I believe TPF-ers (with reference to PF) is getting smarter. In the past, JTB knowledge and the Gettier problem would have generated many more posts this far in. Perhaps we can look forward to a day in the near future when there won't be any! — tim wood

Well, I've my own argument against what Gettier does, and it's becoming sharper. However, it's all about the belief aspect, as hinted at in my first post in this thread. That's another matter altogether though.

Take any definition which I gave you of "justified" and you will see how it is so. If "justified" means "responsible in believing" then you might think I am responsible in believing that P, even though you think P is false. Hence, you would think that I am justified in believing P, even though P is false. — PossibleAaran

You're changing the subject. What we were talking about is a hypothetical situation when the subject believes that X is false. and also believes that X is justified. Now you are talking about whether or not I think that you are justified in your belief of X. That's a different situation altogether. involving two subjects instead of one.

What is that supposed to mean? What is 'enough information to make justified statements about probabilities?

I mean, does he know all the influencing factors and the exact number of possible outcomes?

If not, then he doesn't have what it takes to know anything at all about probability, does he?

What's false knowledge? Knowledge has to be true, does it not? If it is false, then it is not knowledge.

Folk back in the day were totally justified in believing that the sun revolved around the earth. Based upon all they knew, it was a reasonable conclusion. The knowledge base grew. Tools were invented. Copernicus figured out that that was not true. He paid dearly.

Eventually folk accepted the fact that the sun did not revolve around the earth. The prior belief turned out to be false. It was justified false belief because it was as well grounded as possible given the knowledge base at the time, but false nonetheless.

Earlier I offered an example of someone fearing for their life based upon good reason(camping in a strange environment, an unknown animal coming towards them, sounds, etc). It was false, but well grounded(justified) belief none-the-less. I just want to make this point to steer the reader clear of the conflation between truth and justification hereabouts.

Here's why it is the case that that is well-grounded belief...

If it would've turned out to be a bear there would be no difference in the reasoning.

Justification is about ones ground... ahem... one's reasons for believing.

If it were a bear, it would've also been true. It was justified regardless. To say that the second case is justified belief simply because it would've been true, is to ignore the reasoning(justification) aspect and focus upon the truth aspect. If the first case is claimed to be unjustified and the second case is claimed to be justified and the only difference between the two is the truth aspect, then again one is conflating truth and justification. The evidence of this is clear, for they would be completely ignoring the reasoning...

Justification is the reasoning.

Now we not only have truth and justification being conflated, but belief as well?

Oh brother...

I can believe that 'X' is true, while knowing that I do not have good reason for believing it. Thus, I can sincerely say that one can believe 'X' even when they knowingly do not have good reason for it.

Hey, no ad hominems here. — BlueBanana

You should've read the rest of that statement. Stopping in mid sentence neglects the reasoning offered for why any reasonable person would say that S did not know (p v q). It is true as a result of things he did not believe.

As it pertains to certainty...

Certainty is an attitude, a confidence as it were. One can be certain of X when X is false. One can also be certain of X when s/he has no justification for believing it.

Certainty is... therefore, irrelevant.

I mean, does he know all the influencing factors and the exact number of possible outcomes? — creativesoul

He doesn't need to. Estimates can be made perfectly well, and are done on a daily basis. For example, in that example, is it not valid to say that the probability of that person's name being whatever-it-was is about 99-100%?

What's false knowledge? Knowledge has to be true, does it not? — creativesoul

Why?

You know the Earth is round, right? There are also people who claim to know it's flat. Someone's knowledge must be false, and unless both are called knowledge, we can call nothing knowledge except things that are known with absolute certainty.

You should've read the rest of that statement. — creativesoul

I did, but I only responded to that part. Having a reasoning for your opinion doesn't give you a right to make ad hominems against the people who disagree with you. Furthermore, you only made the claim there that knowledge can't be based on something one didn't believe, but offered no reasoning for that.

for in both cases Q is true as a result of something that S didn't believe. — creativesoul

One can be certain of X when X is false. — creativesoul

Depends on how strictly certainty is defined. In colloquial sense you are right, but strictly speaking certain information is information that can't be false by definition. Because only one such fact exists, it's understandable that outside philosophical discussion certainty can refer to information that is extremely unlikely to be false.

It was false, but well grounded(justified) belief none-the-less. — creativesoul

Justified enough to claim that they knew they were in danger. Not well justified enough so that they could objectively claim to know that their knowledge was true.

To say that the second case is justified belief simply because it would've been true, is to ignore the reasoning(justification) aspect and focus upon the truth aspect. — creativesoul

You're claiming that the second case would've been knowledge, but not the first one. The only difference is that the second one turned out, by sheer luck, to be true. That makes knowledge, by JTB, nothing but a lucky guess.

