think that that is the fact of the matter. Yet if VERI is true, there is no fact of the matter. There is only what it is useful to believe and meaninglessness. I am not sure how to reconcile this quote with VERI.

Suddenly it seems like you're agreeing with me, although I don't think you think you are. — T Clark

I don't think I am either. I think that there is a fact of the matter about the questions I listed in my last post, but you insist that there is only an issue about how it is useful to think. You accept VERI (I think?), and I don't.

If I have interpreted you correctly in this post, and you are still looking for like-minded philosophers, I am now thinking of Rudolf Carnap,who accepts something much like VERI and has a similar attitude towards metaphysics. I find him personally more interesting than Collingwood.

One thing that comes out in your discussion is your commitment to a certain kind of Verificationism - although perhaps a kind weaker than the once very popular doctrine. — PossibleAaran

I don't remember seeing this word before. Wikipedia

Verificationism, also known as the verification idea or the verifiability criterion of meaning, is the philosophical doctrine that only statements that are empirically verifiable (i.e. verifiable through the senses) are cognitively meaningful, or else they are truths of logic (tautologies).

Do I believe this? Not at all. Not anything like it.

If you mean unperceivable even in theory, then I'm not sure whether that is a metaphysical question or just meaningless.
— T Clark

I'll go back to my criteria for the existence of a fact - If a phenomenon cannot be observed or verified, even in principal, then whether or not it exists is not a question of yes or no. It's either metaphysical, rhetorical, or meaningless.
— T Clark

In these quotes you infer from the premise that X is unverifiable in principle to the conclusion that X is either "metaphysical or meaningless". I suspect you have your own definition of "metaphysical" in mind, according to which a question is metaphysical if and only if it is a question about how it is useful to think. Then your phrase "metaphysical question or just meaningless" equates to "a question about what it is useful to believe or just meaningless". If that is what you mean, then you hold the following doctrine:

VERI: For any question, Q, Q is either (a) a question the answer to which is verifiable by perception, (b) a question about how it is useful to think, or (c) just meaningless. — PossibleAaran

First of all, you're right. When I say "metaphysical" I mean my previous conceptions of metaphysics. After this discussion I'll have to come up with a new way to describe what I mean. I like the way you've said it - a statement which is not a matter of fact but is a description of how it is useful to think. It doesn't capture everything I want - the fact that these statements are foundational, they set the rules of reason, they are something we have to agree on in order to go any further.

I am not sure why you accept VERI. Do you have any argument for it? Relatedly, unless VERI is a useful thing for us to believe, then VERI is itself meaningless by its own standards, because it isn't verifiable by perception. I am not sure, however, what VERI would be useful for. — PossibleAaran

First of all, you're right, it is not matter of fact. I find it very useful. To me, it's the most important procedural, foundational concept of philosophy I can imagine. Would it be stretching things to say that answering, or at least addressing, these types of questions is what philosophy is. I'll have to think about that. On these pages, who cares if Paris is the capital of France? All that's important here is how I can demonstrate my belief that Paris is the capital of France is correct.

By the way, what is "VERI?" Is that a word you just made up, or does it have some established meaning?

Saying that there is nothing more to morality except what different people like and dislike is the very same as saying that there is no objective morality - answering "no" to the question "is there an objective morality?" — PossibleAaran

Ok - Morality is a matter of human value - I like this, I don't like that I find this useful, I don't find that useful. I'm not trying to be funny and I'm not backtracking. I guess I was not careful enough with my language. I like it or I find it useful - either way, it's a matter of preference not fact. I take philosophy seriously, when I say I like something in this context, I mean I find it useful.

If I have interpreted you correctly in this post, and you are still looking for like-minded philosophers, I am now thinking of Rudolf Carnap,who accepts something much like VERI and has a similar attitude towards metaphysics. I find him personally more interesting than Collingwood. — PossibleAaran

I'll take a look.

This has been really fun, by which I mean useful.

I always had thought that Carnap was 'scientism' incarnate. I am willing to be corrected, though.

I always had thought that Carnap was 'scientism' incarnate. I am willing to be corrected, though. — Wayfarer

I always thought he was great



Wait - that's Carnak.

7

First of all, you're right, it is not matter of fact. I find it very useful. To me, it's the most important procedural, foundational concept of philosophy I can imagine. Would it be stretching things to say that answering, or at least addressing, these types of questions is what philosophy is. I'll have to think about that. On these pages, who cares if Paris is the capital of France? All that's important here is how I can demonstrate my belief that Paris is the capital of France is correct. — T Clark

You distanced yourself from Verificationism in your post, but then you accepted VERI. VERI it seems to me is incredibly close to Verificationism, but that doesn't really matter. At any rate you say that VERI is useful. You say it is the most important "procedural and foundational concept of Philosophy". Could you explain more what you mean by this? Give me some example of how VERI is useful perhaps?

