You're making claims in the public domain though. You're not saying "for me, knowledge is of this, or that, sort" you're making a claim about what knowledge actually is (or rather what it isn't), including what I and the likes of Dawkins 'should' accept it as being, so what I guess what I'm asking is why should I believe you.

I'm hold a belief that means I require some form of conflicting evidence to dissuade me from any belief I hold. I'm also of the view that philosophy is about making persuasive arguments. So to me a philosophical argument that (for example) Heidegger says something meaningful (contrary to what I currently believe, would either contain some evidence of meaning, or an argument that I should be dissuaded from my beliefs by some other method (and then a demonstration that Heidegger satisfies that method).

What you've provided here are some more people giving an account of what they 'reckon' is the case. I don't really understand what process you think that forms part of in making your argument more persuasive.

You're making a claim about what knowledge actually is (or rather what it isn't) — Pseudonym

Am I? I like to think that I'm making or rather promoting claims about useful ways of thinking about knowledge, ways that can be pressed into the service of different needs, depending on different motivations. What scientism seems to do is deny - in a way that has nothing to do with science and everything to do with ideological dogma - that there are any other kinds of useful knowledge than science. Which is, prima facie, a load of horseshit that any two year old can smell.

And again, that much of what philosophy deals with is 'knowledge' is something I've only granted very provisionally, insofar as it's not at all clear that most of philosophy does in fact deal with knowledge. And the constant refrain for 'evidence' counts for very little, if only because what does and does not count as evidence is of course, precisely a philosophical and even perhaps historical issue of which you remain entirely unreflective about. Again, all these words you think you're using as self-evident - knowledge, evidence, meaningfulness - these are things you seem to think you understand, when most of your posts betray nothing but naivety with respect to their use. You're careless with language, and you wield that carelessness unthinkingly to make invalid claims, over and over again.

I like to think that I'm making or rather promoting claims about useful ways of thinking about knowledge, ways that can be pressed into the service of different needs, depending on different motivations — StreetlightX

OK, so what classes as useful? If philosophical ideas are judged by their utility, then how are you deciding that (for example) the idea that science can determine morality is not a useful one?

what does and does not count as evidence is of course, precisely a philosophical and even perhaps historical issue of which you remain entirely unreflective about. — StreetlightX

Again, you're simply imposing your worldview here, because I have a view about what constitutes evidence that differs from yours I must be 'unreflective', I must, through my own inadequacies, have missed something. Is the idea that I might well have reflected long and hard on these matters but simply reached a different conclusion to you so hard to accept?

Again, all these words you think you're using as self-evident - knowledge, evidence, meaningfulness - these are things you seem to think you understand, — StreetlightX

But you've used exactly the same words in your posts. We're back to this condescending insistence that whilst you're free to use such terms in whatever context you see fit, and it's simply implied that you'd be amenable to other interpretation, my use of the terms in a similarly loose, colloquial must be the result of ignorance.

you wield that carelessness unthinkingly to make invalid claims, over and over again. — StreetlightX

So now claims are back to being valid or invalid. So when I ask that philosophical positions validate their claims we get this wishy-washy, "not even really a knowledge claim", different methods for different enquiries kind of relativism, but when claims are made about philosophy itself we turn to strict rhetoric 'invalid', 'nonsense', 'wrong', 'misunderstood'. Such defensiveness does not foster useful investigation.

Again, you're simply imposing your worldview here, because I have a view about what constitutes evidence that differs from yours I must be 'unreflective', I must, through my own inadequacies, have missed something. Is the idea that I might well have reflected long and hard on these matters but simply reached a different conclusion to you so hard to accept? — Pseudonym

You're the evidence guy - and so far there is no 'evidence' that you have for a moment thought about, or understood the specificities of philosophy. I mean, there is simply no way to take seriously, for example, the idea that 'science=objective' and 'philosophy=subjective'. What is your theory of the object? What is your theory of the subject? Do you even have one? Or again, are you employing these empty terms that have nothing but a (implied and untheorized) value valence to them, and drawing conclusions based on that fake veneer of meaningfulness? Because, as with most of your terms, you simply haven't discussed or explained their use. did you know that the meaning of objectivity in science has changed so much that it's possible to write 500 page books about it? Or that the idea of what counts as an 'explanation' in science has had a similarly rich and varied history? And let's not even speak about evidence, which is a minefield all on its own.