I can believe that 'X' is true, while knowing that I do not have good reason for believing it. Thus, I can sincerely say that one can believe 'X' even when they knowingly do not have good reason for it. — creativesoul

I agree, what is this a response to?

You are right in that one instance, but the other definitions I used still work when it is you believing that X is both justified and false.

Not interested naner...

Hang out with Meta... birds of a feather and all...

You are right in that one instance, but the other definitions I used still work when it is you believing that X is both justified and false. — PossibleAaran

I don't see this at all. All your examples are in the form of "You see that I...", or "I see that you..."

You see that I have tried my absolute best to investigate things. You see that I have considered all of the objections against P...

I think that you have very good arguments for your belief that P...

You think that my belief that P is produced by a reliable process. — PossibleAaran

None of this relates to "I believe both that X is justified and that X is false", nor "you believe that X is both justified and false.

I can believe that 'X' is true, while knowing that I do not have good reason for believing it. Thus, I can sincerely say that one can believe 'X' even when they knowingly do not have good reason for it. — creativesoul

As I explained already, the issue Is not with "I believe both, that X is true, and that X is not justified". The issue is with "I believe both, that X is false, and that X is justified".

Your examples, like PossibleAaran's are not relevant, because they are examples of one person believing X is justified, with another person designating X is false. They are not examples of one person believing both X is false, and X is justified.

The Gettier problem is, in a general form, as follows: a person has a false belief a, from which a conclusion b is drawn. It is then found out that a was false, yet b is true (although only when interpreted in some different way).

Edmund Gettier made the following two assumptions:

1) b is a justified, true belief (JTB-definition of knowledge)
2) b is not knowledge — BlueBanana

The point is, that no one can truthfully say both, that (a) is a false belief, and that (b) being a conclusion derived from the false belief (a), is justified. To say both, that (a) is false, and that (b) is justified requires that one lie. Either the person doesn't really believe that (a) is false, or the person doesn't really believe that (b) is justified. In other words, Gettier is lying when he says b is justified.

The point is, that no one can truthfully say both, that (a) is a false belief, and that (b) being a conclusion derived from the false belief (a), is justified. To say both, that (a) is false, and that (b) is justified requires that one lie. Either the person doesn't really believe that (a) is false, or the person doesn't really believe that (b) is justified. In other words, Gettier is lying when he says b is justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

Someone uses that belief to justify their belief in something else, therefore it's a justification. It's a bad one, yes, and the belief is not well justified, but it is, technically speaking, justified.

It cannot qualify as a justification if the belief which supposedly justifies is known to be false. Otherwise we could justify all sorts of irrational beliefs by asserting falsities. So, "technically speaking" it is not justified.

Otherwise we could justify all sorts of irrational beliefs by asserting falsities. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, we do. Those justifications are just not valid.

I believe both that 'X' is false and justified.

Let 'X' be "The sun revolves around the earth". Let the timeframe be more than four centuries prior to Copernicus.

Gettier is - perhaps - lying, but not about whether S is justified in believing Q. That justification is - quite simply - had by S's following the rules of inference. Rather, he's lying about the content of S's belief, if he knows that S believes Q is true because P is and deliberately leaves out the 'because P is' portion of S's belief. That is about the second case...

The first is questionable as well, but for other reasons. Gettier knows that "the man" is not equivalent to "Smith". If his move from "Smith will get the job" to "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" follows the rules of entailment, then those rules do not preserve truth, and thus are invalid.

I don't see this at all. All your examples are in the form of "You see that I...", or "I see that you..." — Metaphysician Undercover

Well here is a very plain example. See if you agree with this one and then we can move to others which are more complex.

Think of the notio of "justification" as responsible belief. I believe that I have a very good argument that God exists. Because I believe that, I believe that "God exists" is justified - I believe it would be responsible for me to believe it. But, I'm a stubborn and dogmatic atheist and I don't really care much whether there are good arguments or whether I'm fulfilling my epistemic responsibilities. I insist that God does not exist. Such a person would be strange, but not logically impossible. Viola, a case where I believe that P is justified and that P is false - using a particular definition of "justified".

Well, we do. Those justifications are just not valid. — BlueBanana

An invalid attempt at justification is not justification. If it is not valid then is doesn't qualify as a justification. X is not justified if the claimed "justification" for X is not valid.

I believe both that 'X' is false and justified.

Let 'X' be "The sun revolves around the earth". Let the timeframe be more than four centuries prior to Copernicus. — creativesoul

What are you saying, that you lived, and believed X is false and justified, four centuries prior to Copernicus? I think you're lying.

