Ever read Gettier's paper? Why look at the OP if it misrepresents Gettier's written words? Strong indeed.

More to your words, but totally off the Gettier subject...

It seems quite odd to me... this idea... that it is somehow unjustified to concluder from false belief? That all belief based upon false premisses is unjustified???

What on earth would it take for that claim to be so?

The very idea is contrary to events that take place in each of lives. Thus, it contradicts what can be readily observed... everyday facts of everyone's lives. That realization ought cause one to pause...

Something is very wrong with this idea that inferring from false belief is unjustified.

Carefully consider the following...


One can and does infer from false belief.
It can be done validly.
It can be done reasonably.

At conception, we are completely void of all thought and belief. Belief is accrued. More complex belief is built upon the simple. Some simple is false. Some of our complex belief was built upon simple but false... belief. We all have no choice but to look at the world through the filter of our upbringing. All of our unbringings contained false belief.

Working from our belief system is unavoidable.
We all hold false belief.
It must be done

The point is that these things are true regardless of that which is subject to individual particulars. They are true descriptions of events that happen within everyone's lives, regardless of that which is subject to cultural, familial, and/or historical particulars. All of our upbringings naturally implant false belief into our belief systems.

Your claim leads one to necessarily conclude that one is only justified in drawing conclusions when one draws them from true belief.

It contradicts actual events in everyone of our lives. It is absurd on it's face in light of everyday fact. Here is what they consist in and/or of.

One is camping in an unfamiliar forest when s/he hears - quite suddenly - a loud startling sound.

It is as if a very large animal is coming through the underbrush. It is far enough away so as not to cause too much immediate fright. However...

The sounds are coming from an unknown source on a path. If it continues it's course it is directly at you. Unknown entity...

Turns out it was a lost dog, who happened to be deaf. This is a valid conclusion drawn from a false premiss and we were completely justified in our doing so. So...

Your criterion for what counts as being "justified" cannot admit that one who is fleeing for their own life were justified in doing so, because they were mistaken.

Did I miss anything?

It seems quite odd to me... this idea... that it is somehow unjustified to concluder from false belief? That all belief based upon false premisses is unjustified???

What on earth would it take for that claim to be so? — creativesoul

Where's the problem? What the belief is based upon, is the justification for that belief. It has been stipulated that what the belief is based upon is a falsity. Why do you think one would be justified in believing something based in falsity?

One can and does infer from false belief.
It can be done validly.
It can be done reasonably. — creativesoul

It has been stipulated that the premise is unsound, false. Therefore the conclusion is unsound. An unsound conclusion cannot be said to be a justified conclusion.

At conception, we are completely void of all thought and belief. Belief is accrued. More complex belief is built upon the simple. Some simple is false. Some of our complex belief was built upon simple but false... belief. We all have no choice but to look at the world through the filter of our upbringing. All of our unbringings contained false belief.

Working from our belief system is unavoidable.
We all hold false belief.
It must be done — creativesoul

Do you not recognize that if you assert that some of your basic beliefs are false, you ought to acknowledge as well, that any beliefs based on these false beliefs are unsound and therefore unjustified?

It contradicts actual events in everyone of our lives. — creativesoul

I don't see any contradiction. If I know that a belief is derived from a falsity I will not claim that the belief is justified. If I do not know whether a particular belief is false, and it really is false, then I might claim that a belief derived from that belief is justified, but clearly I would be wrong. The belief is false and my conclusion is unsound and not justified.

One is camping in an unfamiliar forest when s/he hears - quite suddenly - a loud startling sound.

It is as if a very large animal is coming through the underbrush. It is far enough away so as not to cause too much immediate fright. However...

The sounds are coming from an unknown source on a path. If it continues it's course it is directly at you. Unknown entity...

Turns out it was a lost dog, who happened to be deaf. This is a valid conclusion drawn from a false premiss and we were completely justified in our doing so. So...

Your criterion for what counts as being "justified" cannot admit that one who is fleeing for their own life were justified in doing so, because they were mistaken.