So yeah, I freely admit that I don't take scientism seriously. It is a position deserving of scorn for it's closemindedness and philosophical vacuousness, and it ought to be treated like the toxic pseudo-philosophy that it is. If 'fostering useful investigation' means anything, it is not the cancerous idea that one and only one discipline (as usual undefined and unspecified by you except nominally) has the right to make claims of and about the world. It's sheer disingenuity to speak for 'fostering useful investigation' while literally denying legitimacy to entire swathes of human understanding. What you call 'wishy-washy' is nothing other than an index of your own inability, and more importantly, unwillingness, to understand the kinds of things philosophy does - it speaks not to philosophy but to your own barren understanding of the very topic you think you're discussing.

And just as another example, when you ask "how are you deciding that (for example) the idea that science can determine morality is not a useful one?" - what are you even asking here? Do you know? What kind of meta-ethics is implied in a question like this? A command theory of ethics? A virtue theory of ethics? What kind of thing would ethics have to be in order for science to bear - or not to bear - upon it? These are not trivial questions, despite your total insensitivity to them. Again, your very questions betray their own emptiness. They're meaningless without elaboration - which is to say, without philosophy.

so far there is no 'evidence' that you have for a moment thought about, or understood the specificities of philosophy. — StreetlightX

Good start, so what would class as evidence that I had thought about or understood the specificities of philosophy, whilst maintaining an ability to reach the conclusion that it is mostly meaningless? Or are we still stuck on the idea that everyone who disagrees with you simply must have misunderstood something?

mean, there is simply no way to take seriously, for example, the idea that 'science=objective' and 'philosophy=subjective'. — StreetlightX

I don't think I ever said that, if I did you'll have to remind me of the context.

What is your theory of the object? What is your theory of the subject? Do you even have one? Or again, are you employing these empty terms that have nothing but a (implied and untheorized) value valence to them, and drawing conclusions based on that fake veneer of meaningfulness? — StreetlightX

Again with the condescension. You ask disingenuously if I have a theory and then proceed with an attack on my intelligence on the unsubstantiated assumption that I haven't. My theory of the objective/subjective divide is a fairly unremarkable one based on (but not entirely explicated by) the idea of signs increasing the probability of an object being part of mind-independent reality. Signs such as intersubjective agreement, logical consistency etc. Yes I'm aware there are other positions and complexities but I find those positions less persuasive. Am I going to have to suffix everything I say with that sentence now in order to avoid accusations of dogmatism?

Because, as with most of your terms, you simply haven't discussed or explained their use. — StreetlightX

Again you still haven't explained to me how it is that you are able to use whatever terms you like without any explanation, yet I must add a short thesis to each word proving to you that I've thought about it.

It's sheer disingenuity to speak for 'fostering useful investigation' while literally denying legitimacy to entire swathes of human understanding. — StreetlightX

No, its an absolutely necessary logical conclusion. If there is to be such a thing as 'useful' or any judgement at all (which you seem to agree with, by dismissing Scientism) then it is simply an inevitable consequence that some methods will come out worse.

What kind of meta-ethics is implied in a question like this? — StreetlightX

Ethical naturalism.

What kind of thing would ethics have to be in order for science to bear - or not to bear - upon it? — StreetlightX

The term given to a particular type of motivation or reasoning, both of which can be seen and measured in biological organisms.

total insensitivity to them. — StreetlightX

You haven't even asked me them yet, where exactly do you get off attacking me personally, I'm interested in the discussion but I'm finding the personal insults quite offensive.

@unenlightened

Do you ever use any scientific results or ways of thinking to inform your people-handling part of the job? (IIRC you work in medical care?)