Think of the notio of "justification" as responsible belief. I believe that I have a very good argument that God exists. Because I believe that, I believe that "God exists" is justified - I believe it would be responsible for me to believe it. But, I'm a stubborn and dogmatic atheist and I don't really care much whether there are good arguments or whether I'm fulfilling my epistemic responsibilities. — PossibleAaran

I don't believe that you actually believe that "God exists" is justified and also false. I think it's easy to make up examples like this which are not really the case. They would be called lies.

Such a person would be strange, but not logically impossible. — PossibleAaran

I think it actually is logically impossible, by way of contradiction. To "justify" requires sound logic. If the premise or conclusion is false, then the logic is unsound. If the logic is unsound then there is no justification. To state that the logic is unsound, and that the conclusion is justified is to state a contradiction.

An invalid attempt at justification is not justification. If it is not valid then is doesn't qualify as a justification. X is not justified if the claimed "justification" for X is not valid. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you're saying that only certain beliefs are justified? So the only justified belief is that I exist?

No, I'm saying that you cannot honestly claim that you belief a specific belief to be both false and justified. If you belief that it is false, this denies the possibility of you believing that it is justified, because a false belief is known to be unsound and this contradicts "justified".

No, I'm saying that you cannot honestly claim that you belief a specific belief to be both false and justified. If you belief that it is false, this denies the possibility of you believing that it is justified, because a false belief is known to be unsound and this contradicts "justified". — Metaphysician Undercover

Every fact has a possibility of being false, in which case they would be unjustified according to you. Whether the belief is justified or not cannot depend on whether the belief later turns out to be true or not.

I believe both that 'X' is false and justified.

Let 'X' be "The sun revolves around the earth". Let the timeframe be more than four centuries prior to Copernicus.
— creativesoul

What are you saying, that you lived, and believed X is false and justified, four centuries prior to Copernicus? I think you're lying. — Metaphysician Undercover

Think what you want.

'X' was justified and false at the specified time. 'X' is still justified(for the people at that time) and false.

Your claim that it is impossible for someone to believe that 'X' is both justified and false is itself... false.

Every fact has a possibility of being false, in which case they would be unjustified according to you. — BlueBanana

No, what I am saying is that it is impossible to believe that X is false and also believe that X is justified. I am not saying anything about whether or not something believed to be justified, might be proven false in the future.

Look at the op. According to what is stated, Gettier believes that (a) is false, and that this false belief (a) can be used to justify (b). That is what is contradictory, Gettier's claim that the belief is false, and that it justifies. Something designated as false does not serve to justify, because it's been designated as false.

'X' was justified and false at the specified time. 'X' is still justified(for the people at that time) and false.

Your claim that it is impossible for someone to believe that 'X' is both justified and false is itself... false. — creativesoul

Are you saying that the people who believed X to be justified, at that specific time, also believed X is false? That's clearly not the case. So unless you are claiming that you now belief X is justified and that you also believe X is false, your argument is irrelevant. And if you are claiming that you believe X is false and that X is justified, I think you're lying.

So, you can assert all you want, that it is possible to believe X is false, and also believe X is justified, but those assertions are contradictory.

No, what I am saying is that it is impossible to believe that X is false and also believe that X is justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

What if a justified belief turns out to be false? Does that change whether the belief was justified?

I think it actually is logically impossible, by way of contradiction. To "justify" requires sound logic. If the premise or conclusion is false, then the logic is unsound. If the logic is unsound then there is no justification. To state that the logic is unsound, and that the conclusion is justified is to state a contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here you are using a definition of "justified" which is not the definition I used. I defined it in terms of being responsible in belief. But I can be perfectly responsible in belief even if the argument I have for my belief is logically unsound. Suppose that I'm just not very smart or very good at logic. I try my level best. I've been responsible, but still my argument is fallacious. Clearly the way you are using the word "justified", I cannot be justified on the basis of a logically unsound argument. You might be right that in your sense of "justified", I cannot believe that X is both justified and false. To find out, we will need a precise statement of what you mean by "justified". Could you give one?

What if a justified belief turns out to be false? Does that change whether the belief was justified? — BlueBanana

No, when the belief turns out to be false it's no longer justified.

But I can be perfectly responsible in belief even if the argument I have for my belief is logically unsound. — PossibleAaran

The issue is whether you believe your argument to be unsound or not, so your example is irrelevant. If you belief the argument is unsound, you are irresponsible if you accept the argument as justification anyway.

No, when the belief turns out to be false it's no longer justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

My question is whether it was justified, not whether it is anymore.

Yes, now look at the op. We must disallow 1). Gettier cannot say that (b) is justified, all he can say is that (b) was justified.