Is the mind an algorithm — m-theory

Is a neural net strictly speaking just an algorithm? Or does it do what it can do because an anticipation-creating learning rule acts as a constraint on material dynamics?

Potentially there is a lot of equivocation in what is understood by "algorithm" here. The difference between neural nets and Turing Machines is a pretty deep one philosophically.

Is a neural net strictly speaking just an algorithm? Or does it do what it can do because an anticipation-creating learning rule acts as a constraint on material dynamics?

Here is a comprehensive lecture on how to configure the neural network so that you can capitalize on the reinforcement learning technique developed by deepmind.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2pWv7GOvuf0&list=PLweqsIcZJac7PfiyYMvYiHfOFPg9Um82B

Potentially there is a lot of equivocation in what is understood by "algorithm" here. The difference between neural nets and Turing Machines is a pretty deep one philosophically.

Not sure what specifically is your grievance...here is the wiki link describing neural turing machine.

From the deepmind link

The company has created a neural network that learns how to play video games in a fashion similar to that of humans,[4] as well as a Neural Turing Machine, or a neural network that may be able to access an external memory like a conventional Turing machine, resulting in a computer that mimics the short-term memory of the human brain.

While it is true that neural network programming is quite a bit more advanced than typical programming...it is no the less reliant upon algorithms so I don't see equivocation being a problem here.
Perhaps I am missing something?

by the way nice to meet up with you again apokrisis
:D

Perhaps I am missing something? — m-theory

Yep. As your cite says: "Neural turing machines combine the fuzzy pattern matching capabilities of neural networks with the algorithmic power of programmable computers."

So this is talking about a hybrid between a neural net and a turing machine with " algorithmic power".

The distinction is important. The mind could be a neural net (neural nets might have the biological realism to do what brains do). But the mind couldn't be a Turing Machine - as biology is different in architectural principle from computation.

Likewise. I believe you were about the first person I "met" on PF, talking about thermal models of time!

I think you should reveiw the lectures link I posted...it is a detailed explanation of the exact algorithm.
There is no question that deepmind is an algorithmic process.
I don't understand the distinction you are making.
The "fuzziness" of neural networks and other computer learning techniques just refers to the probability methods being used.
Those probabilistic techniques are covered in depth in the lecture vids.

These methods are no less step by step format of an algorithm.
I assure you, from a computer science perspective, it is no equivocation to say that the deepmind general purpose ai is an algorithm.

The interesting thing to me is that this breakthrough was possible because the mind was modeled as though it were an algorithm.

In the deepmind example the machine learns from performing actions...it models itself as an agent that can act in the world in order to learn what to do next and becomes more proficient by a system of rewards and penalties meant to model the reward system of the brain.
Through trail and error in the actions it takes it will approach an optimum solution to real world tasks.
It forms a simulation of itself acting in the world that it experiences only as raw data (simply pixels in the case of deepmind) to create possible courses of action then executes what it predicts will be the most beneficial action.
.
These are all very interesting developments in the field of A.I. because before A.I. systems were model dependent and humans had to hand craft those models.
With deepmind system the models of reality are formed from scratch through trail and error actions within the world that the machine experiences.

The interesting thing to me is that this breakthrough was possible because the mind was modeled as though it were an algorithm. — m-theory

It's certainly an algorithm (what else could it be?) but to call the algorithm a "mind" is not very helpful, because it isn't one.

It's certainly an algorithm (what else could it be?) — tom

The computational theory of mind is one philosophical view among many, and it's been heavily criticized. If it's your position then cool, but don't pretend it's not a philosophical issue.

The computational theory of mind is one philosophical view among many, and has been heavily critized. If it's your position then cool, but don't pretend it's not a philosophical issue. — jamalrob

The program running on the laptop or the supercomputer is an algorithm. Not only are "program" and "algorithm" synonymous, but it cannot be anything but an algorithm!