I use scientific results and ways of thinking to make a cup of coffee every morning. But I think I decided last time I looked at it unscientifically that this was a troll thread, so I'll let y'all manage without my reading it all and applying my art and science. :wink:

Understood. I asked because I imagined you'd have thought about it quite a lot and would have a unique/interesting perspective - of all the people here I'd imagine you would have found out if scientific results/training made a difference in how you treated people professionally. Apologies for wasting your time. :)

I think I decided last time I looked at it unscientifically that this was a troll thread — unenlightened

So in addition to being vacuous, closed-minded, toxic, cancerous, disingenuous, infantile, barren, and ignorant, and I'm now also a troll?

Well it was the thread - that is to say the topic - that I identified as trollish, and then only when I was invoked.

And that is because the short answer to the question 'What is scientism?' is that it is a term of abuse. It is something one is accused of, not something one espouses. And if no one espouses a philosophy, no one is in a position to seriously explicate it. So what is left to talk about except the personal failings of the contributors? Which is what seems to have happened. now if you want to plead innocence of trollishness, and at the same time complain about the bad feeling that has been produced, then you might be well advised to try and learn the lessons, and set up future discussions rather more carefully with a substantial topic.

So what does 'understand' mean in this context? How does one judge when one has 'understood' the human condition? — Pseudonym

I use the term "human situation" and in your response you change it to "human condition". Probably doesn't matter much, I guess.

You have understood the human situation when you have an understanding of it. There are many understandings; and probably none of them are absolutely comprehensive.

In what way has, for example, Camus, understood the human condition significantly more than Aristotle — Pseudonym

I said philosophy is anything but aimless, and that it could even be said to have an overarching aim; understanding the human situation. Now you've changed the subject and seem to be suggesting that I have claimed that philosophy progresses to ever greater understanding. Well, I haven't said that. But leaving that stronger claim aside, it is true that Camus' understanding is more comprehensive than Aristotle's for the very obvious reason that he has an extra 2000 years of philosophy, not to mention history, art, literature, music, religion and science to draw upon. He can have Aristotle's understanding plus all the rest; his understanding can thus subsume Aristotle's.

So what might be an equivalent example demonstrating the 'direction' of philosophy? — Pseudonym

And there you have it, scientism in a nutshell: demanding that philosophy must justify its value to you by showing that it satisfies the same criteria that you believe gives science its value.

And that is because the short answer to the question 'What is scientism?' is that it is a term of abuse. — unenlightened

That's like saying the answer to the question "what is Idealism?" would just be "it's the name of a school of philosophy", end of discussion. I can guarantee you that if I posted that question it would lead to a wide discussion about the history, principles and criticisms of Idealism, not just a semantic explanation of the use of the term. I think the full post gave a perfectly clear account of what aspects of the use of term I wanted to discuss, so I'm not seeing the leap to trollishness just from the title.

And if no one espouses a philosophy, no one is in a position to seriously explicate it. So what is left to talk about except the personal failings of the contributors? — unenlightened

If Scientism is just a term of abuse, which I was quite clear I already knew in the first sentence of the post, then what is left to discuss is why, which is the question I asked.

and set up future discussions rather more carefully with a substantial topic. — unenlightened

No, that's not it at all. If the topic were insubstantial, it would have simply received little interest, it's eight pages long. We're it simply of low quality, it would have been deleted (I've seen other go that way). I'm open to alternative explanations for the vitriol in virtually all of the responses I've received to any suggestion that science can answer questions of philosophy, but at the moment it's hard to move away from the glaringly obvious explanation, that people are scared it just might be right.

Presuming it means something like the excessive use of science, how are we determining excessive? How does Scientism differ from either Physicalism or Positivism such that it deserves it's own name? — Pseudonym

My own definition of what characterises Scientism is that it is a dependence on Newtonian metaphysics. We can recognise it as that metaphysical package that revolves around the notions of reductionism, atomism, materialism, mechanicalism, computationalism, localism, nominalism, monadism and determinism.

So it is not the "scientific method" which is being excessively applied. There are good epistemic reasons to think that rational inquiry - that combination of theory and measurement - is the only proper way to arrive at a more objective view. And that objectivity has been the whole point of philosophy in the modern western tradition.

