Science relies on there being an 'epistemic gap' between knower and known. And ultimately we're not apart from reality. So all knowledge is forever conditional, it can't be any other way. So 'cracking holism' requires breaking out of the dualistic mindset that underlies science. — Wayfarer

Hence semiosis - as a science. Hence dualism giving away to the trichotomy of the generalised modelling relation.

So yes, cracking holism is all about getting past dualism.

No, its an absolutely necessary logical conclusion. — Pseudonym

Logical conclusion of what exactly? The unargued-for dogmatism that you've simply assumed throughout this thread? You all but admitted, previously, that your entire position so far is founded on tautology - that if you assume you are right, it will follow that you will assume you are right. I thought it so obvious a triviality that I didn't bother to comment on it after having pointed it out, but it seems that you are so committed to your pseudo-philosophy that not even the most elementary of logical errors, triviality and tautology, seems to ring any alarm bells with you. The feigned psuedo confusion of why people dislike a stance that aims to exclude most of human understanding began as laughable, and it is now tired. As if the nationalist-xenophobe wondering why, when all he wants to do is kick out everyone else, he is so reviled as the scum he is - and then cries foul about 'openness to investigation'. It would be a joke if it wasn't so clear just how serious you think you are.

Ethical naturalism — Pseudonym

Another example of hand-waving nomination, as if branding about a pair of empty, unelaborated words explains anything at all, instead of crying out for explanation at the deepest level.

And as always in the modern view, Darwin trumps Plato, right? So ultimately it comes down to what survives, or what propagates; that's the only kind of 'meaning' that has currency in today's world. — Wayfarer

You are the one who needs Scientism to justify your anti-Scientism.

My position is different. Holism doesn’t have to reject reductionism. It just has to show how material and effective cause are a small part of the bigger causal picture.

How do we fix science as a discipline so it is more completely pro-social? — apokrisis

By not declaring every problem amenable to a scientific solution; by recognising what is and isn't a scientific problem. I still think this OP in the NY Times articulates the issue very well.

Your appraisal of spiritual experience - in terms of it the subjective, but also the apodictic, nature of 'spiritual experiences' - seems to me to be generally derived from a Protestant worldview - which is by no means either pejorative, or unique to yourself, as it's in many ways the prevalent cultural attitude. So, I'm not saying that I think there's anything the matter with it, but it does in some ways, 'bracket' the consideration of the religious aspect of metaphysics. It makes it a private matter, which in the context of trying to articulate a 'metaphysic of value', means that it doesn't have much to say.

Now, as for the alternatives - do have a glance at that OP I posted above. It concerns Jurgen Habermas' re-evaluation of the role of religions in public life. I haven't read the book - it's a dialogue between Habermas and Ratzinger, who went on to become Pope. But it rings true to me - he's saying that at the very least, scientific humanism needs to recognise the role of religion as a way of grounding metaphysics.

You are the one who needs Scientism to justify your anti-Scientism. — apokrisis

Hey, you're the one who said that

all the different ways of thought will play themselves out in good old evolutionary fashion. — apokrisis

So - Darwin trumps Plato, just as I said. ;-)

By not declaring every problem amenable to a scientific solution; by recognising what is and isn't a scientific problem. — Wayfarer

That is a fair point. But it is a general one. Religions might treat prayer or mediation as the universal solvent of problems as well.

Maybe some things, even many things, are merely accidents with no especial causal mechanism.

But then isn’t that what the scientific method already presumes? The null hypothesis is what is provisionally held. It is up to the weight of the evidence to falsify it.

So by training, scientists ought to limit the scope of what demands explaining. They can shrug their shoulders at even quite “miraculous” coincidences.

positions definite enough to be believed or doubted on the basis of some suitable form of evidence. — apokrisis

Positions in science may be able to fulfil this requirement, but not all, or even many, positions in philosophy can. This is evidenced by the fact that consensus is generally reached in science; while it is never reached in philosophy.

Essentially philosophy is scientific. — apokrisis

This is where we disagree; I think philosophy is as much an art as it is a science.