Did I miss anything? — creativesoul

I don't understand your example. Where's the false belief? Where's the inference? Where's the supposed justified conclusion? All I see is a person in the forest who was scared by an approaching dog. Are you claiming that the person was justified in being scared, but at the same time ought not have been scared because it was just a dog? I don't get it, fear is instinctual.

Your criterion for what counts as being "justified" cannot admit that one who is fleeing for their own life were justified in doing so, because they were mistaken.

On your view, there are no false justified belief. I suspect that you're either conflating being true with being well-grounded or you're arguing from definitional fiat alone.

What's the difference between being true and being justified, on your view?

Ever read Gettier's paper? Why look at the OP if it misrepresents Gettier's written words? Strong indeed. — creativesoul

How is that a misrepresentation? Up until the point where I claim the person has the knowledge, I'm arriving at the same conclusions as you were in your comment.

Your criterion for what counts as being "justified" cannot admit that one who is fleeing for their own life were justified in doing so, because they were mistaken. — creativesoul

Of course, to say one is "mistaken" (wrong) in one's actions is to say that the actions are not justified. To argue otherwise would be irrational. The danger they're fleeing from is not real, so the fleeing is not justified. Likewise, if you attacked a person whom you believed was a danger to your life, claiming self-defence, but that person really didn't endanger you at all, then the attack would not be justified. To make such a mistake is to proceed in an unjustified action.

A belief can be true and justified, or true and not justified. But a belief cannot be said to be false and justified because the designation of "false" denies the possibility of justification.

a belief cannot be said to be false and justified because the designation of "false" denies the possibility of justification. — Metaphysician Undercover

So... it is exactly as suspected. You're arguing from definitional fiat. Semantic arguments are not interesting to me, especially when the definition is terrible to start with and the interlocutor engages in equivocation/self-contradiction.

We once went round and round about your notion of justification and how it relates to whether or not a belief is justified. You claimed that all justified belief require being argued for by the believer. It's the arguing that is the justification process, according to you, and without that the belief is not justified. A belief is, according to you, only justified after it has been argued for. So, your criterion for what counts
as being justified requires that the belief be both true, and that the author has argued for the belief.

Is convincing another required as well, or is just any old arguing good enough?

:sweat:

More to the thread...

Smith believes Jones owns a Ford. His justification for believing this is that Jones has always owned a Ford as long as Smith has known him, and Jones just today he gave Smith a ride while driving a Ford.

According to you, Smith's belief that Jones owns a Ford is not justified, unless Jones owns a Ford. That is to conflate truth and justification.

Your criterion for what counts as being "justified" cannot admit that one who is fleeing for their own life were justified in doing so, because they were mistaken. — creativesoul

Of course, to say one is "mistaken" (wrong) in one's actions is to say that the actions are not justified. To argue otherwise would be irrational. — Metaphysician Undercover

Evidently our notions of irrationality are irreconcilable as well. Conflating truth with justification is irrational. You're doing precisely that. Don't lose sight of the target here. It's not actions... it's belief.

It is irrational to deny that someone camping in unfamiliar woods who concludes that they are in danger because of hearing an unknown, unseen, and startlingly noisy entity coming directly towards them has justified belief simply because they were mistaken. Their belief was false, but if that doesn't count as sufficient reason to believe that one is in danger, and thus that that belief is justified, then nothing will.

I'm done with your semantic hogwash...

How is that a misrepresentation? Up until the point where I claim the person has the knowledge, I'm arriving at the same conclusions as you were in your comment. — BlueBanana

Gettier explicitly lays out the formulation he sets out to place under suspicion, and another he aims to do so with. There are two formulations underwriting the essay. Unless those are satisfactorily addressed and dealt with, you're aiming at the wrong target...

An unsound conclusion cannot be said to be a justified conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

It most certainly can. All it takes it knowing the difference between what it takes to be true, and what it takes to be well-grounded/justified.

There are two formulations underwriting the essay. Unless those are satisfactorily addressed and dealt with, you're aiming at the wrong target. — creativesoul

Are you claiming my addressing of them wasn't satisfactory enough? How so?