It is instead a particular brand of metaphysics which is being excessively (or not) being applied.

The Newtonian paradigm justified - at the level of universal observation and mathematical-strength theory - a particular view of Nature. Extrapolated, it says that all there is are atoms blindly following deterministic paths that make all higher organisation or complexity essentially meaningless and epiphenomenal. This is what people object to. The ruling out of everything potentially more interesting than a web of impressed forces acting on dumb masses.

In Aristotelian terms, the Newtonian paradigm allows you to treat Nature as purely the sum of its material and efficient causes. Its formal and final causes just don't have any real ontological standing. Purpose and meaning become a grand illusion of some kind or other. They are now merely subjective.

And that paradigm of Nature obviously has a whole lot of direct philosophical consequences. It says something basic about politics, ethics and aesthetics. It decides what counts as a legitimate question in these areas.

So the modal scope of this reductionist view is completely sweeping. Which is what gets folk squealing.

Obviously I view Newtonian reductionism to be a useful (indeed, super-useful) way of thinking, but also - metaphysically - incomplete. A holistic or systems view of Nature takes the expanded view that brings top-down formal and final cause back into the picture as also elements of scientific inquiry. And of course, science itself is increasingly understanding Nature in this fashion.

So once science cracks holism, then it is game over. :)

Of course, philosophy being a social activity, people can define it as they like. They can talk about other ways of "knowing" - like feeling, or poetry, or revelation.

And that is fine. In an open competition of ideas, all the different ways of thought will play themselves out in good old evolutionary fashion.

My only personal concern is that Newtonian reductionism can be quite a damaging paradigm in long-run social terms. And to counter-act that, it needs a strong and well-grounded response - the kind of response that only a scientific holism could deliver.

Waffling on about feelings, poetry and revealed truth - the ongoing Romantic response to the Enlightenment - ain't going to cut it. The only answer to half-done science is to come back and finish the job.

You have understood the human situation when you have an understanding of it. — Janus

Right, so what does having an understanding of it look/feel like?

is true that Camus' understanding is more comprehensive than Aristotle's for the very obvious reason — Janus

I didn't ask how, I asked 'in what way', what constitutes the progress?

demanding that philosophy must justify its value to you by showing that it satisfies the same criteria that you believe gives science its value. — Janus

Who's demanding anything? I'm just asking. Yes, I'd like to know if you think philosophy can show progress in something I can understand as being useful. If it can't, fine, you don't need to get so touchy about it.

Finally, an insightful response not filled with bitter resentment.

I agree that the over application of Newtonian reductionism is a big problem. As is the excessive use of 'survival of the fittest' and a massive failure to acknowledge the biases and statistical failings of modern science.

But none of this changes the basic position, as JJ Smart put it, that metaphysics should be based on science as our best model, despite its failings.

Personally, I'd like to see more work on information theory as well as a more holistic science, as I think that is the only way to reign in the metaphysical woo surrounding quantum physics, but until then we certainly are not going to improve on a flawed and biased science by throwing our hands up and saying we might as well just believe anything.

The point someone like Hawking is making is that the whole of philosophy is unnecessary in answering the questions humanity has of its existence. — Pseudonym

That is not a point. It is an assertion. And it is unsupported by any argument. Hence it is not worthy of anybody spending any time considering it.

Further, it is an assertion that is observed to be wrong, as many people have been able to find answers to the questions they had about existence, through philosophy. The fact that Hawking has not was a problem for him, not for anybody else. Now you may say that the answers people have found are 'subjective', or 'illusory', or 'meaningless', but that's beside the point. They found answers that were helpful to them, that gave them greater peace of mind, acceptance, sense of purpose, or whatever else they were after. So for them, philosophy served its purpose.

It's as though Hawking said 'I don't like Marmite, so nobody should eat Marmite'.

Right, so what does having an understanding of it look/feel like? — Pseudonym

Obviously depends on the undertsnding. There are countless possible understandings of the human situation.