I disagree...this example is helping define exactly what the term mind should mean in a very practical way.
A way that generates results.

I have made this argument before but I will do it again here.

Either we can decide what a mind is or the question of what a mind actually is will be an undecidable problem.

If the mind is an undecidable problem then we cannot answer the question of whether we have minds or not.
If we can answer that question it will mean that there is an effective procedure/algorithm to solve that problem.

What ever we mean by the terms mind and consciousness we must define these terms in a way which makes them decidable by an algorithm of some sort or we must conclude that they are undecidable problems and that we cannot be sure we have a mind or consciousness.

As far as I can tell, if we wish to have an intelligible definition of terms like mind and consciousness, then we are forced to formalize these terms in logic and math and when we do so we will be able to create effective procedures and algorithms that are able to think, that are intelligent, and that can learn.

The alternative is that we are saying that we cannot know if we are consciousness or if we have minds.

We could not claim to know if we had minds or consciousness...is that really what you believe?
What would the philosophical implications of that be?

If you believe that you can answer yes or no the question of whether you have a mind or consciousness then a consequence of that is fundamentally you believe the mind/consciousness is computable.

The question is whether the mind is an algorithm, meaning the human mind, which m-theory is suggesting might be one of the philosophical implications.

Exactly...I am asking if we have discovered the correct algorithm for what we mean by the term mind or if this is just one step in that direction.

Is the device a being? Because if it were, then you would have to recognize its rights to self-determination - you would have to ask it how it felt about being born into the world as a consequence of being manufactured by human beings, and what that means to it.

If none of that makes sense, then, the likelihood is, it's a device.

That is probably what I am most curious about is if the algorithm could be adapted to do just as you say. Learn emotions, think emotionally, and reflect upon it's own experiences in an emotional context. Right now, that appears to be quite a bit of a ways off in the future. It is certainly not a being in the sense that it is human, and I don't think it ever will be.

So I would have to say no, it can't recognize itself as a being deserving of dignity and rights not as of now. The question if it could or did is often viewed as troubling for many that speculate on the future of A.I. and is probably a topic for another thread.

I do think it is fair to say that it is a being in the sense that it does experience though, albeit at a very primitive level compared to human level identity of self.

But it does model itself as an agent that acts in an environment that will react to its actions. I think it can be argued quite reasonably that it does have some concept of self as an experiencing being because it can form these models of itself acting without taking those actions.
It can think about what it will do before it does something and it does have a sense of self as collection of past experiences and biases.

Either we can decide what a mind is or the question of what a mind actually is will be an undecidable problem. — m-theory

But there is no such thing as an undecidable problem in physics. It is inconceivable that a "mind" could be programmed by accident i.e. that's not going to happen until we understand what constitutes a mind.

Properties that the artificial mind will possess include consciousness, qualia, creativity, and dare I say it, free will. AlphaGo possesses none of these. It is not a mind.

The question is whether the mind is an algorithm, meaning the human mind, which m-theory is suggesting might be one of the philosophical implications. — jamalrob

What else could a mind possibly be? The mind is software.

Are you joking? I already said:

The computational theory of mind is one philosophical view among many, and it's been heavily criticized. If it's your position then cool, but don't pretend it's not a philosophical issue. — jamalrob

But there is no such thing as an undecidable problem in physics.

Yes there is.
Perhaps you failed to understand.
Algorithms are mechanical physical things.
They are not just mere abstractions...many problems exist for which there is no mechanical solution and can be no mechanical solution or algorithm.
This statement is very uninformed.
Any undecidable problem is literally a physically undecidable problem.

It is inconceivable that a "mind" could be programmed by accident i.e. that's not going to happen until we understand what constitutes a mind.

The mind in this case is no accident...it was very deliberately created by modeling psychology and neurology.
As well I pointed out before that we are not ever going to understand the mind if we define that term as something that is undecidable.
Again if you believe you can answer the question "do I have a mind/consciousness" with a yes or a no definitively and correctly...then you fundamentally believe that the mind/consciousness is a computable thing that an algorithm determines.