But it is silly to say that even reductionist science is a restricted part of philosophy. — apokrisis

Sure, it is assumed in the eliminative physicalist paradigms which are fairly prominent these days; but not in phenomenological, existentialist, enactivist, process or post-modern philosophical thought. It depends on which country you live, I guess.

I don't agree that philosophy is only about critical thought; although obviously that is a big part of it. Every metaphysic, for example, carries its own set of presupposition which cannot be demonstrated or proven deductively, and there is no way to bring about a situation where everyone will find the same set of presuppositions the most plausible or desirable as a starting point for philosophical investigation and speculation ( and nor would you want to even if you could).

This is where we disagree; I think philosophy is as much an art as it is a science. — Janus

Define art.

There is a reason why modern fine art departments sell their courses as applied critical thinking these days. Just like philosophy departments. Indeed the humanities sell themselves as crucial to the modern economy - another STEM subject in effect as tech goes social.

I think you are trying to preserve some fusty Oxbridge culture wars distinctions here.

Art is a social technology. It always has been since the first beads and cave paintings.

It makes it a private matter, which in the context of trying to articulate a 'metaphysic of value', means that it doesn't have much to say. — Wayfarer

I think you are still conflating the content of religious experience with the fact of religious experience. I*n any case the content is not subjective; it is inter-subjective in the sense that it is culturally mediated. This is obvious if you look at the differences between the expressions of Buddhist and Brahmanic expressions of religious and mystical experience and understanding, and Christian, Judaic and islamic expressions. Also it is not "merely subjective" insofar as there are objective similarities between mystical experience and its expressions in and across all cultures.

To reiterate and hopefully clarify, my only point is that such experiences cannot be inter-subjectively corroborated, not that they cannot be inter-subjectively agreed upon. And it is this sense that they cannot be counted as knowledge in the sense that empirical knowledge can be. I genuinely hope this explanation clears up your long-running misunderstanding of my position once and for all.

So in addition to being vacuous, closed-minded, toxic, cancerous, disingenuous, infantile, barren, and ignorant, and I'm now also a troll? — Pseudonym

You missed out callous and brazen. Those especially amused me. I could only read that bit in the tone of a communist Chinese denunciation of the Western bourgeoisie. The hyperbole dial cranked up to 11. :)

Define art. — apokrisis

Like any diverse activity, as Wittgenstein pointed out, it cannot be precisely defined in some essentialist manner. But we all can recognize art in terms of its range of "family resemblances" just as we can in the case of, for example, games.

Of course, whether any particular work really is art (in the sense of being good or worthy art) is an entirely different question. No inter-subjective corroboration, as opposed to mere agreement, is possible here just as it is not possible with religious and mystical experience, and, really, even philosophy. Corroboration would consist in universal agreement; the inability of any suitably good-willed and unbiased observer to disagree once they have been presented with, and understood, the evidence. This exists, if it exist anywhere in human activities and enquiry, only in science, and more so in some categories of science than in others, it seems.

To reiterate and hopefully clarify, my only point is that such experiences cannot be inter-subjectively corroborated, not that they cannot be inter-subjectively agreed upon. And it is this sense that they cannot be counted as knowledge in the sense that empirical knowledge can be. I genuinely hope this explanation clears up your long-running misunderstanding of my position once and for all. — Janus

Well, that's a very clear explanation. I think where you and I have had disagreements previously, however, is whenever I attempt to say something about there being 'higher knowledge'. So the question becomes 'in what sense can it be 'higher'? And my view is that the vertical dimension, so to speak, is something that has generally speaking dropped out of current cultural discourse. I attempt to illustrate that with reference to those philosophies that do preserve that sense of 'higher knowledge' - among others Platonist, Buddhist and Hindu. And that's where many our disagreements have been in the past - that I'm waxing nostalgic for some bygone age or idealised perennial philosophy that doesn't really exist. I mean, there's probably some truth in that, but it's not the whole truth; there's literally hardly anything in current analytical philosophy that maps against what I am trying to argue for.