I didn't ask how, I asked 'in what way', what constitutes the progress? — Pseudonym

I haven't said there is progress; again you are falling into comparing other disciplines with your conception of science. Having said that, there is obviously a progression in philosophy; it is a dialectical progression; philosophers are influenced by, and respond to, other philosophers. It is a cumulative discipline, just like the arts, literature and music; the possibilities become ever greater in some ways and less in others; philosophy becomes more comprehensive by exploring new possibilities of understanding.

Who's demanding anything? I'm just asking. Yes, I'd like to know if you think philosophy can show progress in something I can understand as being useful. If it can't, fine, you don't need to get so touchy about it. — Pseudonym

Why do you want to cast me as being "touchy"; I don't think I've given you any reason to think that. I probably do become a bit impatient at times with those who seem to have no will to understand the obvious, but that is not the same as being "touchy".

And again you are asking that it should be demonstrated that philosophy progresses in the way you think science does; this just seems to be a prejudice you cannot help yourself repeatedly falling into.

The only answer to half-done science is to come back and finish the job. — apokrisis

Which is of course true in the context of science; but more or less irrelevant when it comes to philosophy, except in those restricted areas where there are problems caused by philosophers hanging on to the Newtonian worldview, or other reductionist paradigms.

That seems mostly to occur with philosophers who over-emphasize the importance of science to the discipline of philosophy. As I see it, scientism consists in the over-emphasis of the importance of science for philosophy (and for the 'humanities', and humanity, in general); regardless of whether the science being advocated is reductionistic or wholistic.

the vitriol in virtually all of the responses I've received to any suggestion that science can answer questions of philosophy, but at the moment it's hard to move away from the glaringly obvious explanation, that people are scared it just might be right. — Pseudonym

The "vitriol" is a phantom projection of your own defensiveness, I would say. I certainly haven't felt any vitriol. Impatience is all I have felt in trying to engage with such a one-dimensional perspective as I see yours to be. I don't see vitriol in most of the other's posts either.

On the other side of the argument, there are posters who have contributed to this thread with whom I disagree about the scope of the role of science in philosophy: i think they wrongly want to rule it out altogether; whereas I think all aspects of human life, all disciplines and investigations, creative, intellectual and religious, have relevance to philosophy.

The point someone like Hawking is making is that the whole of philosophy is unnecessary in answering the questions humanity has of its existence. — Pseudonym

One of my very favourite Hawking quotes:

“The human race is just a chemical scum on a moderate-sized planet, orbiting around a very average star in the outer suburb of one among a hundred billion galaxies. We are so insignificant that I can't believe the whole universe exists for our benefit. That would be like saying that you would disappear if I closed my eyes.”

He might have found out by now ;-)

So once science cracks holism, then it is game over. :) — apokrisis

Science relies on there being an 'epistemic gap' between knower and known. And ultimately we're not apart from reality. So all knowledge is forever conditional, it can't be any other way. So 'cracking holism' requires breaking out of the dualistic mindset that underlies science.

philosophy being a social activity, people can define it as they like. They can talk about other ways of "knowing" - like feeling, or poetry, or revelation.

And that is fine. In an open competition of ideas, all the different ways of thought will play themselves out in good old evolutionary fashion. — apokrisis

Well, the history of the subject, going back to the Greeks, is partially 'philosophy of nature', which is your area of interest, but it also has other facets which have been considerably de-emphasised in the post-Enlightenment West. Plato, as Nagel comments, was concerned with making sense of the Universe, not from the viewpoint of engineering and science, but in terms of meaning. Now 'the meaning of life' would probably be categorised as 'romanticism'. And as always in the modern view, Darwin trumps Plato, right? So ultimately it comes down to what survives, or what propagates; that's the only kind of 'meaning' that has currency in today's world. It's kind of like Descartes, but with a slight tweak: 'I propagate, therefore I am' (to put it politely ;-) )

Science relies on there being an 'epistemic gap' between knower and known. And ultimately we're not apart from reality. So all knowledge is forever conditional, it can't be any other way. So 'cracking holism' requires breaking out of the dualistic mindset that underlies science. — Wayfarer

It seems to me that not just science, but all human discourses, inevitably have this dualism of knower and known, self and other; and that this is just the nature of discursive thought and knowledge. @Apo champions (rightly, I think) the incorporation of a third principle; the relation between knower and known; and I think that is what constitutes a coherent wholism.