If you believe that the question "do I have a mind/consciousness" cannot be answered with an algorithm...then you believe fundamentally that it is an undecidable question.

Properties that the artificial mind will possess include consciousness, qualia, creativity, and dare I say it, free will. AlphaGo possesses none of these. It is not a mind.

Alpha go is just one iteration of deepmind.
I disagree with you on many of these points.
I believe the deepmind system does posses qualia, creativity and free will, and even some level of consciousness.
But of course that is just my opinion, I have argued in other posts why I hold that opinion.

What concerns me here, about this remark, is you simply assert this statement as though it is true without providing any justification as to why it actually is true.
Simply stating flat out that "it has none of these" is not particularly convincing if you don't bother to explain how you can know that it is true.

Yes there is.
Perhaps you failed to understand.
Algorithms are mechanical physical things.
They are not just mere abstractions...many problems exist for which there is no mechanical solution and can be no mechanical solution or algorithm.
This statement is very uninformed.
Any undecidable problem is literally a physically undecidable problem. — m-theory

So, it should be no problem for you to give a few examples of these undecidable problems in physics?

I believe the deepmind system does posses qualia, creativity and free will, and even some level of consciousness. — m-theory

Why do you believe the computer program possesses qualia?

First let me ask do you believe it is or ever will be possible for machines to think in similar ways that humans do such that they can or could form minds and consciousness.
If you don't even believe it is possible then of course this breakthrough will seem unimportant and inconsequential.
If you do, however, believe that such a thing is possible then this breakthrough is quite different as it represent a crucial milestone towards that path.

So, it should be no problem for you to give a few examples of these undecidable problems in physics?

The halting problem has no mechanical or physical solution.
It cannot be decided by any physical means.
Here is a list of more.

Why do you believe the computer program possesses qualia?

First I don't simply assume that computers cannot possess qualia.
My definition of the term does not automatically exclude computers and their programs from having qualia because I don't believe the term qualia refers to something that is undecidable.
That is to say I think the question of "Is this qualia" can be answered yes or no.

Deepmind experiences things and forms a concept of its own existence as an acting agent within an environment that responds to the actions that deepmind performs.

If deepmind was unable to model itself it would not be able to achieve what it has.

I can understand people being skeptical that deepmind is general purpose A.I. and I will admit there is still a long way to go before we have to worry about whether not deepmind or systems like it are minds/consciousness in similar ways that humans are (most computer science experts believe this is still 50 years away) but I don't agree that you can simply dismiss the philosophical implications of this A.I. breakthrough as you have done.

I also believe it is important to take this breakthrough seriously now rather than wait until it is at a human level consciousness.

People should stop simply dismissing the idea because it makes them uncomfortable and start asking themselves what if it is possible and what does it mean if it is possible?

The halting problem has no mechanical or physical solution.
It cannot be decided by any physical means.
Here is a list of more. — m-theory

There are no physics problems in your list. The undecidable problems of mathematics are irrelevant to physics, as are the non-computable functions and non-computable numbers. None is required to describe reality.

Deepmind experiences things and forms a concept of its own existence as an acting agent within an environment that responds to the actions that deepmind performs. — m-theory

That is simply a fantasy. But you seem to have decided the undecidable problem nevertheless.

There are no physics problems in your list. The undecidable problems of mathematics are irrelevant to physics,

This is simply false.
These problems are physically impossible to solve.
You are woefully ignorant in this subject area it seems.
In reality all of the problems I have listed are physical problems in the sense that there can be no mechanical solutions to them.

None the less here is a search result for a google of the terms undecidable problems in physics with About 108,000 results (0.33 seconds).
Undecidability is not simply some abstraction that does not apply to physics which you can brush off so lightly.
Undecidability is an important discovery about mathematics and mechanical systems.