Like any diverse activity, as Wittgenstein pointed out, it cannot be precisely defined in some essentialist manner. — Janus

Yes, it all comes back to constraints-based thinking. ;)

No inter-subjective corroboration, as opposed to mere agreement, is possible here just as it is not possible with religious and mystical experience, and, really, even philosophy. Corroboration would consist in universal agreement; the inability of any suitably good-willed and unbiased observer to disagree once they have been presented with, and understood, the evidence. This exists, if it exist anywhere in the the human enquiry, only in science, and more so in some categories of science than in others, it seems. — Janus

Again, pragmatism already says this.

So the only place where we can differ is that you want to treat the private ineffable experience of the individual as some kind of reliable interior evidence - for a communally-defined externalist methodology.

Which would be Romanticism in a nutshell. It's art if I think it is art ... even if the whole notion of "art" is a form of life, a language game.

No. Communities seek to impose increasingly restrictive standards to socially-construct a hierarchy of "artistic impulse". You know you have really made it when they hang it on a gallery wall as if it were a sacred cultural relic. So some committee of the great and the good gets to choose whose vision is communally celebrated.

It's just like science in other words. Though science pretends to be much more democratic in its admission criteria - and indeed, it often is.

You say - "Corroboration would consist in universal agreement; the inability of any suitably good-willed and unbiased observer to disagree once they have been presented with, and understood, the evidence."

You must know that the art world doesn't operate with this kind of open-minded good will and lack of bias. And the art world justifies that by saying it is all subjective in the end anyway.

It is only science which openly sets this kind of standard of public acceptability. Well, and courts of law and other rational institutions that expect the evidence to tell its own story.

And as I say, in practice, the first thing fine art faculties want to teach its young and impressionable students is that it is social game. You need to network to get ahead. You need to focus on what's the new innovation and then market the hell out of yourself if you hope to earn a living out of it.

So the human artistic impulse is a bad example for your case.

I agree we certainly do feel something when we approach a great work of art with a correctly cultivated mindset. It is not as if we can get eliminativist about that aesthetic response.

But feeling an aesthetic delight at clever solutions to difficult problems is something all our creative endeavours share in common. It is as true of science and maths. And neurobiologically, it makes evolutionary sense that we are atuned to recognising ideas that strike upon the optimal path - the solutions that reduce the most information in accordance to that dearest principle of science, the least action principle.

It is only the target of the art that has changed. The "problem to be solved with optimal efficiency" used to be the manufacture of religious awe and the communication of moral precepts on behalf of the institutional church. Then it became kings, queens and the power hierarchy that needed to be communicated the same way. Then the right national "form of life" - the quintessential Englishman, or whatever.

Eventually it has become the manufacture of social disorientation and dissent. We have reasons collectively to want to shake things up.

The game goes on in the same way, even as its targets change to best suit the problems of the times.

The Romantic view of course is that art is instead an excavation of what is deepest and most precious in the individual human soul. But regard that as just a self-serving cover story of the modern institutional elite, the guard-dogs of the galleries and salons.

That is not a point. It is an assertion. And it is unsupported by any argument. Hence it is not worthy of anybody spending any time considering it. — andrewk

I don't think that's fair. The book 'The Grand Design', in which the "philosophy is dead" statement was made, goes on to explain Hawking how feels the answers to questions like "why are we here?" are correctly answered by a deductive nomological model. The answer to why we are consists of a theory as how things like life come to be and then the conditions of the universe which one 'plugs in' to such a theory. Many people disagree with the deductive nomological model, and it has a number of problems, but that's not sufficient to say that no-one can rationally reach the conclusion that they still believe it is correct, and if they do reach such a conclusion, then a supporting argument in favour of the statement that science can answer questions of philosophy would be science answering some of the questions of philosophy, which is exactly what Hawking provides us with in the rest of the book.

Further, it is an assertion that is observed to be wrong, as many people have been able to find answers to the questions they had about existence, through philosophy. The fact that Hawking has not was a problem for him, not for anybody else. Now you may say that the answers people have found are 'subjective', or 'illusory', or 'meaningless', but that's beside the point. They found answers that were helpful to them, that gave them greater peace of mind, acceptance, sense of purpose, or whatever else they were after. So for them, philosophy served its purpose. — andrewk

No, the fact that the answers may be illusory is not beside the point. Hawking (to my knowledge) has never claimed that philosophy doesn't serve any purpose at all, so the fact that it comforts some people cannot be used to disprove his assertion. The ontological argument comforts some people, so is any philosopher claiming it is in error wrong to do so because they've missed the point?