Obviously, a very deep issues. The remark you're commenting on, is part of the heuristic that I have been developing derived from non-dualist philosophies.

Obviously, Apokrisis' philosophy based on semiotics and meaning is worlds above mechanistic materialism; the fact that current science (as so ably represented by him) has begun to adopt 'language' instead of 'mechanism' as the fundamental metaphor, is a real sea-change in the whole metaphysical model of Western thinking, and I have great respect for it. But I'm also drawn to 'the spiritual' - which actually is not a very good word at all, in my book, but one for which there are not many suitable equivalents in the modern lexicon (suggestions, anyone?)

As you no doubt know; I am also interested in "the spiritual". The problem is, and we have touched on this before, that spiritual experience doesn't constitute inter-subjective knowledge that can reliably be corroborated by any suitable impartial observer. So, while I would say that the content of religious or mystical experience has no philosophical import, of course i do believe that the fact of religious and mystical experience most certainly does. In that way it is, like aesthetic experience, as opposed to empirical experience. more art than science, more feeling than fact.

My perspective on your posts on the issue is that they're an expression of a characteristically Protestant type of understanding of the interiority and private nature of the relationship with the Divine. At the time that this was framed, there was, of course, inter-subjective agreement in the form of belief in the Bible as a common ground between individual believers. However one consequence of the Protestant emphasis on the subjective nature of the relationship and of the remoteness of God ('deus absconditus') was the tendency to rejection of the very idea of the 'divine source of being' from public discourse. Which is, in turn, one of the main factors underlying scientism as a kind of quasi-religious belief system - amply illustrated in this thread ;-) .

Which is, in turn, one of the main factors underlying scientism as a kind of quasi-religious belief system - amply illustrated in this thread ;-) . — Wayfarer

Maybe you'll enjoy, if you haven't read them already:

Atheism Considered as a Christian Sect

and (recommended by darthbarracuda, recently):

A Short History of Atheism by Gavin Hyman

:up:

My senses, translated into thoughts by my brain. — Pseudonym

So, you did have senses.

The world; and I didn’t articulate it because I hadn't learned how to talk. — Pseudonym

As a child?

Which is of course true in the context of science; but more or less irrelevant when it comes to philosophy, except in those restricted areas where there are problems caused by philosophers hanging on to the Newtonian worldview, or other reductionist paradigms. — Janus

So how are you defining philosophy here?

To me, the disicipline of philosophy exists to teach a particular method of critical thought. It is about the habits of clear reasoning which lead to positions definite enough to be believed or doubted on the basis of some suitable form of evidence.

What you are talking about are then particular philosophies, Within that umbrella definition of critical thought, all manner of theories, and all manner of evidence, might be advanced.

Essentially philosophy is scientific. As a discipline, it simply allows a far wider range of paradigms in terms of their ontic commitments and hence what could,work as suitable evidence.

Theism is acceptable, phenomenology is acceptable, PoMo is acceptable. They each have their own way of arguing and their own matching notions of evidence. To be part of the stable of philosophies, they only have to pass some minimal critical thinking standards.

Science is then that part of philosophy which has become dominant as its particular kind of rigour has proven its value socially. And I agree that also - as reductionism - has often proven itself anti-social.

The question then is what follows? How do we fix science as a discipline so it is more completely pro-social?

But it is silly to say that even reductionist science is a restricted part of philosophy. It clearly dominates in terms of results to the extent it is its own thing these days. It is no longer merely one of the many philosophies residing within the philosophy department.

Two questions; in what way precisely are they necessarily Protestant? And how do you propose that inter-subjective corroboration (which is the term I used) as opposed to inter-subjective agreement, could be reached in regard to religious and spiritual experience?