That is simply a fantasy. But you seem to have decided the undecidable problem nevertheless.

Perhaps you could explain how you know it is a fantasy...for some one so uninformed you are rather quick to doll out proclamations as though they are simply true.
If you can't explain yourself you should probably not bother with this site.
Just saying stating things baldly is not how our community operates...you need to be more in depth with your replies.

Undecidability is an important discovery about mathematics and mechanical systems. — m-theory

The reason you cannot give an example of an undecidable problem in physics is because there aren't any. The reason for that, is that only the class of computable functions (and computable numbers) is required to express any physical law, or any problem in physics. No physical process relies on the the unphysical aspects of undecidability, which either involve the liar paradox or infinity.

It just so happens that the famous Bekenstien Bound guarantees that Reality is a finite-state machine. Every calculation which you have carried out, every calculation any computer has carried out, and any calculation that any finite-state machine ever will carry out is expressible in Presburger arithmetic.

I believe the deepmind system does posses qualia, creativity and free will, and even some level of consciousness. — m-theory

As for your fantasy that any current computer program experiences qualia etc, well you had better be wrong. If you are not, then what exists is an artificial person who can suffer and who should be protected by rights like the rest of us.

Fortunately, you have just been taken in by the hype, florid language and some software jargon.

The reason you cannot give an example of an undecidable problem in physics is because there aren't any. The reason for that, is that only the class of computable functions (and computable numbers) is required to express any physical law, or any problem in physics. No physical process relies on the the unphysical aspects of undecidability, which either involve the liar paradox or infinity.

Sigh...honestly I don't care.
OK fine...have it your way...you are right and undecidibility is "nonphysical."
It is unimportant to my argument either way.

Simply calling undecidability nonphysical does not make that problem go away though, you are still left with the problem of whether or not the mind is decidable or undecidable.

So again I will ask you...do you think the term mind/consciousness should mean something that is decidable or undecidable?

And again I will remind you that if you believe you can answer the question "do I have a mind/consciousness" correctly with a yes or no everytime you ask then at a fundamental level the consequence is that the mind/consciousness is something that is decidable.

It just so happens that the famous Bekenstien Bound guarantees that Reality is a finite-state machine. Every calculation which you have carried out, every calculation any computer has carried out, and any calculation that any finite-state machine ever will carry out is expressible in Presburger arithmetic.

.
Not sure how this proves the mind/consciousness cannot be decidable?
Perhaps you could elaborate further on how this is relevant or how it eliminates the possibility that the mind/consciousness could be expressed algorithmically?

As for your fantasy that any current computer program experiences qualia etc, well you had better be wrong. If you are not, then what exists is an artificial person who can suffer and who should be protected by rights like the rest of us.

Again you state that it is fantasy and still you have not demonstrated why that is so.

Should I just take your word for it?

Is it something you know that i, or others, cannot know?

Don't be shy...share your wisdom with us...I am quite eager to hear how you know it is mere fantasy that deepmind has no mind at all.

Simply calling undecidability nonphysical does not make that problem go away though, you are still left with the problem of whether or not the mind is decidable or undecidable. — m-theory

But all you need to do (on the 3rd time of asking) is to demonstrate that a physical theory is undecidable. How many opportunities do you need to present a counter-example?

The fact that the class of functions necessary for describing all of Reality is an infinitesimal subset of all possible functions, is not only amazing, but is a consequence of the laws of physics.

And again I will remind you that if you believe you can answer the question "do I have a mind/consciousness" correctly with a yes or no everytime you ask then at a fundamental level the consequence is that the mind/consciousness is something that is decidable. — m-theory

Thanks for the reminder. Since I have explained that no problem in physics is undecidable, and that I have detailed some of the properties expected from a mind, do you really think I would pretend the question of consciousness-or-not is undecidable?