If the the purpose of philosophy was to comfort people, then why do philosopher debate their theories using rational analysis. Why do they use terms like 'unpersuasive', 'invalid', even just plain 'wrong'. Refer me to a single philosophy paper assessing a text on the grounds of its ability to comfort people and I will concede the point, other wise it seems like it's one rule for other philosophers to criticise each other's work, but when a scientists tries to do it they move the goalposts.

If the 'purpose' of philosophy is to comfort people, then show me a paper marked on its ability to do so. Show me a critique of Kant complaining that it's not very comforting. Or is that just an assertion, without an argument to back it up and so not worth anyone's time considering?

There are countless possible understandings of the human situation. — Janus

So how does one critique a philosophy then? If there are countless understandings that must mean there's at least one for every person on the planet, and you've stated that philosophy's aim is to produce this feeling of understanding, then how can any philosophy be better than any other?

Yet that's exactly what happens in academic philosophy. No-one starts a paper with "all those previous ideas were great, but here's another one you might like". Literally every philosophical movement has begun by either rejecting entirely previous approaches, or by pointing out what they consider to be flaws in it. But how can there be flaws unless they've checked the entire population to find that absolutely no-one obtained a feeling of understanding from it? I'm finding it hard to marry your idea of the aim of philosophy with the actual way it is practised in academia. Are the two very different?

no will to understand the obvious — Janus

I don't understand this bit, what is it that is 'obvious' and how can one require a will to understand it if it is obvious? the two seem logically contradictory to me. Something which is obvious is surely defined by the fact that it does not require any effort to understand it?

And again you are asking that it should be demonstrated that philosophy progresses in the way you think science does — Janus

How are you getting that I've asked that? I asked "...if you think philosophy can show progress in something I can understand as being useful". Where in that question is any instruction about what philosophy 'should' demonstrate? I'm just asking if it can.

And I'm sorry if I insulted you by suggesting you were 'touchy' but for clarification, this is exactly the sort of thing I meant. I'm just asking some questions about philosophy and you're interpreting each one as an attack on it, a demand that it should do this or that, when I've not used any demanding or pejorative terms. It just seems odd that would interpret my questions as demands, that's all.

The "vitriol" is a phantom projection of your own defensiveness, I would say. I certainly haven't felt any vitriol — Janus

Have you read the thread? I (and scientists typically associated with 'Scientism') have been labelled - vacuous, closed-minded, toxic, cancerous, disingenuous, infantile, barren, callous and ignorant. How on earth are you not reading vitriol?

One of my very favourite Hawking quotes:

“The human race is just a chemical scum on a moderate-sized planet, orbiting around a very average star in the outer suburb of one among a hundred billion galaxies. We are so insignificant that I can't believe the whole universe exists for our benefit. That would be like saying that you would disappear if I closed my eyes.” — Wayfarer

Yes, one of my favourites too, though I suspect for very different reasons.

He might have found out by now ;-) — Wayfarer

A little in poor taste.

So, you did have senses. — Caldwell

Yes.

As a child? — Caldwell

Well as a child I could articulate it because I had learned how to talk.

Where's this line of questioning going? It seems a bit random, some insight into where you're heading might help.

You missed out callous and brazen. Those especially amused me. I could only read that bit in the tone of a communist Chinese denunciation of the Western bourgeoisie. The hyperbole dial cranked up to 11. — apokrisis

Oh yes, how could I have missed those gems. I'm wondering if the stock of abusive terms has been entirely used up yet, or if we have more to come... I'm offering 3:1 on 'mindless' and an outside 10:1 on a use of the archaic 'hebetudinous' turning up in the next post, if you're interested in a virtual gamble.

Theism is acceptable, phenomenology is acceptable, PoMo is acceptable. They each have their own way of arguing and their own matching notions of evidence. To be part of the stable of philosophies, they only have to pass some minimal critical thinking standards.