That is to conflate truth and justification. — creativesoul

No, I don't conflate truth and justification. I state the simple fact that believing X to be true is a necessary condition of believing X is justified. One cannot believe X is justified without believing X is true. But this does not mean all truths are justified.

It is irrational to deny that someone camping in unfamiliar woods who concludes that they are in danger because of hearing an unknown, unseen, and startlingly noisy entity coming directly towards them has justified belief simply because they were mistaken. Their belief was false, but if that doesn't count as sufficient reason to believe that one is in danger, and thus that that belief is justified, then nothing will. — creativesoul

That's silly. You are arguing that not knowing what is out there is reason to believe oneself to be in danger. How do you suppose that the premise "I don't know what's going on" leads to the justified conclusion "I am in danger"? That's ridiculous, you're trying to justify fear of the unknown.

You're a twit.

If it were the case that all justified belief were true, then it would also be the case that the "T" in JTB would be superfluous. But it's not. A belief can be justified and false. If it could not, then the "T" would be unnecessary for all justified belief would also be true... necessarily so. So there would be no need for the "T" is JTB. But it's not, and there is.

Gettier cases meet the standard formulation of JTB if B is a proposition. Gettier offers examples where S is justified in believing P, derives Q from P(validly), and thus is justified in believing Q. Q is true in both cases. However, no reasonable person would claim that S knows Q for in both cases Q is true as a result of something that S didn't believe. Take the second case...

Q is a disjunction. Disjunctions are true if either one of the disjuncts is true. S did not believe that the second disjunct was true. Rather he believed that the first disjunct was true, and as a result of his knowing that if the first one is true, then so too is the disjunct itself, he believed the disjunct was true for all the wrong reasons...

Not knowledge... epistemic luck.

No, I don't conflate truth and justification. I state the simple fact that believing X to be true is a necessary condition of believing X is justified. One cannot believe X is justified without believing X is true. But this does not mean all truths are justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suppose it depends what is being built into the notion of being "justified" here. Normally, if I say someone is justified in believing something, I mean that they have good reason to believe it, and either no reason or a comparatively weak reason not to believe it. Clearly I could think there are such reasons for believing that P without my being psychologically convinced that P. Maybe I recognize the strong case to be made for P, but I just find the idea of P hard to believe. This is at least logically possible. Hence, it is possible to believe that X is justified without believing that X is true - in this sense of "justified".

Some Philosophers have a very weak notion of being justified as having been responsible in believing. It seems painfully easy for me to believe that you have been responsible in believing that P and yet I do not believe that P. Maybe I see that you have thought about it as carefully as you are capable, have made no obvious mistakes which you should have reasonably noticed etc, yet I still think you are mistaken.

Other Philosophers define "justified" as "produced by a reliable process". On thwt definition, I could believe that my belief that X is produced by a reliable process. Its just that I also believe that on this particular occassion the process got things wrong - X is false.

I suppose it depends what is being built into the notion of being "justified" here. Normally, if I say someone is justified in believing something, I mean that they have good reason to believe it, and either no reason or a comparatively weak reason not to believe it. Clearly I could think there are such reasons for believing that P without my being psychologically convinced that P. Maybe I recognize the strong case to be made for P, but I just find the idea of P hard to believe. This is at least logically possible. Hence, it is possible to believe that X is justified without believing that X is true - in this sense of "justified". — PossibleAaran

I don't see how one could "believe that P" without being "psychologically convinced that P". Aren't believing and being psychologically convinced the very same thing? Are you arguing that one could think that P is justified, but still not believe in P? I don't see how that's possible. Justification is the act which cause belief, psychologically convinces. If the supposed justification fails to cause belief, it would be false to call it a justification.

If one still does not believe in P, after the supposed justification, this means that the justification has been rejected for whatever reason, so the person cannot really say that P is justified. If the reasons for rejecting the justification are unknown, then the person is being irrational, but I still do not see how one can truthfully say "I think P is justified but I still do not believe P". I think that would be a lie.