To repeat: It is utterly improbable that, in trying to solve the computational problem "how to win at Go" will also solve the hard problem. Of course, it is possible that in trying to solve the problem "how to win at space-invaders" the problem of qualia is also solved, but what use is that? If we have solved the problem of qualia without an explanatory theory of qualia, then how could we ever learn of our inexplicable success?

Despite the complete absence of a theory of why a computer program is conscious, you wish me to provide a refutation of a non-existent theory. By the way, there is no orbiting invisible teapot.

But all you need to do (on the 3rd time of asking) is to demonstrate that a physical theory is undecidable. How many opportunities do you need to present a counter-example?

Why?
I already conceded the point...you win.
It does not matter so I do not care and it does not change my argument if we say undecidability is physical or nonphysical.
The same argument applies either way.

To repeat: It is utterly improbable that, in trying to solve the computational problem "how to win at go" will also solve the hard problem. Of course, it is possible that in trying to solve the problem "how to win at space-invaders" the problem of qualia is also solved, but what use is that? If we have solved the problem of qualia without an explanatory theory of qualia,

First the people that engineered deepmind were not trying to solve the problem of "how to win at go"...that is a very silly thing to say....they were trying to solve the problem of general purpose A.I..
Go is just one task their algorithm has learned to preform.
Second the game of go has long been considered a major milestone in A.I. because it is all but impossible to use brute force calculating to win at go.
Deepmind is not a brute force go engine, and it plays intuitively just as do humans (technically better than humans)...guess you missed that somehow?

The explanation of qualia is that it is algorithmic.
If the mind/consciousness is decidable then the hard problem is solved with an algorithm.
The hard problem should not be too hard at all...especially considering we already have examples (our own minds and brains) that we reverse engineer.

I disagree that it is improbable that we might discover that algorithm for general consciousness/minds.
That is not a very well thought out rebuttal in light of the fact that we are modeling the mechanism of our own psyches and brains.

To discover the algorithm for a particular mind...sure I might grant you that it is highly unlikely.

But I believe there is a general template upon which particular minds are formed and it is not all that unlikely that we might discover what that general template is, considering we are modeling from neurology and psychology.
To me it seems improbable that we won't discover the proper algorithm.

I assure you, from a computer science perspective, it is no equivocation to say that the deepmind general purpose ai is an algorithm. — m-theory

There is a computer science difference between programmable computers and learning machines.

So yes, you can point to a learning rule embedded in a neural network node and say there - calculating a weight - is an algorithm.

But then a neural network is (ideally) in dynamical feedback interaction with the world. It is embodied in the way of a brain. And this is a non-algorithmic aspect of its being. You can't write out the program that is the system's forward model of the world. The forward model emerges rather than being represented by a-priori routines.

So sure, you can ask about the algorithm of the mind. But this is equivocal if you then seem to think you are talking about some kind of programmable computer and not giving due weight to the non-algorithmic aspects of a neural net which are the actual basis of its biological realism.

The idea of an algorithm in itself completely fails to have biological realism. Sure we can mathematically simulate the dynamical bistability of molecular machine. We can model what is going on in brains and cells in terms of a sequence of rules. But algorithms can't push matter about or regulate dissipative processes.

That is the whole point of Turing machine - to disconnect the software actions from the hardware mechanics. And the whole point of biology is the opposite - to have a dynamical interaction between the symbols and the matter. At every level of the biological organisation, matter needs to get pushed about for anything to be happening.

So in philosophy of mind terms, Turing computation is quite unlike biological semiosis in a completely fundamental way.

See - http://www.academia.edu/3075569/Artificial_Life_Needs_a_Real_Epistemology

And a neural net architecture tries to bridge the gap. But to the degree it is algorithmic, it is merely a Turing-based simulation of neurosemiosis~neurodynamics.

Just a bit of simulated biological realism is of course very powerful. Neural nets make a big break with programmable devices even if the biology is simulated at the most trivial two layer perceptron level. And if you are asking the big question of whether neural networks could be conscious - have qualitative states - I think that is a tough thing to even pin down as an intelligible query.