Science is then that part of philosophy which has become dominant as its particular kind of rigour has proven its value socially. And I agree that also - as reductionism - has often proven itself anti-social. — apokrisis

I heard an interview with Dan Dennett recently in which he argued that Philosophy nowadays should really contain none of these schools, that theism was it's own thing (unsurprising fro Dennett), phenomenology and the like can be subsumed into psychology (not all of which is scientific, which is important if it is to be a broad enough container), semantics into linguistics etc.. Philosophy's job, he argued, was to act as translator, to allow these various modes of investigation to speak to one another, to translate what has been said in one field into the other so that they might benefit from each other's insights.

I quite like that approach, and I think that science hearing a little more from some other fields might help with it's anti-social tendencies, but it's not going to happen if the other fields don't want to hear anything from science.

I've had enough of this, if all you're going to do is spit bile, I've no interest in discussing with you. If this is the standard of debate exemplified by a moderator, it's a disgrace.

goes on to explain Hawking how feels the answers to questions like "why are we here?" are correctly answered by a deductive nomological model. — Pseudonym

Is the model falsifiable?

If not then Hawking is doing philosophy, not science when he engages with such a model. Which makes his claim that philosophy is dead look rather confused.

If the the purpose of philosophy was to comfort people, then why do philosopher debate their theories using rational analysis. Why do they use terms like 'unpersuasive', 'invalid', even just plain 'wrong'. Refer me to a single philosophy paper... — Pseudonym

This may be a point where there is less distance between our positions. Some philosophers do indeed debate in the way you describe, even (unfortunately) on this forum. I see such an approach as misguided and unhelpful. I don't think there is any useful role for the word 'wrong' in philosophy, and I think the way that some academic philosophers have lost sight of the role philosophy plays in giving meaning to people's lives is most unfortunate.

I stopped the quote at the word 'paper' because I think the best philosophy is not done in universities, or academia generally. While there are some academic philosophical papers I like very much, most seem to me to be a waste of time*. But that is a comment on the current state of academic philosophy, not on philosophy generally. It is only relatively recently that philosophy was seen as something that principally belonged in universities. I hope for a reversal of that trend.

If Hawking had said 'Academic Analytic philosophy is dead' then, while I wouldn't necessary agree with him, I would not disagree strongly enough to think it worth saying so. But alas, that is not what he said.

* although to be fair, the same could be said, to only a slightly lesser extent, of scientific papers. But that leads to another large and controversial topic - the parlous state of scientific academia and the current corporatist obsession with KPIs dominated by publication numbers and impact factors rather than actual meaningful content. That's best left to another thread.

Is the model falsifiable?

If not then Hawking is doing philosophy, not science when he engages with such a model. Which makes his claim that philosophy is dead look rather confused. — andrewk

I agree entirely, it is an act of philosophy to say that philosophy is dead, but I don't see this as any more contradictory than Wittgenstein's 'ladder'. Not all philosophical statements can be true without making each one pointless (unless we accept your 'philosophy as comfort' idea, which I will come back to), not all philosophical statements can be false as that would itself be a philosophical statement and so paradoxical (again, we could argue about whether that's actually a problem, but let's presume it is for now). So that leaves us with the inevitable conclusion that some finite number of philosophical statements are true/valid/useful, whilst others are not. I can't see any logic which prevents that finite number from being one, which means that making a philosophical statement about all other philosophical statements in not itself a contradiction.

Some philosophers do indeed debate in the way you describe, even (unfortunately) on this forum. I see such an approach as misguided and unhelpful. I don't think there is any useful role for the word 'wrong' in philosophy, and I think the way that some academic philosophers have lost sight of the role philosophy plays in giving meaning to people's lives is most unfortunate. — andrewk

I think I broadly agree with you here. I think it's a reasonable role for philosophy to provide people with a story to explain (by which I mean, make consistent) all the otherwise disparate and chaotic experiences they have through life. I think we have a great need for things to be consistent and fairly simple, so that we can feel like we have some chance of predicting the future, whereas in reality, things are very complex. Philosophy can provide that story to take the edge off the chaos.