Would it be stretching things to say that answering, or at least addressing, these types of questions is what philosophy is. — T Clark

I am not sure which questions you are talking about here. I think I missed a step. Could you show me which questions you meant? I think this is related to the previous issue.

On these pages, who cares if Paris is the capital of France? All that's important here is how I can demonstrate my belief that Paris is the capital of France is correct. — T Clark

Perhaps here we agree. I do think that a major part of philosophy involves justifying these sorts of beliefs which we do not usually try to justify.

By the way, what is "VERI?" Is that a word you just made up, or does it have some established meaning? — T Clark

It was just a name I gave to the principle which I attributed to you. I used "VERI" as a shortening of Verificationism because I thought the principle was very close to that doctrine.

it's a matter of preference not fact. — T Clark

I think you missed my point here. The view that "morality is a matter of preference" is the denial of the claim that morality is objective. Presumably, you think that "morality is just preference" is a fact. But if you accept VERI this is exactly what you cannot hold. Because the view that " morality is just preference" is not verifiable by perception. So you cannot say that "morality is preference" is a fact. You can either hold that "morality is preference" is a useful thing to believe, or that "morality is preference" is a meaningless sentence. Or you could abandon VERI and admit that the question "is morality objective?" has a factual answer - the answer being "no, morality is just preference".

Thanks again for your reply.

I always had thought that Carnap was 'scientism' incarnate. I am willing to be corrected, though. — Wayfarer

Well he was a Verificationist and thoroughly disliked metaphysics. So in a way yes, he was scientism incarnate. But, contrary to his own protestations, his philosophy contains very serious metaphysical commitments. His philosophy is quite fascinating, if you see through his surface level scientistic rhetoric.

:grin:

I did a unit on A J Ayer as an undergrad which told me everything I need to know about positivism (although I softened my view of Ayer somewhat after reading this.)

You distanced yourself from Verificationism in your post, but then you accepted VERI. VERI it seems to me is incredibly close to Verificationism, but that doesn't really matter. At any rate you say that VERI is useful. You say it is the most important "procedural and foundational concept of Philosophy". Could you explain more what you mean by this? Give me some example of how VERI is useful perhaps? — PossibleAaran

Here's an example of when what you call "VERI" is useful:
Let's imagine a discussion - Question - Is abortion immoral.
Speaker 1 - It's clear to me that human life begins at conception. Destroying human life is immoral. Therefore abortion is immoral.
Speaker 2 - I don't believe that human life begins at conception. Abortion is not immoral.
Speaker 1 - Boy, this is a problem. If we can't agree whether or not human life begins at conception, I don't think we can resolve this issue.
Speaker 2 - Geez - you're right. What say we get a beer.
Speaker 1 - Sounds good to me. What about them Sox.

Yes, joke, but not completely. If we can't agree on the basic assumptions of our discussion, there's nothing to talk about. If people could just understand that, one of two things would happen 1) a lot of pointless arguments could be avoided or shortened or 2) People would pay more attention to the underlying assumptions they are making and work to make sure everyone is on the same page before the discussion begins. Many (most?) discussions on this forum come down to this - the participants never make the underlying assumptions of the discussion clear so there is no possibility of resolution.

I am not sure which questions you are talking about here. I think I missed a step. Could you show me which questions you meant? I think this is related to the previous issue. — PossibleAaran

I'm talking about questions that are not matters of fact but rather of the most useful ways to think about things, as we have been discussing.

I think you missed my point here. The view that "morality is a matter of preference" is the denial of the claim that morality is objective. Presumably, you think that "morality is just preference" is a fact. — PossibleAaran

My view that morality is a matter of preference is not a matter of fact. It is a matter of what is the most useful way of looking at the issue. It's a matter of preference. Yes - I am serious.

My view that morality is a matter of preference is not a matter of fact. It is a matter of what is the most useful way of looking at the issue. It's a matter of preference. Yes - I am serious. — T Clark

But isn't 'most' useful then a matter of fact. How are you measuring 'most' useful?

But isn't 'most' useful then a matter of fact. How are you measuring 'most' useful? — Pseudonym

If I find it useful or we can negotiate what we both agree is useful, it's useful.

Yes, but what does it mean to be useful? What is the use we are putting the theory to that you and I agree it is good at?

Yes, but what does it mean to be useful? What is the use we are putting the theory to that you and I agree it is good at? — Pseudonym

Let's try an example:

T Clark - John X killed George Y, what punishment do you think he should receive?

Pseudonym - I don't believe in free will, so I don't think he should be punished.

T Clark - I don't believe there is no free will. Given that you do, how should the situation be handled?

Pseudonym - I think we should find the most effective way to keep something like that from happening again with no consideration for blame or responsibility.

T Clark - Well, as I said, I believe there is free will and John X should be held responsible and punished, but I'd like to hear what your ideas are, so for the purposes of this discussion, let's assume there is no free will. Can you give some specific examples of how the killing should be handled?

Pseudonym - ......

Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market-place, and cried incessantly: "I am looking for God! I am looking for God!"
As many of those who did not believe in God were standing together there, he excited considerable laughter. Have you lost him, then? said one. Did he lose his way like a child? said another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? or emigrated? Thus they shouted and laughed. The madman sprang into their midst and pierced them with his glances.

"Where has God gone?" he cried. "I shall tell you. We have killed him - you and I. We are his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained the earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not perpetually falling? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is it not more and more night coming on all the time? Must not lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell anything yet of God's decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, murderers of all murderers, console ourselves? That which was the holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet possessed has bled to death under our knives. Who will wipe this blood off us? With what water could we purify ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we need to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we not ourselves become gods simply to be worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and whosoever shall be born after us - for the sake of this deed he shall be part of a higher history than all history hitherto."

Here the madman fell silent and again regarded his listeners; and they too were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern to the ground, and it broke and went out. "I have come too early," he said then; "my time has not come yet. The tremendous event is still on its way, still travelling - it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time, the light of the stars requires time, deeds require time even after they are done, before they can be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the distant stars - and yet they have done it themselves."

It has been further related that on that same day the madman entered divers churches and there sang a requiem. Led out and quietened, he is said to have retorted each time: "what are these churches now if they are not the tombs and sepulchres of God?"

Many (most?) discussions on this forum come down to this - the participants never make the underlying assumptions of the discussion clear so there is no possibility of resolution. — T Clark

You have to learn to look at your spectacles and not just through them. Particularly challenging for realists.

Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market-place, and cried incessantly: "I am looking for God! I am looking for God!" — bloodninja

A really interesting story. You write well.

I think it relates to one of the comments I made previously - the existence of God as both a matter of fact and as a matter of metaphysical preference.

You have to learn to look at your spectacles and not just through them. Particularly challenging for realists. — Wayfarer

Oddly enough, I was laying in bed this morning with my reading glasses sitting on the bedside table. The sun was shining through them showing they are covered with fingerprints. Maybe that's been my problem all the time.

Hah. Well I’ve discovered the miracle of disposable contacts. But the analogy remains.

BTW the Bloodninja story is almost word for word from Nietszche - Twilight of the Idols, I think it was. It is the passage associated with the famous ‘Death of God’ proclamation.

BTW the Bloodninja story is almost word for word from Nietszche - Twilight of the Idols, I think it was. It is the passage associated with the famous ‘Death of God’ proclamation. — Wayfarer

Yes, well, I didn't recognize the specific quote but it didn't seem very Bloodninjay and did sound sort of Nietszchey, so I checked. I was just being cute.

Twilight of the Idols, I think it was. — Wayfarer

I believe it is quoted, word for word, from The Gay Science.

RIght! I stand corrected.

as I understand it, you find VERI useful because its a conversation stopper. It stops people talking on and on about things where they will never agree with one another, because they don't share the same assumptions. That's hard to deny. VERI sure does do that. But then, we don't really need anything as strong as VERI for that. All we need to do to avoid endless conversations is try hard to lay out agreed starting assumptions for our discussions. We need not insist that if something isn't verifiable by the senses then it is either a useful perspective or meaningless. That's a very strong claim which isn't needed for the goal you want to achieve. So I still can't really see the use of VERI.

It is a matter of what is the most useful way of looking at the issue — T Clark

It does not generally seem true that it is useful to think of morality as preference. In fact it encourages an "anything goes" type attitude where everyone just does what they prefer. Murder? Rape? Genocide? Kidnap? Hey if that's what you prefer! This does not seem like a useful attitude for the human race.

All we need to do to avoid endless conversations is try hard to lay out agreed starting assumptions for our discussions. — PossibleAaran

Seriously - have you ever tried that on this forum? Anyway, if I "insist that if something isn't verifiable by the senses then it is either a useful perspective or meaningless," I'm just pointing out that that something has to be included in our starting assumptions because it can never be rationally established.

It does not generally seem true that it is useful to think of morality as preference. In fact it encourages an "anything goes" type attitude where everyone just does what they prefer. Murder? Rape? Genocide? Kidnap? Hey if that's what you prefer! This does not seem like a useful attitude for the human race. — PossibleAaran

I disagree. To me, it is much more useful to think about how to solve what we call moral problems in a practical way than it is to wring our hands about what is right and wrong.

So, anyway - Metaphysical questions cannot be addressed with yes or no answers. They’re not issues of right or wrong, what matters is usefulness. — T Clark

What would be an example of a "useful" metaphysical answer or thesis?

What would be an example of a "useful" metaphysical answer or thesis? — Arkady

Example 1 - A belief in an objective morality can lead people to focus more on blame than on solving the problem.

Example 2 - Belief in objective reality is very useful, indispensable, for most of physics. On the other hand, it can lead to an overly reductionist approach that doesn't work well in other areas such as biology. Take a look at StreetLightX's discussion - "More Is Different."