I can imagine a simulation of neurodynamics that is so speedy that it can keep up with the world at the rate that humans keep up with the world. But would this simulation have feelings if it wasn't simulating also the interior millieu of a regulated biogical body? And how grainy would the simulation be given internal metabolic processes have nano range timescales?

The natural human brain builds up from nanoscale molecular dynamics and so never suffers a graininess issue. There is an intimate connection with the material world built into the semiotic activity from the get-go.

But computation comes from the other direction. It starts algorithmically with no material semiosis - a designed-in disconnect between the symbolic software and the physical hardware. And to attain biological realism via simulation, it has to start building in that feedback dynamical connection with the world - the Bayesian forward modeling loop - from the top down. And clearly, the extra computational cost of that increases exponentially as the design tries to build a connection in on ever finer scales of interaction.

So I don't just say that neural nets can't be conscious. But I do say we can see why it might be impossibly expensive to do that via algorithmic simulation of material semiosis.

But then a neural network is (ideally) in dynamical feedback interaction with the world. It is embodied in the way of a brain. And this is a non-algorithmic aspect of its being. You can't write out the program that is the system's forward model of the world. The forward model emerges rather than being represented by a-priori routines.

I am not sure I understand this.
Can you elaborate further on this point?
I fear that you are suggesting that computers must be able to operate in a continuous and analog fashion and that digitization is something that will prevent computers from having minds...is that what you are saying?

So sure, you can ask about the algorithm of the mind. But this is equivocal if you then seem to think you are talking about some kind of programmable computer and not giving due weight to the non-algorithmic aspects of a neural net which are the actual basis of its biological realism.

It was my understanding, apokrisis, that an algorithm is simply a set of steps or operations that get processed in a particular order depending upon logical conditions of the computational architecture.
My understanding of neural nets is that their architecture is different from a programmable computer, yes, but that term algorithm still applies in the neural network cases because algorithms can be adapted to account for the additional logical conditions of that architecture.
If I was mistaken about that I apologize, I did admit that I did not understand the distinction you are making though and I still don't

It seems to me you may be suggesting that biology is not algorithmic and/or cannot be algorithmic?

The idea of an algorithm in itself completely fails to have biological realism. Sure we can mathematically simulate the dynamical bistability of molecular machine. We can model what is going on in brains and cells in terms of a sequence of rules. But algorithms can't push matter about or regulate dissipative processes.

That is the whole point of Turing machine - to disconnect the software actions from the hardware mechanics. And the whole point of biology is the opposite - to have a dynamical interaction between the symbols and the matter. At every level of the biological organisation, matter needs to get pushed about for anything to be happening.

So in philosophy of mind terms, Turing computation is quite unlike biological semiosis in a completely fundamental way.

If the criterion is achieving nano-scale biological realism, then yes...deepmind falls well short of this measure.
That is still quite a ways off indeed.
To me you seemed to be suggesting...it may be necessary to simulate all of the brains mechanisms and only then can we begin to probe the question of whether that computer simulations has a mind.

Are you saying that it is necessary to digitize the brain and maybe even the body at a nano scale?

At any rate you have raised some good points and have given me quite a bit to think about.

I still say, that if you think of it in terms of whether the device or neural network, or whatever, is actually a being, then you have answered the question. If it can think, in the sense that humans think, then it would be 'a being' and no longer simply a device; it would be an 'I'. That's what was behind the provocative title of Isaac Asimov's great Sci Fi series, 'I, Robot'. The fact that a robot could refer to itself in the first person was the point of the title. (A lot of people don't seem to get that.)

See, I don't think that any element, nor the totality, of those systems, has the reflexive first-person knowledge of being, or experience of being, that humans have, or are; it is not an 'I'. So, sure, you could feasibly create an incredibly clever system, that could answer questions and engage in dialogue, but it would still not be a being.