Where I would disagree though, is that all philosophy then is on an equal footing. I think that the experience of clinical psychology is generally that taking people's word for what comforts them best is not a sound way of helping others. If I asked a Heroin addict what he wanted and simply took his word for it, without applying my own critical thinking, would I really be doing my duty by him? Surely he'd answer that he wanted more Heroin? It's the same with the comfort people get from certain philosophy. I don't thing here would be the right place to go into specific examples, but could you agree that it is at least conceivable that the comfort some people feel from some philosophies might actually cause them more pain in the long run? If that's the case, like the heroin addict, is it not a social duty to try and replace such philosophies with ones we believe are less harmful?

is it not a social duty to try and replace such philosophies with ones we believe are less harmful? — Pseudonym

Yes, I agree with that. Ayn Rand's philosophy is an example of one I think it's good to talk people out of, as are the more extreme versions of nihilism. My overall impression though is that most philosophies are helpful rather than harmful.

By the way I didn't say philosophy as 'comfort'. I don't mind the idea of philosophy as 'consolation', since that phrase has a distinguished history going all the way back to Boethius. But I draw the line at 'comfort'. Plus I think notions like 'purpose' are much richer and more open than consolation.

What has this thread become? Maybe it should be called "whose a troll, whose an idiot and whose worth taking seriously?". Various people can defend themselves from the charge.

Anyway, I'll try to say something useful.

science can answer questions of philosophy — Pseudonym

I am not sure if you actually claim this Pseudo. But I've always thought of Philosophy as the examination of opinions and assumptions which are usually taken for-granted. I think here of the existence of the external world, other minds, the existence of God, the authority of science, the distinction between right and wrong, and between fact and value. All of these things are often just taken for-granted. Few people pause to think about what they really mean in making these assumptions, nor how they might justify them. These are tasks for Philosophy.

I don't have any a priori objection to the idea that scientific approaches could answer these questions, but any time I've seen that attempted has made some gross confusion or skipped right over the most contentious issue. This is just what Sam Harris does. He just assumes a kind of Consequentialism and then uses science to work out consequences. That isn't using science to answer philosophical questions. That is assuming an answer without reflecting on what it means or trying to justify it, which is just what I defined Philosophy as not doing.

Hawking's book is an odd case. He says Philosophy is dead. He then discusses extensively scientific realism and anti-realism, a clearly philosophical issue, seemingly without realizing that it is Philosophy.

By the way I didn't say philosophy as 'comfort'. I don't mind the idea of philosophy as 'consolation', since that phrase has a distinguished history going all the way back to Boethius. But I draw the line at 'comfort'. Plus I think notions like 'purpose' are much richer and more open than consolation. — andrewk

Yes, the term consolation works better because it actually avoids some of the more heroin-like philosophies which offer a certain 'comfort' in the face of chaos. I think my personal line would, however, be crossed by 'purpose'. The trouble with 'purpose' is it is future-set and that opens up too much possibility for excuse; "your reward's in heaven, don't worry about the state of things now", "yes, the revolution/war will bring death and destruction, but it's all for a grander purpose". I can see the benefits, but the risks are too great for my liking.

science can answer questions of philosophy
— Pseudonym

I am not sure if you actually claim this Pseudo. — PossibleAaran

How can this even be a question at this point?

I'm wondering if the stock of abusive terms has been entirely used up yet, or if we have more to come.. — Pseudonym

Abuse shouldn’t be a worry to us ‘chemical scum’, should it? And if it is a worry, you can console yourself that whatever worry you feel is really only the churning of neurochemicals, and doesn’t have any intrinsic meaning.

science can answer questions of philosophy — Pseudonym


I am not sure if you actually claim this Pseudo — PossibleAaran

Yes, to be clear, I would make that claim, particularly in the fields of mind and ethics. Despite SLX's protestations that I explain every position I hold with a doctoral length thesis otherwise I'm not to be taken seriously, I don't actually think an exposition of why I hold those beliefs is appropriate to the thread topic, suffice to say I do not take them for granted, I have thought about them and accept that they are ultimately beliefs. I simply require that beliefs are not overwhelmingly contradicted by objective evidence, but again, I accept that that position itself is just a belief. What I object to is the insulting suggesting that it is not even 'allowed' for someone to hold those beliefs.