Other Philosophers define "justified" as "produced by a reliable process". On thwt definition, I could believe that my belief that X is produced by a reliable process. Its just that I also believe that on this particular occassion the process got things wrong - X is false. — PossibleAaran

I think you are appealing to contradiction here, saying I believe X is a reliable process, but I also believe X got it wrong. How can you believe that X is a reliable process and also believe that X got it wrong, at the same time? What you are arguing is nothing but lying to oneself, self-deception.

Try looking at it this way PA. To say "X is justified" is strong evidence that one believes X. To say "X is not justified" is strong evidence that one does not believe X. So to say "X is justified but I do not believe X" is evidence that one is being untruthful.

I still do not see how one can truthfully say "I think P is justified but I still do not believe P". — Metaphysician Undercover

Take any definition which I gave you of "justified" and you will see how it is so. If "justified" means "responsible in believing" then you might think I am responsible in believing that P, even though you think P is false. Hence, you would think that I am justified in believing P, even though P is false. The way this would work is quite simple. You see that I have tried my absolute best to investigate things. You see that I have considered all of the objections against P, weighed up the best arguments for P, and I've made no obviously foolish mistake. I am convinced that P, and, you think, perfectly responsibly. You, however, have more information than I do, and you are far smarter than I could ever aspire to be. Because of this, you can see clearly that P is false. Here you believe that P is false and that poor foolish little me is justified in believing that P.

The very same for the notion of "justified" as "having reason to believe". I think that you have very good arguments for your belief that P - arguments which I don't quite know how to criticize. Still, I'm dogmatic and stubborn. I think that P is false and that there must be some answer or another to your arguments. I think you are justified in your belief, but I think that P is false.

Again, take the notion of "justified" as "produced by a reliable process". You think that my belief that P is produced by a reliable process. A process is reliable if and only if when it produces beliefs they are for the most part true. But, that my belief that P was produced by a process which usually gets things right does not entail that the process has gotten it right on this particular occasion. It's reliable, not infallible. Hence, you might think that my belief is produced by such a process whilst nevertheless thinking that, in this instance, the belief is false.

To say "X is justified" is strong evidence that one believes X. To say "X is not justified" is strong evidence that one does not believe X. So to say "X is justified but I do not believe X" is evidence that one is being untruthful. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a much weaker claim than the one you originally made, which was that

believing X to be true is a necessary condition of believing X is justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

Still, perhaps the weaker claim is right.

However, no reasonable person would claim that S knows Q — creativesoul

Hey, no ad hominems here.

Gettier offers examples where S is justified in believing P — creativesoul

No he's not. There is only enough information to make justified statements about probabilities.

No he's not. There is only enough information to make justified statements about probabilities. — BlueBanana

Are you saying that a belief is only justified if it's certain?

I'm using justified as a synonym for well justified because that's what is meant by justified (badly justified is an oxymoron and makes that condition for knowledge meaningless). Also because it's easier to type just justified.

I got an error message or something saying my comment has been queued for moderation or something which I haven't seen before. I'm not banned or anything, am I?

No. Don't know why that happened. Will ask jamalrob.

Ah, it's because "moron" has been added to a trigger word list, and your comment contained "oxymoron".

So a belief is only well justified if it's certain?

Yes. Otherwise there exists a possibility that it's false knowledge.

Yes. Otherwise there exists a possibility that it's false knowledge. — BlueBanana

So if I meet someone and she tells me that her name is Sarah then I'm not well justified in believing that her name is Sarah because it isn't certain – she might be lying? And even if she shows me her passport and driving license then I'm still not well justified because it still isn't certain – they might be forgeries?

Requiring certainty for (strong) justification seems unreasonable.

Requiring certainty for good justification seems unreasonable. — Michael

But the possibilities exist. You have a justified belief, although the justification is a bad one, so you know her name, but the knowledge might be false.

I believe TPF-ers (with reference to PF) is getting smarter. In the past, JTB knowledge and the Gettier problem would have generated many more posts this far in. Perhaps we can look forward to a day in the near future when there won't be any!