I've always thought of Philosophy as the examination of opinions and assumptions which are usually taken for-granted. — PossibleAaran

I don't think that's a bad thing, but it seems pointless to me unless there is some conclusion at the end of the process, and presuming there is, some of the things thus examined must end up passing the test. The authority of science (in certain areas) might well be one of those things that pass the test surely?

He just assumes a kind of Consequentialism and then uses science to work out consequences. That isn't using science to answer philosophical questions. That is assuming an answer without reflecting on what it means or trying to justify it, which is just what I defined Philosophy as not doing. — PossibleAaran

I don't know if you've read Harris, but his work is built upon quite a firm foundation of Ethical Naturalism that goes all the way back to Aristotle (in some form). It's really not just 'assuming 'consequentialism', it's building on the work of those who have argued in favour of it quite persuasively, which is surely all any philosophy can do. Also, I agree with most of what Harris has to say, except that I'm broadly a virtue ethicist. I don't really find the consequensialism necessary to the point he's making about science and morality. It could equally be applied, as Phillipa Foot does, to which virtues it is necessary to cultivate.

Despite SLX's protestations that I explain every position I hold with a doctoral length thesis otherwise I'm not to be taken seriously, I don't actually think an exposition of why I hold those beliefs is appropriate to the thread topic, — Pseudonym

What I'm asking is far more basic than 'why' - justification presupposes the conceptual coherency of what is so justified, and what I'm suggesting is that your stance doesn't even meet the minimal criteria of meaningfulness - of sensical speech, let alone justifiability. 'Science (and only science) can answer the questions of philosophy': but this is just language on holiday, a sentence with correct grammatical form bereft of semantic content. It may as well read: 'ornithology (and only ornithology) can answer the questions of paediatrics'. These propositions are not analogies but identities as far as semantic content goes. What kind of questions are at stake here? And what is said about the specificities of both philosophy and science that would make the one be able to 'answer' - if 'answer' is the right word, and it very likely isn't - the 'questions' of the other? But at no point are any of these specificities discussed, except in some hand waving nominalist fashion.

If 'meaninglessness' seem to be just over-the-top rhetorical bluster, take an absolutely concrete case (something unsurprisingly absent from this thread): Quine, mentioned earlier, understood being as a matter of being reckoned with as a value of a variable. What would science have to say here? But what would this question even mean? Quine's signal innovation - the very reason his 'On What There Is' paper is so widely lauded - is not only that he provided an 'answer' to the question posed, but that he changed, or rather provided a new sense to the question itself. Quine transposed, in an entirely original way, the question of ontology into the sphere of language, 'desubstantializing' the question and making it amenable to logical - in the strict, formal sense - analysis. Where does 'science' even begin with this? Or is the question simply a misuse of grammar? But of course it is. Quine's innovation takes place at the level of sense - as does all good and interesting philosophy. And while it is absolutely the case that science can be recruited to help in the quest of sense-making, it is meaningless to say - or again, not even wrong to say - that science can exhaust the interrogations posed at that level.

And this is simply how philosophy operates, as has long been recognized by those with any taste for philosophy: "The truth is that in philosophy and even elsewhere it is a question of finding the problem and consequently of positing it, even more than of solving it. For a speculative problem is solved as soon as it is properly stated. ...But stating the problem is not simply uncovering, it is inventing. Discovery, or uncovering, has to do with what already exists, actually or virtually; it was therefore certain to happen sooner or later. Invention gives being to what did not exist; it might never have happened. Already in mathematics, and still more in metaphysics, the effort of invention consists most often in raising the problem, in creating the terms in which it will be stated. The stating and solving of the problem are here very close to being equivalent: The truly great problems are set forth only when they are solved." (Bergson, The Creative Mind).

My accusations of amateurism by Pseudo aren't nice, but they are absolutely honest.

your stance doesn't even meet the minimal criteria of meaningfulness - of sensical speech — StreetlightX

Well, I didn't see that coming, now I'm too stupid to even speak. No mention of hebetudinous though.

Unless you are your stance, perhaps not too stupid to speak, but maybe a bit of brushing up in the comprehension department wouldn't be the worst idea.